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ABSTRACT k 
The purpose of this study is an inquiry into the present state of 
customary international law on the use of armed force by individual 
States. 
It deals with the historical evolution of the law towards the current 
rule of the prohibition of the use of force, the content of this prohibition 
and the purported exceptions to it that are invoked in the practice of States 
as justifications of lawful resort to force. The present author does not deal 
with the use of force under the authority of competent organs of the 
United Nations and regional organisations, as well as questions of 
individual criminal responsibility for resort to armed force. 
The present author has adopted an analytical and empirical 
approach towards the phenomenon of the use of armed force by States. 
The study is based on an examination of the practice of individual States, 
both within and outside the framework of United Nations organs. More 
specifically it concentrates on the practice of States that perpetrated the use 
of force, the States that were the targets of this force and the reactions of 
third States (in the sense of not those directly involved) to instances of use 
of force. Moreover, the present author considers certain resolutions 
adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly as part of the 
practice of States and evidence of opinio juris of this practice. By this it is 
meant that the adoption (or not) of resolutions, especially in the Security 
Council, is not insulated from statements by individual members of these 
U. N. organs. Hence, in the case of the Security Council the lack of 
condemnation is not automatically considered as approval of the action 
that is the object of debate at the Council, beyond and apart from the 
attitude of individual Members. At the same time the adoption of a 
resolution is treated as a projection of the position advocated by 
individual States, while account is taken of the voting pattern and dissent 
or reservations expressed upon adoptionl. 
The study of State practice is compared with the ruling of the 
International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua Case (Merits) 2 (the issues 
1 Cf 
. 
E. Lauterpacht, Aspects of the Administration of International justice, 1991, pp. 45-6. 
2 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua. 
Nicaragua v. U. S. A. 
, 
I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14. Problems with respect to questions of 
jurisdiction and admissibility (with the exception of the justiciability of claims of self- 
defence) in the course of the proceedings are not dealt with in the present study. On this see 
generally, P. W. Kahn, From Nuremberg to the Hague: The United States Position in 
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of use of armed force dealt with by the Court) with the aim of proving that 
the restrictive interpretation of the law on the use of force upheld by the 
Court corresponds to the actual practice of States as a component of 
general customary law. The position of the law of the use of force rests on 
a twofold basis. First, the rule of the prohibition of resort to armed force 
that constitutes the foundation and the starting point of the legal 
regulation of unilateral resort to armed force, and secondly, the purported 
exceptions to the rule. It is undoubtedly the case that the legal force of the 
rule of non-use of armed violence is not diminished. The numerous 
resorts to armed force by individual States have been justified either on 
the basis of restrictive interpretation of the content of the prohibition itself 
or of the purported exceptions to it. In the subsequent sections it is shown 
that State practice does not admit a restrictive interpretation of 
components of the rule and is unanimous only with regard to one of the 
purported exceptions to it : the right of defensive action. With regard to 
other exceptions, there exists extreme controversy as to their existence and 
scope. 
The content of the prohibition of the use of force, the scope of the 
"universally admitted" exception of defensive action, and, finally, the 
controversial exceptions to the rule of non-use of force constitute the three 
main thematic issues that are dealt with in this study. Hence the structure 
of the present thesis reflects this contingency. 
The present study considers the evolution of the law on the 
regulation of the use of force as marked by continuity from the period of 
the League of Nations to the present, and it is divided in three parts. 
Part One deals with the rule of the prohibition of the use of armed 
force by individual States. It considers the historical evolution of the rule 
and focuses greatly on the important developments in the practice of 
Nicaragua v. United States and the Development of International Law, 72 Yale J. 1. L. 1 
(1987) ; A. Chayes, Nicaragua, The United States, and the World Court, 85 Col. L. R. 1445 
(7985) ; W. M. Reisman, Has the International Court Exceeded its jurisdiction?, 80 A. J. I. L. 
128 (1986) ; Briggs, Nicaragua v. United States: Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 79 A. J. I. L. 
373 (798,5); Malloy, Developments at the International Court of Justice: Provisional 
Measures and Jurisdiction in the Nicaragua Case, 6 N. Y. L. Sch. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 55 (1984) ; 
B. S. Chimni, The International Court and Maintenance of International Peace and Security, 
35 I. C. L. Q. 960 (1986) ; K. Highet, Between a Rock and a Hard Place 
- 
The U. S. 
, 
the 
International Court and the Nicaragua Case, 21 Internat. Lawyer 1083 (1987) ; H. Hohmann 
& P. Wart, Compulsory Jurisdiction and the Use of Force as a Legal Issue, 34 N. I. L. R. 162 
(1987) ; J. N. Moore, The Secret War in Central America and the Future of World Order, 80 
A. J. I. L. 43 (1986), pp. 92-102 ; id. The Nicaragua Case and the Deterioration of World 
Order, 81 A. J. I. L. 151 (1987), p. 155 ; E. Gordon, Discretion to Decline to Exercise jurisdiction, 
81 A. J. I. L. 129 (1987) ; R. Falk, The World Court's Achievement, 81 A. J. I. L. 106 (1987). 
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States during the period of the League of Nations that culminated in the 
total prohibition of armed force as a result of the Conclusion of the Pact of 
Paris (1928) and the establishment of the United Nations Organisation 
(Chapter 1). The remainder of Part One deals with the content of the 
prohibition of the threat or use of force by focusing, mainly, on the practice 
of States in the period 1945 
- 
19913. The issues that are dealt with are 
related to the phenomena of indirect use of force by way of armed bands 
(Chapter 2); armed reprisals (Chapter 3); the concepts of threat of force 
(Chapter 4); economic coercion (Chapter 5); anti-colonial armed struggles 
in relation to the rule of non-use of force (Chapter 6); and territorial 
integrity and political independence as the object of forcible action. 
Part Two examines the historical evolution (Chapter 8) and the 
content of the right of self-defence (Chapters 9& 10), as the only 
universally accepted ground for lawful unilateral resort to armed force. 
Chapter 9 deals with the content of individual defensive action and 
Chapter 10 concerns the concept of collective self-defence. 
Finally, in Part Three the present author considers justifications for 
lawful resort to armed force that are surrounded by controversy: Namely, 
the use of force by States for the protection of the lives and property of 
nationals or under the doctrine of "humanitarian intervention" (Chapter 
11) and the concept of military intervention on the basis of the consent of 
the State on whose territory military action is taking place (Chapter 12). 
By way of last word it must be pointed out that in this study the 
term "intervention" is considered as wider than the concept of "armed 
force" 
- 
the latter is included in the former but not vice-versa 
.A study of 
intervention necessarily includes, in this writer's view, instances of non- 
forcible State activity detailed consideration of which was beyond the scope 
of this thesis4. 
3 The present study examines issues of jus ad bellum by individual States that arose out of 
the major international crisis that erupted on 2 August 1990 as a result of the invasion of 
Kuwait by Iraq. 
4 Reference to such activity is made in the context of economic coercion and financial 
assistance to armed bands, not as an autonomous object of study but in connection with the use 
of armed force. 
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INTRODUCTION. 
The phenomenon of armed force in international relations has been 
the subject of a voluminous literature since the early writings on the subject 
of international law. 
The onerous consequence-, of violence that are evinced in the 
destruction of human life, property and natural environment constitute an 
understatement of the grim result of resort to arms by States. Its effects are felt 
at every level of social life, both within and beyond the boundaries of 
individual States. 
To a student of international law unilateral resort to armed force 
represents an extreme assertion of individualism at the expense of the 
international society. It represents a case of repudiating the rule of law that 
regulates relation-, among the members of the community in favour of the 
promotion of individual interests. As such, it is too obvious that unilateral 
resort to force is destructive of any idea of international society. 
This underlying truth has generated the need for regulating resort to 
force on the international plane in the same way and with the same aim as it 
had been the case with domestic communities. In the case of the latter this 
was achieved in an organised and integrated fashion by way of instituting 
elaborate and centralised legislative and enforcement machinery. Individual 
members of domestic societies have been deprived of violence as a means of 
furthering their interests and redressing their grievances. Instead, the 
centralised authorities therein have the monopoly of the use of force in order 
to enforce individual claims. This has the twofold purpose, on the one hand, 
to satisfy the interests of the individual and 
, 
on the other, to strike a balance 
between those interests and the community as a whole. The guidelines for 
this task are provided by the law. Individual members are, nevertheless, 
conceded the right to resort to violence unilaterally in very exceptional 
circumstances strictly defined and delimited by the law 
- 
namely, self-defence 
and necessity. 
The problem with the international society is the lack of a centralised 
legislative and executive authority identical to the one of domestic 
4 
communities. Despite this reality, however, the need for regulation of 
individual resort to force has been acknowledged and pursued. This very 
significant contingency seems to be underlined by common sense: If 
unilateral violence is destructive of organised community, it is both 
destructive of less organised entities, and, furthermore, constitutes an 
impediment towards further organisation and integration. 
An initial attempt in the Middle Ages and Renaissance period at 
regulating resort to force on the basis of the "justice" of its cause became 
redundant after the 17th century because of the image projected by the 
international community as a result of the emergence of nation-States. This 
event had as its concomitant the formulation and development of the 
concepts of State sovereignty and the sovereign equality of States. These 
concepts emerged as a result of and reflected precisely the situation of lack of 
centralised authority in the international community. There was no superior 
authority to that of the individual State which was bound by no rule of law 
unless it had expressly consented or tacitly acquiesced to it. Resort to violence 
was, therefore, a contingency lying with the sovereign prerogative of every 
State. 
The outcome of resort to force, namely, a situation of armed conflict 
with all its consequences in the relations between the warring parties and its 
interference with States other than the belligerents created a practical need for 
legal regulation. Furthermore, the commercial interdependence of States and 
the ever increasing destruction potential of the means of warfare because of 
the advance in technology led, in the aftermath of the First World War, to a 
voluntary limitation of the hitherto unlimited sovereign right to resort to 
force. Mere regulation of armed conflict was now complemented with the 
regulation of initiating force that led to it. 
This process was set in train in a manner analogous, but not identical, 
to the pattern of domestic societies. The practice of States by way of treaty- 
making (of which the establishment of the League of Nations and the United 
Nations Organisation are part) and individual claims as to how the law 
requires States to act or desist from acting has generated the following 
development: A balance was struck between the individualism represented 
by sovereignty (that has been far from forfeited) and the common interest for 
a condition of international peace within which "sovereignty" could be 
exercised. It has been acknowledged that force constitutes not only an exercise 
5 
of sovereign will of its author but also the means of the destruction of the 
sovereignty of its target. Therefore, an uncontrolled freedom to use force 
unilaterally could lead to a process that would substitute the entirety of the 
law, as a means of conducting international relations, with individual power. 
A situation similar to Pax Romana was incompatible with the concept 
of nation-State, as the Napoleonic adventure manifested. Moreover, the 
concept of the Balance of Power, that was developed in the aftermath of the 
Treaty of Westphalia (1648), aspired to accommodating the interests of 
individual States by guarding against individual policies pursued in manner 
similar to France under Napoleon I. The Balance of Power, however, 
although consensual in nature and of lasting duration, was a reciprocal 
arrangement that did not depend on considerations of community interest 
reflected in legal norms of universal application that prescribed in advance 
the conduct of individual States. It was, rather, an arrangement based on 
individualism and which could be derogated at will whenever a State felt its 
interests were encroached upon and it was powerful enough to assert itself at 
the expense of other States. Such an arrangement was not a condition for 
lasting peace. It was, rather, a temporary concealment of rampant 
unilateralism that could be released at will without any a priori constraint. 
By contrast, a normative regulation of resort to force aspired to 
subjecting considerations of Balance of Power to higher community interests. 
The domestic analogy to this effect was manifested through a twofold 
prescription: First, unilateral resort to force is subject to strict regulation 
Covenant of the League of Nations) or total prohibition (Pact of Paris, U. N. 
Charter) by being as a rule delegated to community machinery (U. N. Charter), 
and, secondly, it is allowed only in exceptional well-defined circumstances 
(self-defence) 1. 
This balance between "sovereignty" and "community interests" is one 
that has been repeatedly broken ever since the establishment of the League of 
Nations. The reason is that the individual interests of States that create the 
motives for resort to armed force have always been present and have 
frequently prevailed over considerations of law and "community" interests. 
1 See Kahn, From Nuremberg to the Hague: The United States Position in Nicaragua v. United 
States and the Development of International Law, 12 Yale I. I. L. 1 (1987). 
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The numerous resorts to force in the aftermath of the Second World 
War, including the most recent Kuwait crisis, manifest that unilateral use of 
force is a very topical subject in international affairs. Furthermore, the 
Judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua Case (Merits) 
2 has provided an opportunity for authoritative pronouncement on the 
subject of use of armed force by way of international adjudication. This 
Judgment as well as the earlier judgment of the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg have firmly placed the regulation of the use of force 
by States on the domestic society analogy, namely, that community interests 
of peace are superior to considerations of individual sovereignty. This is 
illustrated by the fact that in both cases attempts were made by the respondent 
parties3 at excluding judicial competence for the acts for which they were 
indicted on the basis of the argument of non-justiciability of claims of self- 
defence. This amounted in effect that State sovereignty in relation to a use of 
force which is in principle admissible in law would prevail over community 
considerations. In other words, the exception to the rule of the non-use of 
force was invoked as a vehicle to assert the sovereign freedom that had been 
surrendered when the prohibition of force was acceded to. 
All in all, the balance that has been created by the prohibition of the use 
of force on the basis of the domestic analogy is a precarious one. The invasion 
of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 is the latest in a long series of cases of unilateral 
resort to force which reveal that the eventuality of use of armed force 
remains a grim prospect. It also provides evidence of the need for scholarly 
study and research. This writer hopes that the present study will contribute to 
the long effort of elucidating this complex and unfortunate phenomenon of 
international relations. Finally, the criticism that this study may generate on 
the part of other researchers cannot but promote knowledge in the field of 
Public International Law. 
2 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14. 
3 The German defendants in Nuremberg and the U. S. A. (albeit in a rather subtle manner). 
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PART ONE 
THE RULE OF THE PROHIBITION OF THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE. 
CHAPTER 1 
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE RULE OF NON-USE OF FORCE. 
1. Introduction 
. 
The phenomenon of the use of armed force is traced back to 
antiquity and precedes the emergence of nation States as they are 
perceived in contemporary historic and political thought. A variety of 
factors such as cultural, political and economic differences among ancient 
societies would lead to violent confrontation with each other resort to 
which was subject to a degree of regulations 
During the Middle Ages, the adoption of Christianity as the official 
religion in the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire and Western Europe, 
and its link with secular power, led to the development in theological 
writings of a theory pertinent to resort to force. The old Roman concept of 
bellwnn justwn (just war) was developed and invested with authority in 
the Christian world by St. Augustine. He was of the opinion that just wars 
were those (i) that avenged injuries commited by the nation against which 
they were resorted to, when the said nation had neglected either to punish 
wrongs commited by its own citizens or to restore what had been unjustly 
taken by it and (ii) those which God Himself ordained 2. 
St. Thomas Acquinas was influenced by the teaching of St. Augustine 
on peace and war and according to his own theory there were three 
prerequisites of a just war: (i) The authority of the sovereign by whose 
command war was waged; (ii) a just cause was required (on this point he 
quoted St. Augustine); and (iii) the belligerents had to have a rightful 
1 See Brownlie, International Lair and the Use of Force by States, 1963, pp. 3-4; Y. Garlan, 
War in the Ancient World, translated by J. Lloyd, 1975 ; id. Guerre et Economie en Grece 
ancienne, 1989 ; C. Phillipson, international Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome, 
1979. 
2 Questiones in Heptatenclnmi, vi, 10 b. For a contemporary consideration of just War issues 
see Melzer, Concepts of Iºist War, 1975 
. 
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intention, so that they intended the advancement of good or the 
avoidance of evil3 
. 
The "just vvar" doctrine was espoused by scholarly opinion4 until 
the 17th century but was abandoned by the positivist writers in the 18th 
and 19th centuries5. The new trend reflected the emergence of nation- 
States and the formulation of the concepts of State sovereignty and the 
Balance of Power6 in the period after the conclusion of the Treaty of 
Westphalia (1648). 
During this period, State sovereignty was attributed an absolute and 
exhaustive character. The society of European States was subject to no legal 
superior and sovereign States were only bound by the law which they 
could make themselves. Consequently, resort to war was a matter lying 
with the sovereign prerogative of each State and was effected whenever it 
seemed expedient to do so. A further consequence of this contingelnc < was 
that war was considered "just" and, hence, lawful on both sides. The 
emergence and development of the law of Neutrality in the practice of 
States illustrates this trenid. 
Ehe above developments, have set the pattern for the state of the 
Jaw in relation to resort to force until the end of the First World War in 
1918. The European Balance of Power collapsed on two occasions during 
the period 1648 
- 
1918, as a result of the Napoleonic Wars of 1792-1815 and 
the f=irst World War of 1914-1918. 
The period of 1815-1914 is characterised by the attempt at restoring 
the Balance of Power in Europe. By contrast, the post 1918 era is marked by 
the novelty of preserving international peace and security through the 
establishment of permanently centralised machinery to deal with 
3 Stamina Theologica, 11, ii, 40 
. 4 E. g. Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres, in The Classics of International Lain No 3, 
London 1923, vols. i, ii. See also Browntie op. cit. supra n. 1, pp. 5-13. 
Cf. Vattel, Le Droh des Geras (The Classics of Interne l0aul Law, 1A'&5hMg1on 1916), Book 
111, Chapters iii and xii. 
h The term means that no State will attempt to further or expand its political interests at 
the expense of the interests of other States. During the period after the end pf the Second 
World Wtiar, the so-called "Cold War", considerations of Balance of Power or Peaceful 
Coexistence were thought to form a guarantee of international peace. Under the 
geopolitical, strategic and ideological concerns of the period, this was translated into the 
abstention by either the U. S. A. or the U. S. S. R. from encroaching by way of force into the 
spheres of influence of each other. See generally, Rostow, Peace in the Balance: The Future 
of American Foreign Policy, 1972 ; Vagts & Vagts, The Balance of Power in International 
Law: A History of an Idea, 73 A. J. I. L. 555 (1979) ; Tunkin, Theon/ of International Lain, 
h arrslntiorr by Butler, 197 4, pp. 35 et seq. 
, 
69-75; Perkins, The Right of Counterintervention, 
17 Ga. J. Int'l & Coinp. L. 171 (1987), pp. 180-3. 
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situations of international crises and unilateral resort to force. This trend 
is embodied in the establishment of the League of Nations (1919-1945) and 
the United Nations Organisation. The developments in the state of the 
law throughout the period 1815-1945 are of considerable significance for 
the understanding of the current state of customary international lax.,, on 
the use of armed force. 
2. The Period 1815-1914 
2. (i) General Consideration 
. 
The European Settlement of1814 and the Final Act of the Congress 
of Vienna of 1815 re-established the concept of Public Law and Balance of 
Power in Europe and the new state of affairs that emerged after the 
Napoleonic wars was marked by a presumption against unilateral changes 
in the status quo of Europe emanating either from national 
revolutionary movements within the European States or from the 
unilateral policy of a European Power? 
. 
The intervention undertaken by 
the Holy Alliance to suppress a revolution in the kingdom of the Two 
Sicilies is a pertinent illustration of the former presumption whereas the 
Treaty of Paris (1856) which was signed not merely by the belligerents, and 
the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, which revised the Treaty of San Stefano of the 
same year, are two illustration of the latter. 
Furthermore, another characteristic of this period was the 
unlimited right of States to resort to war and the total abandonment of the 
theory of just and unjust wars. The creation of nation States and the 
concept of State sovereignty had the result that there was no international 
authority similar to the Pope or Holy Roman Emperor to apply it8 
. 
Hall, 
in his celebrated quotation, maintained that: 
"International law has no alternative but to accept war, independently of 
the justice of its origin, as a relation which the parties to it may set up, if 
they choose, and to busy itself only in regulating the effects of the 
7 See H. Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna, 1946 ; L. C. B. Seaman, From Vienna to 
Versailles, 1955 ; Ch. Webster, The Congress of Vienna 1814-1815,2nd ed. 1963 
. 
8 See Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International 
Law 81 H. R. C. 455 (1952 11), p. 457; Brierly, The Law of Nations, 6th ed. by Waldock, 1963, 
p. 398. 
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relation"9 
Consequently, the right to resort to war was based either on 
morality and policy outside the sphere of law or on its being a means of 
change aiding the evolution of international society or on the lack of a 
central authority on the international plane for the enforcement of rights, 
the obtaining redress for wrongs done and the infliction of sanctionsl0 
. 
However, according to Oppenheiml1 the two latter reasons 
justifying resort to war were open to juridical objections due to the fact 
that they were satisfactorily met only by the denial of the legal nature of 
International law or by an assertion of its weakness as a system of law. He 
elaborated on the above contradiction by arguing that (a) "as an 
instrument for the vindication of the law, war signified a legally 
inadmissible identification of victorious power wielded by the interested 
State with a legal right" and (b) "as a means of changing the law it 
constituted a radical break in the continuity of the system of International 
law since by waging war a State would release itself from all the 
obligations of international law except those appertaining to the conduct 
of war". 
A new development of the period under consideration was an 
attempt to eliminate resort to war by the use of the institution of 
arbitration for the pacific settlement of disputes between States and the 
conclusion of various treaties providing for the peaceful settlement of 
disputes. More significant was the fact that disputes involving Great 
Powers were in some instances successfully settled by arbitration12. 
The Hague Conference for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes of 1899 
resulted in the establishment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The 
first International Court, the short-lived Central American Court of 
Justice, was established in 1907. A great number of bilateral treaties were 
concluded of which the "Treaties for the Advancement of Peace" or, as 
they are better known "The Bryan 
9 Hall, International Law 8th ed. by P. Higgins, 1924, p. 82. 
10 Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 1, pp. 20 n. 4,21 notes 1-2 ; cf. Q. Wright, The Outlawry of 
War, 19 A. J. I. L. 76 (1925), p. 76 
. 11 Oppenheim, International Lath, vol. ii, 7th ed. by Laiiterpacht 1952, pp. 178-9. 
12 See the Alabama Claims Award, in J. B. Moore, History and Digest of the International 
Arbitrations to which the United States has been a Party, Vol. 1,1898 pp. 495-682; the 
Bhering Sea Fisheries Award, 6 A. J. I. L. 233 (1912) and Moore op. cit. supra, pp. 755-961. 
11 
Treaties" concluded by the United States government in 1913-14, are a 
celebrated illustration 13 
. 
However, the movement towards arbitration 
must not be over-estimated because of the fact that disputes concerning 
"power" or political antagonism between States were rarely submitted to 
arbitration. Arbitration treaties were qualified by the doctrine of the non- 
justiciability of certain categories of disputes, for instance, those 
concerning "vital interests"and "national honour" of States 
. 
Moreover, 
proposals made for obligatory arbitration in the course of the Second 
Hague Peace Conference in 1907 were rejected. Still, the said Conference 
marked a progressive development with regard to the right of States to 
resort to force: Article 1 of the Hague Convention II (1907) provided for the 
limitation of the employment of armed force for the recovery of Contract 
Debts14. In the period prior to the First World War the terms "aggression" 
and "provocation" made their appearance in the practice of States, mainly 
in treaties of alliance, where they were regarded as casuc foederic for 
resort to war15. The meaning of aggression started to attract consideration 
and was generally assumed to be a military attack involving frontier 
crossing but this concept was often qualified by "provocation". The latter 
was extremely vague, because "any act or omission by the authorities of a 
State could be regarded as provocation if it displeased a powerful 
opponent"16 
. 
Furthermore, the idea of the legal regulation of the use of 
force started being fostered in rather rudimentary ways17. Still, 
however, the more successful attempts in this period were limited to the 
regulation of the conduct of hostilities by codifying the laws of war. 
2. (ii) The State of War Doctrine. 
We have so far seen that resort to war by States was considered to be 
a prerogative deriving from the concept of sovereignty. However, in the 
19th century governments began to concern themselves more with the 
justifications of resort to war. This tendency was dictated by various 
reasons such as, the increasingly influential power of public opinion in 
13 See The Bryan Peace Treaties, 7 A. J. J. L. 823 (7,973), 8 A. I. I. L. 876 (7974). 
14 See Oppenheim op. cit. supra n. 11, p. 179; Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 1, pp. 23-4; Waldock 
loc. cit. supra in. 8, p. 468; Bowett, Self-Defence in international Laug, 1958, p. 120. 
15 Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 1, p. 24. 
16 Ibid. p. 227; Giraud, La Theorie de la Legitime Defense, 49 H. R. C. 697 (7934 III), pp. 
756-9. 
17 Viz 
. 
the concept of neutral State or Territory. See Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 1, pp. 24-5. 
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the management of the State's policy, the extension of constitutional and 
democratic control over the policies of the executive, the modernisation of 
the means of warfare which brought a heavier burden on the population 
and the economic resources of a State and the odium inherent in the 
notion of war. Moreover, in addition to the above moral and political 
reasons it is pertinent to refer to a legal 
one, namely, that the commencement of war triggered off the application 
of the laws of war, as between the belligerent parties on one hand, and the 
laws of Neutrality, as between the belligerents and third States, on the 
other. As far as the belligerent States were concerned when war "enters on 
the scene all law that was previously concerned with the dispute retires 
and a new law steps in directed only to secure fair and not too inhuman 
fighting" 18 
. 
Moreover, the relations hitherto between the contending parties 
were significantly affected: diplomatic relations would be broken off, 
bilateral treaties between them would be suspended or abrogated, property 
of the belligerents' nationals existing in either of their territories would be 
confiscated, the doctrine of Non-Intercourse would be applied, that is the 
prohibition of trade or any other intercourse based on existing contracts 
with the enemy subjects19 
. 
Furthermore, the exceptional character 
attached to the situation of war between two or more States was reflected 
by the structure of Public International Law as such, namely, that the latter 
was deemed to be divided into two strictly and absolutely distinct parts: 
"The law of Peace", that is the body of rules governing the inter-State 
relations at a time of peace as opposed to "rhe law of War and Neutrality" 
dealing with the inter-State relations whenever resort to arms was had. 
The theory of International law maintained that there i vas no 
intermediate stage between Peace and War: inter belluin et pacein nihil est 
medium 2t) 
For all the above reasons State practice devised a legal doctrine, 
namely, the state of war or de jure war or war in the legal sense Mar 
since the time of Grotius was considered to be a state of affairs and not 
18 Westlake, hitmiational Law, Part 11,2nd ed. 1913, p. 4. 
19 fbid, pp. 33-5; Oppenheim op. cit. supra n. 11,300-335; Hall op. cit. supra n. 9, pp. 453- 
4E¬. 
20 Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, iii, xxi, 1.1; see also McNair, The Legal meaning of War 
and the Relation of War to Reprisals, 11 Grot. Soc. Proc. 29 (1925), p. 33; Hindmarsh, Force 
in Peace, 1933, p. 90. 
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mere acts of force: non actio sed status eo nomine indicatur 21 and what 
the state of war doctrine purported to do was an attempt to limit the 
coming into being of this state of affairs by depending for its very existence 
on the intention of the contending parties. 
State practice in the period under discussion emphasized that by the 
term war was meant not the mere use of force but the existence of a legal 
situation in which rights were or might be prosecuted by force22. 
The doctrine had the practical effect that instances of large-scale 
hostilities resulting in considerable loss of life and destruction of property 
would not result in war, so far as International law was concerned, simply 
because the parties to the conflict opted not to characterize their armed 
contention as "war"23 
. 
Governments were thus in a position to exercise 
forcible measures against another State without incurring the moral 
responsibility of declaring war, without observing the stipulations of the 
constitutional law of their States with regard to a declaration of war and by 
dispensing with the rights of Neutrality which third States would assert24. 
Thus, States possessed a very ample discretion to apply force 
, 
to 
restrict it to a certain locality and at the same time to avoid any rupture of 
their peaceful relations with the State against which the forcible action was 
directed25. This practice gave rise to a whole body of legal doctrine with 
regard to acts of force such as reprisals, pacific blockade, armed 
intervention for the protection of life and property of nationals abroad 
which came under the rubric "Measures of force short of war" and which 
will be dealt with in the next section. 
The subjectivity which constituted the basis of the legal dualism of 
"state of war" and "measures of force short of ivar", was also its main 
weakness. A state of war was deemed to be brought about if the intention 
21 Grotius op. cit. supra n. 30,1.1,2.1; Oppenheim op. cit. supra n. 11, pp. 202-3. For more 
definitions of War see McNair loc. cit. supra n. 20, pp. 31-2. 
22 Moore, Digest of international Law, vol. vii, p. 153. A state of war could exist without 
hostilities. C'f 
. 
Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, 1988, pp. 11-13. 
23 J. B. Moore, The New Isolation, 2.7 A. J. I. L. 60: ' (1933), p. 622; Giraud loc. cit. snpm n. 16, 
p. 699; Q. Wright, TheTest of Aggression in the Italo-Ethiopian War, 30 A. I. I. L. 45 (1936), 
p. 51; Sir f.. Fischer-Williams, The Covenant of the League and War, 5 Camb. L. J. 1 (1933), 
p. 2; Waldock, 81 H. R. C. 455 (1952 11), p. 457; Baty, Abuse of Terms: "Recognition"- "War", 
30 A. I. I. L. 377 (1936), p. 381; Hindmarsh op. cit. supra n. 20, p. 57; N. Politis, Les 
Represailles Armees entre les Membres de ]a Societe des Nations, 31 R. G. D. I. P. 5 (1924), p. 
9. 
24 McNair loc. cit. signv n. 20, p. 33; Politis loc. cit. supra n. 23, p. 28. 
25 McNair loc. cit. sierra n. 20, p. 45; Hindmarsh op. cit. supra n. 20,93; Q. Wright, When 
Does War Exist ?, 26 A. J. 1. L. 362 (1932), pp. 365-6. 
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of at least one of the parties was expressed to that extent, either in the form 
of a declaration of war or an ultimatum conditional upon a declaration of 
war, or upon the commission of an act of force done aniino belligerendi 
or without anirno belligerendi and the other State elected to regard as 
creating a state of war, either repelling force by force or in some other 
way2E' 
. 
Thus, measures of force which were considered not to initiate 
"war" in the legal sense could constitute casus Belli if the State against 
which they were directed chose to repel them by force27 
. 
This in practical 
terms meant that if the States were of similar power then a state of war 
would most likely arise. By contrast, if the author of the measures short of 
war was a Great Power- as it mostly was the case- and the victim of the use 
of force a weak State the latter would be unlikely to convert those 
measures to a state of war for, mainly, two reasons: 
(a) A state of war would result to an unlimited use of force both in 
quantitative and geographical terms and (b) the application of the duties of 
Neutrality on the part of third States would economically throttle the 
weak Power. For, unlike its powerful opponent, it would not be 
economically wealthy with self-sufficiency of resources, but it would 
depend on commerce with third States. On the other hand, if the use of 
force without the recognition of a state of war took such proportions as to 
affect third States and give rise to protests on their part, the 
"inconvenience" created. thereby could be easily dispensed with either by a 
recognition that a state of war existed or by the fact that the protesting third 
State was powerful enough to assert its rights as a neutral'-s. An 
illustration with regard to the latter is the French blockade of Formosa in 
1884. The blockade was exercised without a state of war existing between 
France and China and it was applied to the shipping of third States. This 
fact was contested by Great Britain and in 1885 the French Prime Minister 
asserted that war existed and called France a "belligerent"29. The 
admission of the existence of a state of war by the State-author of force 
arose in the course of the blockade of Venezuela by Great Britain, 
Germany and Italy in 1902. The German government at first intended to 
26 MacNair loc. cit. supra n. 20, pp. 33-5; Politis loc. cit. supra n. 23, p. 10. 
27 Ch. de Visscher, L' Interpretation du Pacte au lendemain du differend Italo-Grec, 5 
Revue de Droit International et de legislation comparee, 3rd series, p. 380; Brierly, 
International Law and Resort to Armed Force, 4 Camb. L. J. 308 (1932), pp. 308-9. 
28 Hindmarsh op. cit. supra n. 20, p. 93; Q. Wright, 26 A. J. I. L. 362 (1932), p. 364; id. 30 
A. J. I. L. 45 (1936), p. 51; Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 1, p. 28. 
29 Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 1, pp. 32-3. 
15 
call the blockade "pacific" (see infra ) but eventually described it as a 
"belligerent blockade" due to a U. S. note that it would not recognize any 
interference with its shipping by the blockading Powers30. 
The state of war doctrine was characterized as an absurdity 
unworthy of any discussion; however, this was not to be realized until the 
period of the League of Nations, for in the 19th and the first two decades 
of the 20th century war was permissible and constituted a matter of 
concern of the contending States only and not of the entire international 
community37 
. 
Furthermore, if a state of war was asserted by a weak Power against a 
Great Power in response to the use of force short of war by the latter, that 
assertion could easily be ignored by the Great Power. This is precisely what 
happened in the case of the U. S. landing and occupation of the Mexican 
port of Vera Cruz32 
The state of war doctrine can be said to have created a climate of 
uncertainty in international relations. Although it can be argued that it 
had some advantages such as the limited application of force and the fact 
that third States did not have to observe the duties of Neutrality, in real 
practical terms armed force could be used under the extremely convenient 
assertion of peace and it would be basically advantageous only to the 
author of the measures short of war33 
. 
Moreover, the said advantage was 
highly dependent on the actual power of the State against which force was 
exercised and most of all on the uncertainty of whether the victim State 
would initiate a state of war which was a matter that depended on purely 
political factors such as a treaty of alliance with a Great Power. So the 
possibility of war in the legal sense was not 
, 
at least theoretically, 
dispensed with. But the practice of States during the 19th and the early 
20th century indicates that measures short of war were accepted as 
permissible under international law and since war was deemed to be 
30 See Westlake op. cit. supra n. 18, p. 19; Ch. de Visscher loc. cit. supra n. 27, p. 380. It 
must be noted that the said blockade became the object of controversy with regard to its 
nature. Holland characterised it as "war sub modo " and "anomalous', 19 L. Q. R. 133 (1903), 
p. 133; Oppenheim op. cit. supra n. 11, p. 146. took the view that the blockade was 
essentially a pacific blockade. Westlake, 25 L. Q. R. 13 (1909), p. 21, considered the 
situation arising out of the blockade of Venezuela, as being "war". The same view was held 
in the Venezuelan Preferential Claims Award (1904), 9 R. I. A. A. 99-110 (1960). 
31 Cf. the two illustrations of pacific blockade. Also see Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 1, pp. 26, 
36-7,39. 
32 See Hindmarsh op. cit. supra n. 20, p. 94; Grob, The Relativity of War and Peace, 1949, 
pp. 94,169; Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 1, p. 40. 
33 Brierly loc. cit. supra n. 27, p. 308 n. 28. 
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lawful it would be unrealistic to doubt the legality or illegality of lesser 
forms of armed force. According to Brownlie34 : 
"... states had to pay for the luxury of avoiding the consequences of a state of war by 
submitting to some measure of legal regulation of the lesser means of coercion as a reprisal, 
pacific blockade, or justified intervention 
... 
" 
2. (iii) Coercive Measures Short of War 
Under this rubric the present author shall deal with forcible 
measures exercised by States and which according to State practice did not 
initiate a state of war. At the outset this writer deems it pertinent to make 
some preliminary observations. 
Whenever a dispute arose between two States it could be settled by 
three means: 
(a) Either by recourse to peaceful methods of dispute settlement such as 
conciliation35, diplomatic negotiations, mediation by a third party 
, 
and 
arbitration, (b) or by recourse to measures of non-amicable character 
directed against the defaulting party, or (c) lastly, by waging war against the 
respondent State3b 
. 
War having been invested with the subjective 
technicality of the state of war doctrine and, moreover, the reluctance of 
governments to characterize recourse to force as war, inevitably, led States 
to use the former two means of settling their disputes. 
Furthermore, non-amicable measures of redress were distinguished 
into those involving and those not involving the use 
of armed force37. The latter comprised (a) the withdrawal of diplomatic 
relations, (b) retorsion, (c) military and naval demons trationS38 and (d) 
embargo39. 
Retorsion is the technical term for retaliation for discourteous 
and inequitable acts by acts of the same or similar kind40. The act against 
34 Op. cit. supra n. 1, p. 28. 
35 As in the case of the Dogger Bank Incident (1904) between the U. K. and Russia. See 
Merrills, 1nfe n rtion d Dispute Settlement, 2nd ed. 1990 
, 
pp. 35-7. 
36 Hall op. cit. supra n. 9, p. 81; cf. Oppenheim op. cit. supra n. 11, p. 132. 
37 Y. de la Briere, Evolution de la Doctrine et de la Pratique des Represailles, 22 H. R. C. 
247 (1928 11), pp. 273-4. 
38 Moore op. cit. supra n. 22, pp. 103-9; Oppenheim op. cit. supra n. 11, p. 133. 
39 Hall op. cit. supra n. 9, p. 435; Hindmarsh op. cit. supra n. 20, p. 64; Waldock, 81 
H. R. C. 455 (1952 11), p. 458. 
40 Oppenheim op. cit. supra n. 11, p. 134. 
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which retorsion is directed is not an illegal act but one which is within the 
competence of its author (i. e., a legislative or administrative act)41 
. 
It has 
been suggested that it is a retaliation in kind42 or that it is a mode of self- 
help, the widest form of reprisals, to cover action taken to redress a 
wwwrong43 
. 
The question in what circumstances retorsion is justified is not 
one of law and it depends on each individual case whether a State would 
retaliate or not by way of retorsion 44. In The Nereide Case 
, 
Mr Marshall 
CJ disputed the very character of retorsion as a legal institution by ruling 
that retorsion was a political and not a legal measure which, consequently, 
could not be brought for consideration before a State's Courts45. An 
illustration of an act of retorsion is the action of Japan in 1907 when she 
imposed differential duties upon Russian imports as a counter-measure to 
Russia's exclusion of Japanese fishermen from the territorial waters of 
Saghalien where they had long been accustomed to fish46. 
E in bargo 47 means the detention or sequestration of the ships of 
another State in the ports of the embargoing State. Embargo was merely a 
particular kind of reprisal aiming at obtaining redress from the State 
whose shipping was detained. It could also be imposed on the plaintiff 
State's vessels- this was the so-called civil embargo48. 
We come now to discuss the compulsive or coercive measures 
short of war which were applied for the redress for committed wrongs. We 
propose to deal with those measures under the general rubric of reprisals 
, 
although several writers of the second half of the 19th and the beginning 
of the present century have referred to reprisals and pacific blockade as two 
distinct institutions of International law49 
. 
On the other hand, some authors took the view that the term 
reprisals had been generally used to refer to coercive measures taken by a 
State against another50, the terms "pacific blockade", "reprisals", 
41 Ibid.; also see Hall op. cit. supra n. 9, p. 433; Brierly op. cit supra n. 8, p. 399. 
42 Moore op. cit. supra n. 22, p. 106. 
43 Westlake op. cit. saepnn n. 18, p. 6; Waldock, 81 H. R. C. 455 (1952 1I), p. 458. 
44 See Oppenherni op. cet. srppn n. 11, p. 134. 
45 9 Cranch, 388,422. 
46 Waldock loc. cit. supra n. 43 
47 Oppenheim op. cit. supra n. 11, pp. 141-2; Westlake op. cit. supra n. 18, p. 8; Hall op. 
cit. supra n. 9, p. 435; Hindmarsh op. cit. supra n. 20, p. 64. 
48 Oppenheim op. cit. supra n. 11, p. 142; Hindmarsh op. cit. supra n. 47. 
49 See Westlake op. cit. supra n. 18, pp. 11-8; id. Pacific Blockade, 25 L. Q. R. 13 (1909), p. 
13; Oppenheim op. cit. supra n. 11, pp. 132,144-9; Hall op. cit. supra n. 9, pp. 437-441. 
50 Hindmarsh op. cit. supra n. 20, p. 58. 
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"embargo", "retorsion" and "intervention" being only "descriptive labels 
and did not represent a scientific division of forcible measures short of 
war" 51 or that the words "retorsion", "reprisals", "intervention" were not 
used by all jurists with the same meaning52 
. 
Moreover, we intend to 
discuss intervention under a different rubric due to the broadness of the 
concept and the relationship attributed to some of its forms with the right 
of self-defence. 
Reprisals. According to Oppenheim53: 
"Reprisals are such injurious and otherwise internationally illegal acts of one state 
against another as are exceptionally permitted for the purpose of compelling the latter to 
consent to a satisfactory settlement of a difference created by its own international 
delinquency" 
Reprisals are coercive measures undertaken without belligerent 
intent54 and they are distinct from belligerent reprisals exercised during 
the process of hostilities in a state of war by one belligerent against another 
with the purpose of compelling him and his subjects and members of his 
armed forces to abandon illegitimate acts of warfare and to comply in the 
future with the rules of legitimate warfare55 
. 
The raison d' titre of reprisals in time of peace was to obtain redress 
for wrongs committed by the State against which they were taken and the 
institution itself goes back to Medieval times having its roots in a system 
of private reprisals which was recognized from the 14th to 18th century. 
An individual who had suffered injustice abroad and been unable to 
obtain redress in the State concerned would obtain his own sovereign's 
authority (by a letter of marque ) to take reprisals against the nationals of 
the foreign sovereign56 
. 
By the 19th century all reprisals had been public reprisals taken by 
the State itself and any international wrong done to the State or its 
nationals i vas a just cause for reprisals, which could take the form of 
51 Waldock, 81 H. R. C. 455 (7952 11), p. 457. 
52 Ibid. p. 458. 
53 Oppenheim op. cit. supra n. 11, p. 136. 
'4 Hindmarsh op. cit. supra n. 20, p. 58. 
55 Oppenheim op. cit. supra n. 11, p. 561. 
56 Waldock, 81 H. R. C. 455 (1952 11), p. 458. For further information about the history of 
reprisals in international law see, Westlake op. cit. supra n. 28, pp. 7-11; Maccoby, 
Reprisals as a Measure of Redress Short of War, 2 Cainh. L. J. 60 (1924), pp. 60-70; E. Speyer- 
Colbert, Retaliation in International Law, 1948 ; Hindmarsh op. cit. supra n. 20, pp. 43-56. 
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bombardment, occupation of territory or pacific blockade. Armed action by 
way of reprisals was a lawful mode of self-help; in other words the State- 
author of reprisals was acting like a judge and like the authority for the 
execution of the judgment in its own case57 
. 
The customary law on reprisals has been stated in the Naulilaa Case 
(1928). This was an arbitration between Portugal and Germany which arose 
out of forcible reprisals conducted by the German armed forces based in 
South West Africa (present Namibia) in the territory of Angola, then a 
Portuguese colony, in October 1914. Portugal was then a neutral Power for 
it did not take part in the First World War until March 1916. After a 
frontier incident which resulted in the killing of three German soldiers, 
the German army conducted a military expedition inside Angola which 
also incited an uprising of the native population with the result of 
considerable loss of life and property. 
The tribunal held that Germany was responsible and then it laid 
down the conditions required for the legitimacy of reprisals: 
(a) Reprisals were justified by the violation of a rule of international law by the 
state against which the reprisals were directed. 
(b) Reprisals were illegal if they are not preceded by a request to remedy the 
alleged wrong. 
(c) Reprisals which were altogether out of proportion with the act that prompted 
them were excessive and therefore illegal58. 
Although reprisals appeared as institutions of customary 
international law their legality was disputed by some jurists while there 
was some agreement for the danger they entailed for international peace. 
We have pointed out when discussing the state of war doctrine that the 
subjectivity surrounding its application by governments as well as its 
technical nature enabled States to resort to force without incurring any 
responsibility of initiating war in the legal sense and to avoid observing 
the duties of neutrality towards third States. Thus the use of force by way 
of reprisals was not considered a rupture of peace. 
Charles de Visseher59, took the view that the theory of coercive 
measures short of war had never had solid foundations in customary law 
and being imprecise it appeared fraught -, A ith political opportunism. He 
57 Waldock loc. cit. supra n. 56, p. 459; J. Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict, 
1954, p. 287; Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 1, p. 220. 
58 4 1. L. R. 1927-8, pp. 526-7. 
59 Loc. cit. supra n. 27, p. 377. 
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challenged the "peaceful" character of those measures by referring to two 
instances of pacific blockade, namely, the French blockade of Formosa and 
the joint British-German-Italian blockade of Venezuela. He argued that 
the character "pacific" was attainable only when a disproportionality of 
power between the disputant States existed. By contrast if the interests of a 
powerful State were affected and the latter asserted its rights the illusory 
etiquettes would disappear and thus reprisals would constitute as such 
hostile acts, sufficient by themselves to justify the existence of a state of 
war. 
Fauchille6l 
, 
argued that reprisals were frequently a pure brutal act 
and not the exercise of a right. 
Waldock62, pointed out that reprisals would definitely develop 
into war if they were resorted to against an evenly-matched State. 
Wright63, cast off the distinction between war and acts short of war 
as unimportant due to the possibility of the victim State to interpret these 
acts as the inauguration of a state of war. 
Westlakeh4 
, 
though he prima facie accepted reprisals as part of 
International law, pointed out that they tended to obscure the line 
between peace and war. He took as starting point Article I of the Hague 
Convention III of 1907 on the Opening of Hostilities and by maintaining 
that the term "hostilities" was free from subjective criteria, he concluded 
that reprisals, in time of peace endangered the security aimed at by the rule 
as, to the declaration of war. He, lastly, recognized the conspicuous reality 
that "no government dealing with another of strength even 
approximately equal to its o-% n, certainly no Great Power dealing with 
another Great Power, would use force by way of reprisal" because -, vvar 
would definitely follow. 
Politis65 
, 
took the view that the requirement of proportionality as 
well as the arbitration provisions in various treaties tended to render 
reprisals less and less justifiable. Even if a dispute was not of the character 
to be submitted to arbitration, he maintained that diplomatic channels 
should be used rather than resort to violence. He rejected the view that 
reprisals did not constitute a breach of the state of peace as illogical, due to 
nl Fauchille, Trade de Droit International Public, t. 7,3me partie, ref. in Brierly loc. cit. 
supra n. 27, p. 309 n. 7. 
h2 87 H. R. C. 455 (1952 11), p. 459. 
63 19 A. J. 1. L. 176 (1925), p. 94. M 25 L. Q. R. 13 (1909), pp. 128,134. 
65 31 R. G. D. I. P. 5 (1924), p. 5. 
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the fact that reprisals did constitute acts of war which were by fact 
completed without a prior declaration of war; moreover, the disruption of 
peace was always dependent on the possibility of resistance on the part of 
the victim State. 
Y. de la Briere6b, pointed out the deficiency of the system of law 
admitting reprisals due to the presumption they entailed of a state of 
anarchy in international society and of the possibility of their abuse; the 
peril they constituted for international peace and the fact that they were 
virtually directed against weak States. Some other jurists considering the 
possibility of abuse of reprisals were quite doubtful of their utility67 
. 
The potential for abuse in using force by way of reprisals finds many 
illustrations in the practice of the 19th and 20th century68 
. 
W Ith regard to the prior attempt to obtain redress from the wrongdoing 
State, the blockade exercised by Great Britain against Greece in 1850 (the 
Don Pacifico case), was universally criticized since the above requirement 
had not been met69 
. 
Don Pacifico 
,a 
British national who had suffered 
loss of property during a riot in Athens, had not sought redress in the 
Greek Courts. 7'he requirement of proportionality was hardly observed in 
the cases of the bombardment of Greytown in 1853 and the U. S. occupation 
of Vera Cruz in 191470 
. 
Finally, the frail distinction between reprisals and 
war did not materialise in the cases of the French blockade of Formosa 
and the blockade of Venezuela. 
At this point the present author thinks it is pertinent to give closer 
consideration to a particular form of reprisal, namely, that of pacific 
blockade due to its extremely controversial nature and the fact that it was 
indicative that the distinction between war and reprisals was so fragile that 
it appeared illusory71 
. 
66 22 H. R. C. 247 0 928 11), p. 278. 
67 See quotations by Calvo and Despagnet in Maccoby loc- cit. supra n. 65, p. 70; Francois, 66 
N. R. C. 
_i (1938 1V), p. 248; Briefly op. cit. supra n. 8, p. 400; McNair loc. cot. supra n. 20, p. 
45; Oppenheim op. cit. supra it 11, p. 143. 
68 For a compehensive account of State practice see Hindmarsh op. cit. supra n. 30, pp. 72-3 
(notes) and p. 77 n. 2; Brown-lie op. cit. supra n. 1, pp. 28-37. 
69 Moore op. cit. supra n. 32,119-151; Waldock, 81 H. R. C. 4.55 (7952 11), p. 459; Brownlie 
op. cit. supra n. 1, p. 220. 
7 Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 1, pp. 36-7,220. 
71 Ch. de Visscher loc. cit. supra n. 27, p. 380. 
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Naval blockade which means preventing all access to the coasts of a 
certain State is a measure that one belligerent may adopt with regard to 
another belligerent and that he may even apply subject to certain 
conditions to neutrals71 
. 
Thus naval blockade is a measure which in 
international law has been a priori associated with a state of war. This was 
the case until the second quarter of the 19th century72 
, 
when instances in 
State practice occurred of naval blockades applied in time of peace as a 
means of securing the settlement of disputes, and the institution seems to 
have acquired a large measure of recognition in State practice73. 
The first case of pacific blockade took place in 1827 when England, 
Russia and France blockaded the coasts of Turkey74, and since then pacific 
blockades had been enforced on twenty two occasions75 
. 
Two main issues arise from the practice of pacific blockade, namely, 
(a) how a given blockade could be determined as being pacific and, if so, (b) 
whether it could be applied to third State shipping. 
(a) It has been suggested that the nature of a naval blockade is to be 
established by reference to the intention of the participating States and if 
the latter was not manifest the legal status of the blockade had to be 
inferred from "indefinite criteria"76 
. 
The best view on that question 
seems to be that taken by Hogan77, and acceded to by McNair78 
, 
namely, 
that it depended wholly on the action of the blockaded State whether a 
blockade should be considered as pacific or belligerent. Indeed, as Ave have 
already seen, if the State-target of any form of armed reprisals resisted by 
repelling force by force a state of war would be brought about; moreover, 
the legal nature of naval blockade could be determined by the reaction of 
third States affected by it. The French blockade of Formosa in 1884 was 
71 Memorandum on Pacific Blockade up to the time of the Foundation of the League of 
Nations by Giraud, L. N. O. J. 1927, p. 841. 
72 Oppenheim op. cit. supra n. 11, p. 144. 
73 The term pacific blockade was primarily a creation of publicists. It was invented by 
Hautefeuille, Des droits et des devoirs de nations neutres en temps de la guerre inaritiine, 
Paris, 1848-49, in, p. 176; also see Wheaton, International Laue. 5th ed. 1916, p. 409; Hyde, 
International Laze, vol. 2,1951, p. 55. 
74 See L. N. O. J. 1927, p. 841; Oppenheim op. cit. supra n. 11, p. 145; Hindmarsh op. cit. 
supra n. 20, p. 72, cites as the first instance of pacific blockade the British blockade of 
Norway in 1814. 
75 For an account of State practice see L. N. O. J. 1927, p. 841 n. 1; Hindmarsh op. cit. supra n. 
20, pp. 72-3; Westlake, 25 L. Q. R. 13 (1909), p. 15 et seq. 
76 Hindmarsh op. cit. supra n. 20, p. 71. 
77 Hogan, Pacific Blockade, Oxford 1908 
78 Loc. cit. supra n. 20, p. 38. 
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initially applied as a pacific blockade but it was eventually converted into a 
belligerent blockade due to protests on behalf of Great Britain in the light 
of its application to British shipping. The controversial blockade of 
Venezuela in 1902 was at the outset justified by Germany, one of the 
blockading Powers, as pacific and it was later recognized as belligerent after 
the U. S. Government had issued a note whereby she refused to acquiesce 
to "any extension of the doctrine of pacific blockade which may adversely 
affect the rights of States not parties to the controversy or discriminate 
against the commerce of neutral nations"80 
(b) A naval blockade could be applied to third State shipping only in 
the case of a state of war. With regard to pacific blockade 
, 
however, the 
practice of States was somewhat unclear on this point. Up to 1850 pacific 
blockades were enforced against third States and this seemed to have been 
met with acquiescence on the part of the latter8l 
. 
In 1850 Great Britain 
blockaded the coasts of Greece (Don Pacifico case), but she did not enforce 
the blockade against the vessels of third States82. Moreover, the joint 
blockades of Greece and of the island of Crete in 1886 and 1897 respectively 
were applied only to Greek vessels83. 
By contrast the French blockade of Formosa of 1884, the joint 
blockade of Venezuela of 1902, the joint blockade of Montenegro in 
1913, the blockade of Greece by the Allied Powers in 1916 and the Italian 
blockade of Fiume in 1920, were all applied on third States84. 
Fhe above seem to indicate that France had always favoured the 
enforcement of pacific blockade on third States 
, 
whereas, the British 
Government seemed not to be in favour of such enforcement85 
. 
In 1887 the Institute of International law suggested a number of 
regulations for the application of the pacific blockade, namely, that (a) ships 
under a foreign flag could enter the blockaded State's ports freely; (b) the 
pacific blockade had to be officially declared and notified and maintained 
by a sufficient force; (c) the ships of the blockaded State which did not 
respect the blockade would be sequestrated. When the blockade was raised 
they had to be restored with their cargoes to the owners but without 
80 Moore op. cit. supra n. 32, p. 140. 
81 Westlake, 25 L. Q. R. 13 (1909), pp. 15-8. 
82 L. N. O. J. 1927, p. 844. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid 
85 Ibid. ; Westlake, 25 L. Q. R. 13 (1909), p. 22. 
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indemnity on any account85 
. 
Moreover, it was suggested that pacific 
blockade being a form of reprisal it should not affect third States since 
reprisals were not meant to have such 
an effects' 
. 
The reasoning behind pacific blockade was the same with any other 
form of reprisals, namely, to obtain redress without resort to war, 
exercising instead a limited use of force 
. 
However, certain publicists were 
opposed to the institution arguing that pacific blockade was more than an 
ordinary reprisal, since its application by means of warships influenced the 
whole life of the blockaded State87 and its effect was not limited as in the 
case of other forms of reprisals. Moreover, speeches by statesmen whose 
Governments had. carried out pacific blockades revealed that they 
considered it difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile a blockade of this kind 
with the continuance of a state of peace88 
. 
As Parry pointed out the 
institution of pacific blockade was an "historical accident, arising from the 
application to one form of reprisals of 
injudicious analogies from the law of war"89 
Furthermore, pacific blockade entailed an inner contradiction, 
namely, that if it was to be applied effectively it had to be enforced against 
third States. This was in conspicuous contradiction with the rule that a 
blockade would be applied on third State shipping only in a state of war. It 
may, lastly, be attributed to this inherent inconsistency that the institution 
was virtually abandoned after the end of the First World War90 
. 
3. The Regulation of the Use of Force During the Period of the League of 
Nations (1920-1945) 
. 
The League of Nations was established in 1919 by the conclusion of 
its constitution, the Covenant91, which was incorporated in the peace 
treaties of 1919-1920 between the victorious Allied and the defeated 
Central Powers and the Ottoman Empire. The establishment of the League 
85 See Westlake loc. cit. sawpm n.. 84, pp. 19-20. 
86 See Fauchille op. cit. supra n. 60, p. 709. 
87 Calvo, Le Uroit International Theorique et Pratigiie, 1888, t. iii, p. 554. 
88 L. N. O. J. 1927, p. 843 n. 7 
89 Parry, British Practice in some 19th century Pacific Blockades, 8 Z. a. ö. R. t'. 672 (1938), 
pp. 685-6. 
90 Westlake loc. cit 
. 
supra n. 93, pp. 19,22. 
91 Text of the Covenant of the League of Nations in U. K. Treaty Series 1919, No 4; M. O. 
Hudson (ed. ), International Legislation, vol. i, 1931, pp. 1-18. 
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reflected a sentiment of revulsion against all war because the World War 
of 1914-18 was the first total war involving not only the armed forces of 
the belligerents but the entire populations and economic resources of their 
countries as well. Moreover, the unprecedented loss of human life created 
the strong desire to ensure that a disaster of such scale would never 
recur92 
. 
Thus it is not surprising that one of the two purposes of the 
League of Nations according to the preamble of the Covenant was to "... 
achieve international peace and security" by way of "... the acceptance of 
obligations not to resort to war". 
The stipulations of the Covenant relevant to international peace 
and security were embodied in Articles 10-17 thereof. 
Article 10 stipulated that: 
The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external 
aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of 
the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such 
aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be 
fulfilled. 
What really lay, in political terms, behind Article 10 was an attempt 
to guarantee the territorial status quo in the post-world war period but the 
eventual defection of the U. S. A. from the League rendered the 
materialization of this purpose virtually impossible. However, as a matter 
of law Article 10 has been interpreted as having imposed a legal obligation 
on Member States: The terminology used was established in political 
treaties and did not merely reflect a moral principle93. Moreover, by its 
Nvording the said Article seemed to launch a total prohibition of war except 
in self-defence and as such to be a dynamic development introduced by the 
Covenant94. 
But the Article was attacked on grounds of constituting a moral obligation 
and its terms of being vague- particularly, the definition of "territorial 
integrity" and "political independence"95 
. 
Furthermore, the criticism of 
Article 10 was focused on its relation with the rest of the provisions of the 
Covenant regarding the settlement of disputes and the maintenance of 
international peace and security: Article 10 was linked with neither 
92 Northedge, The League of Nations, 1986, pp. 1-2; Giraud, La Theorie de ]a Legitime 
Defense, 49 H. R. C. 691 (1934 111), p. 693. 
93 See Brownlie, international Lain and the Use of Force by States, 1963, p. 62. 
94 ]bid. pp. 63,65. 
95 Ibid. p. 62. 
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Articles 11-15 nor Article 16 of the Covenant96. More specifically the 
provision of Article 10 was said to contradict Article 15(7) which permitted 
resort to war in certain circumstances97 in order to enforce claims. The 
problem of Article 10 gave rise to the development of various views 
attempting to reconcile it with the subsequent provisions of the Covenant. 
It has been suggested, and the preparatory works of the Covenant seem to 
reflect that view, that Article 10 was subordinate to the Articles on the 
pacific settlement of disputes and that it operated only in relation to wars 
that were unlawful under Article 1598. Another view maintained that 
wars under Article 15(7) would not contravene Article 10 so long as the 
lawful belligerent did not take steps which would permanently affect the 
territorial integrity and political independence of its adversary". Lastly 
the 4th Assembly of the League in interpreting Article 10 held that 
Member States were absolutely free in deciding the matter of taking 
measures to implement the guarantee contained therein and by this 
interpretation the ambit of Article 10 was greatly diminishedl00. 
However, Article 10 was referred to in communications by States 
having recourse to the League of Nations when a dispute arose. Thus it 
was invoked by Bulgaria following the invasion of Bulgarian territory by 
the Greek army in 1925 (Graeco-Bulgarian dispute)1 0» 
. 
China appealed to 
the Council of the League under Articles 10 and 11 after the Mukden 
incident of Sept. 18,1931 (Sino-Japanese conflict)102 
. 
When Italy invaded 
and subsequently annexed Albania in 1939, the latter appealed to the 
League of Nations under Article 10 of the Covenant103 
. 
Nevertheless 
Article 10 was not constantly referred to by either the Council or the 
Assembly of the League of Nations with the exceptions of the appeal 
addressed on Feb. 16,1932 by the Members of the Council, other than 
China and Japan, to the Japanese Government under Article 10 104 and of 
96 See Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International 
Law, 81 H. R. C. 455 (1952 II), p. 469. 
97 Namely, in the event of the Council of the League failing to reach a unanimous report in 
respect of a dispute between two Member States. See also Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 93, pp. 
62-3. 
98 See Giraud, 49 H. R. C. 691 (1934 11I), p. 695; Komarnicki, La Question de 1' Integrite 
Territoriale, 1923, pp. 157,202; Hunter-Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, vol. i, p. 170. 
99 See references in Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 93, p. 63 n. 2. 
100 Referred to in Ibid. p. 64 n. 1. 
101 L. N. O. J. 1925 II, p. 1696. 
102 L. N. O. J. 1931, p. 2453. 
103 L. N 
. 
O. J. 1939, p. 246 
104 Text in 27 A. I. I. L. Supp1p1.131 ( 933) 
. 
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the resolutions of the League Council concerning foreign intervention in 
the Spanish civil war105 
. 
The League Council and the Member States 
were more eager to use Article 11 concerning preventive action by the 
Council, mainly in the context of cessation of hostilities. It is interesting, 
however, that the progressive and dynamic nature of Article 10 did not 
pass completely unobserved. The said stipulation was used as the legal 
basis of the adoption by the League of the Stimson doctrine of non- 
recognition10' and this fact was interpreted by some jurists as indicative of 
Article 10 involving mutual guarantees only against ultimate loss of 
territory or independence107. 
The controversy surrounding Article 10 is not met when dealing 
with Article 11 
, 
which provided that: 
1. Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of 
the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the 
League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace 
of nations. In case any such emergency should arise the Secretary-General shall on the 
request of any Member of the League summon a meeting of the Council. 
2. It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member of the League to bring 
to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting 
international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good 
understanding between nations upon which peace depends. 
The above provision constituted another development brought 
about by the League Covenant in that any war or threat thereof was 
considered for the first time to be a matter of concern to the entire 
Membership, whether affecting immediately any of the individual 
Members or not. Moreover, the League would take any action that might 
be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nationsIO8. 
Article 11 owes its frequent application by the Member States in 
their appeals to the Council and by the Council itself when dealing with a 
dispute, to the ample discretion it offered to the latter not to settle the 
dispute as such but to take preventive and preliminary steps, such as a 
request for the cessation of hostilities or the setting-up of a commission to 
105 L. N. O. J. 1937, pp. 18 et seq. 
, 
333 et seq. 
106 See Waldock, 81 H. R. C. 455 (1952 II), p. 470. 
107 Ibid. p. 469; Sir J. Fischer-Williams, Some Aspects of the Covenant, 1934, pp. 103-125; 
Q. Wright, The Outlawry of War, 19 A. J. I. L. 76 (1925), p. 92; cf. Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 
93, p. 65. 
108 Article 11 of the Covenant is very reminiscent of the provisions of Articles 39 and 40 of 
the U. N. Charter. 
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observe the execution of the former, in order to prevent any aggravation 
of the dispute. 
Action taken thereunder was a measure of "policing the peace"109 
and there was no attempt whatsoever to determine the legality or illegality 
of recourse to force by individual States110 
. 
An illustration of this is the 
action which was taken by the League Council in the Graeco-Bulgarian 
dispute of 1925, which arose out of the invasion of the Bulgarian territory 
by the Greek army following a frontier incident between the armed forces 
of the two States. The Council of the League was convened in an 
extraordinary session and the Acting President thereof urged both parties 
to cease military action and to withdraw their troops back in their 
respective territories pending the consideration of the dispute by the 
Council l11 
. 
It was also made clear by A. Briand, the President of the 
Council, that the latter was interested-at least in the first instance- in the 
cessation of the hostilities rather than the merits of the dispute112. The 
appeal of the Council was successful and its recommendations were 
carried out by both Greece and Bulgaria, but it was not so at the early stages 
of the Sino-Japanese conflict in Manchuria where the appeal of the 
Council for cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of the Japanese troops 
was virtually evaded and ultimately ignored by Japan113. The importance 
of Article 11 was stressed by some jurists to the point of arguing that it 
excluded per se resort to wart 14 
. 
The present author thinks that is 
sufficient to conclude that Article 11 offered to the Council a great 
flexibility to achieve a temporary halt of a recently started armed 
contention before it degenerated into a major conflict. 
The triplet of Articles 12,13, and 15 dealt with the ad hoc structure 
of the pacific settlement of disputes advocated in the Covenant of the 
League of Nations115. 
109 Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict, 1954, pp. 168-9. 
110 Kopelmanas, The Problem of Aggression and of Prevention of War, 31 A. J. I. L. 244 (1937) 
Waldock, 81 H. R. C. 455 (1952 11), p. 470. 
111 L. N. O. J. 1925 11, p. 1696 et seq. 
112 Ibid. p. 1698- 
113 L. N. O. J. 1931, p. 2265 et se 
114 See de Brouckere, Prevention de la Guerre, 50 H. R. C. 5 (1934 IV), pp. 25-8. 
115 Article 12(1) provided general procedural guidance to the Members of the League in the 
event of a dispute " 
... 
likely to lead to a rupture 
... 
". The undertaking consisted of 
submitting the matter either to arbitration or adjudication or enquiry by the Council of the 
League. Moreover, Member States undertook not to resort to war " 
... 
until three months 
... 
" 
after the award by the arbitrators or the judicial decision or the report of the Council. 
Article 13 dealt with the case a dispute was submitted to arbitration or judicial settlement. 
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When reviewing the above provisions of the Covenant it becomes 
absolutely conspicuous that it did not prohibit all war but that it only 
attempted to regulate resort thereto116 
. 
Indeed, resort to war was 
permissible (a) if the other State failed to carry out an award, judicial 
decision or a unanimous report of the Council; (b) if the Council failed to 
arrive at a unanimous report; (c) if the plea of domestic jurisdiction was 
upheld 117. With the possible exception of the plea of domestic 
jurisdiction, the provisions of the Covenant left few lacunae for lawful 
resort to war and there was no indication in the several serious disputes 
that came before the League that these "gaps" in the Covenant would be 
responsible for any case of unlawful resort to war118. Finally, in terms of 
application of the mechanism provided in the Covenant for the 
maintenance of international peace there was a marked preference for the 
application of Articles 11 and 15 to the disputes brought before the Council 
of the League rather than Article 16119. In other words the Council 
seemed to have considered its task to be primarily focused on preventive 
action so that a dispute did not escalate into a major conflict, leaving the 
question of the determination of the violation of Articles 12,13 and 15 
until the irreparable effects of such violation had been prevented120. 
3. (i) The meaning of the phrase "resort to war" in the Covenant 
. 
Measures of force short of war and the Covenant of the League of Nations 
The structure of the process of the pacific settlement of disputes as it 
was laid down in Article 12(1) of the Covenant as well as the realization of 
the sanctions mechanism of Article 16 were dependent on the 
Article 15 laid down the procedure for the conduct of an enquiry by the Council of the 
League. Finally, Article 16 provided for the measures to be taken by the Membership of the 
League in case of resort to war in violation of Articles 12,13 and 15 of the Covenant. 
116 See Oppenheim, International Law, vol. il, 7th ed. by Lauterpacht 1952, p. 180; 
Brownlie op. cit. supra t?. 93, p. 56; Kopelmanas, 31 A. J. I. L. 244 (1937), p. 245; de Brouckere, 
50 H. R. C. 5 (1934 I1'), p. 24; Stone op. cit. supra n. 109, p. 175; id. Aggressioºº and World 
Order, 195.9, p_ 27; Hin, dmarsl Force in Peace, 1931, p. 126; Wehberg, The Outlawry of War, 
1931, p. 9; Zourek, L' I nterdictiorº de V Eznploi de in Force en Droit International, 1974, p. 28; 
cf. Brierly, International Law and Resort to Armed Force, 4 Camb. L. J. 308 (1932), p. 310. 
117 Cf 1ººfi, a Ch. 6. 
118 See Waldock, 81 H. R. C. 455 (1952 11), p. 471. 
119 Article 16 was applied quite late in the life of the League on two occasions: The ltalo- 
Ethiopian conflict in 1935 and the Russo-Finnish conflict in 1939. 
120 See Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law, 1958, p. 131. 
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undertaking not to resort to war, in the case of the former, and on the 
violation of the said undertaking in the case of the latter. 
The phrase "resort to war", that appeared in the text of Articles 12 
and 16, was proved to be the most dangerous lacuna in the Covenant 
structure for the maintenance of international peace and security, because 
State practice had attributed to the term "war" a meaning of legalistic 
technicality by making its existence in law dependent upon the subjective 
determination of one of the parties to the dispute or at least of third parties 
and by ignoring at the same time any objective and factual situations of 
occurrence of acts of force121 
. 
The practice of some States resulted in the most disingenuous 
interpretation of the term war in the Covenant, namely that the latter did 
not prohibit the exercise of reprisals short of war. This interpretation was 
asserted despite the very clear stipulation of Article 12(1) that any dispute 
likely to lead to a rupture should be submitted to one of the three methods 
of pacific settlement provided thereby 
, 
which scarcely rendered any resort 
to hostilities compatible with the execution of this Article in good faith122 
and notwithstanding the fact that in the dispute between Albania and 
Yugoslavia in 1921 the threat of application of Article 16 which was 
suggested by the British Government eventually led to the withdrawal of 
the Yugoslav army from Albanian territory123 
. 
The issue arose in the Corfu Incident in 1923, when the Italian fleet 
bombarded the city and occupied the island of Corfu in reprisal for the 
murder of the Italian General Tellini on Greek territory when he was 
acting as chairman of the mixed Greek-Albanian boundary commission. 
Greece had recourse to the League Council under Articles 12 and 15 of the 
Covenant 
. 
During the debate before the Council, the Italian representative 
denied any belligerent intent on the part of Italy and declared that reprisals 
in time of peace and occupation of territory as security were measures that 
had often been sanctioned in international practice124 
. 
The dispute itself 
was finally settled outside the League but the legal issues that were given 
rise to were referred by the Council to a special Committee of jurists. The 
relevant question was the following: 
121 See Supra p. 
122 Waldock, 81 H. R. C. 455 (1952 11), p. 472; Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 93,218-9. 
123 See L. N. O. J. 1921 11 
, 
pp. 474 et seq., 1194. 
124 L. N. O. J. 1923, p. 1276 et seq.; 5 B. Y. I. L. 251(1924) ; Monthly Summary of the League of 
Nations, vol. 3,1923, pp. 212-215. 
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" Are measures of coercion which are not meant to constitute acts of war consistent with the 
terms of Articles 12 
- 
15 of the Covenant when they are taken by one Member of the League 
of Nations against another Member without prior recourse to the procedure laid down in 
those Articles ?" 
The reply was that coercive measures which were not intended to 
constitute acts of war " may or may not be consistent" with Articles 12 
- 
15 
of the Covenant and it was for the Council when the dispute had been 
submitted to it to decide immediately having due regard to all the 
circumstances of the case and to the nature of the measures having been 
adopted 
, 
whether it should recommend the maintenance or the 
withdrawal of such measures126. 
Considering the reply of the Committee of jurists more than half a 
century later we can think of two possible ways of dealing with the matter. 
If one follows a strict interpretation the issue will, from the very outset, 
become otiose by reason of the argument that since Article 12 mentioned 
"resort to war" the question becomes self-defeating. But, if, on the other 
hand, one views the Covenant of the League of Nations as a progressive 
attempt to move towards the achievement of international security 
through the development of international organisation and 
-though at a 
rudimentary level- the regulation of resort to force, one finds that the 
reply of the Committee of jurists was at least very unsatisfactory. 
Indeed, it was most vehemently criticized by weak States and some 
jurists with Charles de Visscher (a member of the Committee himself) the 
most eminent among the latter12 
. 
He based his argument on the 
incompatibility of reprisals with the provision of Article 12 of the 
Covenant. The right to resort to reprisals, he argued, rested on the absolute 
right to resort to war and since Article 12 limited the right to resort to war 
before having recourse to certain procedure of pacific settlement of 
disputes, the excuse that reprisals were a more humane means of forcible 
redress than war was by that very fact rendered non-existent. The fact that 
forcible reprisals were intrinsically hostile acts which were by their nature 
likely to lead to a rupture and had to be considered contrary to the 
moratorium stipulated in Article 12. Moreover the criterion of forcible 
reprisals being acts likely to lead to a rupture should not be sought in the 
unilateral qualification given to them by their author because there was 
126 L. N. O. J. 1924 1, p. 523. 
127 Ch. de Visscher, L' Interpretation du Pacte au Lendemain du Differend Italo-Grec, 5 
Revue D. 1. Legisl. Coinp. 37% (1924), p. 382 et seq. 
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always the possibility that the victim State would forcibly oppose an act of 
reprisal, and that would bring about a state of war. In such a case the roles 
would be reversed in that the victim of the attack would be considered as 
the one to have initiated war and thus to be a violator of the Covenant 
liable to be subject to the sanctions provided in Article 16. The fact that the 
victim State might have been too weak to resist did not justify reprisals 
under Article 12 and it would be totally contrary to the most essential 
principles of the Covenant and profoundly immoral to allow the 
disproportionality of force to benefit the aggressor. By contrast, de Visscher 
went on, Article 12 permitted economic and financial reprisals since they 
were not intrinsically likely to lead to a rupture128. 
An opposite school of thought, while recognising that the use of 
force short of war constituted as great a danger as war in the legal sense, 
pointed out the inadequate and defective regulation of the use of force in 
the Covenant insofar the letter of the latter did not include measures of 
force short of war with actual resort thereto as illegal and involving a 
breach of the Covenant129. 
A very interesting point of view was taken by Sir H. Lauterpacht130" 
He argued that the interpretation of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations would rest on a compromise between the principle of 
effectiveness and the wording of the Covenant as evidence of the 
intention of its framers. The phrase "resort to war", he maintained, 
contemplated not only cases of express animus belligerendi but also cases, 
of a "constructive state of war", that is a state of war brought about by third 
States as it was the case in the blockades of Formosa and Venezuela. So 
long as the member States of the League were the sole judges to decide 
128 See Declarations by the representatives of Sweden and Uruguay, L. N. O. J. 1924 1, p. 
526; Baty, 30 A. J. I. L. 377 (1936), p. 395; Stone op. cit. supra n. 116, p. 29; id. op. cit. supra n. 
109, pp. 285-6; Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 93, p. 222; Borchard, "War" and "Peace", 27 
A. I. I. L. 114 (1933), pp. 115-6; Y. de ]a Briere, Evolution de la doctrine et la pratique des 
represailles, 22 H. R. C. 241 (1928 11), pp. 283-4; Politis, Les Represailles Armees entre les 
Membres de la Societe des Nations, 31 R. G. D. I. P. 5 (1924) ; Wehberg op. cit. supra n. 116, p. 
49; Fischer-Williams, The Covenant of the League of Nations and War, 5 Camb. L. J. 7 
(1933), pp. 14-7; Brier4y, 58 H. RG. 5 (1936 IV), p. 124; id. The Law of Nations, 6th ed. by 
Waldock 1963, p. 412; id 4 Carob. L. J. 308 (1932), pp. 313-4; Oppenheim op. cit. supra n. 116, 
p 152. 
129 See Hindmarsh op. cit. supra n. 116, pp. 125-139; McNair, The Legal Meaning of War 
and the Relation of War to Reprisals, 11 Grot. Soc. Proc. 29 (1925), pp. 41,43; Q. Wright, 
The Opinion of the Committee of jurists on the Janina-Corfu Affair, 18 A. J. 11.536 (1924), p. 
541; id. 26 
. 
ý. J. I. L. 362 (1932), p. 365 but cf. pp. 367-8; Maccoby, Reprisals as a Measure of 
Redress short of War, 2 Camb. L. J. 60 (1924), p. 71; Waldock, 81 H. R. C. 455 (1952 11), pp. 
473-4, but (f p. 476. 
130 Lauterpacht, 28 A. J. I. L. 43 (1934) 
. 
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whether a breach of the Covenant had been committed, it was upon them 
to deliberate whether the circumstances warranted an act of force to 
constitute or not "resort to war" according to the provisions of the 
Covenant130. 
In the subsequent years of the League the question of whether 
"resort to war" had taken place arose in the Manchurian dispute between 
China and Japan in 1931 
- 
32. A special Commission of Enquiry under the 
chairmanship of Lord Lytton was set up by virtue of the resolution of the 
Council of Dec. 10,1931 and it finally produced a report in Sept. 1932 which 
was subsequently adopted by the Assembly of the League on February 24, 
1933. The Lytton Commission of Enquiry and later the Assembly, that 
verbatim repeated the Lytton report on this point, found that: " 
Undoubtedly the present case is not that of a country which has declared 
war on another country without previously exhausting the opportunities 
for conciliation provided in the Covenant of the League of Nations"131 
. 
Nevertheless, the Japanese action was not condoned on grounds of 
forcible seizure of territory from China. In fact by March 1932 the whole of 
Manchuria had been under Japanese military occupation and although 
Japan had forcefully denied any territorial ambitions with regard 
thereto132, she favourably regarded the proclamation of the independence 
of Manchuria under the name of Manchukuo on February 17,1932 which 
she formally recognized in September 1932 
. 
Meanwhile on March 
11,1932 the Assembly of the League adopted a resolution according to 
which it was "incumbent upon members of the League of Nations not to 
recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about 
by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Pact 
of Paris"] 33 
. 
An identical pronouncement had been previously made in 
the celebrated Note sent to both China and Japan by the U. S. Secretary of 
State, Mr Stimson on January 7,1932 which was subsequently referred to 
in the literature of International law as the Stirnson doctrine of non 
- 
recognition 
.A similar pronouncement had also been made in the appeal 
addressed to China and Japan by the members of the League Council 
- 
other than the disputant parties- under Article 10 of the Covenant as well 
130 [bid. p. 51 et seq. 
131 27 A. I. I. L. SulpL 146 (1933). 
132 Statement by the Japanese representative in the League Council, L. N. O. J. 1931, p. 2280. 
133 League of Nations Suppl. No 101-110 1932, p. 87; 21' A. J. I. L. Sul pl. 133 (1933); cf 
. 
Brierly, The Meaning and Legal Effect of the Resolution of the League Assembly of March 
11,1932,16 B. Y. 1. L. 159 (1935) 
. 
. 
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as in the declaration by nineteen American States of August 3rd, 1932 with 
regard to the Chaco conflict between Bolivia and Paraguay134. The 
principle of non-recognition that was in fact an application of the maxim 
ex inji. lria jus non oritur had been applied in State practice and had 
appeared in the literature of International law before the famous Stimson 
Note' 35 
. 
In 1932 
- 
33 hostilities broke out between Colombia and Peru as a 
result of Peruvian support to a band of Peruvian nationals who had 
occupied the Colombian district of Leticia by force] 36 
. 
Colombia appealed 
to the League Council and the latter adopted a report on the situation 
stating that the presence of Peruvian forces on Colombian territory was 
contrary to the Covenant of the League and the Pact of Paris but neither 
the parties nor the Council itself spoke of the existence of a state of wart 37 
In July 1937 hostilities occurred between China and Japan which 
were followed by large scale operations resulting in the occupation of a 
large portion of Chinese territory. Although diplomatic relations were 
broken in 1938 and Japan initiated a blockade on Chinese shipping in 1937 
neither of the parties admitted the existence of a state of war and reference 
to the situation was made as the "China Incident" 138. It was not until the 
Council resolution of September 30th, 1938 according to which Japan was 
subject to the provisions of Article 16 under Article 17(3)139, that an 
implicit admission that resort to war had occurred but still this aspect was 
not treated as changing the situation in any way140. 
By contrast the existence of a state of war was recognized by the 
League Council in the Italo 
- 
Ethiopian conflict in 1935. Although Italy had 
invaded Ethiopia without a declaration of war the Council in its report of 
Oct. 7th, 1935, which was based on the report adopted by the Special 
Committee of Six 
, 
relied on a series of communiques of the Italian High 
Command and found that a state of war existed between Italy and 
EthiopiaW 
. 
134 27 A. J. I. L. Suppl. 131 (7933); Brownie op. cit. supra n. 93, pp. 92-3. 
135 Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 2,410-411. 
136 Ibid. pp. 386-7. 
137 L. N. O. J. 1933, pp. 523,599-609. 
138 Northedge op. cit. supra n. 92, p. 59. 
139 Reference to Art. 17 was had because Japan had meanwhile withdrawn from the 
League. 
140 Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 93, p. 388 n. 1. 
141 See 30 A. J. I. L. Suupppi. 37-40 (1936) ; Q. Wright, The Test of Aggression in the Italo- 
Ethiopian War, 30 A. J. 1. L. 45 (1936) 
. 
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Finally, in the Russo 
- 
Finnish dispute in 1939 the Assembly of the 
League in its report of Dec. 14,1939 found that "... it is impossible to argue 
that the operations of the Soviet force-, in Finland do not constitute resort 
to war within the meaning of the Pact of Paris or Article 12 of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations"143. As a result of the above report 
the Council of the League expelled the Soviet Union from the League of 
Nations under Article 16(4)144. 
If the above practice of the organs of the League of Nations is 
considered vi. s ä is the reply of the Special Committee of jurists in the 
aftermath of the Corfu Incident it may be concluded that though the latter 
was very ambiguous, it had virtually left the question open. Although in 
subsequent situations of international crises the existence of resort to war 
under Article 12 was not pronounced, acts of force short of war did create 
marked concern among the members- of the League and were by no means 
deemed to justify the action of their authors145 
. 
In the Graeco 
- 
Bulgarian 
dispute, Mr. Briand, commenting on the plea of self 
- 
defence advanced by 
Greece said the following: 
" 
... 
Under the pretext of legitimate defence, disputes might arise which, though 
limited in extent, were extremely unfortunate owing to the damage they entailed. These 
disputes, once they had broken out, might assume such proportions that the Government, 
which started them under a feeling of legitimate defence would be no longer able to control 
them. The League of Nations, through its Council, and through all the methods of 
conciliation which were at its disposal, offered the nations a means of avoiding such 
deplorable events 
... 
"1'tb. 
On Dec. 10,1931 after the adoption of a resolution by the League 
Council with regard to the Sinn 
- 
Japanese conflict in Manchuria 
, 
the 
President thereof said that " 
... 
except in the case of an express stipulation 
in treaties in force the Covenant of the League of Nations, does not 
authorise a State, however well founded its grievances against another 
State to seek redress by methods other than the pacific methods set forth in 
Article 12 of the Covenant... "147. When the Assembly of the League 
43 L. N. O. J. 1939, pp. 531,539. 
144 Ibid. p. 506. 
145 See L. N. O. J. 1031, p. 2378. The President of the Council of the League stated the 
following after the adoption of the resolution of 10 December 1931: "Since then, though 
there has not been resort to war within the meaning of Article 12 of the Covenant, there 
have unfortunately been acts of hostility". Also see Q. Wright, 26 A. J. I. L. 362 (1932), p. 
368. 
14 L. N. O. J. 192-5 II 
, 
p. 1709. 
14' L. N. O. J. 1931, p. 2378. 
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adopted the Lytton report on Feb. 24,1933 it was stated that "the adoption 
of measures of self-defence does not exempt a State from complying with 
the provisions of Article 12 of the Covenant"] 47 
. 
The incompatibility of 
the unilateral resort to force for the settlement of disputes with Article 12 
of the Covenant was also stated by the Council in its report on the Italo- 
Ethiopian conflict148 and by the Assembly of the League with regard to the 
Russo-Finish conflict149 
Although all the above illustrations were connected with invasion 
of territory aiming at adjustments of the territorial status quo by the use of 
force and in violation of Articles 10 and 19 of the Covenant, it is submitted 
that the references to the recourse to the pacific settlement procedure of 
Articles 12,13 and 15 as being the due process in cases of disputes between 
States, is not at all irrelevant to a general consideration of the state of law 
with regard to the compatibility of acts of force with the Covenant of the 
League without prior recourse to the procedure of Articles 12,13 and 15 
and as such it should not be considered strictly in connection with 
territorial aggrandisement alone. It is also evidence that the practice of 
States through their participation in the organs of the League was 
gradually moving from the technical distinction between de jure war and 
acts of force short of war with regard to the legality of the latter under the 
Covenant of the the League of Nations. Indeed, it began to be realized that 
the term war was not absolute in International law and that no definition 
thereof was universally admitted150. In fact as long as a state of war could 
be brought about either by the author of the forcible acts 
-through a 
declaration of war or an ultimatum dependent thereon- or by the victim 
of the said acts by repelling force by force, or by third States whose interests 
might be affected by an armed conflict short of war in the legal sense, a 
state of war was as much fiction as it was a horrific reality. It entailed the 
disruption of the inter-State relations, which could be brought about so 
very precipitately, and that possibility urged the organs of the League of 
Nations and the States participating therein to start focusing their 
attention and concern on acts of force short of war. 
After the Corfu. incident there has been only one clear-cut case of 
reprisal, namely, the bombardment of the Spanish port of Almeria by 
147 27 A. I. I. L. Suppi. 145 (1933). 
148 30 A. J. I. L. Suppl. 39 (7936). 
149 L. N. O. J. 1939, p. 539; also see L. N. O. J. 1933, pp. 599-609 (the Leticia dispute between 
Colombia and Peru). 
150 Waldock, 81 H. R. C. 455 (1952 II), p. 472. 
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German warships in May 1937 as a measure of reprisal for the bombing of 
the German cruiser Deutschland by the Republican Air 
- 
Force152 
. 
The 
military occupation of the Ruhr valley in 1923 by the French and Belgian 
armed forces was regarded mainly as a question of interpretation of 
treaties because it involved the interpretation of Article 428 of the Treaty 
of Versailles 1919153. Furthermore, the legality of pacific blockade was 
challenged in the period under discussion. There were two instances of 
pacific blockade in State practice: (i) the blockade of Soviet Russia by the 
Allied Powers in 1919, the legality of which was somehow disputed by the 
Allied Supreme Council and (ii) the blockade of the Chinese coast by Japan 
in 1937 which seemed to have been regarded as simply a part of the hostile 
activity of Japan in the area and not as an individual act of reprisal154. 
Moreover, if the delphic reply of the Committee of jurists is considered 
according to the view taken by Lauterpacht155 it can be concluded that the 
members of the League of Nations were prima facie more sensitive 
towards the acquisition of territory by way of armed force- this 
conspicuously reflected in the course of the work of the League with 
reference to the disputes brought before it. However, this author's 
submission for the beginning of an evolution in State practice is a fortiori 
strengthened by the attempts both within and outside the League for an 
improvement of the regulation of the use of force and of the system of 
pacific settlement of disputes. 
3. (ii). Attempts towards a more elaborate regulation of the use of 
force 
. 
The Covenant of the League of Nations by introducing provisions 
to regulate resort to war and machinery and procedure for the peaceful 
settlement of disputes marked an innovation which stood against and 
seemed to qualify the customary law of the period which admitted an 
unlimited right to wage war. Prima facie the stipulations in the Covenant 
were characterized by a procedure the breach of which would owe its 
illegality to a violation of a treaty obligation rather than the violation of 
152 Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 2, p. 222 n. 1. 
153 Ibid. 342-3. 
154 Ibid. pp. 223-4. 
155 Id. 28 A. J. I. L. 43 (1934) 
. 
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duties laid down by general International law156. However, it soon 
became clear that acts of force by way of reprisals might escape illegality 
under the Covenant, as it was the case in the Corfu incident and at the 
same time it was realized that such acts could very precipitately evolve 
into a maior conflict which was likely to bring about a state of war 
-e. g. the 
settlement of the Graecc*-Bulgarian dispute. The above facts prompted the 
Council of the League to pursue a conciliatory function under Articles 11 
and 15 rather than a "police" function under Article 16 of the Covenant. 
On the other hand it focused its attention on acts of force and the 
prevention of the aggravation of disputes rather than the determination 
of the existence of a state of war. Moreover, the Covenant was the source 
of and inspiration of the need for a more elaborate regulation of resort to 
armed force and thus a series of attempts was initiated in the forms of 
resolutions of the League Assembly 
, 
Draft treaties of Mutual Assistance, 
treaties for the pacific settlement of disputes15' 
. 
The practice of States 
elevated self-defence, especially after the conclusion of the Pact of Paris in 
1928, as the only justification for resort to force and at the same time 
attempts were made to illegalise all other forms of resort to armed force 
under the terms of aggressive war, war of aggression, acts of aggression, or 
simply aggression. Still the main realization, at least with regard to the 
conclusion of international treaties during this period, was the fact that 
mere limitation of the use of force would be meaningless without a 
parallel development of a machinery for the peaceful settlement of 
disputes. This development in the treaty practice will be the object of our 
consideration in this section. 
. 
3. (ii). a. The Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance (1923) 158 
. 
The Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance aimed at the improvement 
of the sanctions system contemplated in Article 16 after it had become 
apparent by the interpretative resolutions of the 2nd Assembly159, that 
member States did not consider themselves bound to take automatic 
action tu implement Article 16160. 
1' Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 93, p. 66. 
157 Ibid. p. 67. 
158 Text in L. N. O. J. 1923 Spec. Suppl. No 6; A 1923 C M, pp. 203-6. 
159 Reports and Resolutions on the Subject of Article 16 of the Covenant, Doc. A 14 1927 v, p. 
43. 
160 Wehberg op. cit. supra n. 116, p. 15. 
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Article 1 of the Draft Treaty provided: 
The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare that aggressive war is an 
international crime and severally undertake that no one of them will be guilty of its 
commission. A war shall not be considered as a war of aggression if waged by a state which 
is a party to a dispute and has accepted the unanimous recommendation of the Council, the 
verdict of the Permanent Court of International justice or an Arbitral award against a High 
Contracting Party which has not accepted it, provided, however, that the first state does 
not intend to violate the political independence or the territorial integrity of the High 
Contracting Party. 
Moreover, the question of determining the aggressor was to be left 
to the League Council that had to establish the aggressor within four 
days160 
. 
The provision of Article 1 was in harmony with the Covenant in 
that it assumed the legality of war as a method of settlement and it was 
more explicit than the Covenant on two matters, namely, that unlike 
Article 15 of the Covenant it made clear that the terms of any settlement 
might be enforced by war and that it attempted to stipulate the illegality of 
war waged in violation of the provisions for peaceful settlement such war 
constituting an "international crime"1'i1 
The treaty, did not meet with approval and did not come into force 
its rejection being dependent on political considerations with regard to 
questions of securittiy and disarmament and not on any dissent from the 
characterization of aggressive war162 
. 
3. (ii). b. The Geneva Protocol (1924)163 
The object of the Protocol was again the provision of mutual 
guarantees against aggression but by contrast to the Draft Treaty of Mutual 
assistance, the security system was coupled with a system of obligatory 
resort to peaceful means of settlement of disputes. According to the 
preamble a war of aggression164 constituted a violation of the solidarity of 
the members of the international community and an international crime. 
In Article 2 the signatories agreed not to have resort to war in any case, 
166 ibicL p_ 16, 
161 Browrelie op. cit. supra n. 93, p. 69. 
162 ibid, r. t. 2. 
163 Text in L. N. O. ). Spec. Suppl. No 24 (1924), Annex 18, pp. 136-140. 
164 The term has created a great deal of controversy in relation to its content and definition. 
Attempts to define aggression started in the period of the League of Nations and were 
concluded in 1974 with the adoption by consensus of the United Nations Definition of 
Aggression which is appended to G. A. Res. 3314 (XXIX) of 1974. 
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either among themselves or against any State which in a given case would 
accept all the obligations set out in the Protocol, with the following 
exceptions: " 
... 
in case of resistance to acts of aggression or when acting in 
agreement with the Council or the Assembly of the League of Nations in 
accordance with the provisions of the Covenant and of the present 
Protocol". Article 8 stipulated that the signatories would abstain from any 
act that might constitute a threat of aggression against another State, while 
Articles 4-7 contained detailed provisions for the pacific settlement of 
disputes. In Article 10 formal criteria for the determination of the 
aggressor were provided; thus, every State which resorted to war in 
violation of the undertakings contained in the Covenant or in the 
Protocol was an aggressor. Moreover, a presumption of aggression in the 
absence of a unanimous decision of the League Council was established in 
the case of an outbreak of hostilities and a refusal by a State to submit the 
dispute to pacific settlement or to comply with an award or a Council 
recommendation or, lastly, in case of a refusal or violation of an armistice 
proposed by the Council. There was no provision for direct military 
assistance but in general it was more elaborate than the Covenant in that 
respect. The dominant idea of the Protocol was that peace should be 
primarily guarantied by a pact binding on all States. Unfortunately, Great 
Britain refused to accept these general guarantees of security beyond the 
obligations she had already undertaken under the Covenant. Finally, the 
Protocol did not receive the ratifications necessary and did not come into 
effect. However, its value as a precedent is not negligible for forty-eight 
States recommended its ratification in the Assembly, nineteen members of 
the League signed the Protocol and two ideas were advanced thereby, 
namely, the prohibition of offensive warfare and arbitration. It is worth 
pointing out that with regard to the latter there had been an acceleration 
in the movement of arbitration which was inspired by the Protocol. Lastly, 
it is interesting that Article 2 of the Protocol was reminiscent of the regime 
introduced by Article 2(4)(5) of the United Nations Charter. 
3. (ii). c. The Lccarntr Treati^- (1925) 166 
. 
The treaties, concluded at the Locarno Conference constitute a 
special guarantee arrangement and their significance lies in their 
influence on the development of arbitration and conciliation in the 
IM Text in 20 A. J. L. Suppl. 27 (7926). See also infra Part Two, Ch. 12, Second Title. 
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practice of States. The most significant instrument for our present study 
was the treaty of mutual guarantee between Germany, Belgium, France, 
Great Britain and Italy. Article 2 provided that Germany on the one hand 
and France and Belgium on the other agreed not to attack, invade or resort 
to war against each other except in cases of (1) the exercise of the right of 
legitimate self-defence, that is resistance to a violation of the undertaking 
not to attack, invade, resort to war or to a flagrant breach of Articles 42 or 
43 of the Treaty of Versailles, if such breach constituted an unprovoked act 
of aggression and by reason of the assembly of armed forces in the 
demilitarized zone immediate action was necessary166 ; (2) action by virtue 
of Article 16 of the Covenant and (3) action as a result of a decision by the 
Assembly or the Council of the League in pursuance of Article 15(7), 
provided that in the latter situation the action was directed against a State 
which was the first to attack. Article 3 provided obligations for peaceful 
settlement of disputes. Article 5 of the treaty of Mutual Guarantee 
provided for immediate military assistance to the victim of flagrant attack 
even if the Council of the League had not yet convened167. 
The importance of the Locarno treaties seems to be somehow 
diminished by the phrase "unprovoked act of aggression" in Articles 2 and 
4(3) in so far as it introduced the vague concept of provocation with regard 
to action taken against a flagrant violation of Articles 42 and 43 of the 
Treaty of Versailles and the assistance to be rendered to the victim of such 
violation or a violation of Article 2 of the treaty168. Moreover, 
provocation offered a very convenient opportunity to the signatories of 
such treaties to escape responsibilities thereunder. Nevertheless a review 
of State practice has shown that the Locarno treaties constituted the 
exception in the treaty practice after 1920 with regard to the notion of 
provocation which gradually became obsolete in the post-First World War 
period169 
. 
3. (ii). d. Resolutions of the Assembly of the League of Nations 
. 
166 This could be cited as an example of anticipatory self-defence. See infra Part Two, Ch. 
9, First Title. 
167 See infra Part Two, Ch. 10. 
168 See supra p. 
169 See Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 93, pp. 227-8. 
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The Sixth Assembly of the League adopted a Resolution170 on 
Sept. 25,1925 according to which "a war of aggression" constituted an 
"international crime". This resolution did not mean to establish new law 
and, indeed, this might have been the reason for the 1st Commission of 
the Assembly to note that unhappily the notion that the war of aggression 
was an international crime had not yet entered positive law. 
The Eighth Assembly adopted unanimously on Sept. 24,1927 a 
resolution proposed by the Polish delegation according to which: "(1) All 
wars of aggression are and shall always be prohibited; (2) Every pacific 
means must be employed to settle disputes of every description, which 
may arise between States. The Assembly declares that the member States of 
the League are under the obligation to conform to these principles". 
Whether the resolution created any legal obligations to member States or 
not is a matter of controversy. The preparatory work of the resolution 
cannot be said to support the view that the resolution created any legal 
obligationl71 
. 
Furthermore, a large number of writers took the view that 
it had moral significance only172 
, 
while others relying on the wording of 
the resolution suggested that the instrument created legal obligations for 
the members of the Leaguer 73 
. 
It is interesting to point out that in its 
Advisory Opinion in the Railway Traffic Between Lithuania and Poland 
the P. C. I. J. held that as the representatives of Lithuania and Poland 
participated in the adoption of a resolution of the Council of the League, 
the two parties were bound by their acceptance of the Council's resolution 
that constituted an engagement between them174, which shows that it was 
not unknown for a resolution of an organ of the League to be binding 
upon the States that assented to it. Another issue raised by the resolution 
was whether it permitted resort to war after recourse to means of pacific 
settlement of disputes had been had. The suggestion behind the wording 
of the resolution was that it did, provided that every pacific means had 
been exhausted and that it referred to wars already prohibited by the 
Covenant175 
. 
170 Wehberg op. cit. summa n. 116 
, 
pp, 41-2; Brownlie p. 71. 
171 Brownlie p. 72. 
172 See Wehberg op. cit. supra n. 116, p. 42; Calogeropoulos-Stratis, Le Pacte General de 
Renonciation ü la Guerre, 1931, pp. 39-41,45-6; Stone op. cit. supra n. 18, p. 325; Brownlie p. 
72 n. 3. 
173 Oppenheim op. cit. supra n. 116, p. 180; Francois, 66 H. R. C. 5 (1938 IV), p. 260; 
Brownlie pp. 72-3. 
174 P. C. I. J. Series A/B No 45, p. 116; 6 I. L. R. 403 (1932), at p. 405. 
175 See Wehberg op. Cit. supra n. 116, p. 43; Brownlie p. 73. 
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3. (ii). e. The Report by de Brouckere. Recommendations of the 
Committee of the Council concerning Article 11 176 
. 
The Belgian delegate de Brouckere submitted to a special 
Committee set up by the League Council, a memorandum with regard to 
the methods or regulations tending to speed the elaboration of the 
decisions to be taken by the Council for putting into effect the obligations 
of the Covenant. The said memorandum was relied upon by the 
Committee of the Council for the establishment of the recommendations 
concerning Article 11 of the Covenant on March 15,1927177. De Brouckere 
stressed the importance of Article 11 rather than of Article 16 of the 
Covenant by arguing that between the first act of hostilities and the real 
beginning of war there was usually a rather long interval which the 
League of Nations should utilize for the sake of peace. Moreover according 
to the view of the German Government which was stated in the 
Committee of arbitration and security war could not be prevented by 
preparing war against war, but only by removing its causes178 
. 
Indeed, this 
had been the aim of the Council of the League which had been successfully 
achieved in the Graeco-Bulgarian dispute in 1925. Despite the term 
"recommendations" in the document of the Committee and the fact that 
mainly threats of war were contemplated there seemed to exist a distinct 
tendency among the members of the League to regard the prevention of 
acts of force short of war more important for the maintenance of 
international peace and security than the suppression of a state of war 
through the application of Article 16 of the Covenant and as we have 
submitted supra in this chapter, this marks the beginning of the 
abandonment of the technical state of war doctrine as a conclusive factor 
for the regulation of the use of force between States, which found its 
formal completion in the general prohibition of the use of force of Article 
2(4) of the United Nations Charter. 
3. (ii). f. The Resolution of the Sixth International Conference of American 
States, Feb. 18,1928 
. 
176 Wehberg pp. 53-8. 
177 Ibid. p. 136. 
178 Ibid. p. 55. 
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According to the said resolution "The Sixth International 
Conference of American States considering that war of aggression 
constitutes an international crime against the human species: Resolved: 
(1) All aggression is considered illicit and as such is declared prohibited. (2) 
The American States will employ all pacific means to settle conflicts which 
may arise between them"179 
In another resolution in which the American republics condemned 
war as an instrument of national policy, the Conference adopted obligatory 
arbitration for the solution of their international differences of a juridical 
character180 
. 
With regard to the legal effect of the resolution it has been 
argued that it was binding and that it had the validity of a precedent181 or 
that it stated what the law was though not creating it182. However, its real 
weakness lay with the problem of defining aggression and it was also 
stressed by the failure of the Conference to adopt a resolution on the 
inadmissibility of intervention in the internal affairs of States183 
. 
4. The General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of 
National Policy 
. 
4. (i). General Considerations 
. 
The General Treaty for the Renunciation of War or Pact of Paris or 
Kellogg-Briand Pact was signed in Paris on August 27,1928 and it is 
viewed in connection with the attempt to improve the regime of the 
Covenant with regard to the regulation of the use of force and the 
maintenance of international peace and security which, until the Pact of 
Paris, had taken the form of condemnation of war of aggression as a 
criminal breach of international peace184. The Pact of Paris became 
binding on sixty four States, virtually the entirety of the international 
community, and due to the fact that it was concluded outside the 
framework of the League of Nations, it survived the demise of the latter 
remaining in full force 185 
. 
179 Text in Brownlie pp. 73-4. 
180 Ibis 
181 Wehberg p. 72; Oppenheim op. cit. supra n. 116, p. 181. 
182 Brownlie p. 74. 
183 Ibid. 
184 Brierly, Some Implications of the Pact of Paris, 10 B. Y. I. L. 208 (1929), p. 208. 
185 See Bowman & Harris (eds. ), Multilateral Treaties, Index, 1984, pp. 75-6. At present. 66 
States are parties to the Pact of Paris. Of these, Antigua and Dominica acceded to the Pact 
in 1988. 
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The Pact of Paris has the merit of being concise and brief in its 
provisions. The essence of the Pact is embodied in the Preamble and the 
first two of its three Articles, which read as follows: 
The High Contracting Parties persuaded that the time has come when a frank 
renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy should be made to the end that the 
peaceful and friendly relations now existing between their peoples may be perpetuated; 
Convinced that all the changes in their relations with one another should be 
sought only by pacific means and be the result of a peaceful and orderly process, and that 
any signatory Power which shall hereafter seek to promote its national interests by resort 
to war should be denied the benefits furnished by this Treaty. 
Article 1 
The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples 
that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and 
renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another. 
Article 11 
The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or the solution of all the disputes 
or conflicts of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be 
sought except by pacific means18 
The Pact Evas originally proposed by the French Foreign Minister, A. 
Briand as a bilateral treaty between France and the U. S. A. In reply the U. S. 
Secretary of State, Mr F. Kellogg, counter-proposed that a greater 
contribution to world peace would be achieved if the proposed treaty 
obtained the adherence of the principal world Powers to a declaration 
renouncing war as an instrument of national policy and the American 
proposal was eventually accepted by France. A long diplomatic 
correspondence then followed which is of the highest importance for the 
interpretation of the Pact of Paris. An initial French proposal that only 
"wars of aggression" should be renounced was opposed to by the 
American side; in his reply to the French Government on Feb. 27,1928, Mr 
Kellogg asserted that an unqualified renunciation of war as an instrument 
of national policy was compatible with the Covenant of the League of 
Nations and at the same time avoided the difficulties in defining the 
aggressor. The French Government in its reply of March 30,1928, insisted 
on three points, namely, that the renunciation of war would not impair 
the right of legitimate defence, the obligations of France under the 
Covenant of the League as well as her obligations under the treaties of 
Locarno and the various agreements of neutrality and guarantee to which 
she was a party. Mr Kellogg replied that the renunciation of war would not 
impair the right of legitimate defence and eventually both the French and 
186 94 L. N. T. S. 57, U. K. Treaty Series 1929, No 29. 
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the U. S. Governments severally submitted Notes and drafts of the 
proposed treaty to the British, German, Italian and Japanese Governments. 
The French draft contained an express reference to self-defence "within 
the framework of existing treaties" and a definition of war as an 
instrument of national policy whereas the American draft which 
eventually prevailed, did not. Finally the treaty was presented by the U. S. 
Government to fourteen States on June 23,1928. The parties signed the 
treaty on condition of the right of self-defence and the other undertakings 
under the Covenant and the Locarno treaties not being impaired188. 
Before dealing with the legal character of the treaty the present 
author would like to point out two characteristics of the Pact with a certain 
degree of political importance. First, the Pact of Paris was primarily laid 
out and its terms were clarified by the principal world Powers, and it was 
only subsequently presented, both the draft treaty and the diplomatic 
exchanges until the 23 June 1928, to the other States which were requested 
to participate. Secondly, it achieved minimizing the consequences of the 
U. S. non-participation in the League of Nation-, by linking her with the 
League system189. 
4. (ii). The Legal Character and the Meaning of the Pact of Paris 
. 
The Pact of Paris is an international treaty which was negotiated 
rather meticulously, signed and ratified by its signatories. Nevertheless 
same jurists disputed the legal character of the Pact on grounds of 
generality and vagueness of its terms, which according to their view 
attributed only moral value to it; of the lack of explicit qualification with 
regard to the renunciation of war; of the existence of reservations to it and 
the absence of any provision for sanctions in the nature of mutual 
assistance and armed action to suppress any violation of the Pact190. 
188 For an account of the diplomatic background of the Pact of Paris see F. Kellogg, The War 
Prevention Policy of the U. S. A., 22 A. J. I. L. 253 (1928) ; Mandelstam, L' Interpretation du 
Pacte Briand-Kellogg par les gouvernements signataires et les parlements des Etats 
signataires, 40 R. G. D. I. P. 537 (1933) 
, 
p. 538 et seq.; Brownlie pp. 80-2; cf. Shotwell, War as 
an Instrument of National Policy, 7929, p. 131. 
189 Borchard, The Multilateral Treaty for the Renunciation of War, 23 A. J. I. L. 116 (1929), 
p. 118; Hunter-Miller, The Peace Pact of Paris, 1928, p. 131; Shotwell op. cit. supra n. 187, 
f4 131. 
190 See 23 A. S. I. L. Proceedings 1929, pp. 88-109; Brownlie p. 83 n. 1; Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Pal in the Trial of War Criminals in the Far East, 1956, p. 37 et seq. ; Hindmarsh op. 
cit. supra n. 116, pp. 124,167-8. 
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The majority of authors have not doubted the character of the Pact 
as a legal instrument and indeed it would seem ludicrous to do so because 
"states do not go through futile charades to create moral obligations" 190. 
The contention of the lack of a sanctions or collective security system 
under the Pact of Paris seems to be self-defeating because it is not unusual 
for international treaties to provide for no sanctions in case of violation of 
their terms191 
. 
A very interesting issue regarding the interpretation of the Pact lies 
with the so-called reservations submitted by the signatories during the 
negotiations. Apart from the declaration of the British Government which 
created most of the controversy and concentrated express reactions by 
some States, there is general agreement that the declarations expressed 
during the diplomatic correspondence preceding the conclusion of the Pact 
constitute an integral part of the latter in that they are conclusive of the 
intention of the parties and form the most authoritative interpretation of 
the treaty792 
. 
These statements were nothing else but a restatement of Mr 
Kellogg's clarifications in the Note of June 23,1928, and they led to the 
undertaking of the same obligations as it would have been the case had 
they been part of the text of the Pact, as in fact was the case with the French 
draft. Moreover they did not contravene the U. S. Note by advancing 
contradictory explanations which would result in the limitation or 
modification of the effect of the treaty with regard to its application as 
between the party formulating the reservation and the other signatories193 
. 
The term "reservation" seems justifiable only insofar it describes a 
condition for the acceptance of the treaty as it was proposed by the U. S. 
Government and it does not refer to the essential context of the 
declarations which did not derogate from the U. S. proposal. 
The most important issue raised by the Pact of Paris is the scope in 
which unilateral resort to force by States was regulated thereunder. By 
virtue of Article I of the treaty the signatories condemned recourse to war 
for the solution of international controversies and renounced it as an 
instrument of national policy. Furthermore, under Article II the parties to 
190 Brownhe p. 83. Also see Descamps, 31 H. R. C. 399 (1931) 1), pp. 456-9. 
191 See Q. Wright, The Meaning of the Pact of Paris, 27 A. I. I. L. 39 (1933), p. 41. 
192 Brownlie p. 84; Shotwell op. cit. sul-n-a n. 187, p. 187 et seq. ; Hunter-Miller op. cit. 
supra n. 188, p. 121; Mandelstam, 40 R. G. D. I. P. 537 (1933), p. 554; id. L' Interpretation du 
Pacte par les organs de la Societe des Nations, 42 R. G. D. I. P. 241 (1935), p. 282; Lauterpacht, 
Les Travau\ Preparatoires et L' interpretation des Traites, 48 H. R. C. 713 (1934 11), p. 809. 
Cf. Wehberg p. 75. 
193 See McNair, The Lm, of Treaties, 1961, p. 158. 
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the Pact undertook to settle all the disputes or conflicts of whatever nature 
or whatever origin they might be and which might arise among them 
only by pacific means because as it is stated in the Preamble, there was the 
conviction that all changes in the relations among signatories should be 
the result of a peaceful and orderly process. 
There are two possible interpretations as to the ambit of the Pact of 
Paris in relation with the use of force by States: 
(1) The first one would rely on the fact that according to the wording 
of the Pact only war was condemned and renounced, and war under the 
customary law of the period was given a rather restrictive meaning, 
namely that of a state of war. Consequently measures short of war like 
reprisals and intervention would not be prohibited by the Pact and 
furthermore they could survive the stipulation of Article II about the 
employment of pacific means for the settlement of disputes, because 
reprisals were deemed to be "pacific" in character; lastly the above 
interpretation could be supported by the controversy created by the reply of 
the Committee of Jurists in the aftermath of the Corfu incident with 
regard to the effect of the League Covenant on the use of force short of 
war'95. 
(2) The second possible interpretation with reference to the effect of 
the Pact of Paris on the use of force would be that the General Treaty 
outlawed war as well as armed force short of war196 
. 
The matter is quite 
controversial in view of the contention over the term "war" in the 
Covenant and the little guidance offered by the preparatory works of the 
Pact197. 
Nevertheless, if by preparatory work only the preceding diplomatic 
correspondence is to be understood, then it can be inferred that, in view of 
the express pronouncements of the signatories with regard to the right of 
self-defence (that subsisted under the Treaty), defensive action was the 
only instance of unilateral resort to force short of war that 
195 Waldock, 91 1-1J 
. 
C. 455 (1952 11), pp. 473-4; Hindmarsh op. cit. supra n. 116, p. 124; 
Lauterpacht, The Pact of Paris and the Budapest Articles of Interpretation, 20 Grot. Soc. 
Proc. 178 (1934) ; Stone op. cit. supra n. 109, p. 300 but cf. p. 286; Bowett, Self-Defence in 
International Laug, 1958, p. 136; Cf. Descamps, 31 H. R. C. 399 (1930 I), p. 464 
. 196 See Q. Wright, 26 A. J. I. L. 362 (1932) ; id. 27 A. J. I. L. 39 (1933), p. 52; Giraud loc. cit. 
supra n. 92, pp. 817-820; Hunter-Miller op. cit. supra n. 188, p. 95; McNair, Collective 
Security, 17 B. Y. I. L. 150 (1936), p. 157; Brierly, 4 Camb. L. J. 308 (1932), pp. 314-5; id. 10 
B. Y. I. L. 208 (1929), pp. 208-9; id. The Law of Nations, 6th ed. by Waldock 1963, p. 412; de 
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had been really contemplated. If the signatories had regarded the 
customary law of the 19th century as being in full force in 1928 then they 
would not have stressed their concern about self-defence being excepted, 
in fact they would not have taken any pains at all to clarify this exception. 
It is also significant that the declarations were made in terms of the "right 
of legitimate defence" without linking the latter to the term "war" at all- 
for instance, "war" in self-defence. 
The contention that reprisals were pacific means for the settlement 
of disputes implied a rather bizarre concept of the term pacific: It was not 
the character of the measures applied for the settlement of a particular 
dispute that really was important but the fact that the application of such 
measures did not disrupt the state of peace by bringing about a state of war. 
This contention may have been compatible with the Pact of Paris, had the 
phrase "... that all changes in their relations with one another should be 
sought only by pacific means and be the result of a peaceful and orderly 
process... " not appeared in the Preamble of the Treaty. The use of force 
short of war between the signatories of the Pact for the settlement of their 
disputes, could hardly have been described as an orderly process79% 
. 
Moreover, the contention that the Pact provided only for the change in 
relations and not for the enforcement of existing legal relations198 does 
not take into consideration the stipulation of Article II that the settlement 
of all disputes 
, 
of whatever origin, should not be sought but by pacific 
means only, as well as the statement in the Preamble that war is 
renounced as an instrument of national policy "to the end that the 
peaceful and friendly relations now existing between their peoples may be 
perpetuated". Indeed, it would be hard to conceive how the above 
statement could have been fulfilled in good faith if reprisals and generally 
the use of force short of war were to subsist. The use of armed force by way 
of reprisals was not considered under customary international law to 
create a rupture of peaceful relations 
- 
that is of the state of peace 
- 
between 
States, but due to their inherent hostile character it was doubtful whether 
the States, as a whole, against which they were directed, (i. e., the public 
opinion therein and the Government thereof) would consider themselves 
to be in peaceful relations with the author of a pacific blockade or a 
bombardment. It has been suggested that the admissibility of the 
lawfulness of reprisals as "pacific means" for the settlement of disputes 
197 Brierly, 4 Camb. L. J. 308 (1932), p. 314. 
198 Oppenheim op. cit. supra n. 196. 
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under the Pact of Paris would "approach the bounds of credibility" due to 
the fact that the terns "pacific means" in the Pact "has a comprehensive 
character indicated by its reference to all disputes or conflicts of whatever 
nature or of whatever origin they may be" 200. This view is supported by 
the declarations of some States both upon their adherence to the Pact and 
their view of the latter as signatories thereof. When Switzerland adhered 
to the Pact of Paris the Swiss Federal Council stated in the communication 
of adherence that pacific means were to be understood as those which 
were usually employed in the peaceful settlement of disputes such as 
conciliation, mediation and arbitration, and this view was not objected to 
by the other signatories201 
. 
In 1933, Mr Litvinov, the Soviet delegate at the 
Disarmament Conference, stated that renunciation of war did not mean 
only renunciation of the right to declare or wage war in the formal sense 
but equal renunciation of all military operations and all acts of violence 
against another State202. 
Moreover, references to the Pact of Paris with regard to acts of force 
short of war were made by signatories thereto both outside and within the 
League of Nations, in the latter case in their capacity as, members of the 
organs thereof. 
In the conflict between the Soviet Union and China in 1929 the 
U. S. A. reminded both parties of their obligations under the Pact of Parise03 
In the Sino-Japanese conflict in Manchuria in 1931, A. Briand, the 
Acting President of the Council of the League, stated that the responsibility 
of a member of the League for not seeking redress for grievances against 
another State except by pacific means was reaffirmed in the Pact of Paris204 
. 
The Assembly of the League in its resolution of March 11,1932 with 
regard to the Sino-Japanese conflict, considered that "(1)..... (2) The 
undertaking entered into by members of the League of Nations to respect 
and preserve as external aggression the territorial integrity and existing 
political independence of all members of the League; (3) Their obligation 
to submit any dispute which may arise between them to procedures for 
peaceful settlement 
..... 
are in full harmony with the Pact of Paris which is 
200 Brownlie p. 86. 
201 Ibid. pp. 87-8 
202 Political Committee seance du 15 Fevrier 1933, Proces verbaux, p. 2, reference in 
Brownlie p. 88. 
203 Brownlie supra n. 114. Cf. Mandelstam, 42 R. G. D. I. P. 247 (1935), p. 288. 
204 L. N. O. J. 1931, p. 2378. 
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one of the cornerstones of the peace organisation of the world"; and in the 
operative part of the same resolution it was proclaimed that it was 
"incumbent upon members not to recognize any situation treaty or 
agreement which might be brought about by means contrary to the 
Covenant of the League or the Pact of Paris"205. 
The Stimson doctrine of non-recognition was also partly based on the Pact 
of Paris. In the Leticia dispute between Colombia and Peru the League 
Council adopted a report whereby the presence of Peruvian forces in 
Colombian territory was incompatible with the principles of the Covenant 
and the Pact of Paris206 
. 
On Nov 4,1932 the Chairman of the Commission of Neutrals 
which was established in 1931 with a view to the settlement of the dispute 
between Bolivia and Paraguay over the Chaco territory, issued a Note that 
linked the declaration of nineteen American States of August 3,1932 ( 
related to the Chaco war), that proclaimed the non-recognition of either 
any territorial settlement not obtained by peaceful means or any 
acquisition of territory effected through occupation or conquest by force of 
arms, with the Pact of Paris 20' 
In the Italo-Ethiopian dispute of 1935, the report of the Committee of Six 
which was adopted by the Council of the League, referred to the Pact of 
Paris208 
. 
References to the Pact of Paris were also made during the so- 
called "China incident" of 1937 209. 
During the Czechoslovak crisis in September 1938 the U. S. 
President, F. D. Roosevelt referred to the obligations of the Pact in a 
message sent to the Prime Ministers of Britain and France, Hitler and 
President Benes210 
. 
In the Russo-Finish dispute in 1939 the Pact of Paris 
was cited by the Assembly of the League in its condemnation of the Soviet 
action211 
Lastly, when Britain and France communicated to the League of Nations 
that a state of war existed between them and Germany, they 
205 League of Nations Supplement, 101-110,1932-33, p. 87. 
206 L. N. O. J. 1933, pp. 599-609. 
207 Hackworth, Digest of International Law, vol. vi, pp. 45-47. 
208 L. N. O. J. 1935, pp. 1223-6; 30 A. J. I. L. Suppi. 50-2 (1936) 
. 209 Brownlie p. 78. 
210 Ibid. p. 79. 
211 L. N 
. 
O. J. 1939, p. 539. 
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declared that by committing an act of aggression against Poland ( which 
was initiated without the prior existence of a "state of war" between 
Poland and Germany), Germany had violated her obligations under the 
the Pact of Paris211 
. 
By contrast, the treaty was not invoked in the incorporation of 
Austria and Czechoslovakia by Germany in 1938 and 1939 respectively, 
that of Albania by Italy in 1939 as well as in the invasion of Poland by the 
Soviet Union in 1939, probably due to the absence of actual hostilities in 
all the above instances. It is, nevertheless, accepted that in all four cases 
the obligations under the Pact of Paris were disregarded212. 
Another source of controversy in interpreting the Pact of Paris is 
found in the stipulation that war was renounced "as an instrument of 
national policy". There was no definition whatsoever of the term in the 
final text of the Treaty, and its somewhat vague meaning was pointed out 
ever since the early days of the Pact213 
. 
The only official interpretation of 
war as an instrument of national policy was attempted in the French draft 
( submitted on April 20,1928 ) according to which it meant "instrument d' 
une action politique personelle, spontanee et independente dont elles fie 
the contracting parties] prendraient 1' initiative et non d' une action dans 
laquelle elles se trouveraient entrainees par 1' application d' une traite tel 
que le Pacte de la S. D. N. ou toute autre traite enregistre a la S. D. N. "214 
. 
Moreover, the diplomatic correspondence that preceded the Pact seems to 
indicate that war was admissible and consequently it would not constitute 
an instrument of national policy if it was undertaken in self-defence or by 
virtue of the relevant provisions of the Covenant and other security 
arrangements 
-e. g. the Locarno treaties. 
The Pact of Paris was not linked to any system of economic or 
military sanctions. The only provision contemplating a case of a violation 
of the Pact was the statement in the Preamble whereby the violator 
"should be denied the benefits of furnished by this treaty". It has been 
argued that this was a superfluous provision being simply a statement of 
the rule that a State can repudiate a treaty broken by the other party215. 
211 jbid. p. 316_ 
212 Oppenheim op, cit. supra n. 116, p. 186; Brownlie pp. 88-9; cf. In Re Weizsaecker et al. 
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Was this implicit of the admissibility of waging war against the violator of 
the Pact ? The matter is rather controversial. It has been suggested both in 
theory and in State practice that failure to have recourse to means of 
peaceful settlement of disputes was incompatible with the Pact of Paris. 
Indeed the commencement of hostilities by a State which had refused 
arbitration was deemed 
, 
by some jurists, to be the conditio sine qua non 
for the qualification of that State as the aggressor2}b 
. 
Other jurists argued 
for the admissibility of war against the violator by way of argumenturn a 
contrario from the statement cited in the Preamble217 
, 
while others took 
the opposite view218 
. 
The only instance in State practice where a state of 
war was justified upon a prior violation of the Pact of Paris was that 
between Great Britain and France on one hand and Germany on the other 
in September 1939219. 
4. (iii). The Subsequent Practice of the Signatories. The Vindication of the 
Pact of Paris 
. 
According to Brownlie the best guide to the meaning of the Pact is 
the subsequent practice of the parties thereto insofar as it constitutes 
evidence of their intention and raises the issue of estoppel 
, 
and which 
leaves little doubt that the Pact was understood to prohibit any substantial 
use of armed force220. 
In several pronouncements by Governments, such as the 
Memorandum on the signature by the British Government of the 
optional clause of the Statute of the P. C. I. J., the message by President 
Hoover to the U. S. Senate on Dec. 10,1930, the speech delivered by the 
U. S. Secretary of State Stimson before the American Council of Foreign 
Relations on August 8,1932, and the communication of the Soviet 
delegation on March 7,1932, significant references were made with regard 
to the state of law on the use of force by States. These references were 
independent from texts of treaties or particular conflicts and revealed an 
216 Hunter-Miller op. cit. supra n. 188, p. 127; Shotwell op. cit. supra n. 187, p. 203. 
217 Mandelstam, 40 R_G. D. I. P. 537 (19331, p. 556; Stone op. cit. supve n. 109, p. 300; Giraud 
loc. cit. supra n. 92, p. 804; In Re Weizci. iecer- et al. 
, 
16 I. L. R. 346 (7949). 
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appears that the issue was not dealt with in the discussions of the ist Commission of the 
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219 Supra n. 211 
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acceptance of the Pact of Paris as a positive obligation221 
. 
In addition the 
treaty-making practice of the period following the conclusion of the Pact of 
Paris is of high importance. 
The Anti-War Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation (or 
otherwise, the Saavedra Lainas Pact ), signed in Rio de Janeiro in 1933 
provided in Article 1 that the parties "solemnly declare that they condemn 
wars of aggression in their mutual relations or in those with other States 
and that the settlement of disputes and controversies of any kind that may 
arise among them shall be effected only by the pacific means which have 
the sanction of International law"222. Moreover, the right of self-defence 
was reserved in a "Statement of reasons" cited in an annex of the 
Argentine draft223 
The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States 
(1933) provided in Article 8 that no State had the right to intervene in the 
internal or external affairs of other States224. 
In the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace 
(Buenos Aires, 1936) a Convention for the Maintenance, Preservation and 
Re-establishmnent of Peace was signed, and by taking consideration of the 
Pact of Paris and the Saavedra Lamas Pact, it proscribed the acquisition of 
territory by armed force; intervention in the internal and external affairs 
of States; forcible collection of pecuniary debts; and stipulated an obligation 
for the pacific settlement of disputes. Moreover an Additional Protocol 
relative to Non-Intervention was signed and it was met with no U. S. 
reservation225 
. 
A large number of bilateral treaties of Friendship and Security, 
Guarantee, Neutrality and Non-Aggression226 were signed in the period 
1925 
-39 with express references to the Pact of Paris in their Preambles or 
being reminiscent of the wording of the latter in some cases. An 
illustration of this practice is the Treaty of Non-Aggression and 
Arbitration between Greece and Romania of 1928 by which the contracting 
parties undertook not to use force against each other by way of an attack or 
invasion and not to resort to war except in cases of (1) the exercise of the 
right of self-defence, (2) action undertaken by virtue of Article 16 of the 
221 Ibid. pp. 93-5. 
222 Text in 163 L. N. T. S. 393; 28 A. J. I. L. Suppl. 79 (1934). 
223 Brownlie p. 98. 
224 Text in 165 L. N. T. S. 19; 28 A. J. I. L. Sulppl. 75 (1934). 
225 Brownlie p. 99 n. 2. 
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Covenant of the League of Nations and (3) action by virtue of a decision of 
the Assembly or the Council of the League of Nations or Article 15(7) of 
the Covenant only if in this case the action was directed against the party 
that is the first to attack227 
. 
This practice has been regarded as conclusive of the state of law in 
this period, namely, the prohibition of the use of force as an instrument of 
national policy228 
.A contention which could be directed against those 
bilateral instruments is that during the period in question there had not 
been formulated a generally accepted definition of aggression. However, it 
may be argued that the Conventions of London of 1933 provided a detailed 
definition of aggression while the Greek-Romanian treaty of non- 
aggression and arbitration attempted a definition of aggression229. 
Finally, the absence of an absolute and conclusive reference to 
"war" in the legal sense as to the regulation of or non-resort to force is of 
the greatest value in that it signified the removal from international 
instruments related to the use of force between States the principal source 
of confusion and uncertainty as to both the state and content of law. 
The Pact of Paris was not established as an authoritative instrument 
with regard to the law on the use of armed force by States until after the 
Second World War. 
The International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg held in its 
judgment that in 1939 aggressive war was illegal as a consequence of the 
Kellogg 
- 
Briand Pact230. The Tribunal supported its finding by quoting the 
U. S. Secretary of State, Stimson saying in 1932 that "... Hereafter when 
nations engage in armed conflict either one or both of them must be 
termed violators of this general treaty law...... We denounce them as law- 
breakers"231 
. 
Moreover, by contending that the law was not static, but that 
by continual evolution it followed the needs of a changing world, and that 
in many cases treaties did no more than expressed and defined for more 
accurate reference the principles of law already existing, the Tribunal 
referred to the treaty 
- 
making history which preceded the Pact 
- 
that is, the 
Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance of 1923; the Geneva Protocol of 1924; the 
227 Text in 108 L. N. T. S. 188 
. 228 Oppenheim op. cit. supra n. 116, pp. 180-1; Francois, 66 H. R. C. 5 (1938 IV), p. 260; de 
Brouckere, 50 H. R. C. 5 (1934 IV), pp. 22-3. 
229 Brownlie p. 102. 
230 The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Proceedings of the International Military 
Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany 
, 
Part 22, H. M. S. O. 1950, p. 444 et seq. 
231 Ibid. p. 445. 
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resolution of the Eighth Assembly of Sept. 24,1927; the resolution of the 
Sixth International Conference of American States of 1928 
- 
and held that 
the interpretation of the Pact applied by the Tribunal was thereby 
reinforced232 
. 
The International Military Tribunal of the Far East sitting in Tokyo 
relied on the Nuremberg judgment in order to dismiss the contentions 
that the Pact of Paris had not made war criminal233. 
In Re von Leeb et al. (The German High Command Trial) the U. S. 
Military Tribunal in Nuremberg relied on the statement in the Preamble 
of the Pact of Paris, that the signatories were "persuaded that the time has 
come when all changes in their relations with one another should be 
sought only by pacific means" and held that by entering into the Pact of 
Paris the parties thereto had considered it imperative that existing 
international relations should not be changed by force234. 
In Re Weizsaecker et al. (The Ministries Trial) the same Tribunal 
held that the renunciation of war by the Kellogg 
- 
Briand Pact was nothing 
but the ultimate step taken by that instrument after having recognized 
that wars and invasions had been in violation of International law. It is 
worth observing that the term invasion was mentioned as distinct from 
the term aggressive war235. Furthermore, in Re Hirota et al. the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo considered all the 
acts of force committed by Japan from the Manchurian Incident in 
September 1931 until the end of the Second World War in 1945 to be 
unlawful as breaches inter alia of the Kellogg 
- 
Briand Pact23h 
. 
With the exception of the Japanese attack on the Dutch East Indies 
(Indonesia) which took place under a formal state of war, because the 
Netherlands had anticipatorily declared war on Japan, all the other 
instances of Japanese use of force were not committed thereunder. The 
same also applies to all instances of resort to force by Germany, except with 
regard to the U. K., France and the U. S. A. : none of them took place under 
a formal state of war. 
232 Ibid. pp. 445-6. 
233 Brownhe pp. 172-3. 
234 15 I. L. R. 382-3 (1948). 
235 16 I. L. R. 346-4 (1949). 
236 Ibid. p. 359; see also in Re Roechling et al., 15 I. L. R. 405 (1948); In Re Zidke 
, 
ibid. p. 
417; in Re Garbe, ibid. p. 419; N. v. B. and B. v. T. 
, 
24 I. L. R. 942,964 (1957). Cf. Blue Star 
Line z'. Burmeister and Wahl (The Adelaide Star), 15 I. L. R. 421 (1948). 
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Finally, by the Resolutions 95 of Dec. 11,1946 and 177 of Nov. 21,1947 the 
General Assembly of the United Nations approved of the Charter and 
judgment of the Nuremberg Military Tribunal as an expression of general 
international law. Although General Assembly Resolution, do not create 
legal obligations it has been submitted and seems generally accepted that 
the votes and the statements by representatives in the General Assembly 
of the U. N. and subsidiary bodies provide cogent evidence of the general 
acceptance by States of particular rules of law; moreover the fact that many 
States that voted on the said Resolutions adhered to the London 
Agreement establishing the Tribunal as well as the fact that they took part 
in the prosecution estopped them from denying the nature of the 
Nuremberg Charter and judgments as part of general international laNv238 
5. The Period 1939-1945 
. 
The invasion of Poland by Nazi Germany on I September 1939, and 
the sub equeºnt state of ivar between Germany, on the one hand, and Great 
Britain and France, on the other, is widely accepted as the starting point of 
the Second World War-139 
The position of the War with respect to the collective attempt at 
preserving international peace and security through the framework of the 
League of Nations was that of the "final act" of the process of 
undermining and erosion of the League that commenced during the 
1930s. The conduct of Japan in China (1931 et seq. ), Italy in Ethiopia (1935- 
36), Germany in Austria (1938) and Czechoslovakia (1938-39), and of the 
U. S. S. R. in Finland (1939-40) repudiated everything that the League stood 
for. 
One would expect that the devastating conflict of 1939-1945 against 
the Axis Powers would be fought under the banner of unilateralism or, at 
best, by way of ephemeral alliances. Surprisingly, it was not so The idea of 
an international organisation for collective security, far from being 
abandoned, was retained and was developed in a more comprehensive 
manner. The joint Declaration of the President of the U. S. A. and 
238 Brownlie pp. 190-1,194 n. 1. 
239 The conflict acquired truly worldwide dimensions, however, only in 1941, after the 
attack against the U. S. S. R. by Germany on 22 June 1941 and the attack against the U. S. A. 
by Japan on 7 December 1941. 
c8 
the Prime Minister of Great Britain (otherwise known as the Atlantic 
Charter), of 14 August 1941, proclaimed the abandonment of unilateral 
resort to force and the " 
... 
establishment of a wider and permanent system 
of general security 
... 
"239 
. 
In the Declaration of the United Nations of 1 January 1942, the 
U. S. A., the U. K., the U. S. S. R. 
, 
China and the States at a state of war with 
Axis Powers24° subscribed to the Atlantic Charter of 14 August 1941, stated 
that they were engaged in a "common struggle" against the Axis and 
declared that they would pursue the war in cooperation with each other241 
. 
This declaration had the effect of attributing to the armed struggle of the 
anti-Axis coalition the character of a collective war of sanction242. 
It, moreover, set in train the establishment, in San Francisco in 
1945, of the United Nations Organisation whose constituent instrument, 
the Charter of the United Nations, declares in its preamble that: 
WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED 
to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime 
has brought untold sorrow to mankind, 
... 
AND FOR THESE ENDS 
... 
to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that 
armed forces shall not be used, save in the common interest 
... 
Furthermore, Article 1 of the Charter states the purposes of the 
Organisation, the first of which is stipulated in paragraph 1: 
... 
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective 
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for 
suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of peace and to bring about by peaceful 
means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or 
settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of peace 
... 
If the above provisions are read in conjunction it becomes clear that 
the use of armed force under the United Nations system is intended to be 
239 Text in 35 A. J. I. L. S»l pl. 191 (1945). 
240 Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, 
El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Poland, South Africa, Yugoslavia. 
241 Text in 36 A. J. I. L. Suppl. 191 (1942). 
242 See Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, 1963, pp. 332-3,332 n. 
3. 
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monopolised by the Organisation244. Unlike the Covenant of the League 
of Nations that prescribed a detailed process of peaceful settlement of 
disputes (Articles 12-15) failing which unilateral resort to "war" was 
admissible, the latter is exclusively reserved to the U. N. Organisation as a 
whole. What is more, the event that would give rise to collective action is, 
first, left undefined in the Charter and, secondly, its determination is 
delegated to the Security Council which has broad discretion under Article 
39 of the Charter to determine that a specific situation warrants the 
undertaking of collective action245 
This monopoly on the use of force finds its corollary, in the context 
of the United Nations, in the prohibition of the unilateral resort to force 
by States. This rule is provided in Article 2(4) of the Charter: 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity and political independence of anv State, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the t'nited Nations. 
At the same time the Members of the Organisation are under the 
obligation stipulated in Article 2(3) of the Charter to settle their disputes by 
peaceful means246 
. 
The text of Article 2(4) makes no reference to "war" 
and has thus dispensed with the disingenuous interpretation of the term 
in the Covenant of the League and the Pact of Paris. As will be seen infra 
(Chapter 3), armed reprisals are unlawful under the Charter of the United 
Nations. 
However, the sweeping prohibition has not eliminated instances of 
unilateral resort to force in the practice of States subsequent to the 
introduction of the Charter. Moreover, the advent of the political and 
military antagonism between the U. S. A. and the U. S. S. R. (otherwise 
known as the "Cold War") prevented the Security Council of the United 
Nations from discharging its primary responsibility for the maintenance 
of international peace and security. This was effected by way of exercising 
the right of negative vote (veto) invested in the Five permanent Members 
244 With the important proviso of Article 51 that admits unilateral forcible action in 
exercise of the right of individual and collective self-defence against an armed attack. See 
infra Part Two, Ch. 9. 
245 See Brierly, The Covenant and the Charter, 23 B. Y. I. L. 83 (1946), pp. 86-7; Waldock, 
The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, 87 H. R. C. 
455 (1952 11), pp. 487-9. 
246 Cf. Waldock, 87 H. R. C. 455 (7952 11), pp. 489-491. 
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of the Council that has the effect of preventing the Council from adopting 
a decision246 
. 
These facts have led to claims by certain jurists of the legal demise 
of Article 2(4) and of virtual return by States to unilateral resort to force247 
. 
The ineffectiveness, as a consequence of the "Cold War", of the 
mechanism of the United Nations for the maintenance of international 
peace is presented as the main cause of this result. It is argued in a manner 
of "fatal inevitability" that since the only reason for the stipulation of an 
overall prohibition of the use of force (namely, the use of force by the 
community as a whole) cannot function, then there is no point in 
maintaining this prohibition. It is then pointed out that States have 
continued to resort to force unilaterally despite the prohibition. 
This writer does not share the above view for two reasons: 
First, it is politically flawed to assert that the inchoate or ineffective 
character of institutional machinery of enforcement and dispute 
settlement would immediately lead to settlement of dispute by way of 
unilateral forcible action. Such claim gives to the failure of the law to 
prevent its own violation the character of the rule rather than the 
exception. As Henkin wrote it constitutes a"... judgement of the vitality 
of the law by looking only at its failures 
... 
"248. It, moreover, falsely 
assumes that the function of a police authority in every community 
constitutes the established state of affairs and a prerequisite for the 
effectiveness of the law. It is submitted that the rule is, rather, that 
individual members of the community have a duty to abide by the law 
and that the functions of police are only exceptional. Indeed, the example 
of Reisman of drawing a parallel between the United Nations during the 
Cold War and an ineffective sheriff in a town of the American "Wild 
Nest" may sound compelling and, as far as, the right of self-defence is 
concerned, it merely states the obvious with regard to international 
society. The creation of the United Nations did not presuppose or result in 
the abolition of national armies. However, there is a great difference 
24o See Article 27 of the Charter; also see N. D. White, Tile United Nations and tile 
mairºterrarrcr of international peace and security, 1990, pp. 7-9. 
247 See Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? OR: Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force 
by States, 64 809 (1970) ; Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing 
Article 2(4), 78 A. J. I. L. 642 (1984) ; id. Article 2(4): The Use of Force in Contemporary 
International Law, 78 A. S. I. L. Proceedings 74 (1984) ; id. Criteria for the Lawful Use of 
Force in International Law, 10 Yale J. I. L. 279 (1984-85). 
248 See Henkin, The Reports of the Death of Article 2(4) are Greatly Exaggerated, 65 
A. I. I. L. 544 (1971) 
. 
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between self-defence and promotion of individual interests by force. The 
latter is simply destructive of the balance of interests that the law, whether 
domestic or international, strives to achieve in a community. 
Reisman's parallel is also a non sequitur in that it is based on an 
analogy (that of the U. N. with a "sheriff") which is untrue249. A sheriff or 
a police force presupposes a superior authority that supervises its 
functions, which is non-existent in contemporary international 
community. Insofar as the collective security mechanism of the United 
Nations is concerned it has been set up by way of treaty, namely, on the 
basis of consent by States that have agreed to abide by it and have resort to 
it. That this mechanism has proved "ineffective" in practice is not a result 
of an inherent flaw in it but, rather, of the attitude of certain States 
towards it. It is submitted that to place the blame on the United Nations 
for acts that constitute a violation of its Charter amounts to the untenable 
position of substituting the validity and the rule of the law with its very 
violations. Moreover, the fact that the U. S. A., the U. S. S. R. 
, 
and to a lesser 
extent, the U. K. and France, have exercised their right of veto in the 
service of their own, rather than, community interests calls for a re- 
examination of this right, not for claims of the total inadequacy of the 
United Nations Organisation or the provision of Article 2(4), and its 
supplanting with individual vigilanteism. Finally, the assertion for return 
to unilateral resort to force, whether for the promotion of "values" or 
not250, would be destructive to the victim of force, the author of force and 
the international community at large25' 
. 
Secondly, the above view ignores the fact that the stipulation of 
Article 2(4) constitutes, apart from a treaty provision, a rule of customary 
international law that exists separately and independently from the 
Charter252 
. 
Article 2(4) is not " 
... 
the product of some momentary burst of 
enthusiasm 
... 
"253. Its introduction constitutes the culmination and part 
of a process in the practice of States that started with the conclusion of the 
Pact of Paris in 1928 and generated, until 1945, a genuine presumption 
249 See E. Lauterpacht, Aspects of the Administration of International justice, 1991, pp. 38- 
39. 
250 Reisman, 10 Yale J. I. L. 279 (1984-85), p. 281. 
251 See Falk, The Decline of Normative Restraint in International Relations, 10 Yale J. I. L. 
263 (1984-85), p. 268. 
252 See Nicaragua Case (Merits), I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, at pp. 94-97, paras 177-181. 
253 Gordon, Article 2(4) in Historical Context, 10 Yale I. I. L. 271 (1984-85), pp. 274-5. 
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against the the unilateral resort to force254 
. 
Moreover, the practice of 
States subsequent to the United Nations Charter evinces adherence to the 
rule of the prohibition of the use of force in three respects. 
(i) No State has denounced or abrogated the Charter of the United 
Nations, including Article 2(4). Gordon has rightly suggested that the 
inference that the rule of the prohibition of force does not correspond to 
actual practice " 
... 
is too subjective and fragile a criterion to replace the 
formal evidence of withdrawal of State consent 
... 
" 
, 
according to the terms 
of the Charter or the general law of treaties, " 
... 
as an indicator of the 
continuing force of treaty obligations 
... 
"255 
(ii) States have adhered to certain General Assembly Resolutions 
- 
e. g. G. A, Res. 2625 (XXV), G. A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), G. A. Res. 42/22 
- 
adopted 
by consensus, that constitute evidence of opinio juris of a customary law 
rule of non-use of force25() 
. (iii) By far more important, however, are the statements by 
Governments of States that have resorted to armed force since 1945. 
Instead of a general rule rule of admissibility of unilateral resort to force, 
and demise of Article 2(4) of the Charter, States have without exception 
resorted to justification premised on exceptions to the prohibition, most 
notably, the right of self-defence. In its Judgment on the Merits of the Case 
Concerning Alilitarj and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v. U. S. A. ) 257 the Court ruled: 
... 
In order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient 
that the conduct of States should, in general, be consistent with such rules and that 
instances of State conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally have been treated 
as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new rule. If a State acts in 
a way prima facie incompatible with a recognized rule, but it defends its conduct by 
appealing to exceptions or justifications contained within the rule itself, then whether or 
not the State's conduct is in fact justifiable on that basis, the significance of that attitude is 
to confirm rather than to weaken the rule 
... 
258 
254 See supra 
. 
Cf. I. C. J. Rep. 1986 per Judge Jennings, pp. 530-533. 
255 Gordon, 10 Yale J. I. L. 271 (1984-85), p. 275. 
256 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, at pp. 99-100,103, paras 188,195; Brownlie, Principles of Public 
international Lain, 4th ed. 1990, p. 14. Contra 
. 
Arangio-Ruiz, The United Nations 
Declaration on Friendly Relations and the System of Sources of lnterºuztional Lard, 1979. 
257 Hereinafter referred to as Nicaragua Case 
. 
258 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, at p. 98, para 186. 
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Furthermore, the rule of the non-use of force is not a rule of 
customary law simpliciter 
. 
It is a rule that has the character of ]us cogens 
in the sense that no State can contract out of it by treaty or consent259 
. 
It is, therefore, concluded that the rule of the prohibition of the use 
of force in Article 2(4) and customary international law is part and parcel 
of contemporary customary international law and discussion should 
ensue not in relation to its validity as a rule of law but rather in relation to 
the scope of its exceptions and in terms of its own formulation in the 
Charter as to the meaning of the concepts of "force", "international 
relations", "territorial integrity and political independence". 
The following Chapters in this Part of this study deal with all these 
issues. 
259 Ibid. pp. 100-1, para 190; Brow nlie op. cit. supra n. 18, p. 513. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE ACTIVITIES OF ARMED BANDS AS A VIOLATION OF THE RULE 
PROHIBITING THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES. 
1. Introduction 
. 
The prohibition of the threat or use of force stipulated in Article 2(4) 
of the United Nations Charter extends to the use of force by the land, 
naval and air forces of a State and it is at present considered to include the 
use of force by armed bands against a State [ victim State] when the said 
bands are organised for the purpose of being sent into the territory of the 
victim State, or, wvhen already operating therein, they are assisted 
, 
namely, 
trained, armed, financed, in the forcible pursuit of their aim by another 
State [assisting Statej. 
The organisation of armed bands may take place and their bases of 
operation against the victim State may be situated either on the territory 
of the victim State or on the territory of the assisting State or on the 
territory of a third State. ] 
Forcible activities by armed bands have become the object of 
concern in the practice of States ever since the end of the First World 
t1'ar. 2 During the drafting of the United Nations Charter, Bolivia and the 
Philippines proposed the inclusion therein of a definition of aggression 
which would enumerate acts which would constitute aggression and 
would enable the Security Council to act under Chapter VII of the Charter. 
The Bolivian definition referred to "....... support given to armed bands for 
the purpose of invasion.... "', whereas the Philippine proposals considered 
as aggression the interference "...... with the internal affairs of another 
nation by supplying arms, ammunition, money or other forms of aid to any 
armed band, faction or group. "3 Both proposals failed to be adopted 
I See Brownlie, International Law and the Activities of Armed Bands, 7 I. C. L. Q. 712 (1958), 
pp. 712-713; P. Lamberti-Zanardi, Indirect Military Aggression, in Cassese (ed. ), The 
Curreºit Legal Regulation of the Use of Firce, 1986, p. 11I et seq. 
2 Brownlie mentions a number of provisions in treaties concluded in the inter-war period 
which deal with guarantees against the "toleration on national territory of, or support to, 
groups which are likely to make armed incursions into or interfere in the internal affairs of 
other States; loc. cit. supra n. 1, pp. 713-714. 
3 See the proposals submitted to the Third Committee of the Third Commission on 5 May 
1945; U. N. C. I. O. vol. 3 Doc. 2, G/14(K) p. 538 (4); Doc. 2, G/ 14(V) p. 577(1-3). 
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and, indeed, this would seem hardly surprising in view of the fact that 
prior to the adoption of the Charter, both in the inter-war period and 
before, force had been exercised between States directly through the use of 
their regular armed forces. It was not until after the adoption of the United 
Nations Charter that assistance to armed bands came to constitute the 
most prominent means of inter-State use of force. 
The reasons that prompt States to align politically with Opposition 
movements and render their material assistance to these movements in 
their armed struggle against the Government of another State cover a very 
wide spectrum of policy. Ideological and political antagonism between the 
two superpowers, the United States and the U. S. S. R., in pursuit of 
widening their respective spheres of political influence at the expense of 
each other; the desire to disseminate revolutionary and nationalist 
government change against regimes considered to be 
"backward", reactionary and subservient to foreign-almost exclusively 
Western-Powers4; the political affinity to peoples having the right of self- 
determination against the colonials or mandatory 11 (under Article 22 of 
the Covenant of the League of Nations) Powers in charge of the 
administration of their territories; the wish to restore the geographical 
unity of a territory divided by colonial boundaries? ; the desire of a 
Government to extend its political influence over other States situated in 
the same geographical regions; the disapproval of the establishment or the 
non-establisment of a State contrary to the aspiration of the majority of the 
population of the territory9; sympathising with the struggle of the 
population of a territory under military occupation against the occupant 
Power. In fact, what seems to lie behind such practice is taking advantage 
of the existence of an on-going internal conflict or creating one within a 
State in order to achieve the furtherance of certain interests of the assisting 
State, which range from political or territorial advantages strictly pertinent 
to the assisting State to the promotion of principles of high moral charge 
such as self-determination, democracy, socialism, without committing its 
4 E. g. the support rendered to the political Opposition in various Arab countries by 
President Nasser of Egypt. 
5 E. g. the situation in the Portuguese colonies in Africa in the period 1960-1974. 
6 E. g. the presence of South Africa in Namibia. 
7 E. g. the crisis between Malaysia and Indonesia in 1963-1965. 
8 E. g. the Libyan interference in the internal affairs of her neighbouring 
States, namely, Egypt, Sudan, Chad and Tunisia. 
9 E. g., respectively, the establishment of the State of Israel that lies at the basis of the so- 
called Arab-Israeli conflict and the presence of Morocco in Western Sahara. 
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own armed forces and, thus, dispensing with the military, economic and 
political risks of an inter-State conflict. 
It was the dramatic increase in assistance rendered to armed bands 
and in fomenting internal strife within another State in the post-Second 
World War State practice that gave rise to the need of dealing with the 
problem more ardently and of drawing a direct link between such 
activities and the principles of non-intervention and non-use of force. The 
matter has been almost exclusively dealt with by way of General Assembly 
Resolutions and constituted the substance of an important decision of the 
International Court of Justice. 1 ° In addition to the above considerations, it 
is evident from the debates at the Security Council with regard to 
complaints that arose due to the military action taken by victim States 
against armed bands on the territory of the alleged assisting State, that the 
Council on some occasions deplored the use of force emanating from 
every quarter and sometimes failed to adopt a resolution because of lack of 
the required majority. Furthermore, the constituent instruments of some 
Regional International Organisations contain provisions that stipulate the 
illegality of fomenting subversion in another State and prohibit their 
Members to interfere "directly or indirectly" in the internal affairs of other 
States. 
Article 18 of the Charter of the Organisation of American States 
provides that "... No State or group of States has the right to 
intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or 
external affairs of any other States... " while Article 3(5) of the Charter of 
the Organisation of African Unity imposes the obligation of " 
... 
Unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political assassination as 
well as subversive activities on the part of neighbouring States or any 
other State;.... " 
Moreover, numerous statements of Governments both within and 
outside the United Nations organs as well as final documents adopted 
upon the conclusion of inter-Governmental Conferences have had a 
direct bearing on the issue of assistance to armed bands as a violation of 
the principles of the prohibition of the use of force and non-intervention. 
Principle VI. of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 adopted at the conclusion of 
the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 
10 Case concerning Military and Pararnilitaiy Activities in and against Nicaragua( 
Nicaragua 71. United States) ; 1. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14. 
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provides that the participating States "...... will, inter alia, refrain from 
direct or indirect assistance to terrorist activities, or subversive or other 
activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another 
participating State... " >>. 
Lastly, a number of bilateral treaties of non-aggression or of peace 
that were concluded over the past twenty years, such as the Camp David 
Peace Treaty of 1979 between Egypt and Israel 12 
, 
and the Nkomati Accord 
of 1984 between Mozambique and South Africa13, expressly prohibit the 
organisation or encouragement of subversive activities on the territory of 
either of the signatories directed against the other. 
The General Assembly of the United Nations in a series of 
Resolutions which dealt with the issue of the maintenance of 
international peace and security and the principles of non-use of force and 
non-intervention addressed the problem of assistance to armed bands on 
six occasions. 
At its fourth session the General Assembly adopted Resolution 
290(I\-') of 1 December 1949 entitled "Essentials of Peace" the third 
operative paragraph of which calls upon every state "... [T]o refrain from 
any threats or acts, direct or indirect, aimed at impairing the freedom, 
independence or integrity of any State, or at fomenting civil strife and 
subverting the will of the people in any State... "14 
Operative paragraph 1 of G. A. Resolution 308(V) of 17 November 
1950, " Peace through Deeds", solemnly reaffirms that "... whatever the 
weapons used, any aggression whether committed openly or by fomenting 
civil strife in the interest of a foreign Power, or otherwise, is the gravest of 
all crimes against peace and security throughout the world... ". 15 
Furthermore, in operative paragraph 2 of G. A. Resolution 2131(XX) 
of 21 December 1965, "Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention 
in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence 
and Sovereignty", it is provided that "... INjo State shall organise, assist, 
foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities 
directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another 
State... ". 1 b 
I1 Te\t in 14 I. L. M. 1293 (1975), p. 1295. 
12 l ext in 18 1. L.. A1.362 (1979), p. 364. 
13 Text in 23 I. L. M. 282 (1984), pp. 283-4. See Keesing's 1984, pp. 32835-6. 
14 G. A. Res. 290(1V), G. A. O. R. 4th session 1949, p. 13. 
15 G. A. Res. 308(V), G. A. O. R. 5th session, Suppl. No 20, p. 13. 
11 G. A. Res. 2131(XX), G. A. O. R. 20th session, Suppl. No 14, p. 11. 
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In 1970 on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations, the 
General Assembly adopted without vote G. A. Resolution 2625(XXV), 
"Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations" 17 which elaborates and interprets the prohibition 
of the threat or use of force stipulated in Article 2(4) of the Charter18 
provides that "... [E]very State has the duty to refrain from organising, 
instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts 
within another State... " 
By virtue of Article 3(g) of G. A. Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 
December 1974, "Definition of Aggression", " [T]he sending by or on behalf 
of a State of armed bands, groups of irregulars or mercenaries which carry 
out acts of armed force against another State or its substantial 
involvement therein... " shall constitute aggression. 19 
Lastly, G. A. Resolution 42 / 22 of 18 November 1987, "Declaration on 
the Enhancement and Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from 
the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations" states in its sixth 
operative paragraph that "[S]tates shall fulfil their obligations under 
international law to refrain from organising, instigating or assisting or 
participating in paramilitary, terrorist or subversive acts, including acts of 
mercenaries in other States, or acquiescing in organised activities within 
their territory directed towards the commission of such acts 
... 
11.20 
The question of assistance to armed bands as a means of inter-State 
use of force was also considered byr the International Law Commission on 
three occasions. By virtue of G. A. Resolution 378(V) of 17 November 
195021 
, 
the General Assembly decided to refer the proposal of the U. S. S. R. 
on the Definition of Aggression22 to be considered by the I. L. C. 23. In its 
Report to the General Assembly it was stated that: 
17 G. A. Res. 2625(XXV), G. A. O. R. 25th session, Suppl. No 28, p. 121. 
18 D. W. Bowett, The Use of Force for the Protection of Nationals Abroad, in A. Cassese 
(ed. ), The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force, 1986, p. 39 at p. 40 ; N. D. White, The 
Legality of Intervention Folfowirng the Nicaragua Case, ix International Relations 535 
(1989), at p. 538. Cf. Arangio-Ruiz 
, 
The United Nations Declaration on Friendly Relations 
and the System of the Sources of International Law, 1979, p. 100 seq. 
19 G. A. Res. 3314(XXIX), G. A. O. R. 29th session, Suppl. No 31, p. 142. 
20 G. A. Res. 42/ 22 
, 
G. A. O. R. 42nd session, Suppl. No 49, p. 287. 
21 G. A. Res. 378 (V), G. A. O. R. 5th session, Suppl. No 20, pp. 12-13. 
22 Doc. A/C. 1 / 108. 
23 The matter was dealt by the I. L. C. at its 92nd-96th, 108th, 109th, 127th-129th and 133rd 
meetings; I. L. C. Ybk 1951, Vol. I. Three members of the Commission submitted proposals for 
a Definition of Aggression which referred to both the direct and indirect use of force by 
fn 
"The Commission gave consideration to the question 
whether indirect aggression should be comprehended 
in the definition. It was felt that a definition of aggression 
should cover not only force used openly by one State against 
another, but also indirect indirect forms of aggression 
such as the fomenting of civil strife by one State in another, 
the arming by a State of organised bands for offensive purposes 
directed against another State and the sending of 'volunteers' to 
engage in hostilities against another State... ". 24 
Article 2(4-6) of the I. L. C. Draft Code of Offences against the Peace 
and Security of Mankind censures, 
4.1 he organisation, or the encouragement of the organisation by the authorities of 
a State, of armed bands within its territory or any other territory for incursions into the 
territory of another State, or the toleration of the organisation of such bands in its own 
territory, or the toleration of the use by stich armed bands of its territory as a base of 
operations or as a point of departure for incursions into the territory of another State, as 
well as direct participation in support of such incursions. 
5. '1 he undertaking or the encouragement by the authorities of a State of activities 
calculated to foment civil strife in another State, or the toleration by the authorities of a 
State of organised activities calculated to foment civil strife in another State. 
6.1 he undertaking or encouragement by the authorities of a State of terrorist 
activities in another State or the toleration by the authorities of a State of organised 
activities calculated to carry out terrorist acts in another State 
................ 
2ti 
States. Mr Yepes suggested that " 
.. _ 
an act of aggression shall be understood to mean any 
direct or indirect use of violence......... Violence exercised by irregular bands organised 
within the territory of a State or outside its territory with the active or passive complicity 
of that State shall be considered aggression within the meaning of the preceding 
paragraph... " 
, 
Doc. A/ CN. 4/ L. 12; I. L. C. Ybk 1951, Vol. 11, p. 40. Mr Hsu proposed that 
"Aggression..... is the hostile act of a State against another State conunitted by 
(a) 
............. 
(b) the arming of organised bands or third States, hostile to the victim State, 
for offensive purposes; or (c) the fomenting of civil strife in the victim State in the interest 
of some foreign State;...... ", Doc. A/ CN. 4/ L. 11 and Corr. 1; ibid. Finally-, Mr Cordova 
considered that "... Aggression is the direct or indirect employment by the authorities of a 
State of armed force against another State..... ", Doc. -A/C\. 4/L. 10; ibid. 
224 I. L. C. Ybk 1951, Vol. It, Part Two, p. 132, para 47; The Commission proposed a definition 
on the basis of a proposal by Mr Alfaro: " Aggression is the threat or use of force by a State 
in am manner, whatever the weapons employed and whether openly or otherwise.... ", Doc. 
. 
-\/C"\,. 4/ L. 8; id, p. 33, at p. 37, para 36. The definition was far from being explicit and 
detailed with regard to the forms of assistance to irregular groups using armed force against 
the Government of a State and it was eventually rejected. 
25 I. L. C. Ybk 1954 Vol. II, Part Two, p. 151. 
MMT n 
Finally Article 4 of the I. L. C. Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of 
States stipulates that: 
Ever State has the duty to refrain from fomenting 
civil strife in the territory of another State and 
to prevent the organisation within its territory 
of activities calculated to foment such civil strife. 26 
Moreover, the issue of assistance to armed bands and the-precise 
degree of responsibility incurred by the assisting State with regard to the 
principles of non-use of force and non-intervention in the internal or 
external affairs of States, as well as the means of response by the victim 
State to counter such activity, were dealt with by the International Court of 
Justice in the Nicaragua Case 277 
. 
On 9 April 1984 the Government of Nicaragua filed an Application 
with the I. C. J. instituting proceedings against the United States on the 
following grounds: 
(a) That the United States in recruiting, training, arming, equipping, financing, 
supplying and otherwise encouraging, supporting, aiding and directing military and 
directing military and paramilitary actions in and against Nicaragua has violated and is 
violating its express Charter and treaty obligations under: 
Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations; 
Articles 18 and 20 of the Charter of the Organisation of American States; 
Article 8 of the Convention on Rights and Duties of States; 
Article 1, Third, of the Convention concerning the Duties and Rights of States in the Event 
of Civil Strife. 
(b) That the United States, in breach of its obligation under 
general and customary international law, has violated and is 
violating the sovereignty of Nicaragua by: 
efforts by direct and indirect means to coerce and intimidate the Government of 
Nicaragua. 
(c) That the United States, in breach of its obligation under general and customary 
international law, has used and is using force and the threat of force against Nicaragua. 
(d) That the United States, in breach of its obligation under general and customary 
international law, has intervened and is intervening in the internal affairs of 
Nicaragua 
........ 
29 
The support of ".... military and paramilitary actions... " that 
Nicaragua indicted the United States with concerned the assistance 
26 I. L. C. Ybk 1954 Vol. TT, Part Two, p. 151. 
2i I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14. 
28 Cited in the Judgment of the Court on the Merits, I. C. J. Rep. 1986 p. 14, pp. 18-19, para 15. 
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provided by the United States Government, by way of supply of, funds, 
arms and logistical support, to the Opposition, otherwise known as 
contra, which waged an armed struggle against the Sandinista 
Government of Nicaragua. 29 The United States justified her assistance to 
the contras as an act of collective self-defence in support of the 
Government of El Salvador which was faced with armed insurgency in 
her territory that was allegedly supported by the Nicaraguan Government. 
The latter contended that the above justification constituted an admission 
by the United States of its "... substantial involvement in the military and 
paramilitary operations against Nicaragua... "30 
The Court observed that "...... the normal purpose of an invocation 
of self-defence is to justify conduct which would otherwise be unlawful. If 
advanced as a justification in itself, not coupled by a denial of the conduct 
alleged, it may well imply both an admission of that conduct and of the 
wrongfulness of that conduct in the absence of the justification of self- 
defence..... " but it declined to uphold the basis of the contention that the 
invocation of self-defence was per se conclusive as to the establishment of 
the entirety of the acts complained of in the absence of express admission 
of the facts on the part of the respondent State 31 
. 
Thus, though the Court 
noted that the United States justification of collective self-defence 
constituted ".... certainly a recognition as to the imputability of some of the 
activities complained of...... 32 
, 
it proceeded to establish the facts 
, 
which 
formed the ground of the Nicaraguan complaint, on the basis of the 
evidence before it. It found that although the contra movement was not 
created by the United States and did not operate as a United States 
Government 'agent' the United States Government financed, trained, 
equipped, armed and organised the guerrillas. 33 
The Court declined to apply the multilateral treaties invoked by 
Nicaragua due to the so-called multilateral treaty reservation appended by 
the United States to its Declaration of acceptance of the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court under Article 36(2) of the Statute of the I. C. J., and 
instead it considered the Nicaraguan complaint on the basis of customary 
29 I. C. J. Rep. 1986 p. 14, pp. 20-21, paras 18-19. 
30 Ibid. pp. 44-45, para 74. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. pp. 53-65, paras 93-116. 
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international law. 34 General Assembly Resolutions 2131(XX), 2625(XX-\-7) 
and 3314(XXIX) 5, all of which refer to the 
-inadmissibility of 
assistance to armed bands, were heavily relied upon by the Court as 
evidence of customary international law on the prohibition of the use of 
force and the inadmissibility of intervention in the affairs of other 
States. 3h iioreover, the Court linked both by ruling that, 
".... The element of coercion, which defines, and indeed forms the very essence of, 
prohibited intervention, is particularly obvious in the case of an intervention which uses 
force, either in the direct form of military action, or in the indirect form of support for 
subversive or terrorist armed activities within another State. As noted above (paragraph 
191), General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) equates assistance of this kind with the use 
of force by the assisting State when the acts committed in another State 'involve a threat 
or use of force'. I hese forms of action are therefore wrongful in the light of both the 
principle of non-use of force, and that of non-intervention........... " 37 
The conclusion was finally reached that the United States assistance 
to the Nicaraguan Opposition was contrary to the principles, of both non- 
use of force and non-intervention. s 
2. Some Co; itiideratiouc Oll the Activities of Armed Bands 
. 
The present author proposes to discuss the following aspects of the 
issue of the activities of armed bands as a violation of the prohibition of 
the use of armed force between States in the light of instances of State 
practice: 
(i) The question of what kind of groups of individuals merit to be 
considered as 'armed bands'. 
(ii) The question of the circumstances in which activities by armed bands 
entail a breach of the principle of non-use of force and Article 2(4) of the 
Charter of the United Nations. 
(iii) The question of the means of unilateral response to the activities of 
armed bands on the part of the victim State. The latter contingency is 
considered in detail in the context of individual defensive action, infra 
Part Two, Chapter 9. 
14 Ibid. p. 92, para 172. 
Y' Article 3(g) of the latter. 
Ibid. pp. 99,103,106-107, paras 188,195,202-203. 
3' Ibid. p. 108, para 205. Cf p. 119, para 228. 
Ibid. pp. I l 
-119,123), 124, paras 227-228,238,242. 
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2(i). The Question of What kind of Groups of Individuals merit to 
be considered as "Awned Bands". 
On the basis of the practice of States it may be argued that not any 
group of individuals may be considered as an 'armed band' for the 
purposes of the international law on the use of force. 39 
Governments have treated as armed bands any group of 
individuals (a) who are not subject to any government authority; (b) who 
use force against the Government of a State, (c) for the fulfilment of a 
political objective and whose activities, if linked with support provided by 
another State, constitute a violation of the principle of non-use of force by 
States. 
(a) The proposition that armed bands must not, for the purposes of jigs 
ad bellion, be under any government authority connotes the absolute lack 
of any constitutional or institutional subordination of a group of 
individuals to the Government or to the executive branch of a State 
according to the municipal law thereof. Accordingly, the regular land, 
naval, air and police forces of a State, as well as government militias or 
units of territorial army should be excluded from the notion of armed 
bands. The units of the Nationalist Chinese Government Army, that 
entered Burma in the aftermath of the Communist victory in the Chinese 
civil war and that had hitherto been regarded as the Regular Army of 
China, were labelled 'guerrillas' from the moment the Nationalist Chinese 
Government in Taiwan dissociated itself from any command 
responsibility over these troops 40. 
The organisation of such groups, however, may vary from a highly 
elaborate structure with political and military sections, a comprehensive 
chain of command, special uniform and insignia, operational, logistical, 
supply and communication centres (similar to the ones of the Regular 
Army of a State), to a loose grouping of individuals that merely mount 
armed operations collectively. All of the national resistance movements 
against the Axis occupation forces in European countries during the 
Second World War and all of the so-called 'national liberation' 
movements 
- 
like S. W. A. P. O., P. O. L. I. S. A. R. I. O., P. A. I. G. C., A. N. C., 
39 Terminology refers to such groups, also as irregulars, rebels, insurgents, guerrillas. 
40 Keesing's 1952-1954, p. 1304. 
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may be said to belong to the former category in terms of the 
structural organisation, while groups of dissident exiles like the ones in 
the cases of the invasions of Guatemala (1954), Costa Rica (1955) and, most 
recently, Liberia (1989) and Rwanda (1990), could fall under the latter. 41 
In terms of numerical strength armed bands may vary again from 
large groups numbering several thousand fighters, as was the case with 
the Vietkong guerrillas in South Viet-Nam or the contras in Nicaragua, 
to a small number of individuals like organisations that hijack airliners, 
take hostages or perpetrate bomb attacks. 
Armed bands may use as the terrain of their activities either the 
territory of the victim State as is the case with the Chadian rebels, the 
Eritrean fighters, the Salvadorean insurgents, or the territory of a third 
State, like the small groups that use force against the citizens or property of 
another State 
- 
viz. hijacking of aircraft, hostage taking, bomb attacks 
- 
or 
both as is the case with the activities of the various Palestinian 
organisations against Israel. The locus from which the activities of armed 
bands emanate may be either the territory of the victim State itself- see, for 
instance, the activities of the Salvadorean insurgents- or the territory of a 
third State or States. The former situation applies to armed groups that are 
based in their organisational entirety on the territory of another State- this 
is for instance the case with the P. L. O. from 1970-1982. 
-and the latter is 
relevant with regard to armed groups whose political section is based in 
one country while their military branch is based in another or others- e. g. 
the allegations by the South African Government with regard to the 
activities of the A. N. C. On 30 January 1981 the South African armed forces 
launched an operation 'against what was described as the planning and 
control headquarters of the A. N. C. in Maputo, the capital of Mozambique. 
The operation was undertaken upon the assertion that the Maputo 
headquarters served as the launching pad for A. N. C. operations inside 
South Africa42 
. 
Moreover, on 19 May 1986 the South African forces 
mounted simultaneous commando raids against alleged A. N. C. offices 
and camps in Zimbabwe, Botswana and Zambia. In the case of Zambia the 
41 The question of the intensity of the organisation of armed bands is pertinent in the 
context of the law of armed conflict or Jus in bello, for the characterisation of their members 
as combatants or non-combatants according to the relevant provisions of the Hague 
Conventions of 1907, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols thereto, 
in the event of an armed conflict of non-international character which may be in progress. 
42 Keesing's 1981, p. 30889. 
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operation was directed against the A. N. C. operational centre outside the 
capital Lusaka43. 
Furthermore, the latter situation is pertinent with regard to the 
activities of mercenaries. The Report of the Security Council Special 
Mission in relation to the mercenary attack on Benin in 1977 revealed that 
the perpetrators were recruited in France, Senegal and the Ivory Coast, 
they were trained in Morocco and mounted their operation from the 
territory of Gabon44. 
(b) A group of individuals should constitute an 'armed band' for the 
purposes of the principle of non-use of force only if they pursue their 
activities by any means that involve the threat or use of armed force. Mere 
possession of weapons of whatever destructive capability does not suffice 
as long as they are not used. Consequently, dissident groups that pursue a 
non-forcible struggle against the Government of a State, by way of media 
propaganda, for instance, should not be considered as 'armed bands'. 
Force must, additionally, be used against the Government of a State 
either directly, by attacking Government functionaries, the armed forces of 
the State, Government property, or indirectly against civilians of the 
victim State or their property, not in their own right as such, but in 
pursuit of compelling the Government of the victim State to resort to 
certain acts or omissions in forming its policy or to satisfy certain political 
demands of the group. In the Nicaragua Case the Court ruled by relying 
on the provisions of General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) that 
assistance to armed bands "... is contrary to the principle of the prohibition 
of the use of force when the acts of civil strife 
........ 
'involve the threat or 
use of force.... °'. 45 
The intensity of the use of force by an 'armed band' may vary 
according to the size of the armed group or according to the sophistication 
of their weaponry or the frequency of committing acts of force against the 
victim State. A numerically small group of armed individuals that use 
weapons of advanced technology may inflict as extensive a destruction as a 
43 Keesing's 1986, p. 34662. 
44 Doc. S/ 12294 and Rev. 1 of 8 March 1977, S. C. O. R. 32nd yr. Special Suppl. No 3, paras, 
136,141-143,145, pp. 38-39. The States named in the Report as being involved in the 
mercenary action strongly denied the finding of the Report. See S. C. O. R. 32nd yr. 2000th 
mtg paras 142-160 (Gabon); 2001st mtg. paras 33-46 (Senegal), 54-67 (France), 72-96 
(Morocco) and 108-138 (Ivory Coast); 2005th mtg. para 35 (Gabon). 
45 I. C. J. Rep. 1986 p. 14, pp. 108,119, paras 205,228. 
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force of thousands of guerrillas with less sophisticated equipment. 
Moreover, notwithstanding the size of the group and the type of weapons 
used, the frequency of their activities, especially if they are spread over a 
long period of time, is very likely to be conceived by the victim State as the 
determinant factor of the gravity of such activities by way of their 
accumulation rather than the specific effects of each and every one of 
them considered separately4o 
. 
(c) The proposition that the forcible activities of armed individuals 
have to be committed in the pursuit of a political objective is very 
pertinent because it draws the fundamental distinction between 'armed 
bands' for the purposes of the principle of the prohibition of the use of 
force between States and mere marauding bandits 47, who are subject to 
the municipal criminal law of the State. Moreover, State practice seems to 
establish conclusively and authoritatively that States that have become 
victims of the use of force by armed individuals refer to a breach of Article 
2(4) of the Charter and the customary law principle of the prohibition of 
the use of force only in cases where the armed bands aspire to realising a 
political goal. The latter, as State practice suggests, may be either the 
overthrow of an existing Government48 ; or the expulsion of another 
State's Administration from a colonial territory49 ; or a territory under 
international mandate according to Article 22 of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations 50 ; or a territory under military occupation 51 ; or from a 
part of the territory of a State for the purposes of seceding from the parent 
State 52 
. 
In all of the above contingencies the armed struggle against the 
Government of the State or the Administering Power of a territory is 
assumed by groups that have the locus standi of an Opposition to the 
46 This is the attitude adopted by the State of Israel with regard to the armed activities of 
Palestinian armed organisations against it. See infra Ch. 4 on Reprisals. 
47 See S. G. Kahn, Private Armed Groups and World Order, 1 N. Y. 1. L. 32 (1970), at p. 51. 
48 E. g. the armed insurgency by the Salvadorean Opposition against the Government of El 
Salvador (1980-1991). 
49 E. g. the armed struggle by P. A. I. G. C. against the Portuguese colonial administration. 
50 E. g. the struggle by S. W. A. P. O. against South Africa in Namibia. 
51 E. g. the use of force by Palestinian guerrilla organisations against Israel in the 
territories occupied in 1967. 
52 E. g. the insurgency led by the E. P. L. F. against the Government of Ethiopia aiming at the 
secession of Eritrea. 
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former in the sense of aspiring to achieving a change of policies by the 
State or the extinction of a specific Administration over a territory. 
In certain cases, namely, the ones involving activities of mercenary 
bands, the actual use of force has been undertaken on behalf of, rather 
than directly by, the organisation representing the political Opposition to 
the Government of the victim State- e. g. the cases of mercenary attacks 
against Guinea in 197053 
, 
Benin in 197754 and the Seychelles in 1981 55 
. 
Still, the objective of the use of force in these cases remains political 
because the actions by the perpetrators of force aims at the overthrow of 
the Government of the State against which it has been resorted to. 
2(ü). The Question of the Circumstances in which the Activities of 
Armed Bands entail a breach of Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United 
Nations and the Principle of the Prohibition of the Use of Force 
. 
Article 2(4) of the Charter prohibits the threat or use of force by a 
State Member of the United Nations against other States. Similarly 
General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 November 1970 provides 
under its first principle that "...... Every State has the duty to refrain in its 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any other State 
........ 
5h. 
Finally, Article 1 of the Annex to General Assembly Resolution 3314 
(XXIX) of 14 December 1974 defines Aggression as the ".... the use of armed 
force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political 
independence of another State..... ". 
It becomes evident from the aforementioned provisions that the 
prohibition of the use of force is relevant as between States and States only 
so far as the authorship of the use of armed force is concerned. 
53 The responsibility for the attack was claimed by the Front de la Liberation Nationale 
de Gººinee (F. L. N. G ý), the Opposition to the Government of President Toure; Keesing's 1969- 
1970 p. 24.353. However, the Government of Guinea imputed the attack to Portugal; see 
Letter dated 22 November 1970 from the representative of Guinea to the President of the 
Security Council, Doc. S/9987, S. C. O. R. 25th yr. Suppl. Oct. 
-Dec. 1970, p. 51; also see 
S. C. O. R. 25th yr. 1558th mtg. para 18. 
54 The Report of the Special Mission of the Security Council in Benin found that the 
mercenaries had been recruited by an organisation called Front de Liberation and 
Rehabilitation du Dahomey (F. E. R. D. ) in order to overthrow the marxist Government of 
Benin. Loc. cit. supra n. 38c, p. 39, para 145. 
55 Keesing's 1982, p. 31513. 
56 See also, I. C. J. Rep. 1986 p. 14, pp. 99,101, paras 188,191. 
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Consequently, the initiation of activities that involve the threat or use of 
force by groups of armed individuals, although it constitutes the grim 
reality that faces several Governments, it does not per se entail any breach 
of the principle of the prohibition of the use of force. 57 
The practice of States suggests that in order for the activities of 
armed bands to constitute a breach of the principle of the prohibition of 
the threat or use of force, a 'link' ought to be established between the actual 
author of the use of force, namely a guerrilla group, against the 
Government of a State, and the acts or omissions on the part of another 
State with regard to the activities of the armed bands. This 'link' can be 
established by way of involvement by a State in the activities of armed 
bands using force against another State, which comprises a wide range of 
State acts or omissions. As to the latter it may be said that the manifest and 
deliberate unwillingness of a State to deal with the activities of armed 
bands operating from its territory against another establishes the required 
'link'. With regard to the former, General Assembly Resolutions 2131 (XX), 
2625(XXV), and 3314 (XXIX) provide a satisfactory basis for ascertaining the 
kind of State activity that constitutes involvement in the acts of force 
committed by armed bands. On the basis of the above Resolutions the 
following acts or omissions appear to be pertinent: the organisation of, 
assistance to, participation in, fomenting, inciting, financing, tolerating, 
instigating, armed, subversive, terrorist activities or the sending of armed 
bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries which commit acts of armed force 
against another State or the substantial involvement ( of the assisting 
State) therein. Some of the above terminology reveals a certain degree of 
pleonasm, in that assistance to armed bands seems to include the 
financing and arming thereof, while fomenting, inciting and instigating 
could be held to suggest the same contingency; on the other hand, 
however, it also uncovers a wide spectrum of State conduct of formidable 
proportions which has been extensively practiced over the past half- 
century. 
The question arises of whether all of the above acts constitute a 
violation of the principle of the prohibition of the threat or use of force by 
States. The answer was given in the negative by the International Court of 
57 An attempt by the non-aligned and socialist States during the period of decolonisation 
to assert a right of self-determination movements to resort to force in self-defence under 
Article 51 of the Charter was met with fierce opposition and, for reasons discussed under a 
different rubric, cannot be said to have become part of customary international law. 
7(1 
Justice in its Judgment on the Merits in the Nicaragua case. The Court 
ruled with regard to the assistance rendered by the United States 
Government by way of organising, supplying of weapons, logistical 
support, training and funds to the contra guerrillas fighting the 
Government of Nicaragua: 
".... As to the claim that United States activities in relation to the contras 
constitute a breach of the customary international law principle of the non-use of force, the 
Court finds that, subject to the question whether the action of the United States might be 
justified as an exercise of the right of self-defence, the United States has committed a 
prima facie violation of that principle by its assistance to the contras in 
Nicaragua 
................................................. 
........... 
In the view of the Court, while the arming and training of the contras can certainly 
be said to involve the threat or use of force against Nicaragua, this is not necessarily so in 
respect of all the assistance given by the United States Government. In particular, the 
Court considers that the mere supply of funds to the contras, while undoubtedly an act of 
intervention in the internal affairs 
of Nicaragua. 
............., 
does not in itself amount to a use of force". 58 
Moreover, in view of the United States justification of her 
assistance to the contras as an act of collective self-defence in support of El- 
Salvador, because Nicaragua was allegedly assisting the Salvadorean 
insurgents, the Court referred to the concept of 'armed attack' as a 
requirement of individual and collective self-defence and observed the 
following: 
"... There appears now to be general agreement on the nature of the acts which can 
be treated as constituting armed attacks. In particular, it may be considered to be agreed 
that an armed attack must be understood as including not merely action by regular armed 
forces across an international border, but also "the sending by or on behalf of a State of 
armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against 
another State of such gravity as to amount to" (inter alia) an actual armed attack conducted 
by regular forces, "or its substantial involvement therein". This description, contained in 
Article 3, paragraph (g), of the Definition of Aggression annexed to General Assembly 
resolution 3314 (XXIX), may be taken to reflect customary international law. The Court sees 
no reason to deny that, in customary law, the prohibition of armed attacks may apply to 
the sending by a State of armed bands to the territory of another State, if such an operation, 
because of its scale and effects, would have been classified as an armed attack rather than 
as a mere frontier incident had it been carried out by regular armed forces........ "59 
Certainly, if the act of 'sending' armed bands to the territory of a 
State or the 'substantial involvement' therein, is to be considered an 
58 I. C. J. Rep. 1986 p. 14, pp. 118-119, para 228. 
59 Ibid. p. 103, para 195. 
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'armed attack' giving rise to the right of individual or collective self- 
defence, it naturally constitutes a breach of the principle of non-use of 
force. 
The practice of States is rather less specific with regard to acts of 
State support for the activities of armed bands that constitute a violation 
of the principle of the prohibition of the use of force, and statements by 
Governments both within and without the framework of the United 
Nations are not at all suggestive or elaborate in isolating certain aspects of 
State involvement in such activities as breaches of the above prohibition. 
Indiscriminate references have been made to General Assembly 
Resolutions 2131,2625,3314, by States faced with armed insurgency as a 
proof of the complicity of the State allegedly assisting the armed bands 60 
. 
In the overwhelming majority of cases, emphasis was laid on the fact that 
the guerrillas operated from or were based on the territory of the 
recalcitrant State hi. This was in itself deemed as sufficient ground to 
establish a breach of the principle of non-use of force without taking great 
pains in identifying the specific aspects of the host State's involvement. 
Accusations of organising, training, arming, financing of armed bands 
have certainly been made in a substantial number of cases, but they seem 
to hold the position of illustrations or evidence of a generally unlawful 
support in absracto that constituted an a priori breach of the principle of 
non-use of force rather than the determinant factor of whether the alleged 
'support' was or was not in violation of the said principle. Indeed, the 
Judgment of the Court could thus seem quite unnecessarily pedantic and 
somewhat redundant in view of the pre-existing State practice; however, it 
is submitted, that this would be a rather hasty conclusion. 
Naturally, the practice of States suggests that any support to armed 
bands is illicit and should be censured; but it does not follow that every 
support is necessarily a breach of the principle of the prohibition of the use 
of force by States, as it does not follow either, and this the Court upheld, 
60 See statement by the representative of Madagascar during the S. C. debate on the 
mercenary attack against Benin, S. C. O. R. 32nd yr. 2002nd mtg. para 97. Statement by the 
representative of Brazil during the S. C. debate on the invasion of the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (1967), S. C. O. R. 22nd yr. 1367th mtg. para 106. Statement by the 
representative of asrae% during the S. C. debate on the operation "Peace for Galilee" (1982), 
S. C. O. R. 37th yr. 2375th mtg. para 54. 
61 See statement by the representative of Portugal during the S. C. debate on the Samine 
incident between Portugal and Senegal (1969), S. C. O. R. 24th yr. 1516th mtg. para 132. 
Statement by the representative of Israel during the S. C. debate on the Israeli operation in 
Lebanon of 2 Sept. 1970, S. C. O. R. 25th yr. 1551st mtg. para 47. 
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that every breach of the latter necessarily gives rise to the right of self- 
defence. 
What victim States have been faced with, in the majority of 
instances of State practice, is the use of force which is actually carried out 
by groups of armed individuals irrespective of their being assisted by a 
third State or not. If assistance is forewarded it has as a result either the 
intensification of the forcible activities perpetrated by the armed bands or 
their possible prolongation. But, with the possible exception of mercenary 
activities or actual sending of armed bands into the territory of another 
State as a proxy author of force (e. g. the sending of S. W. L. F. by Somalia 
into Ogaden in Ethiopia), such assistance does not necessarily signify the 
initiation of an armed struggle and, equally, its cessation is not a conditio 
sine qua non of the termination of guerrilla activities. 
Assistance in abstracto including the financing, organising, arming, 
training, providing of logistical support to guerrillas is prima facie a form 
of unlawful intervention in the internal affairs of the State that suffers the 
activities of the armed bands in that it constitutes a kind of preservation of 
their struggle against the Government of that State. 62 At the same time, 
however, certain forms of assistance to guerrillas, such as the provision of 
weapons, logistical and intelligence support, training in military 
operations, their recruitment and organisation into contingents, have, in 
terms of their serviceability, an outright bearing on the actual use of 
material force in the course of the guerrilla operations. If a State provides 
training and arms to a guerrilla force which to everybody's knowledge 
wages an armed struggle against another State, it is not only a case of 
maintenance of a civil strife on the territory of another State; it is a case of 
maintenance par excellence of the use of force waged by a guerrilla group 
against the Government of another State. For, the provision of weapons, 
for instance, to a guerrilla group guarantees that its purpose is the use of 
armed force against the victim State and this brings the assisting State very 
close to the actual source of the victim State's plight, namely, the 
insurgents, notwithstanding the fact that the assisting State is not its actual 
author. According to the above submission, therefore, the assisting State 
constitutes the "vehicle" that leads directly to a use of force against 
another State, and consequently merits to be considered as a violator of the 
principle of the prohibition of the use of force against other States. Hence, 
it is submitted, that although State practice has been rather unclear with 
62 See I. C. J. Rep. 1986 p. 14, p. 124, para 242. 
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regard to which forms of assistance do and which do not constitute a 
breach of the principle of non-use of force, the references by victim States 
to an abstract contingency of 'support' to guerrillas coupled by the stressing 
of action-, like the arming, training, organising, providing of sanctuary and 
bases to guerrilla groups, may suggest that these forms of support, albeit 
not of an exhaustive enumeration, are indicative of breach of the 
prohibition of the use of force by States. 
State sponsorship of guerrilla activities, as the practice of 'States 
suggests, is prima facie presumed primarily on grounds of territoriality, 
namely, on the basis of the territory of the State from which the guerrilla 
activities are waged or where the guerrillas are based. This has been 
considered as conclusive evidence on the part of States victims of such 
activities in a great number of cases, and has considerably influenced their 
practice in forcible response against the States allegedly assisting the armed 
bands, which in the majority of cases were neighbouring States of the 
target of the guerrilla action. 
However, the above contingency seems to have been equally 
dictated by political tension or long-standing dispute as between the victim 
State and the alleged sponsor of the guerrilla activities with the result of 
the latter becoming part and parcel thereof 63, or, because of the originating 
of the said activities in the policies of the victim State, they acquired the 
political sympathy of the neighbouring States or of the international 
community at large 64. The Arab-Israeli conflict presents a combination of 
both the aforementioned situations in that the establishment of the State 
of Israel has been conceived by the Arab States as an effrontery to 
themselves while the post- 1967 occupation of Arab territories by Israel has 
generated a world-wide sympathy for the aspirations of the P. L. O. Still, 
assertions and accusations of complicity on the basis of territorial 
neighbourliness or political tensions and disputes, have been met by 
opposition on the part of the alleged assisting States in view of their 
disclaimer of any involvement in the activities of armed bands, or of the 
presentation of certain measures they have adopted to curb such activities 
from their territories, or prohibit the use of the latter for the transport of 
material support to guerrillas operating on the victim State's territory. The 
63 See, for instance the United States assistance to the contras in Nicaragua and the 
N. Viet-Namese assistance to the Vietkong in S. Viet-Nam. 
64 See the armed struggle of national liberation movements in colonial territories and the 
struggle of S. W. A. P. O. and the A. N. C. against South Africa. 
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attacks perpetrated by mercenary bands have amply manifested that at 
least the territorial factor alone is by no means conclusive in establishing 
the complicity of a Government in guerrilla activities. 
This can be ascertained by way of a twofold consideration. 
First, on the basis of evidence, with regard to the acts allegedly 
committed by the assisting State, furnished by the victim State or its allies, 
such as the monitoring of activities around the border area between itself 
and the allegedly recalcitrant State. If assistance to armed bands is asserted 
by the victim State but no cogent evidence is provided with regard 
, 
for 
instance, supply of materiel or infiltration of individuals, then it has been 
ruled by the I. C. J. in the Nicaragua case that this can only be interpreted to 
mean that "... either that this flow exists, but it is neither as frequent nor as 
considerable as alleged by the respondent State; or it is being carried on 
without the knowledge and against the will of a government which 
would rather put a stop to it..... "65 
. 
Moreover, as far as the assisting State is 
concerned, its political affinities with a guerrilla movement or the 
background tension in its relations with the victim State are of 
significance but they are deemed to fall short of and be secondary to 
concrete evidence of the existence of acts (and presumably omissions) 
related to assistance to armed bands that operate from its territory. 6o 
Secondly, acts of assistance rendered to guerrillas, if proved to take 
place, then they must be imputed to the Government of the State from the 
territory of which they are alleged to be perpetrated; evidence of such 
imputability may not be itself revealed, in view of the secrecy with which 
States generally invest their intelligence gathering machinery, but it is 
assumed to exist if the victim State or its allies "... take advantage of it in 
order to forestall or disrupt... " such acts of support. 67 
On the basis of both of these assumptions the lack of either or both 
of them cannot establish the complicity of the Government of a State, and 
consequently the finding that this State is in breach of the prohibition of 
the use of force. The final evaluation of the above contingency must 
include examination of the means that every State in the region, 
including the one faced with armed insurgency, possesses in order to curb 
acts of assistance to guerrillas that may take place on its territory as well as 
of the geographical features of the region and of the inherent clandestine 
65 I. C. J. Rep. 1986 p. 14, p. 84, para 154. 
66 Ibid. p. 82, paras 150-151. 
67 Ibid. pp. 84-85, paras 155-156. 
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nature of such acts. The Court considering the allegations of the 
Government of EI-Salvador in the Declaration of Intervention in the 
proceedings of the Nicaragua case under Article 63 of the Statute of the 
I. C'. J. (, s, of a constant flow of arms to the Salvadorean insurgents through 
the territory of Nicaragua, observed the following: 
"....., if the flow of arms is in fact reaching El-Salvador without either Honduras or 
El-Salvador or the United States succeeding in preventing it would be unreasonable to 
demand of the Government of Nicaragua a higher degree of diligence than is achieved by 
even the combined efforts of the other three States 
................................. 
As the means at 
the disposal of the governments in the region are roughly comparable, the geographical 
obstacles, and the intrinsic character of any clandestine arms traffic, simply show that this 
traffic may be carried on successfull`- without any complicity from governmental 
authorities, and even when they seek to put a stop to it. Finally, if it is true that the 
exceptionally extensive resources deployed by the United States have been powerless to 
prevent this traffic from keeping the Salvadorean armed opposition supplied, this 
suggests even more clearly how powerless Nicaragua must be with the much smaller 
resources at its disposal for subduing this traffic if it takes place on its territory and the 
authorities endeavour to put a stop to it........... " 69 
This, it is submitted, is in agreement with pre-existing State practice. 
In many a statement of Governments that have been accused of assisting 
and abetting the activities of armed bands evidence was presented of 
application of measures at their disposal aimed at curbing such activities 
or geographical particularities of the terrain where infiltration of 
personnel or traffic in arms has taken place were invoked. 
The internal strife in Nicaragua provide-, two Mustrations of the 
above contingency. During the Nicaraguan civil war relations between 
Nicaragua, on the one hand, and Honduras and Costa Rica, on the other, 
became strained because the contra guerrillas had their bases on the 
territory of the latter. On 22 March 1983 Nicaragua requested an urgent 
meeting of the Security Council to consider " 
... 
the great increase of acts of 
aggression 
... 
" against it 70. During the debate the representative of 
Nicaragua claimed that the contra bands operated from Honduran 
territory 71 
. 
The representative of Honduras denied the allegation that 
nh Text in 23 l. L. M. 380984). 
6y See I. C. J. Rep. 1986 p. 14, p. 85, para 157. 
70 Doc. S/ 15651, S. C. O. R. 38th yr. Suppi. for Jan. 
-March 1983, p. 82; Doc. S/ 15656, id. p. 85. 71 U. N. Chronicle, vol. XX, No 3, May 1983, p. 10 
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there were guerrilla bases in Honduras and said that it was impossible for 
the Honduran Army to control a border of thousands of kilometres 7/2. 
The Government of Costa Rica adopted certain administrative 
measures such as the closure of premises and the expulsion of members of 
A. R. D. E. (one of the contra organisations) 73. Moreover, the Costa Rican 
Government agreed to the establishment in February 1982 of joint border 
patrols with the Nicaraguan security forces 74. 
In the context of the early years of the Arab-Israeli conflict the then 
newly established State of Israel faced continuing acts of infiltration by 
Arab armed bands across the 1949 Armistice line from the West Bank of 
the Jordan River (then under Jordanian occupation). During the Security 
Council debate on the Qibya raid of 1953, the representative of the U. K. 
stated that: 
" 
... 
[the] nature and the length of the border makes it difficult for Jordanian 
authorities to control the border with Israel 
... 
" 75 
A number of victim States, moreover, took several non-forcible 
measures on their territories by way, for instance, of erecting earthworks, 
or barbed-wire fences 76, or invoked error "in the heat of the battle" or the 
geography of the area, if their armed forces crossed into a neighbouring 
State in the course of military operations against the guerrillas 
. 
The latter 
is illustrated by the explanations offered by the U. S. and South Viet 
Namese Governments in relation to the incursions by the U. S. and South 
Viet Namese forces in Cambodia during operations against the 1'ietkonig 
guerrillas in 1964 and in 1968 7s. 
Lastly, the Court singled out a form of support to armed bands 
which it deemed lawful in relation to the principles of the prohibition of 
the use of force and non- intervention. It ruled that : 
"... There can be no doubt that the provision of strictly humanitarian aid to persons 
or forces in another country, whatever their political affiliations or objectives, cannot he 
72 Ibid. p. 12. 
73 See Keesing's 1984, p. 33275; Keesing's 1986, p. 34532; Keesing's 1987, pp. 35309-35310. 
4 Keesing's 1983, p. 32308. 
75 S. C. O. R. 8th yr. 632nd mtg. para 54. 
/" See infra Part Two, Ch. 9, Second Title. 
77 See S. C. O. R. 19th yr. 1119th mtg. para 27,1121st mtg. paras 28-29. 78 See Keesing's 1969-1970, p. 24016. 
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regarded as unlawful intervention, or as in any other way contrary to international 
law............ " 79 
State practice seems to be quite consistent with regard to the 
provision of so-called 'humanitarian assistance' or 'moral and political 
support' in that States, mainly the ones accused of assisting armed bands 
have unopposedly asserted a right of offering asylum to 'refugees' from 
political oppression or civil strife and that they should not become the 
target-, of the use of force by another State, merely for supporting the 
armed opposition within the territory of the latter; 'support', however, has 
been referred to in abstracto without having being elaborated as to its 
precise extent. While 'humanitarian assistance' is in principle lawful its, 
distribution to the armed bands poses a separate issue. It seems that it can 
lawfully take place on the territory of the assisting State or the State where 
the armed bands are based but it does not appear to be beyond any doubt 
that this can be the case with regard to the territory of the victim State 
where the insurgency takes place, without any form of prior consent by the 
latter. The Government of Sri Lanka protested vehemently, and was 
supported by other Governments, against the drop of food and medicine 
by the Indian Air Force in Jaffna in 1987, while it agreed to the provision 
of such aid to be distributed by itself so 
. 
Moreover, the distribution of the 
international relief aid to the famished peoples of Eritrea and Tigray 
during the 1984-85 drought was insisted upon to be carried out by the 
Ethiopian Government. This is illustrated by the Ethiopian Government's 
unwillingness to allow shipment and distribution of relief aid, without its 
involvement, to E. P. L. F. and T. P. L. F. controlled areas. In January 1985 the 
Ethiopian Government seized the cargoes of the Australian vessel The 
Golden Venture and of a German freighter. Both ships were loaded with 
relief supplies destined for Eritrea and Tigray via Sudan. The German 
vessel's cargo was finally released 
, 
but only after its having been 
consigned to the Ethiopian Government sl. 
19 The Court reached the above finding by relying on the first and second principles "......... 
declared by the Twentieth International Conference of the Red Cross... ". See I. C. J. Rep. 
1986 para 242, pp. 124-125. Also, ibid. per judge Schwebel, para 180, p. 350. The dissenting 
Judge considering the case of the so-called 'self-determination movements' also ruled that 
moral and political support to such armed groups is lawful; this seems to apply to every 
type of guerrilla group. ýO Keesing's 1987, pp. 35315-35316. 
81 Keesing's 1985, p. 33384. Allegations were made that the Ethiopian Government 
deliberately blocked aid to the guerrilla controlled areas. This was countered by Ethiopian 
officials as an attempt by Western States to "politicize" the issue of famine; id. p. 33383. 
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In the aftermath of the Gulf Conflict of 1991 the Iraqi Government 
embarked upon the crushing of the Kurdish uprising in the north of the 
country that led to a large flow of refugees into Turkey and Iran in late 
March 1991. 
In the early stages of the Kurdish refugee crisis there was an absence 
of coordinated international response to it. The U. S. Government 
reiterated its policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of Iraq and 
the U. K. Foreign Secretary, D. Hurd, stated that " 
... 
I don't think we can get 
into the business of using force 
... 
in order to impose a particular answer 
on Iraq... " 82. On 2 April 1991 a French proposal of adopting a Security 
Council resolution authorising the protection of the Kurds was defeated 
due to opposition by China, the U. S. S. R. and the U. S. A. that maintained 
that this would set a precedent for United Nations involvement in the 
internal affairs of States 83 
. 
On 5 April 1991 the Council adopted S. C. Res. 688 (1991) 84 which 
recalled Article 2(7) of the Charter (that stipulates the non-intervention of 
the Organisation in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of Member 
States) and condemned " 
... 
the repression of the Iraqi civilian population 
in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas, 
the consequences of which threaten international peace and security in the 
area 
... 
". The resolution was not adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter. 
Indeed, no reference to Article 2(7) would have been necessary if this had 
been intended. Moreover, the wording of the resolution does not indicate 
that there existed an actual threat to the peace. The word "consequences" 
seems to point to future possibility, rather than actual fact. Furthermore, 
S. C. Res. 688 (1991) demanded that Iraq ended the repression of its civilian 
population and insisted that " 
... 
Iraq allow immediate access by 
international humanitarian organisations to all those in need of assistance 
in all parts of Iraq and to make available all necessary facilities for their 
operations 
... 
" It is submitted that this pronouncement was not and could 
not be the basis for unilateral or collective action without the consent of 
the Iraqi Government. Indeed, on 18 April 1991 the United Nations 
concluded an agreement with Iraq according to which U. N. officials would 
82 Keesing's 1991, p. 38127. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Text in 30 I. L. M. 858 (1991), Voting 10: 3(Cuba, Yemen, Zimbabwe): 2 abst. (China, 
India). 
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introducing troops into Northern Iraq on the part of the U. K., Italy, 
Germany, France, the Netherlands and the U. S. A. on 17 April 1991 sh. The 
action, that constituted an abrupt reversal of the policy of non- 
intervention in Iraq, was undertaken in promotion of the concept of "safe 
havens" to protect the Kurds from Iraqi attacks 87 
. 
This action was undertaken outside the United Nations and was in 
stark contrast with previous statements, of non-intervention and 
opposition to the French proposal of 2 April 1991ss. Moreover, the States 
that dispatched troops linked their action to the distribution of relief aid to 
the Kurds 
- 
which deprive-, it of the character of the so-called 
"humanitarian intervention" 89- and were prompt to withdraw the armed 
contingents, when U. N. official-, were ready to be posted in the area. 
Furthermore, the allied action was met with opposition on the part of 
Iran, itself a recipient of large numbers of Kurdish refugees, and 
scepticism on the part of the United Nations. On 17 April 1991 Secretary 
General Perez de Cuellar stated that the deployment of troops in Iraq 
required the permission of the Iraqi Government go. It is submitted that 
due to the opposition to it, its inconsistency with practice advocated only 
days before, and the speed with which precedence was given to the U. N 
process of managing the crisis, the dispatch of coalition forces in Northern 
Iraq does not constitute practice contributing to the creation of customary 
law 
'n. 
It may be submitted in conclusion that the customary law principle 
of non-use of force extends to activities of armed bands, namely, groups of 
armed individuals that do not belong to the armed or security forces of 
another State. The prohibition of the use of force covers such activities 
only in case of provision of material assistance to the guerrillas by another 
State that establishes a direct "link" between the assisting State and the 
fighting potential of the guerrillas against the victim State. It excludes the 
provision of humanitarian assistance and political support for the 
insurgency. 
8h See Keesing's ')991, p. Sts? 27. 
The term was coined by the U. K. Prune Minister, 1. Major, during the E. E. C. summit in 
Luxembourg on 8 April 1991; ibid. 
88 Cf. Greenwood, New World Order or Old? The Invasion of Kuwait and the Rule of Lax%, 
55 Modern L. R. 753 (7992), pp. 176-7. 
89 See is: fns Part Three 
, 
Ch. 11, Second Title. 
90 Keesing's 1991, p. 38128. Also see N. D. White & H. McCoubrey, International Law and 
the Use of Force in the Gulf, x Int. Rel. 347 (1991), pp. 358-9. 
91 Greenwood loc. cit. supra n. 8S, p. 1/77. 
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CHAPTER 3 
REPRISALS INVOLVING THE USE OF ARMED FORCE. 
The prohibition of the threat or use of armed force in Article 2(4) of 
the United Nations Charter has settled conclusively the long standing 
controversy, which arose in the aftermath of the Corfu incident of 1923, 
concerning the admissibility of armed reprisals under the Covenant of the 
League of Nations and the Pact of Paris. Both of these instruments 
stipulated, respectively, limitations to and prohibition of the hitherto 
sovereign right of States to resort to "war". The use of the term "force" in 
Article 2(4) of the Charter in contrast to the term "war" used in both the 
Covenant and the Pact of Paris seems to preclude a priori the application 
of any legalistic interpretation, such as the one pursued by the 
Government of Italy in defence of the Italian bombardment of Corfu in 
1923, in favour of the lawful practice of armed reprisalsl 
. 
"Force", whether within or without a formal state of "war" is now 
banned. Consequently, armed reprisals being considered under classical 
International law as instances of armed force short of a state of war fall 
under the prohibition of Article 2(4) of the Charter. Moreover, the 
wording of Article 2(3) of the Charter by virtue of which the Members of 
the United Nations are under the obligation to settle all their disputes by 
peaceful means, is directed against the very reasoning of the serviceability 
of armed reprisals in the practice of States, namely, the inflicting of 
punishment and the exacting of retribution by way of armed force against 
a State found in breach of its International law obligations towards the 
State-author of reprisals2 
. 
It can be, therefore, submitted that armed 
reprisals are unlawful under the Charter of the United Nations3. 
I See supra Ch. 1. 
2 See The Naulilaa Case ( Portugal v. Germany), 2 U. N. R. I. A. A. p. 1011, at pp. 1025-1028; 
also in Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases 1927-28, pp. 526-7. D. W. Bowett, 
Self-Defence in International Law, Manchester 1958, p. 13. 
3 Authority seems to be considerably uniform in support of the above submission. 
See Oppenheim, International Laze, vol. ii, 7th ed. by Lauterpac)tt 1955 
, 
pp. 143-4,154, 
184; BrierlyL The Law of Nations, 6th ed. by Waldock, Oxford 1963, pp. 415-416; Wehberg, 
L' Interdiction du Recours a la Force. Le Principe et les Problemes qui se posent, 78 H. R. C. 7 
(1951 1), at p. 72; Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in 
International Law, 81 H. R. C. 4.55 (1952 11), at p. 493 and id., General Course on Public 
International Law, 106 H. R. C. 5 (1962 11), at p. 233; Bowett, op. cit. supra n. 2; Brownlie, 
International Law and the Use of Force by States, Oxford 1963, pp. 281-2; Higgins, The 
Development of International Law through the Political Organs of the United Nations, 
Oxford i963, pp. 217-218; Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict, London 1954, pp. 
286-7 but the author implicitly takes the opposite view in 
, 
Aggression and World Order, 
7958, pp. 92-102; McDougal and Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order, 1961, pp. 
90 
Furthermore, and in addition to the text of the United Nations 
Charter, reprisals involving the use of armed force are unlawful under 
customary international law. 
The Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation which was adopted by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations by consensus, stipulates that: 
... 
States have a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force... 4 
207,208 n. 193; Wright, The Strengthening of International Law, 98 H. R. C. 5 (1959 III), at 
p. 167; id. Legal Aspects of the U-2 Incident, 54 A. J. I. L. 836 (1960), at pp. 848-9; id. The 
Goa Incident, 56 A. J. I. L. 617 (1962), at p. 628; Guggenheim, Traite de Droit International 
Public, vol. ii, 1954, p. 91; Fitzmaurice, The General Principles of International Law 
Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law, 92 H. R. C. 5 (1957 II) at p. 120; 
Schwarzenberger, The Fundamental Principles of International Law, 87 H. R. C. 195 (1955 
1), at pp. 327-8,330; Schwarzenberger and Brown, A Mannual of International Law, 6th ed. 
1976, pp. 151,256; Ch. de Visscher, Theories et Realites en Droit International Public, 4th 
ed. 1970, pp. 333-4; Mosier, International Socieh/ as a Legal Community, 1980, pp. 280-1; 
Goodrich, Hambro and Simons, The Charter of the United Nations, 3rd ed. 1969, pp. 54,346; 
Cot and Pellet, La Charte des Nations Unies, 1985, p. 121; Wengler, L' Interdiction de 
Recourir a la Force. Problemes et Tendences, 7 Rev. Bellte D. 1.401 (1971), at p. 413, Cf. p. 
449; Barsotti, Armed Reprisals, in Cassese (ed. ) The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of 
Force, 1986, pp. 79-81; Skubizewski, Use of Force by States. Collective Security. Law of War 
and Neutrality, in Sorensen (ed. ) Manual of Public International Lars, 1968, p. 754, Cf. 
however, of the fact that the author confuses reprisals with self-defence: "... But armed 
reprisals that are taken in self-defence against an armed attack are permitted... " ; 
Obradovic, Prohibition of the Threat or Use of Force, in Sahovic (ed. ) Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation, 1972, p. 104; Rosenstock, 
The Declaration of Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations: A 
Survey, 65 A. J. I. L. 713 (1971), at p. 719; Grieg, faster n ation al Laze, 2nd ed. 1976, pp. 888-9, 
cf. 890,891; Schachter, General Course in Public International Law, 178 H. R. C. 9 (1982 V), 
at p. 169; id. The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 Mich. L. R. 1620 (1984), at pp. 
1625-6; id. In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force, 53 University of Chicago L. 
R. 113 (1986); id. Self-Help in International Law, 37 Journal of Internat. Affairs 231 
(1984), pp. 241 seq. ; Jimenez de Arechaga, International Law in the Past Third of a 
Century, 159 H. R. C. 9 (1978 1), at pp. 92-3; Fawcett, General Course of Public International 
Law, 132 H. R. C. 369 (1971 1), at p. 494; Rousseau, Principes de Droit International Public, 
93 H. R. C. 373 (1958 1), at p. 539; Sorensen, Principes de Droit International Public, 101 
H. R. C. 5 (1960 111), at p. 245; Thierry-Combacau-Sur-Vallee, Droit International Public, 
5eºne ed. 1986, p. 531; implicitly Henkin, General Course on Public International Law, 216 
H. R. C. 9 (1989 ill), at pp. 149,157; L. M. Gross, The Legal Implications of Israel's 1982 
Invasion into Lebanon, 13 Cal. West. 1. L. J. 458 (1983) at p. 475; G. F. Intoccia, American 
Bombing of Libya: An International Legal Analysis, 19 Case West. J. Int. L. 177 (1987), at 
pp. 198-200; J. A. McCredie, The April 14,1986 Bombing of Libya: Act of Self-Defence or 
Reprisal?, 19 arse Vv st. Res. J. 1. L. 215 (1987), at pp. 237-9; D. Sullivan, Legal Restrictions 
on the Right to Use Force against International Terrorism, 10 A. S. I. L. S. 1. L. J. 169 (1986), at 
pp. 189-191; L. Stuesser, Active Defence: State Military Response to International 
Terrorism, 17 Calif. West. I. L. J. 1 (1987), pp. 7-8; K. Motshabi, International Law and the 
United States Raid on Libya, 104 S. A. L. J. 669 (1987), at pp. 681-2; J. L. Taulbee and 
J. Anderson, Reprisal Redux, 16 Case West. Res. J. I. L. 309 (1984); C. Greenwood, 
International Law and the United States Air Operation Against Libya, 89 West Va. L. R. 
933 (1987) at pp. 948-953; Thornberry, International Law and its Discontents: The U. S. Raid 
on Libya, 8 Liverpool L. R. 53 (1986), at p. 60. 
4 G. A. Res. 2625 (XXV) of 1970, G. A. O. R. 25th session, Suppl. No 28, p. 121. 
91 
The above document was held by the International Court of Justice 
in the Nicaragua case to constitute evidence of the opinio juris of the 
customary law prohibition of the threat or use of forces and the 
preparatory work prior to its adoption reveals uniformity of opinion as to 
the illegality of armed reprisals6. Moreover the Court ruled that: 
... 
for a State to use force against another on the ground that that State has 
committed a wrongful act of force against a third State, is regarded as lawful by way of 
exception, only when the wrongful act provoking the response was an armed attack 
... 
7 
which is implicit that the Court does not consider as lawful the use of 
force, by a State against another, in any circumstances other than in self- 
defence 8. Judge Nagendra Singh has been more explicit in his Separate 
Opinion in the Nicaragua case 
, 
by expressly advocating the illegality of 
forcible retaliation 9. 
The practice of the Security Council can be argued to be 
unequivocally consistent in respect of the illegality of reprisals under the 
Charter. In S. C. Resolution 101 (1953) of 24 November 1953 adopted with 
regard to the Qibya Incident, the Council found that 
... 
the retaliatory action at Qibya taken by the armed forces of Israel on 14-15 
October 1953 and all such actions constitute a violation of the cease-fire provisions...... and 
are inconsistent with the parties' obligations under the General Armistice Agreement 
between Israel and Jordan and the Charter of the United Nations... 
and then expressed 
... 
the strongest censure of that action which can only prejudice the chances of a 
peaceful settlement which both parties in accordance with the Charter are bound to 
seek 
... 
10 
Moreover, in S. C. Resolution 188 (1964) of 9 April 1964 in respect of 
the air raid launched by the U. K Royal Air Force against Fort Harib on the 
territory of the Yemen Arab Republic, the Council after "... Recalling 
I. C. I. Rep. 1986, p. 14 at pp. 99-100, para 188. 
See Obradovic, loc. cit. supra n. 3. 
7 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 110, para 211. 
8 Henkin, loc. cit. supra n. 3, p. 157. 
9 1. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 151. 
10 S. C. Res. 101(1953) of 24 Nov. 1953, S/3139/Rev. 2, adopted at the 642nd mtg by 9: 0: 2 
abstentions ( Lebanon, U. S. S. R. ). 
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Article 2 paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Charter of the United Nations... " 
condemned 
... 
reprisals as incompatible with the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations... ] l 
In his Report to the Security Council pursuant to the Council's 
Resolution of 4 April 1956 on the Palestine Question, the Secretary 
General of the United Nations stressed the fact that the reservation of the 
right of self-defence under the Armistice Agreements between Israel and 
its Arab neighbours 
... 
does not permit acts of retaliation, which repeatedly have been condemned by 
the Security Council... 12 
Individual statements of Governments reveal a uniformity and 
consistency of practice concerning the inadmissibility of reprisals as a 
matter of law. During the debate at the Security Council on the Qibya 
incident Mr. Lodge, the United States representative, stated : 
"... The individual Members of the United Nations have bound themselves, in 
signing and adhering to the United Nations Charter, to refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force and to settle their international disputes by 
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not 
endangered. Nations should not take the law into their own hands.... "13 
In a similar fashion the Argentine representative stated in the 
course of the debate concerning the Almagor incident of July 1966: 
"... The Argentine Government can scarcely agree, even if there are important 
reasons involved that armed retaliation should become an accepted form of international 
conduct 
We hold that as international relations are today, States should resort first and 
foremost to methods of settling disputes peacefully.... "14 
I1S. C. Res. 188 (1964) of 9 April 1964, S/ 5650, adopted at the 1111th mtg by 9: 0: 2 
abstentions(U. K. 
, 
U. S. A. ); Ibid. S. C. O. R. 19th yr. 
, 
pp. 9-10. Other condemnations of acts of 
armed reprisal are found in S. C. Resolutions 106 (1955), S/ 3378 [ Gaza Strip Incidents of 
1955]; 11](1956), S/3538, ! Lake Tiberias Incident of 19551; 228(19661. (Samu Incident of 1966]; 
248(1968) [Karameh Incident of 19681; 262(1968) f Beirut Raid of 1968]; 265(1969) [Es Salt 
Raid of 1969]; 270(1969) [Israeli air strike in S. Lebanon]; 280(1970) [Israeli land incursion 
into S. Lebanon]; 573 (1985) [Israeli air raid against the P. L. O. Headquarters in Tunis; in 
this instance Israel was condemned for an act '.. of armed aggression perpetrated.... against 
Tunisia.. '] 
12 Doc. S/ 3596, S. C. O. R. 11th yr. 
, 
Suppl. for April-June 1956, p. 30 at p. 41, para 46. 
13 S. C. O. R. 8th yr. 
, 
627th mtg. para 60. 
14 S. C. O. R. 21st yr. 
, 
1292nd mtg. paras 94-95. 
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Furthermore, in a letter dated May 29,1974 the Acting Secretary of 
State K. Rush replied to Professor Eugene Rostow's suggestion of 
readmitting armed reprisals under Article 51 of the Charter by stating the 
following: 
"..... resolution 2625 also contains the following categorical statement: 'States have 
a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force'. That injunction codifies 
resolutions of the Security Council which have so affirmed. 
The United States has supported and supports the foregoing principle....... "15 
On February 16,1979 a Department of State examination of the 
United States position with respect to acts of armed reprisals during the 
period 1953-1975 found that: 
... 
While the United States has modified its initial position of willingness to 
isolate armed reprisals and condemn them as illegal by insisting on a balanced 
condemnation of both the provocative acts, especially acts of terrorism, and the armed 
reprisals the United States has not changed its position that reprisals involving the use of 
armed force are illegal...... "16 
Much more interesting, however, appears to be the attitude of the 
States that resorted to retaliatory action. No-one of the reprisal-authors, 
without any exception whatever, has ever asserted a de lege lata right of 
armed reprisals. Instead the action taken was justified as an exercise of the 
right of self-defence. 
This has been consistently asserted by the Government of Israel 
since the Qibya incident of 19531-/,. 
In the debate at the Security Council on the Fort Harib incident, Sir 
Patrick Dean, the representative of the U. K., not only did he characterize 
the operation of his country's Air Force as action in self-defence, but 
15 Text in 68 A. I. I. L. 736 (1974) 
16 Text in 73 A. J. I. L. 489 (1979), at p. 493. 
17 See statements at the Security Council by fr_ Eban, S. C. O. R. 8th yr. 637th mtg. paras 4, 
21,23,42 (Qibya incident); S. C. O. R. 9th yr. 670th mtg. paras 131-134 (Nahalin incident); 
S. C. O. R. 10th yr. 693rd mtg. para 62(Gaza incidents); Mr. Comay, S. C. O. R. 19th yr. 
1162nd mtg. para 45 (Kibbutz Dan incident); Mr. Rosenne, S. C. O. R. 23rd yr. 1460th mtg. 
paras 42-55 (Beirut Raid); Mr. Tekoah, S. C. O. R. 24th yr. 1466th mtg. paras 87,89 and 
1468th mtg. para 59 (Es-Salt Raid); Mr. Rosenne, S. C. OR. 25th yr. 1551st mtg. para 47 
Israeli Operation in S. Lebanon); Mr. Netanyahu, U. N. Chronicle vol. X11, nos 10/11, 
Nov. /Dec. 1985, p. 4 (Israeli Air Strike on the P. L. O. Headquarters in Tunis). 
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proceeded to distinguish expressly reprisal action from self-defence as 
being "punitive" or "retributive" in nature 18. 
The United States offered the justification of self-defence on two 
occasions of retaliatory use of force by its armed forces, namely, the Gulf of 
Tonkin incident of 196419 and the air strike against Libya of 14-15 April 
198620 
Moreover, the Portuguese Government always justified its armed 
retaliatory actions taken on the territory of the African States bordering on 
its colonies in Africa as in accordance with the right of self-defence2l. 
The South African armed forces have mounted military operations 
in the territories of the neighbouring States of Angola, Botswana, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Mozambique, in retaliation to the armed 
activities of the S. W. A. P. O. and the A. N. C. against the South African 
presence in Namibia and the racial segregation policies in South Africa 
proper respectively. In all instances of use of force the South African 
Government defended its actions by invoking the right of self-defence22. 
The importance of the above practice lie-, in this: There has certainly 
been armed force used in a considerable number of instances the 
circumstances of which reveal a punitive character and an aim at 
retribution with respect to the States against which it was directed. When 
this practice, however, was placed within the framework of the law in 
force, it was the right of self-defence which was invoked and no right of 
resorting to force in reprisal. Being confronted with State practice which 
1? SLOR 19th yr. 1109th mtg. para 26. Furthermore, the U. K. abstained in the voting on 
the draft resolution, finally adopted as S. C. Res. 188(1964), and in explaining the 
abstention the U. K. representative stressed the fact that his Government had no objection 
with regard to the condenuzation of reprisals in op. para. 1 of the Resolution, for the U. K. 
considered the action as in self-defence, not reprisal. See id. 1111th mtg. para 29. 
19 See the statement to the Security Council by Mr. A. Stevenson, S. C. O. R. 19th yr. 1140th 
mtg. paras 44-49. 
20 Letter dated 14 April 1986 from the Acting Permanent Representative of the U. S. A. to 
the President of the Security Council, Doc. S/ 17990; also see the statement to the Security 
Council by Mr. 'V. Walters, the U. S. representative in the Council; both texts in 80 A. J. I. L. 
632-636 (1986). See further Keesing's vol. XXXII 34454 (1986), at p. 34457. 
21 See statements by the Portuguese Government before the Security Council: S. C. O. R 24th 
yr. 1486th mtg. para 72(The shelling of the village of Lote in Zambia, June 1969); id. 1520th 
mtg. para 12 ( The shelling of the Village of Saumine in Senegal, November 1969). During 
the period 1960-74 Portugal was faced with national liberation armed struggle in each one 
of its African colonies of Guinea (Bissau), Angola and Mozambique. 
22 See statement by Mr. Eksteen, on behalf of South Africa, to the Security Council; 
S. C. O. R. 2298th mtg. para. 16 (Operation 'Protea' mounted by the South African Army 
inside Angola, 24 August 1981); statement by Mr. Schirnding, on behalf of the South African 
Government, to the Security Council, U. N. Chronicle, vol. XXIl, Number 6, June 1985, p. 23 
(South African commando raid against alleged A. N. C. bases in Botswana). 
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has all the characteristics of reprisal but is purported to be required by law 
on the basis of self-defence, one cannot but immediately point to the total 
absence of any opinio juris with regard to a customary law exception to 
the principle of the prohibition of the use of force other than that of self- 
defence. Moreover, such practice accompanied by an opinio juris that 
reflects a universally recognized and de lege lata exception to the rule of 
non-use of force, apart from failing to lead to the creation of a rule of 
customary law of the legality of armed reprisals rather seems to reinforce 
the rule of their illegality in contemporary international law and is far 
from discrediting its legal force. The Judgment of the Court in the 
Nicaragua case is very unequivocal in this respect; the Court ruled: 
... 
If a State acts in a way prima facie incompatible with a recognized rule, but 
defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications contained within the rule 
itself, then whether or not the State's conduct is in fact justifiable on that basis, the 
significance of that attitude is to confirm rather than to weaken the rule... 23 
* 
Reprisals must be distinguished from self-defence. The distinction 
is a crucial one, for both acts constitute instances of unilateral resort to 
armed force and form part of the more general concept of self-help, 
namely the pursuit of protecting or satisfying one's rights by unilateral 
forcible action 24. Forcible self-help in general is held to be inadmissible. 
Counsel for the U. K. in the Corfu Channel Case defended the Royal Navy 
mine-sweeping operation inside the territorial waters of Albania by 
arguing that ".... international law did and I say still does and must 
recognize a larger measure of self-help than municipal law needs to 
recognize... " 25. The Court rejected the above submission by ruling that: 
The Court cannot accept such a line of defence. The Court can only regard the 
alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy of force, such as has, in the 
past, given rise to most serious abuses and such as cannot, whatever be the defects in present 
international organisation, find a place in international law.......... The U. K. Agent, in his 
speech in reply, has further classified "Operation Retail" among methods of self- 
protection or self-help. The Court cannot accept this defence either. Between independent 
States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of international 
23 1. C. º. Rep. 1986, p. 98 para. 185. Also see Barsotti loc. cit. supra n. 3, pp. 91-2; Schachter, 
53 Unit. Ch. L. R. 123-4 (1986) supra n. 3. 
24 See Bowett op. cit. supra n. 2 and id. 66 A. I. I. L. 1 (1972), at p. 3; Lauterpacht, The 
Function of Law in the International Community, 1933, pp. 393-6; Waldock loc. cit. supra n. 3; 
Schachter, 82 Mich. L. R. 1620 (1984) loc. cit. supra n. 3. 
25 J. C. J. Pleadings 1950 vol. IV, pp. 582-4. 
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relations. The Court recognizes that the Albanian Government' s complete failure to carry 
out its duties after the explosions, and the dilatory nature of its diplomatic notes, are 
extenuating circumstances for the action of the United Kingdom Government. But to ensure 
respect for international law, of which it is the organ, the Court must declare that the 
action of the British Navy constituted a violation of Albanian sovereignty..... "26. 
Furthermore, as practice of States shows, the plea of self-defence is 
to be invoked in defence of most cases of unilateral resort to force 27. 
This in itself, however, is very likely to signal, as indeed it has (see, for 
instance the practice of Israel) a practice of forcible retaliation with all the 
traditional characteristics of reprisals28 
, 
which is nevertheless justified in 
law as self-defence. The aim of such practice appears to be, not any wish of 
a de lege lata re-introduction of reprisals in the body of international law, 
but, rather, an enlargement of the content of the right of self-defence29. 
Authority indicates that the distinction between reprisals and self-defence 
lies in the discrepancy of their aim, being respectively punitive and 
protective30. 
The Naulilaa Award emphasized that an act of reprisal 
... 
tend ä imposer, ä 1' Etat offenseur, la reparation de l'offense ou le recour ä ]a 
legalite, en evitation de nouvelles offenses.... 31 
In the debate before the Security Council on the Fort Harib incident 
Sir Patrick Dean, the U. K. representative, said with regard to the U. K. 
resort to force: 
"... There is in existing law a clear distinction to be drawn between two forms of self- 
help. One, which is of retributive or punitive nature, is termed "retaliatory" or "reprisals"; 
the other which is expressly contemplated and authorized by the Charter, is self-defence 
against armed attack 
...... 
32 
State practice, however, indicates that the above ground for 
distinction between self-defence and reprisals, though, in itself, a 
26 I. C. J. Rep. 1949, p. 4 at p. 35. It must be pointed, however, that only the use of force in 
self-defence is considered to be a permissible exercise of forcible self-help; see Bowett 
supra n_ 3. 
27" Schachter, 53 Unity. Or. L. R. 113 (1986), at p. 123, loc. cit. supra n. 3. 
2S Namely, prior illegal act and resort to force in retribution for the former. 
29 Greenwood loc. cit. supra n. 3, at p. 953 seq. ; E. Zoller, Peacetime Unilateral Remedies: 
An Analysis of Countermeasures, 1984L p. 39. 
30 Schwarzenberger, 87 H. R. C. 195 (1955 1), p. 343; Bowett supra n. 3; 
_Goodrich, 
Hambro 
and Simons, op. cit. supra n. 3; F. Kalshoven, Belligerent Reprisals, 1971, p. 27; Intoccia, loc. 
cit. supra n. 3, p. 198; Stuesser, loc. cit. supra n. 3, p. 7; Cf. Sullivan, loc. cit. supra n. 3, p. 191. 
31 2 U. N. R. I. A. A. p. 1011, at p. 1026. 
32 S. C. O. R. 19th yr., 1109th mtg. para. 26. 
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satisfactory point of departure, has been undergoing considerable strain. 
The reason lies in the invocation by a number of States of the right of self- 
defence, and hence, the characterisation of an otherwise punitive act as 
protective by simply looking at the act that has given rise to the armed 
response, not in isolation, but against the overall background of the 
relations between the State-author and the State-victim of the use of 
armed force. In short, what is taken into account for justifying resort to 
force is a Nadelstichtaktik 32bis (tactics of the needle prick) or an 
"accumulation" or the "cumulative" effect of past events rather than one 
act of force33. 
The concept of "accumulation of events" has been introduced by the 
Government of Israel in defence of Israeli uses of force on the territory of 
Arab States in retaliation of acts of force perpetrated against Israel 
therefrom. In the Security Council debate with regard to the Qibya 
incident, Mr. Eban, the representative of Israel, stated: 
"... 1 cannot approach this question in any perspective narrower than that of Arab- 
Israeli relations as a whole... "34 
During the debate on the Es-Salt incident of 1969, Mr. Tekoah, the 
representative of Israel in the Security Council, justified his country's 
forcible action by arguing: 
".... For the last twenty years Israel has striven to safeguard its existence and 
independence in the face of Arab war...... The Israeli action of 26 March was an act of self- 
defence.... Where there is aggression there is defence;....... Those who openly wage war 
against Israel cannot complain if it turns the point of its sword against them....... "35 
On 1 October 1985 the Israeli Air Force launched an air strike against 
the P. L. O. Headquarters in Tunis that resulted in heavy casualties. The act 
of force that gave rise to the Israeli action was the killing of three Israeli 
tourists in Cyprus as a result of the attack on their yacht by armed 
32bis The term is used in Blum, The Legality of State Response to Acts of Terrorism, in B. 
Netanyahu (ed. ), Terrorism Hour the West Can Win 1986, pp. 135-6. 
33 Bowett, 66 A. I. I. L. 1 (1972), at p. 6; Blum, The Legality of State Response to Acts of 
Terrorism, in B. Netanyahu (ed. ), Terrorism How the West Can Win, N. York 1986,133, at 
p. 136 ; B. Levenfeld, Israel's Counter-Fedayeen Tactics in Lebanon: Self-Defence and 
Reprisal under Modern International Law, 21 Columbia J. Transnat. L. 1 (1982-83); 
Greenwood, loc. cit. supra n. 3, p. 954; W. V. O'Brien, Deterrence and Self-Defence in 
Counterterror Operations, 30 Va J. I. L. 421 (1990), pp. 469-478. 
34 S. C. O. R. 8th yr. 
, 
637th mtg. para. 4. 
35 S. C. O. R. 24th yr. 
, 
1466th mtg. paras. 57,87. 
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individuals36. However, Mr. Netanyahu, the Israeli representative in the 
Security Council, referred to "terrorist acts" planned at the P. L. O. 
Headquarters in Tunis and directed against Israel, Israeli targets outside 
Israel and against Jeivs everywhere during the ".. past year.. "-;. 
Israel, has not been the only State that defended its action on the 
basis of "accumulation of events". When the Fort Harib incident was 
considered by the Security Council, Sir Patrick Dean presented the U. K. 
action as defensive by invoking past "... series of actual air attacks from 
Yemen on the South Arab Federation and its inhabitants... violation-, of 
the Federal territory by incursions into its air space.... " which should be 
considered "... against the background of the general attack by radio and by 
subversion against the Federation of Southern Arabia, including 
deliberate incitement to rebellion and murder... "; lastly, it was claimed 
that action against Fort Harib was taken due to "... the unreasonable 
hostility and the continuing active opposition on the part of the Yemeni 
authorities to the Federation... "3R 
Finally, the United States air strike against Libya of 14-15 April 1986 
was also justified as an exercise of the right of self-defence. The U. S. action 
was taken in the aftermath of a bombing attack in Nest Berlin on 5 April 
1986 which resulted in the death of a U. S. serviceman and several others 
injured. Ambassador H. S. Okun, the Acting Permanent Representative of 
the U. S. to the United Nations, in a letter dated 14 April 1986 and 
addressed to the President of the Security Council communicated the 
following: 
"... Over a considerable period of time Libya has openly targeted American citizens 
and United States installations. The most recent instance was in West Berlin on April 5, 
........ 
"39 
The concept of "accumulation of events" as a basis for resort to force 
in self-defence seems to consist of a wide range of acts, some of which 
involve the threat or use of force and others simply consist of hostile or 
3E' Keesing's 1985, pp. 34", 44077- 
37 U. N. Chronicle, vol. XIl, nos 10 / 11, Nov / Dec. 1985, p. 4. It must be noted that in this 
instance it was stressed that the Israeli action was taken against the "terrorist killers" and 
not against their host country. This seems to indicate a narrower perspective of 
"accumulation of events" as far as the author of the use of force is concerned; emphasis was 
laid on the action taken by the guerrillas as such, rather than by the host State by % aý of 
using guerrillas qua weapon against Israel. 
38 S. C. O. R. 19th y r. 
, 
1106th mtg. paras. 48,52; 1109th mtg. para32. 
39 Doc. S/ 17990; also see statement of 'dir. V. Walters before the Security Council; extracts 
of both documents printed in 80 t. L1. L. 633 (1986), at p. 635. 
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unfriendly policy which do not as such entail the use of force. Given the 
purpose of self-defence as being the resort to force in order to counter an 
armed attack which has occurred against the State-author of the use of 
force4o, it is hard to see against what the forcible action given rise to by 
this "accumulation of events" is purported to defend the State, beyond the 
forcible response to the act of force perpetrated by the subsequent victim of 
reprisals. Indeed, the plea of "accumulation of events" as justifying the 
exercise of the right of self-defence appears to be a very convenient means 
to dispense with the requirement of proportionality in the use of force in 
self-defence4l or even to simply disguise the truly punitive character of the 
action taken. If self-defence is asserted against past incidents of use of force 
which may have been left unopposed or even were opposed on the 
ground when they took place, then it is unavoidable that the question of 
what the aim of the action is, namely, whether it is defensive or punitive, 
is bound to arise. It appears to this writer that a use of force by a State in 
response to some remote instances of other uses of force by another State 
is not to be considered defensive due to the lack of the requirement of 
"immediacy" of the exercise of self-defence. It, rather, appears to be an 
exercise of punishment, for in such cases there is simply nothing to be 
defended; what seems to be sought is to obtain satisfaction for and deter 
future acts of force- the very character of "sanction", which reprisals 
purportedly are in law42. 
By far more obscure and misleading is the assertion of deterrence of 
future acts force for it constitutes an attempt to present the forcible action 
taken as "anticipatory self-defence"43. In the debate at the Security Council 
on the Gulf of Tonkin incident the U. S. alleged that the bombardment of 
the N. Viet-Namese positions subsequent to the repulsion of the N. Viet- 
Namese vessels that attacked U. S. warships was deemed necessary in order 
to ..... securre its naval units against further aggression... " 44. To this 
statement the Czechoslovak representative retorted: 
` or according to the proponents of the so-called "anticipatory self-defence" against an 
"imminent", but still, an armed attack. 
41 Bowett, 66 A. J. I. L. 1 (1972), at p. 6. 
42 Kelsen, Collective Security under International Law, U. S. Naval War College, 
International Law Studies 1954,1956, pp. 34-35; Kalshoven, op. cit. supra n. 30, pp. 22-26. 
43 The said concept is fraught with controversy as to its legality. Even if arguendo it is 
accepted then strong evidence must be provided in support of the imminence of the armed 
attack- a contingency which is very unlikely in practice. See Greenwood, loc cit. supra n. 3, 
at p. 956 seq. 
44 Statement by Mr. A. Stevenson, S. C. O. R. 19th yr. 
, 
1140th mtg. para 44. The U. S. air 
strike against Libya was similarly defended on the basis of the U. S. having "... evidence 
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"... The United States delegation maintains that the aggression against the 
territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam was an act of legitimate self-defence 
under Article 51 of the Charter. The American description itself of the act, however, 
exceeds the definition of this Article. In the United States version, the alleged Viet- 
Namese attack was immediately followed by an equally alleged act of self-defence; the 
alleged attack was repelled, resulting in the sinking of at least two patrol boats and the 
damaging of two others..... Consequently, had there been a Viet-Namese naval attack 
during the night of 4 August 1964 then it was allegedly followed by an immediate action of 
defence and even of retaliation against the boats which were said to have unäeftaken this 
attack. Thus even in the United States version, there was no place for any further United 
States military action in terms of self-defence..... 
Even in the light of that version, the attack by the United States against the 
territory of the Democratic republic of Viet-Nam could not be considered as an act of 
legitimate self-defence. At the most it could be qualified.... as an act of reprisal; and as we 
all remember this Security Council, by its resolution of 9 April 1964, " condemns reprisals as 
incompatible with the purposes and principles of the United Nations"... 45 
Moreover, the justification of self-defence seems to be more credible 
if the action taken in its exercise is directed against the source of the use of 
force to be repelled. In the Security Council debate on the Fort Harib 
incident the representative of Czechoslovakia pointed out that: 
"... it would be very difficult to find any sort of factor which would qualify the 
action against Harib as self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter...... 
If the alleged violations and attacks from Yemen had been carried out by isolated 
aircraft and helicopters, the only immediate defence should have been directed against 
those machines. However, what was attacked by a superior air force was a land objective, 
which had nothing to do with the alleged raids which would have justified or rather 
served as a pretext for the attack.... 
The whole scope of the action against Harib thus exceeds the dimensions of these 
incidents, a fact which is shown particularly clearly by the extent of its disastrous effects, 
which brought death to twenty-five human beings... "46 
The above is of importance in the case of armed action taken due to 
activities of armed bands. To justify action as self-defence against the host 
or assisting State of such groups it is necessary to establish that a link exists 
between the activities of the guerrillas and the host State of such an 
intensity as for the armed action by the guerrillas to amount to an armed 
attack perpetrated by the host State itself. The Court in the Nicaragua case 
of future terrorist acts... "; see statement by Mr. Walters, loc. cit. supra n. 39. lt is worth noting 
that no concrete evidence was presented by the U. S. Government in support of the above 
claim. 
45 Ibid. 1141st mtg. paras. 30-31. 
46 S. C. O. R. 19th yr. 
, 
111 0th mtg. paras. 23,24,25. 
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ruled that such a link exists only if the assisting State sends the armed 
bands or if its involvement in their activities renders them quasi agents 
of the Government of the assisting State 47. If the assistance of the host 
State only amounts to the provision of arms, funds, training, logistical 
support, then the victim State of the armed bands may take proportionate 
counter-measures 48. 
It is obvious from State practice that lack of evidence of such link is 
most likely to result in the very strong condemnation of armed action 
taken against an alleged host State or on the territory of such State by the 
victim of the activities of armed bands; moreover, the use of force by the 
latter is likely to be censured as "armed attack" or "aggression". The 
condemnations of S. Africa for its actions against Lesotho 49 and Botswana 
50, and of Israel for the Beirut raid 51 and the air strike on the P. L. O. 
Headquarters in Tunis 52 are illustrations of the above submission. 
The fact that the concept of "accumulation of events" may entail a 
situation of political tension or a long-standing unfriendly conduct 
between two or more States points to the direction of the existence of a 
dispute. Certainly, if force is used and is justified as defensive on the basis 
of a body of past events and the relations as a whole between the State- 
author and the State-victim of the use of force, then the right of self- 
defence 
-as the only universally accepted exception to the rule of the 
prohibition of the unilateral use of force- is bound to be asserted beyond its 
protective role in the event of an armed attack. Furthermore, such an 
exercise of self-defence will probably assume proportions of a great extent 
effectively amounting to a right of States to vindicate their rights or settle 
their disputes by way of armed force. In view of the obligation of States 
under Article 2(3) of the Charter and customary international law to settle 
47 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, pp. 63-65,103, paras 113-116,195; see also N. D. White, ix Internat. Rel. 
535 (1989). 
48 Ibid. pp. 110,127, paras. 210,249. The scope of proportionate counter-measures is proposed 
to be discussed in a subsequent section. 
49 S. C. Res. 527 (1982) of 15 Dec. 1982; S. Africa was strongly condemned for its "... 
premeditated aggressive act against the Kingdom of Lesotho... ". 
50 S. C. Res. 568 (1985) of 21 June 1985; strong condemnation of South Africa for aggression. 
51 S. C. Res. 262 (1968) of 30 Dec. 1968; condemnation of the Israeli operation as 
"... premeditated military... " action. 
52 S. C. Res. 573 (1985) of 4 Oct. 1985; vigorous condemnation of the Israeli raid as "... armed 
aggression... ". 
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their disputes by peaceful means, it is submitted that such a contingency 
would contravene existing international law 53. 
State and United Nations practice suggest that the solution of a 
long-standing dispute in which either of the parties shows unwillingness 
of settling the dispute is in no way promoted by resort to force. With 
regard to the Qibya incident of 1953, Maj. Gen. Bennike, the Chief of Staff 
of U. N. T. S. O. in Palestine stated in his report to the Security Council that 
"... the application of such measures.... creates the chain reaction of 
retaliatory measures... and blood feuds... "54. In the debate on the Lake 
Tiberias incident of 1955 the Soviet representative said that "... Our Charter 
makes it quite clearly that other methods than the use of armed force are 
53 Practice of States through statements of Governments, conclusion of bilateral and 
multilateral treaties, consensus in the adoption of U. N. Resolutions, reveals an opinio puns 
as to the existence of positive obligation by States to settle their disputes by peaceful 
means. See The Pact of Paris of 1928, Art. 11; The Charter of the United Nations Art. 2(3); 
G. A. Res. 2625 (XXV) of 1970; The Corfu Channel Case 
, 
I. C. J. Rep. 1949, p. 35; Nicaragua 
Case, I. C. J. Rep. 1986 p. 14, at pp. 99-100, para. 188. The peaceful means for the settlement 
of disputes are proposed in Article 33 of the U. N. Charter and they are, "... negotiation, 
enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies 
or arrangement, or other peaceful means of their choice... ". It is submitted that States are 
under an obligation to settle their disputes by peaceful means in general and not under any 
obligation to seek settlement of disputes by resorting to a specific means. Waldock pointed 
to the lack of a judicial body of compulsory jurisdiction on the international plane as a 
situation which in view of the absolute prohibition of the use of force under the Charter 
would entail the "... seeds of trouble... "; 81 H. R. C. 455 (1952 11), at p. 490. This appears to 
the present author as to strict an analogy with domestic law. The existence of compulsory 
jurisdiction thereunder, far from being the only method of dispute settlement, does not 
constitute as such an automatic prohibition of forcible settlement of disputes, but is distinct 
from and exists alongside the latter. According to Jennings, General Course on Principles of 
International Law, 121 H. R. C. 327 (1967 11), at pp. 586-587, the non-resort to force in 
accordance with Article 2(4) does not necessarily imply compliance with Article 2(3) and 
this may constitute a dangerous prospect for the effectiveness of the former provision, "... 
for it is impossible indefinitely to hold a position where a person is forbidden to employ 
self-help and yet at the same time is not enabled to take his opponent into Court... ". 
Whether Article 2(3) of the Charter entails an obligation to settle a dispute in general, is 
not the object of this research. Be that as it may, it does not follow, and indeed is 
irrelevant to the settlement of any dispute in. the face of intransigence on the part of either 
party thereto, that the other should be released from its obligation not to have recourse to 
force. Article 2(3) expressly refers to the settlement of disputes "... in such a manner that 
international peace and security are not endangered". To resort to force because the other 
party in a dispute is not forft omi<ng to settling the dispute by way of one or another of the 
means contained in Art. 33 of the Charter, is to jeopardise the very framework of the 
Charter system. Moreover, the obligation to settle a dispute seems to be distinct from the 
means by which the dispute is to be settled. The willingness to settle a dispute, even if it 
emanates from one of the parties thereto, is always assumed to be achieved by peaceful 
means. 
54 S. C. O. R. 8th yr. 
, 
630th mtg. para. 61. Sir Gladwyn Jebb, the U. K. delegate in the 
Security Council stated that "... such actions... must inevitably create new obstacles to the 
cause which the Council has at heart, namely, the return of peace to the Middle East... ", 
ibid, 640th mtg. para. 10. 
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to be employed for the settlement of disputes... " 55. Mr Wiggins, the United 
States delegate, said in his speech to the Council with respect to the Beirut 
raid that "... violence leads to more violence and retaliation rather than 
bringing an end to terrorism weakens the forces of peace... "56. Moreover, 
the danger of escalation and conflagration of the reprisal action into a 
major conflict has been also pointed out. The Yugoslav representative 
speaking during the debate on the Lake Tiberias incident said that "... the 
attacker cannot always restrict the range of his actions; measures of 
retaliation no matter what their range, can lead to sharp response on the 
part of the side attacked and can have grave and unforeseen 
consequences... " 57. 
Although the "accumulation of events", the whole context of the 
dispute between the author and the victim of reprisals, is acknowledged by 
third States, it is not accepted as a justification for armed action by either of 
the parties to the dispute 58. The fact is that such action by being unilateral 
and by having as its basis the overall background of relations between the 
author and the target of the use of force, as perceived by the former 
, 
it 
offers strong grounds for doubting the objectivity of the presentation of 
the overall relations by the author of the retaliatory action 59. 
The concept of "accumulation of events", as justification for resort 
to force, has been repeatedly rejected by the Security Council 6o. 
States may take account of the overall relations between two disputant 
parties in assessing possible routes for peaceful settlement or determining 
their attitude towards a draft resolution laid before them at the Security 
Council; but they fall short of accepting it as justifying resort to force. The 
delegate of Uruguay stated during the debate on the Almagor incident of 
1966: 
"... If the air attack on Syria of 14 July is considered in isolation it undoubtedly 
constitutes an illegal aggressive act; second, if that attack is linked to the acts of sabotage, 
and so forth.... the responsibility is considerably mitigated.... especially if both Syrian 
55 S. C. O. R. 11th yr. 
, 
710th mtg. para. 94. 56 S. C. O. R. 23rd yr. 
, 
1460th mtg. para. 73. Indeed, more than forty years of the so-called 
Arab-Israeli conflict seems to support the above statements. 
57 S. C. O. R. 11th yr. 
, 
711th mtg. para. 10; Schwarzenberger, 87 H. R. C. 195 (1955 I), at 
p328. 
Statement by the french delegate in the Security Council during the debate on the 
Qibya incident; S. C. O. R. 8th yr. 
, 
635th mtg. para. 63. 59 Statement by Mr. Zafrulla Khan, the Pakistani delegate in the Security Council during 
the Qibya incident debate; ibid. 640th mtg. paras. 26,28. 
60 Bowett, 66 A. I. I. L. 1 (1972), at p. 7; Sullivan, loc. cit. supra n. 3, p. 191; Cf. Greenwood loc. 
cit. supra n. 3, p. 956. 
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and Israel incidents are viewed against the general background of passion, hostility and 
hate which has prevailed in that region since 1947..... This mitigation of responsibility 
also applies to the Syrian Arab Republic... It is obvious that armed reprisals cannot in any 
circumstances be recognized as a lawful instrument in international relations and that the 
illegal use of force constitues a violation of the positive international law created in San 
Francisco. These reprisals are known as "taking the law into one's own hands". They can be 
explained by the extenuating circumstances to which I referred previously, but they cannot 
be justified, for there are international organs empowered to intervene in the case of acts 
such as those which provoked the reaction of 14 July.... " 61 
The "accumulation of events" as an explanatory factor of resort to 
force, although not preventing the latter from being condemned or 
deplored, may be of moral and political significance in implying that the 
victim of reprisals bears some degree of responsibility for the forcible 
action 62 
. 
Such an "accumulation of events", however, is unlikely to offer 
the 'benefit' of condemnation for reprisals to States whose policy 
constitutes a denial of the fulfilment of a right under international law at 
the time when they resort to force. This attitude has so far been 
demonstrated with regard to the denial of the right of self-determination 
of colonial peoples and practices of human rights violations, especially in 
the form of racial discrimination 63. 
It may be deduced from State practice that the distinction between 
reprisals and self-defence is generally maintained on the basis of their aim. 
The starting point and indeed the final judgment over an act of force is to 
be founded on the plea of self-defence that is asserted by the author of the 
use of force. Any use of force going beyond the necessity of self-defence or 
against a target other than the source of the armed force, which must be 
designated as such beyond any doubt on the basis of evidence, seems 
bound to be characterised as reprisal. It appears that the punitive essence of 
the latter is deduced a contrario by the absence of any irrefutable grounds 
for self-defence. 
61 S. C. O. R. 21st yr. 
, 
1293rd mtg. para. 47. Uruguay abstained in the voting on the draft 
res, oiuti n because it was thought that a condemnation of Israel "-.. would neither be useful 
or conducive.. 
_" 
towards achieving peace in the region; ibid. para. 57. 
62 The many instances of condemnation of Israel for reprisals and not for aggression may be 
implicit of the Arab States prior breach of international law; see Barsotti, loc. cit. supra 
n. 3, pp. 89,93,95. 
63 lt is worth mentioning that Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa have always been 
condemned for "armed attack" or "armed aggression" for resorting to force on the territory of 
neighbouring States in response to activities by guerrilla groups and despite the fact that 
the characteristics of the majority of those forcible actions partake the nature of reprisals. 
See Barsotti, loc. cit. supra n. 3 pp. 84-88; Cf. Cot and Pellet op. cit. supra n. 3, p. 121. 
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Thus, it seems that States that have resorted to reprisals have 
sought to justify their action as defensive, on the basis of its aim rather 
than on any assertions of non-distinction between reprisals and self- 
defence 64 or permissibility of limited force in "defensive reprisals" as 
long as major force is permitted in self-defence65 
. 
The premise that reprisals are unlawful under the Charter of the 
United Nations and customary international law has been subject to doubt 
by learned authority 66. 
The line of argument advocated rests on a twofold basis. First, it is 
argued, that the ineffectiveness of the collective security machinery of the 
United Nations compels a resurrection of the pre-Charter customary law 
of reprisals either by way of a "... second order level of legal inquiry that is 
guided by the more permissive attitudes towards the use of force... "67, or 
by directly arguing for the re-institution of the concept of reprisals by not 
interpreting the Charter "... arbitrarily... but to read experience into it... ", 
which, in its turn, reveals that coercion is necessary for the protection of 
o`t Tucker, Reprisals and Self-Defence: The Customary Law, 66 A. J. I. L. 586 (1972); Blum, 
loc. cit. in Netanyahu op. cit. supra n. 33, pp. 134-5; Levenfeld, Israel's Counter-Fedayeen 
Tactics in Lebanon: Self-Defence and Reprisal under Modern International Law, 21 
Columbia I. I. L. 1 (1982-83), at pp. 37-8; Cf. Skubizewski, loc. cit. in Sorensen op. cit. S11171-11 
n. 3, p. 754. 
65 Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, 1988, p. 202 seq. esp. at p. 210; id. The Legal 
Issues of "Para-War" and Peace in the Middle East, in Moore (ed. ), The Arab-Israeli 
Co17flict, 77ol. ii, Princeton 1974, p. 158, at p. 164. 
E'f' E. S. Colbert, Retaliation in International law, N. York 1948, pp. 201-204; Cheng, General 
Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, 1953, p. 101; Stone, 
Aggression and World Order, 1958, pp. 92-102; Falk, The Beirut Raid and the International 
Law of Retaliation, 63 A. J. I. L. 415 (1969); Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed 
Force, 66 A. J. I. L. 1 (1972); Lillich, Readings in International Law from the Naval War 
College Review 1947-77, R. B. Lillich and J. N. Moore (ed. ) vol. ii: The Use of Force, Human 
Riglits and General International Legal Issues, pp. 130,133,136,138 ; Levenfeld, Israel's 
Counter-Fedayeen Tactics in Lebanon: Self-Defence and Reprisal Under Modern 
International Law, 21 Columbia J. Trans. L. 1 (1982-83), at p. 35; G. B. Roberts, Self-Help in 
Combating State-Sponsored Terrorism: Self-Defence and Peacetime Reprisals, 19 Case 
West. Res. J. I. L. 243 (1987), pp. 283-285; A. N. Salpeter-). C. Walter, Armed Reprisals 
During Intermediacy- A New Framework for Analysis in International Law, 17 Vill. L. R. 
270 (7971-72), pp. 296-7; G. Carpenter, The South African Raid on Terrorist bases in Lesotho, 
8 S. A. Y. 1. L. 154 (1982), 1%-7; G. von Glahn, Lau? Among Nations, 5th ed. 1986, p. 568; Cf. M. 
Virally, Cours General de Droit International Public, 183 H. R. C. 9 (1983 V), pp. 106-7. 
67 Falk, loc. cit. supra n. 66, pp. 430-1. The author argues that "... If the Charter status of 
reprisals exhausted legal inquiry, then there would be no prospect of moderating force in 
retaliatory settings wherein the Charter approach was ineffectual..... The customary 
international law of reprisal is a very important illustration of such second order 
legality... ". Note that, although the author appears to consider that a prohibition of 
resort to force in armed reprisals is not part of customary law, he imposes strict limitations 
to what he considers as lawful resort to armed retaliation, id. pp. 441-2. See also criticism 
by Blum, The Beirut Raid and the International Double Standard, 64 A. J. I. L. 73 (1970). 
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the objectives of the United Nations 68 
. 
Both of the above theses are 
manifestly conspicuous for their total disregard of the practice of States 
and the Security Council, as well as the opinio juri, under which the 
above practice has occurred which reveal the unlawfulness of reprisals in 
contemporary international law. It is submitted that the invocation of the 
ineffectiveness of the United Nations collective security machinery as 
offering licence to States to resort to forcible self-help is a de lege lata 
flawed argument. lt finds no support in the practice of States because no 
State has ever asserted a right to resort to armed force in reprisals as 
required by law. Secondly, the ineffectiveness of the Charter security 
machinery, as indeed the one of the old League of Nations, does not seem 
to be due to the provisions of the Charter as such but rather to the attitude 
certain members of the organisation have towards these provisions 69. 
Finally, and as a consequence of the second of this author's submissions, 
the immediate resort to self-help by States because, apart from the 
ineffectiveness of the United Nations system, of the state of development 
of international law in general is in direct contradiction to considering the 
latter as law at all- an assertion never put forward by any authority. The 
'inchoate' character of the international community manifested by a lack 
of central legislative and executive authority for the making and enforcing 
of the law, as well as the absence of compulsory jurisdiction of any court, 
does, by no means, create a permissiveness of self-help by way of reprisals 
as a "legal institution"70. 
The second line of criticism is based on the practice of the Security 
Council 71, It is being argued that on certain occasions, acts of reprisals 
taken by Israel against Arab States, have escaped condemnation by the 
Security Council; this is attributed to the "reasonableness" of the acts of 
armed retaliation that escaped censure, which, in its turn, is largely based 
on the proportionality of the force used, as well as of the selection of the 
target of the use of force 72. Consequently, "... there is clearly some 
evidence that certain reprisals will, even if not accepted as justified, at 
least avoid condemnation... ", and "... if this trend continues we shall 
(8 Lillich 
, 
op. cit. srºpra n. 66, p. ; he further maintains that the prohibition of the use of 
force "... is not an absolute virtue; it has to be weighed against other values as well... ", 
ibid. Also see references to Stone, Colbert, Carpenter, Salpeter and Waller and Roberts, loc. 
ct. slºpra n. 66 
69 Brierly, The Covenant and the Charter, 23 B. Y. I. L. 83 (7946), at p. 84. 
70 Lauterpacht, 
_The 
Fººººclioºr of Law in the International Cominunity, 1933, pp. 394-5. 
71 Bowett, loc. Cit. supra n. 66. Also see O'Brien, 30 Va J. I. L. 427 (1990), pp. 469-475. 
72 Bowett, loc. cit. supra n. 66, pp. 10 seq. 
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achieve a position in which while reprisals remain illegal de jure they 
become accepted de facto. Indeed it may be that the more relevant 
distinction today is not between self-defence and reprisals, but reprisals 
that are likely to be condemned and those which because they satisfy some 
concept of 'reasonableness' are not... "73. The above thesis, however, seems 
a tentative one for the author concedes that "... it is possibly premature to 
suggest that the principle is now jeopardized. The principle of 
inadmissibility of reprisals is part of the broader prohibition of the use of 
force that constitutes jus cogens... " 74. 
Still, its implications are alarming because what it seems to suggest 
is that reprisals may be tolerated within the very framework of the United 
Nations whose Charter is deemed to have rendered them unlawful 75. 
However, a study of the cases in which condemnation was withheld does 
not seem to suggest that the Security Council or its Members were 
prepared to accept certain acts of reprisal as "reasonable". With regard to 
the Nahahn incident of 1954, the Security Council took no action on the 
basis of procedural irregularity 76. Consideration of the Qalqilya incident of 
10 October 1956 was interrupted by the eruption of the Suez Crisis on 29 
October 1956. Another Israeli action, the air raid on the site of the Syrian 
development scheme of the Jordan River failed to be condemned by the 
Council 77. The Israeli action was nevertheless deplored78 and 
condemnation seems to have been withheld because of the failure of the 
73 Id. p. 10. 
74 Id. p. 22. 
75 Barsotti, loc. cit. supra n. 3, p. 82. An examination of the practice of the Security Council 
reveals that the disproportionate nature of certain reprisals was stressed in some 
Resolutions of the Council; see S. C. Resolutions 228(1968) on the Samu incident and 
248(1968) on the Karameh incident. However, such reference seems not to constitute 
condonement of the armed action but rather an attempt at explaining why it has been solely 
Israel that was condemned and not simultaneously and in the same Resolutions, the Arab 
States that encouraged infiltration of armed bands against the former. See Barsotti, pp. 92- 
3. 
76 Jordan that had been the target of the Israeli action was not a Member of the United 
Nations at the time when the complaint was launched. Although it was Lebanon that 
requested a meeting of the Council to consider the incident, the complaint was deemed to be 
.. 
in substance a complaint by Jordan... "; in view of the fact that the latter had not given 
notice in advance, according to Article 35(2) of the Charter, that it accepted the obligations 
of the pacific settlement of disputes, the Council declined to consider the matter. See 
statement by Sir Pierson Dixon, the President of the Council, S. C. O. R. 9th yr. 671st mtg, 
para. 16. 
77 A draft resolution sponsored by Jordan and Mali condemning Israel-Doc. S/ 7437. S. C. O. R. 
21st yr. Suppl. for July-Sept. 1966, p. 59-was defeated by 6: 0: 9 abstentions; S. C. O. R. 21st yr. 
, 
1295th mtg, para. 76. 
78 See statement by the representative of Uruguay, ibid. 1293rd mtg, para. 47. 
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draft resolution to equally censure the Syrian support for armed 
infiltration inside Israel79. 
Finally, on two occasions condemnation by the Council was frustrated by 
the United States negative vote. On 8 September 1972 the Israeli Air Force 
launched a series of strikes on Palestinian refugee camps in Syria and 
Lebanon in retaliation of the killing of the Members of the Israeli national 
Olympic team in Munich on 5 September 1972. In voting against the draft 
resolution 8o Mr. Bush, the representative of the United States, stated that 
the United States delegation "... are.. convinced that the Council would 
have done neither the parties nor itself any good by adopting a draft 
resolution which ignored realities, which spoke to one form of violence 
and not another, which looked to effect but not to cause... " 81. On 2 
December 1975 the Israeli Air Force mounted a large-scale air raid on three 
Palestinian refugee camps in Southern Lebanon; a draft resolution 82 
which would have condemned Israel was not adopted due to the negative 
vote of the United States. The representative of the latter stated: "... Now, 
the United States strongly deplores the Israeli action... 
. 
But we also believe 
that the problem of loss of innocent life resulting from incursions from 
Lebanon and other neighbouring States... should also be condemned.... " 83. 
It, therefore, becomes clear that the failure of condemning Israel was 
due to reasons of procedure, considerations of the Council's role to 
promote the settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute at large which went 
beyond any condemnation o¬ either side, and insistence that the acts of 
Arab States, especially their support for activities by armed groups against 
Israel, should have been condemned alongside the Israeli resort to 
retaliatory force. 
In conclusion it may be stated that reprisals are unlawful under 
present international law; whether taken by way of punishment or 
deterrent of future acts of the State against which they are directed, they 
still have the character of unilateral enforcement sanctions by way of use 
of armed force. No plea of ineffectiveness of the present structure of the 
international community can be held to justify resort to armed retaliation 
aspiring to the settlement of disputes or the vindication of rights. Practice 
79 Statement by the representative of Uganda, ibid. 1294th mtg, para. 7. 
80 Doc. S/10784, submitted before the Council at its 1661st mtg by Guinea, Somalia and 
Yugoslavia; para. 39, S. C. O. R. 27th. 
81 S. C. O. R. 27th yr. 
, 
1662nd mtg para. 76. 
82 Doc. S/ 11898. 
83 S. C. O. R. 30th yr. 
, 
1862nd mtg para. 134. 
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in the context of the Arab-Israeli dispute, the Portuguese colonies, the 
situation in Rhodesia and the relations between South Africa and her 
neighbouring States, suggests that tension and long-standing disputes, 
instead of being settled, become dangerously protracted with potentially 
immeasurable peril for international peace and security. Finally, aggrieved 
States are recognised the right to resort to equally effective reprisals that 
are short of the use of armed force 84. 
84 See Case Concerning the Air Services Agreement of 27 March 1946 (United States Z'. 
France), 54 I. L. R. p. 304; Bowett, 13 Va I. I. L. 1 (1972-73); Elagab, op. cit. ; Zoller, op. cit. 
Schachter, 37 Journal of Intern. Aff. 231 (1984). 
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CHAPTER 4 
THREAT OF FORCE 
The prohibition of armed force under Article 2(4) of the United 
Nations Charter extends to the threat apart from the actual use of force by 
States. It was for the first time that the prohibition of the threat of force has 
been included in a contractual provision which illegalises the use of 
armed force. This development came probably as a result of the Nazi 
experience with regard to the seizure of Austria in 1938 and 
Czechoslovakia in 1939 where in both cases the threat of armed force by 
Germany was followed by unopposed invasions. 
According to Brownlie: 
' 
... 
A threat of force consists in an express or implied promise by a government of a 
resort to force conditional on non-acceptance of certain demands of that government. If the 
promise is to resort to force in conditions in which no justification for the use of force exists, 
the threat itself is illegal 
... 
"1 
The meaning of "threat of force" has not received extensive 
consideration and there seems to exist a good deal of uncertainty with 
regard to characterizing certain instances of State practice as "threats of 
force" within the meaning of Article 2(4) of the Chartere. 
States often have large parts of their armed forces stationed along or 
within proximity of the frontiers of neighbouring States; they stockpile 
certain types of weapons, such as nuclear weapons; they take 
measures by way of domestic legislation pertaining to their security; an 
illustration of the latter is the Ordinance Containing Instructions for the 
Armed Forces in Time of Peace and in State of Neutrality issued by the 
Swedish Government on March 3,19833 
. 
According to the Ordinance any 
foreign submarine found submerged in the internal waters of Sweden 
shall be forced to surface and be taken ashore for further action; moreover, 
the use of armed force is not excluded4 
Brownlie, International Lau, and the Use of Force by States, 1963, p. 364. Cf 
. 
Dinstein, 
War, Aggression and Self Defence, 1988, pp. 12,18. 
2 See Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 Mich. L. R. 7620 (1984), p. 
1625. 
3 See Sadurska, Threats of Force, 82 A. J. I. L. 239 (1988), pp. 255-6, esp. n. 8 at p. 255. 4 Ibid. The above piece of legislation followed the abortive large-scale operation 
conducted by the Swedish armed forces with regard to the intrusion of an unidentified 
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States also enter defensive alliance treaties (N. A. T. O. 
, 
Warsaw Pact) and 
they often conduct military manoeuvres on their territories. 
Are all the above cases to be considered as threats of force within the 
meaning of Article 2(4) of the Charter? The deployment of nuclear 
weapons by certain States, for instance, has been described as a "deterrent", 
namely, a means of preserving the peace through the certainty of mutual 
destruction in case of resort to force by way of nuclear attacks 
. 
Nevertheless, the legality of the possession and deployment of any type of 
weapons as well as any measure relevant to the security and defence of the 
State adopted by any Government within the territory of the State is 
undisputed under International law6; indeed, it seems to derive its 
legitimacy freie the principle of State sovereignty. 
The aforementioned submission may be, and indeed, it has often 
been qualified by the whole context of relations between specific States or 
groups of States, nanmely, considerations of strategic policy, power politics, 
spheres of influence of the two super powers. 
The deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962 was interpreted by the 
U. S. A. as a "deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status 
quo". ' Similarly the Soviet Union interpreted any change of the regime 
in the Eastern European States as prejudicial to her security: it was stated 
within regard to Czechoslovakia in 1968 that the result of 
"Czechoslovakia's separation from the socialist comnmomvealth" would 
have been that " N. A. T. O. troops might approach the Soviet borders... "s 
Most recently the U. S. Government announced that it was contemplating 
unilateral military action against a Libyan plant suspected of making 
chemical weapons9 
. 
Taking into consideration the high tension in the 
US 
- 
Libyan relations due to the allegations 
foreign submarine in the territorial waters of Sweden, in the vicinity of a top secret naval 
base, on 10 October 1982. 
5 Sadurska loc. cit. supra n. 2, p. 247 but cf. pp. 246-7. 
See I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, at p. 134, para 269; Tucker, Using Force Against Libya? N. York 
Tines 
, 
January 11,7989, at A 25, cols 2-5, extracts reprinted in D' Amato, International Law 
in the Public Forum: The New York Times and the Libyan Chemical Weapons Plant, 83 
4. J. 1. L. 527 (7989), p. 528. 
7 47 Dept. of State Bull. 1962, p. 715. 
R See Reisman, Old Wine in New Bottles: The Reagan and Bre7hnev Doctrines in 
Contemporary Law and Practice, 13 Yale J. 1. L. 1'1 (1988), p. 174 notes 7-9. 
9 Keesing's 1989, p. 36385; D' Amato loc. cit. supra n. 6. 
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made by the United States Government that Libya sponsors terrorist 
activities against American targets", the economic measures instituted by 
the U. S. against Libya> > and the air raids by the U. S. Air Force on Tripoli 
and Bengazi in April 1986 12 it may be concluded that the potential 
capacity of Libya to produce chemical weapons was conceived as a possible 
threat to the security of the United States. During the drafting of the 
Declaration on Principles of Friendly Relations13 the meaning of the term 
"threat of force" was 
commented on but without any formal proposals being made with regard 
to it. It was claimed that a threat of force could be direct or indirect and 
could be expressed both in deeds and words14. Chile in a proposal with 
regard to the content of the principle of the non-use of force suggested 
that: 
'The expression threat of force shall refer to any action, direct or indirect, 
whatever the form it may take, which tends to produce in the other state a justified fear 
that it or the regional community of which it is a part will be exposed to serious and 
irreparable harm... ', 15 
It was moreover stated that the meaning of the term threat of force 
should be approached with caution16 while the issue of the threat of force 
was linked with the rather vague concept of provocation in the sense that 
a State could provoke another State into using armed force against it so as 
the latter State be presented as violating international law» 
. 
Be that as it 
may, the meaning of the threat of force was not elaborated and hence the 
sole reference to the threat of force in the restated text of Article 2(4) of the 
Charter under the First Principle of the Declaration. 
During the United Nations quest for the definition of Aggression 
the issue of the "threat of force' and its inclusion in the Definition of 
Aggression was met with opposition and scepticism due to the 
controversy surrounding the possible response to such "threat" in 
anticipatory self-defence and the ambiguous concept of provocation that 
10 See 25 I. L. M. 182-191,199-202 (1986). 
11 Ibid. 
12 Keesing's 1986, p. 34456. 
13 G. A. Res. 2625 (XXV), G. A. O. R. 25th session, Suppl. No 28, p. 121. 
14 G. A. O. R. 20th session Annexes, p. 87. 
15 Doc. A/ AC. 125/ L. 23, G. A. O. R. 21st session Annexes, p. 30. 
16 G. A. O. R. 20th session Annexes, p. 87. 
17 G. A. O. R. 21st session Annexes, p. 34. 
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aggression18 and it is probably for this reason that the "threat of force" does 
not appear in Article 1 of the 1974 Definition of Aggression ( G. A. Res. 3314 
(XXIX) of 1974). 
The International Law Commission (I. L. C. ) in the course of its work 
on the Draft Code on Offences against the Peace and Security of Alartkind 
has included "any threat by the authorities of a State to resort to an act of 
aggression against another state" in the Draft Code19. During the debates 
in the I. L. C. it has been acknowledged that the result of the threat of force 
was the same in some circumstances, at least- with that of the use of force, 
because as, it has rightly been pointed out, "... there was only a difference of 
degree between the threat of employment of armed force and the actual 
employment of it"20 
. 
This was demonstrated in the cases of the Anschluss (the 
incorporation of Austria in the Third Reich) and the seizure of 
Czechoslovakia in March 1938, and September 1938 and March 1939 
respectively. In both cases the Nazi Government issued explicit threats of 
military action unless its demands were met; however, both cases were 
regarded by the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg not as 
constituting aggressive wars, but rather as parts of the common plan to 
wage a ivar of aggression in Europe21 
. 
The fact, moreover, that in cases 
where the threat to use force is folloxved by unopposed invasion is usually 
regarded as an actual use of force22, does not, in the present author's 
view, deprive such explicit threat of any significance with regard to its 
onerous nature. In fact, an explicit threat of the use of armed force is an 
extremely convenient means of achieving one's purposes and at the same 
time dispensing with any possible risks which an overt use of force 
entails' 
18 Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, G. A. O. R. 12th 
session, Suppl. No 16, p. 7, paras 53-56; Report of the Special Committee on the Question of 
Defining Aggression, G. A. O. R. 24th session, Suppl. No 20, p. 18, paras 31-33; also see 
IVengier, L. ' Interdiction de Recourir ä la Force: Probletnes et Tendences, 7 Revue Belge D. I. 
401 (1971 ), p. 405 n. 12. See infra Part Two, Ch. 9, First Title. 
19 Article 2(2), L. L. C. YbI. 1951, vol. i, pp. 58-60; id. 1954, vol. ii, pp. 151-2; G. A. O. R. 40th 
session, Suppi. No 10, p. 30 n. 36, para 86; G. A. O. R. 41st session, Suppl. No 10, p. 104 n. 84. 
20 Comment by 'dir. Yepes, I. L. C. Ybk 1951, vol. i, p. 58, para 40. 21 The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Proceedings of the International Military 
Tribunal Sitting at N'ure nberg, Germany, Part 22, H. M. S. O. 1950, pp. 427,429. In the case of 
the occupation of Denmark, which was effected under similar circumstances, the Tribunal 
held that it was a war of aggression; ibid. p. 436. 
22 Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 1, p. 365. 
23 Comment by Mr. Yepes, loc. cit. supra n. 20, para 41. 
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A threat of force may also be and, indeed, in most cases is implicit. It 
may be deduced from putting the armed forces of a State on alert along the 
borders of the target State. 
On 25 March 1987 the Turkish Government issued a permit 
enabling the State-owned Turkish Petroleum Corporation to conduct 
hydrographic research for oil exploration in the Aegean Sea outside the 
Turkish territorial waters. On the following day the Greek Government 
repeated its offer to submit the continental shelf dispute to the I. C. J, but 
warned that if the Turkish Petroleum Corporation vessel carried out 
research "in areas where under conventional and customary law the 
continental shelf belongs to Greece, the Greek Government will take the 
necessary measures to ensure its sovereign rights". The Greek armed 
forces were promptly put on alert24. 
A similar situation may arise out of the conduct of military 
manoeuvres 
- 
viz. the U. S. Navy manoeuvres in the Gulf of Sirte in 
January 198925. 
While the unlawful character of an explicit threat of force is clearly 
discernible, it is not so when a threat of force is implicit. Army 
movements and the conduct of military manoeuvres do not as such 
qualify as threats of force. It is submitted that it is the context of the 
relations between the two States that attributes the character of the threat 
of force to an act which is generally considered to be lawful. The reference 
to the context of relations of the State-author and the State-target of the 
threat must not be understood as the general context of the international 
relations between the two States, namely, the fact that two global or 
regional powers, such as the U. S. A. and the U. S. S. R. 
, 
had opposing 
interests only because of the fact that they both were of matching military 
power and each one exercises considerable political 
influence over a number of States. What really must be taken into account 
is the context of the relations between the two States with regard to a 
particular dispute or controversy. The threat of use of force by Greece 
against Turkey in March 1987 is perceived as such if the relations of the 
24 The situation between Greece and Turkey is also a case of explicit threat. The Prime 
Minister of Greece, Mr. A. Papandreou, stated that the Greek armed forces " 
... 
would teach 
Turkey a very hard lesson" if Turkey continued with "aggressive acts" in the Aegean. See 
Keesing's 1987, p. 35129. 
25 Keesing's 1989, p. 36385. According to the U. S. A. the manoeuvres were conducted on the 
high seas. Libya, on the other hand, has asserted territorial sovereignty over the Gulf of 
Sirte by claiming that it constitutes a historic bay. 
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two States are viewed against the background of the dispute over the 
Aegean Sea continental shelf. 
Similarly the U. S. military manoeuvres in the Panama Canal Zone 
may be qualified as a threat of force in the light of the tension in the 
relations of the U. S. Government and General Noriega2b 
. 
The qualification of an action by a State as a "threat of force" derives 
its wrongful and unlawful character from the element of coercion which 
must be established with regard to an action purported to be a threat of 
force. This is supported by the judgment of the I. C. J. in the Nicaragua Case 
. 
In dealing with the principle of non-intervention in connection with the 
assistance provided to armed bands operating against a State the Court 
held: 
" 
... 
The element of coercion which defines and indeed forms the very essence of 
intervention, is particular obvious in the case of an intervention which uses force, either in 
the direct form of military action, or in the indirect form of support for subversive or 
terrorist activities within another State. As noted above (paragraph 191), General 
Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) equates assistance of this kind with the use of force by the 
assisting state when the acts committed in another state "involve a threat or use of force". 
These forms of action are therefore wrongful in the light of both the principle of non-use of 
force and that of non-intervention 
... 
"2, 
Thus, if the Opposition to the Government of State A threatens to 
resort to force against that Government and State B threatens State A that 
that it will provide the Opposition with military and logistical support 
unless State A heeds to certain demands of State B, then State B commits 
an unlawful threat of force and possibly intervention in the internal 
affairs of State A. 
The unlawful character of the threat of force is complemented by 
Brownlie's submission that if the promise is to resort to force in 
conditions in which no justification for the use of force exists, the threat 
itself is illegales 
. 
Thus, in the example above, State A could legitimately 
counter-threaten that it should take all appropriate counter-measures to 
intercept the traffic in arms and logistical support to the Opposition29. 
Nicaragua contended that the joint military manoeuvres conducted 
by the U. S. and Honduran armed forces in Honduras constituted a threat 
2 Keesing's 1988, pp. 35815-8,36215; Keesing's 1989, pp. 36645-6,36684. 
27 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, at p. 108, para 205. 
28 Op. cit. supra n. 1. 
29 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, at pp. 110,127, paras 211,249. 
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of force. The Court rejected the Nicaraguan claim because the manoeuvres 
were held in circumstances which did not constitute on the part of the 
U. S. A. a breach of the principle of the prohibition of the threat or use of 
force30. The character of an action as an unlawful use of force is, 
therefore, not to be judged solely in the background of the context of the 
relations between the the threatening and the target State with regard to a 
specific dispute. The circumstances surrounding the action purported to 
constitute a threat of force seem to be equally relevant. 
In the specific case of the joint U. S. 
-Honduran military manoeuvres 
it could be argued that the threat of force to Nicaragua was subsumed by 
the actual use of force by the U. S. A. against Nicaragua. This seems to the 
present author to be a rather tentative argument, in view of the fact that 
the Court did not find a direct link between the manoeuvres on the one 
hand and the U. S. direct use of of force against Nicaragua and its assistance 
to the contras on the other. 
In fact, it becomes clear from the appraisal of the facts of the 
Nicaraguan conflict that the Court drew a distinction between the 
instances of the use of force directly by the U. S. A. (i. e. the laying of mines 
in Nicaragua's internal and territorial waters, the attacks on Nicaraguan 
ports, oil installations and a naval base) and its indirect use of force in 
support of the contras 
. 
The alleged threat of force by way of military 
manoeuvres was considered as pertinent to the former situation31 
. 
The 
non-existence of any causal link between the conduct of the manoeuvres 
and the action against the Government of Nicaragua seems to have been 
decisive in respect of the above finding of the Court. 
The illegality of the threat of force, though not expressly denied, has 
been treated with a certain degree of scepticism. Sadurska32 has argued 
that there is no justification for equal treatment of the threat with the use 
of force because International law is preoccupied with the political 
independence of States not due to a concern for the freedom of States from 
external pressure but due to the need for peace and order among nations 
. 
This has been contrasted with domestic legal systems where the 
prohibition of duress, undue influence and criminal threat is purported to 
be linked to the protection of the freedom of the individual as the 
ultimate ratio of domestic society33 
. 
The same author concludes that, "[It] 
30 Ibid. p. 53, para 92. 
31 Ibid. p. 118, para 227. 
32 Sadurska, 82 A. J. 1. L. 239 (1988), p 249 et seq. 
33 Ibid, p. 249. 
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seems that as long as the threat of force does not jeopardize peace or lead 
to massive violations of human rights, international actors demonstrate 
varying degrees of approval or more or less reluctant tolerance for 
unilateral threats"34. The coercive character of a threat of force is 
dispensed with by arguing that "international law, as any other kind of 
law, is intimately linked with coercion: denying this does not change 
reality itself" 35 
. 
Finally, the whole line of argument boils down to the 
much-cherished and much-referred to finding of the inability of the 
Security Council of the U. N. to act and, thus, a threat of force is elevated to 
the status of a means of enforcing the law36 
. 
The threat of force is also 
presented as having the merit of being a lesser and often reasonable form 
of coercion3% 
If the above suggestions are accepted the aspect of inter-State 
relations which is more likely to be encroached upon is the very peace and 
order among nations. It is submitted that first, to base an argument in 
favour of the threat of force on the difference of the ultimate values 
protected in domestic and international communities is a non sequitur 
Domestic law is also preoccupied with order and peace among the 
individual members of human society. Indeed, a means to achieve this is 
the legal requirement to refrain from exercising duress etc. against another 
member of the community. Similarly, the prohibition of the 
threat of armed force aspires to achieving the same end. 
Secondly, it must be admitted that international law is linked with 
coercion ; at the same time, however, it must also be borne in mind that 
international law regulates armed coercion: the unilateral use of force is 
only permitted in the exercise of the right of individual or collective self- 
defence if an armed attack occurs ( Article 51 of the U. N. Charter). 
Thirdly, the lack of effectiveness of enforcement machinery on the 
international plane may be a prima facie serious defect of international 
law. It should be realized, however, that on both domestic and 
international planes it is primarily the individual members of the 
community that have the duty to observe the law and that police action is 
an exceptional measure and does not represent the rule on the domestic 
plane. The existence or not of enforcement machinery does not in any case 
34 Ibid. p. 250. 
35 Ibid. p. 251. 
3n [bid. p. 253. 
37 Ibid. pp. 253,261. 
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waive the undertaking by members of both the international and domestic 
communities to respect the law. 
A threat of armed force is said to be used to vindicate and enforce a 
right against another State or to promote the settlement of a dispute. 
However, the use of a means of coercion does not solve a dispute in the 
long-run. It merely inflicts, a fast, rather resentful and unilaterally assessed 
settlement which may constitute a temporary solution but not an ultimate 
settlement of the dispute. The threat of force by Greece against Turkey in 
March 1987 may have caused Turkey to refrain from conducting 
hydrographic research on the Aegean Sea continental shelf, but it has by 
no means provided a solution to the dispute over the Continental shelf as 
such. 
As for the vindication of a denied right the reliance on the Corfu 
Channel Case and, in particular, on the fact that the Albanian authorities 
regarded the exercise of the customary right of innocent passage by the 
British warships on 22 October 1946 as a threat of force doe-, not hold any 
water in view of two points. 
First, a threat of force constitutes by its very nature an act short of 
and equally coercive with an actual use of force and therefore, an act of 
self-help which was expressly rejected by the Court in the very same case 
with regard to the Operation Retail 
- 
The mine-sweeping of the Corfu 
Channel by the British Navy in order secure evidence against Albania38 
Secondly, it is implicit in the Court's Judgment in the 'ý'rcarag1La 
Case that what a State conceives as a threat of force is net in itself 
conclusive of the character of such an act. The ultimate conclusion lies 
Nvitll the circumstances in which the action allegedly constituting a threat 
was carried out39 
. 
In the light of the Nicaragua Case the circumstances in 
which the passage of the British warships took place on 22 October 1946 
indicated nothing less than the exercise of a right established in customary 
law 40 
. 
The threat of use of force because of its coercive nature does not 
constitute a peaceful means for the settlement of disputes between States 
in the sense of Article 2(3) of the U. N. Charter; on the contrary, temporary 
suspension of disputes effected by the threat of force may contain the seeds 
of escalating a dispute to the point of resorting to actual armed violence41 
. 
I. C. I. Rep. 1949, p. 4, at pp. 34-35. 
39 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, at p. 118, para 227. 
40 I. C. J. Rep. 1949, p. 4, pp. 30-31. 
41 Supra n. 18. 
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In conclusion, it is submitted that a threat of force in violation of 
Article 2(4) of the Charter and customary law exists if there is an explicit or 
implicit indication of the intention to use force by one State against 
another that is not factually premised on an exception to the rule of non- 
use of force. This statement of intention to use force must be viewed 
against the background of the relations between both States with regard to 
a specific dispute and in the light of the facts surrounding the articulation 
of the purported threat. 
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CHAPTER 5 
FORCE: ECONOMIC COERCION'. 
The prohibition of the threat or use of force in Article 2(4) of the 
United Nations Charter has been left unqualified. This being the case the 
issue arises whether the said prohibition extends over economic coercion. 
The question is rather complex in view of the broadness, interdependence 
and multifarness of inter-State economic activity. Furthermore, it is well 
established that the regulation of a State's foreign trade relations is normally a 
right within the sovereign prerogative of every State, namely, that 
international law imposes no obligation on any State to trade with any other 
Statelbis. On the other hand it is equally a fact that foreign trade 
, 
because of 
its nature, affects other nations2 
. 
Moreover, the concept of State sovereignty suggests readiness to 
concede concomitant rights to other States and assume obligations under 
international latiw3 
. 
Therefore, while prima facie the freedom of economic 
conduct of States is something undisputed under international law, it does 
I The topic is sometimes held to include political or ideologigal coercion 
. 
The situation 
envisaged by this term is political or ideological propaganda that emanates from abroad and is 
directed against the Government of the target State. Viewed from the point of the State that is 
its source, such conduct may be a legitimate exercise of the right of freedom of expression. 
Conversely, if the target Government has genuine popular support, then ideological 
propaganda may have no effect on the citizenry. In case, however, of domestic political 
discontent, such propaganda may constitute a critique that can influence the attitude of the 
local electorate, for instance, but it is unlikely to be the sole factor of an ultimate fall of an 
unpopular Government. The seeds of such eventuality already exist within the local 
population. It is only where such action is accompanied by severe economic measures, or even 
material assistance to insurgents, that may form the component of an act of unlawful 
intervention 
- 
viz. the charges made by Lebanon against the U. A. R. in 1958: It was alleged that 
hostile propaganda was coupled with infiltration of armed bands in Lebanon. The practice of 
States contains no instance where political propaganda alone was held to constitute a case of 
violation of the rule of non-use of force. This is not the case with regard to economic coercion 
which is to be dealt with in this section. On political coercion see Farer, Political and Economic 
Coercion in Contemporary International Law, 79 A. J. I. L. 405 (1985), p. 407. 
1bi See Vattel, Le Droit des Gens, Book 1, Ch. V111, The Classics of International Law, 1916, p. 
40; Nicaragua Case (Merits) I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, p. 138, para 276; J. C. Henderson, Legality of 
Economic Sanctions under International Law; The Case of Nicaragua, 43 Wash. and Lee L. R. 167 
(1986), p. 179. Cf. Lauterpacht, Boycott in International Relations, 14 B. Y. I. L. 125 (1933), p. 
130; 
, 
\kehurst, A Modern Introduction to International Law 6th ed. 1987, p. 16; S. C. Neff, 
Boycott and the Law of Nations: Economic Wafiare and Modern International Law in 
Historical Perspective, 39 B. Y. I. L. 113 (7988), pp. 114-5,129. 
2 Thomas & Thomas, Non-intervention. The Law and its Import in the Americas, 1956, p. 409. 
3 Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 4th ed. 1990, p. 288; Lillich, Economic 
Coercion and the International Legal Order, 51 Init. Aff. 358 (1975), pp. 366-7. 
not seem to be unlimited due to the reciprocity which is implicit in the 
principles of State sovereignty and the sovereign equality of States. However, 
the above contention is by far less absolute and rigid than the asserted 
prohibition of economic coercion under Article 2(4) of the Charter. 
At the outset the present author must exclude three types of economic 
conduct which is not relevant to the issue under consideration. 
First, certain economic conduct may be unlawful under specific 
provisions of treaties. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade4, for 
instance, introduces in Article 1 the most-favoured-nation clause to eliminate 
discriminatory economic measures among the Members of the Organisation 
and Article 11 stipulates the unlawfulness of discriminatory export 
prohibitions or restrictions. A similar prescription also appears in the context 
bilateral treaties. An illustration of this are the so-called Treaties of 
Friendship Commerce and Navigation (F. C. N. Treaties) which the U. S. A. has 
concluded with over 40 countries and which provide for the undertaking by 
one party not to discriminate or restrict the import or export of a product in 
which the other party has an important interest, unless such restrictions are 
applied to like imports from or exports to all other countries5 
. 
One such 
Treaty was concluded on January 21,1956 between Nicaragua and the U. S. A. 6 
In the Nicaragua Case 7, Nicaragua claimed that the U. S. had violated the 
provisions of the F. C. N. Treaty relating to the freedom of communication 
and commerce. The Court upheld the claim by ruling that " 
... 
[I]n the 
commercial context of the Treaty, Nicaragua's claim is justified not only as to 
the physical damage to its vessels, but also the consequential damage to its 
trade and commerce 
... 
". s Moreover, with regard to the Executive Order dated 
May 1,1985 whereby the President of the United States imposed an all-out 
embargo on Nicaraguan exports to the U. S. A., the Court held that it 
4 Text of the Agreement in 55 U. N. T. S. 266 
. 5 See D. Muir, The Boycott in International Law, in Lillich (ed. ), Econotnic Coercion and the 
New International Economic Order, 1976, p. 21 at p. 34. 
69U. S. T. 449. Article 14(2) accorded both parties most-favoured nation status and precluded 
both the United States and Nicaragua from restricting the imports or exports of the other 
party, unless the restricting party applies the same restrictions to all third parties with whom 
the restricting State trades. The Treaty was terminated by the U. S. A. on 1 May 1985, and the 
termination took effect on I May 1986. 
7 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14. 
8 Ibid. p. 139, para 278. 
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"constituted a measure in contradiction with Article 19 of the 1956 F. C. N. 
. 
Treaty, "" 
Secondly, economic measures authorised by a competent organ of an 
international Organisation as sanctions must be excluded. This is the case, for 
example, of the economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security 
Council under Article 41 of the Charter against Rhodesia by virtue of the S. C. 
Res. 232 (1966)10 and S. C. 253 (1968)11 
, 
against South Africa by S. C. Res. 418 
(1977)12, and against Iraq by S. C. Res. 661 (199O)12bis 
. 
Thirdly, economic coercion is justified, outside treaty commitments, 
when exercised by way of defensive13 or punitive retaliation. The retaliatory 
exercise of economic coercion is revealed in the practice of some States. 
The West German "Parliamentary Weeks" held in \Vest Berlin in 
February 1968, E-1-ere considered bye the Soviet Union as breach of the Allied 
. 
Agreements. \Vhen the Soviet protest was rejected, Fast Germany imposed 
restrictions can the traffic of goods and travel between East Germany and West 
Berlin. These measures were justified as a form of "self-defence". The Fast 
German Minister of the Interior said that "It is the clear duty of our socialist 
State to protect its citizens from dangers emanating from the West". )4 
In 1969 the Spanish authorities suspended the Gibraltar 
- 
Algeciras 
ferry service "in defence of Spanish interests"" 
. 
The Spanish action was 
related to the dispute between Spain and the U. K. over exercise of sovereignty 
in respect of Gibraltar. 
Ibid. p. 140, para 279. The plea of national security that the U. S. Government argued in 
justification for the economic measures against Nicaragua under Article 21 of the 1956 F. N. C. 
Treaty was also rejected by the Court; ibid. pp. 141-142, paras 281-282. 
1eß Resolutions and Decisions of the S. C. 1966, S. C. O. R. 21st yr. 
, 
p. 7. 
11 Ibid. 13, S. C. O. R. 23rd. yr. 
, 
p. 5. 
12 lbid. 1977, S. C. O. R. 32nd yr. 
, 
p. 5. 12bi' Lauterpacht & others (eds. ), Kuwait Crisis-Basic Docum ents, 7997, p. 88. See also S. C. 
Res. 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991 imposing a mandatory arms embargo on Yugoslavia; S. C. 
Res. 733 (19+2) of 23 January 1992 imposing a mandatory arms embargo on Somalia; S. C. Res. 746 
(1992) of 31 March 1992 imposing a mandatory air and arms embargo on Libya. 
13 This is inferred by the concept of proportionate counter-measures against political 
intervention introduced by the Court in the Nicaragua Cast, 
. 
See infra Part Two, Ch. 9, Second 
Title. 
14 Keesing's 1968, pp. 22799-22800. 
I' Keesing's 1969, p. 23453. 
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In 1960 President Eisenhower reduced the quota of sugar import to the 
United States from Cuba1 '. The U. S. Secretary of State denied that the 
reduction of the sugar quota was an exercise of reprisal17. However, the U. S. 
Court of Appeal for the 2nd Circuit stated in the Banco National de Cuba vv. 
Sabbatino that "legislative history made it abundantly clear that the main 
purpose 
.............. 
was to impose a sanction against an unfriendly nation. ". 18 
The Cuban Government responded by nationalizing U. S. property in Cuba by 
virtue of Law No 851 of July 6,1960, "in the security and defence of the 
state". 19 
Most recently retaliatory action by instituting economic measures has 
been taken by both the European Community and the United States. In 
February 1985, a GATT panel ruled that U. S. trade in fresh oranges had been 
substantially impaired and that tariff preferences given by the E. C. to 
Mediterranean countries had upset competition between U. S. and 
Mediterranean supplies. At a session of the GATT Council on April 29, the 
E. C. refused to allow the panel's finding to be endorsed or to implement its 
recommendation that some alternative tariff compensation be offered. As a 
response the U. S. increased the tariffs on E. C. pasta imports and the E. C. 
retaliated by raising the duty on U. S. lemons20 
. 
Another illustration of economic reprisal is the U. S. imposition of 100 
per cent duties on E. C. products on 1 February 1989 in retaliation for the 
imposition of 100 per cent tariffs on U. S. growth-hormone-beef by the E. C. on 
1 January 198921 
. 
By virtue of Executive Orders 12543 and 12544 of 7 and 8 January 1986 
the President of the U. S. A. ordered, respectively, the prohibition of trade 
between U. S. citizens and Libya and blocked Libyan Government property 
situated in the U. S. A. or held by U. S. citizens22. 
In the immediate aftermath of the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on 2 
August 1990, the Governments of the U. K. 
, 
the U. S. A. and other countries 
16 Keesing's 1960, p. 17538. 
17 43 Dept of State Bull. p. 404 (Statement of 24 August 1960). 
18 307 F. 2nd 845 (1962). 
19 Bowett, International Law and Economic Coercion, in Lillich (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 5, p. 89, at 
p 14. 
Keesing's 1986, p. 34366. 
21 Keesing's 1989, pp. 36405,36712. 
22 See U. S. Federal Register, vol. 51, No 11 (Jan. 16,1986); 25 I. L. M. 173-202 (1986). 
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took unilateral action to freeze Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets within their 
territories. Greenwood has taken the view that the above action constituted " 
... 
economic measures as first steps of collective self-defence with Kuwait or 
... 
economic counter-measures in response to an unlawful attack against a 
friendly State 
... 
"22bi 
Lastly, the lawful character of economic reprisals is a fortiori supported 
by the U. S. 
- 
France Air Services Award 23 
. 
By virtue of the Air Services Agreement of 27 March 1946 between 
France and the U. S. A 24 
, 
air carriers designated by the U. S. were authorised to 
operate from the West coast of the U. S. to Paris, via London. Pan American 
World Airways (PanAin ) was designated by the U. S. as carrier and it 
intermittently operated services untill March 1975. 
In 1978 PanAin informed the French authorities of their intention to 
resume services on the same route with a change of gauge in London from a 
Boeing 747 aircraft, which would be used between the U. S. and London, to a 
smaller Boeing 727 aircraft, which would be used between London and Paris 
when the flight would have fewer passengers. The proposed change was 
rejected by the French authorities as inconsistent with the 1946 Agreement. 
The U. S. challenged the above interpretation. 
PanAin resumed the gauge according to the proposed change and on 3 
May 1978 the French authorities refused to allow the passengers to disembark 
and ordered the PanAr 727 aircraft to return to London. On 4 May 1978, the 
U. S. A. proposed arbitration and France accepted in principle on 13 May. 
However, on 9 May 1378 the U. S. Civil Aeronautics Board required two 
French airlines to file schedules of their proposed flights. On 31 May, the 
Board issued a further order (which was to be implemented on 12 July 1978) 
prohibiting Air France to operate certain flights to the U. S. The second order 
never came into effect because on 11 July 1978 the two countries agreed to 
submit the dispute to arbitration. 
22bis Greenwood, New World Order or Old? The Invasion of Kuwait and the Rule of Law, 55 
Moderne L. R. 153 (1992), p. 159. 
23 U. N. R. I. A. A. vol. XVIII, p. 417; 54 I. L. R. 304. 
24 139 U. N. T. S. 253 ; Exchange of Notes of 5 April 1960 amending the 1946 Agreement, 458 
U. N. T. S. 292. 
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One of the issues the tribunal was seized with consisted of the question 
of whether the U. S. had the right to take the measures it had prescribed on 9 
May25 
. 
The arbitral Tribunal unanimously held that when a State considered 
that an obligation owed to it had been violated it was entitled to resort to 
"counter 
- 
measures", provided that "its retaliation was in approximate 
proportion to the alleged violation"26 
. 
Moreover, the Award marked a 
considerable departure from the requirement for prior unsuccessful resort to 
peaceful means for obtaining redress for the wrong suffered, in that it did not 
consider such process as obligatory on the part of the injured party even if 
there was a duty to negotiate or to resort to arbitration27. 
Expropriation of alien property may be undertaken by way of reprisal. 
The nationalisation of the B. P. concession by the Libyan Government in 1971 
was justified as a retaliatory measure against the failure of the U. K. to prevent 
the occupation by Iran of the Tumb islands in the Persian Gulf28 
. 
However, it has been suggested that an act of expropriation appears to 
constitute more than punitive retaliation in that it amounts to a permanent 
economic "gain" for its author and, correspondingly, to a permanent 
economic "loss" for its target. It, therefore, seems to lack the character of a 
coerccitive act that is undertaken to counter a prior detrimental conduct, 
which, if it ceases, renders the economic reprisal redundantly. 
The above instances of lawful or unlawful economic coercion cover a 
substantial part of inter 
- 
State economic relations. The question that arises, 
therefore, is whether the exercise of economic force as such against a State 
may be as damaging and onerous as it is the case with the use of armed force 
and, if so, whether it should be prohibited by Article 2(4) of the United 
Nations Charter. There is little doubt that economic pressure may be a 
powerful weapon against the economy, internal stability or the political 
independence of a State. 
25 U. N. R. I. A. A. voi. XV111, p. 419- 
26 Ibid. p. 443, paras 81,83. 
27 Ibid. p. 443, para 89. Cf. Bo >ett, Economic Coercion and Reprisals by States, 73 Va J. I. L. 1 
(1972), p. 10. Conlra Elagab, The Legality of Non-Forcible Counter-Measures in International 
Law, 7988, pp. 77-8. 
2,, '%The islands were part of the State of Ras Al-Khaymah (now a constituent element of the 
U. A. E. ) that was under U. K. protection; see D. J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International 
LaW44th ed. 1991, p. 541. 
29 See Elagab op. cit. supra n. 27, pp. 105-6,111; Farer, 79 A. J. I. L. 405 (7985), pp. 411-412. 
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After the nationalization of the Anglb 
- 
Iranian Oil Company by the 
Iranian Government in 1951, the United Kingdom and the seven major 
international oil companies refused to buy Iranian oil and threatened to stop 
buying from shipping companies who carried Iranian oil; the result was that 
only 40 tankers loaded Iranian oil during Mossadech's rule from 1951 
- 
54 30. 
Furthermore, the great public discontent towards S. Allende's Government in 
Chile in 1973 was caused to a great extent by the economic pressure exercised 
by the U. S. Government31 
Authority has argued that "the flow of goods and services in the 
international arena can be managed as to inflict a substantial measure of 
coercion upon a target state and 
... 
with increasingly tight economic 
interdependences, the vulnerability of most states to economic coercion tends 
to increase"32 
. 
That economic coercion is by its nature likely to be potentially 
detrimental to the State against which it is directed is not a conclusion drawn 
from recent international practice. In the period prior to the U. N. Charter the 
practice of boycott was extensively used33. 
In 1932, during the Manchurian conflict between China 
and Japan, the Chinese resorted to a boycott of Japanese goods. The legality of 
the above measures was considered by the Special Committee of Nineteen of 
the Assembly of the League of Nations. This Committee did not reach a 
conclusion with regard to the lawfulness of the boycott at its inception, but 
considered it as a lawful measure of reprisal for the Japanese attack on 
? Manchuria, on September 18,1931. 
0 See Delanis, Force under Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter: The Question of 
Economic and Political Coercion, 12 Vand. J. Trans. L. 101 (1979), p. 125. 
31 Sigmund, The "Invisible Blockade" and the Overthrow of Allende, 52 Foreign 
. 
off. 322 
McDougal & Feliciano, Law and Mini, nu, n World Public Order, 1961, p. 196. 
33 The term boycolt means the variety of measures directed at the social and economic 
isolation of an adversary, whether privately or governmentally organised on the domestic or 
international plane; see Lncitcfopaedza of Public h tornational Law, vol. 3, pp. 74-5. 
'1 See L. I. O. J. 1933, Spec. Suppl. 112, at p. 56. When the Assembly of the League adopted the 
Report of the Lytton Commission of Inquiry it stated that " The use of the boycott 
... 
could not 
fail to make a situation which was tense still more tense. The use of the boycott by China, 
subsequent to the events. of September 15,1931, falls under the category of reprisals"; see 28 
A. I. J. L. Suppl. 145 (1934). Also see Wehberg, L' Interdiction du Recours a la Force: Le Principe et 
les Problemes qui se posent, 78 H. R. C. 7 (1951 1), pp. 69 notes 2-4,70; Bowett, Self-Defence in 
12 1 
'Ehe issue of economic coercion has been dealt with by a, number of 
jurists who have suggested tests pertaining to the legality or not of this form 
of coercion. 
Bowett, takes the view that economic conduct should be judged by the 
intent of its author and to that extent he propose-, as a yardstick the concept of 
"economic conspiracy" by analogy from the English law of Tort35. The merit 
of this theory is that it protects the economic interests of a State and does not 
legitimise economic coercion injurious to another State when the 
furtherance or protection of the political interests of the author of the 
economic measures is involved36 
. 
This theory has been criticized in that it 
can be very difficult to apply in practice because Governments rarely make 
revealing admissions with regard to their decision-making37. 
Some authorities have propounded the theory of a reliance test which 
applies, to situations of a State using economic aid or trade agreements to 
cause another State to rely on it economicallyy35 
. 
The illicit character of an 
economic conduct with regard to the above situations lies in the case of an 
abrupt discontinuance of trade" 
. 
Again, this theory, was criticized on the 
basis of disregarding, the premise that it is a prerogative of State sovereignty to 
trade or not with other States4U as well as on the numerous instances of 
economic measures taken in reprisal; in 1982 Nigeria suspended oil 
shipments to Ghana until one-fifth on oil debt totalling $150,000,000 had been 
paid4' 
A third submi cton bases the unla-, vfuiness of certain economic. 
conduct on it-, effect on the target-State, and more specifically, on any action 
that deprive-, the target State of essential resources or interfering with its 
normal economic 
International Law, 7958, p- 1T4, Goodrich, Hambro, Simons, The Charter of the United , 'Nations, 
Conitnentan and Docr1rrrerkts, Sad exi. 1969, p. 49_ 
Bowett loc. cit. supra n. 19, p. '9. ß. See also Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort, 73th ed. 7989, pp. 
514-521. 
3h Ibid. 
Elagab op. ct. ýrrhr: e n. 27, p. 195; Delanis loc. cit. supra n. 30, p. 119; Parry, Defining 
Economic Coercion in international Law, 12 Texas I. L. J. 1 (1977), p. 4. 
McDougal & Feliciano op. cit. supra n. 32, pp. 121-9; Parry supra n. 37. 
39 Elagab supra n. 37; Damrosch, Politics across Borders: Nonintervention and Nonforcible 
Influence over Domestic Affairs, 83 A. I. I. L. 1 (1989), pp. 32-7 but cf. p. 39. 
40 See supra n. l bi--. 
41 Elagab ýrslýnr n. 37. 
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conditions42 
. 
The Arab oil embargo of 1973 may fall under the above 
contention with regard to the States that were not directly involved in the 
Palestine situation43 
. 
Lastly, there is the mixed intent-effect submission with regard to 
economic coercion whereby an economic conduct would be deemed illicit 
only if its purpose would be to annihilate the target State economically with 
the result seriously compromising its security44 
. 
All the above proposals about the licit or not character of economic 
conduct have the merit of contributing various criteria and standards which 
will enable to identify the nature of certain economic measures resorted to by 
States. But they only refer to the inherent substance of economic conduct as 
such. However, it is submitted that is not directly relevant with regard to the 
specific de lege lata prohibition of economic coercion under international law 
in general and Article 2(4) of the Charter in particular. It is submitted that the 
establishment of the injurious nature of a certain economic conduct, by 
whatever criteria or standards, only implies but does not in itself ascertain 
with finality the violation of one or another rule of international law. What 
is needed is to seek for a prohibiting rule of international customary or treaty 
law which is a totally distinct matter. Thus, the question arises whether 
Article 2(4) which launches a general prohibition of the threat or use of force 
and which embodies a principle of both treaty and customary law45 
, 
bans 
economic coercion. 
At the San Francisco Conference where the Charter of the United 
Nations was drafted, the Brazilian delegate proposed an amendment to the 
original paragraph 4 of Chapter II of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals46, 
including the use of economic measures under the prohibition of the use of 
force47 
. 
The said amendment was rejected with a big majority48 ; however, a 
42 Thomas & Thomas op. cit. supra n. 2, p. 91. 
43 Bowett loc. cit. supra n. 19, pp. 90-1, n. 8;. cf 
. 
Shühata, Arab Oil Policies and the New 
International Economic Order, 16 Va J. LL.. 261 (1976). 
44 See Muir, 9 Journal of International Law and Economics 186 (1974), p. 203; cf 
. 
Paust & 
Blaustein, The Arab 00 \iea n-A Threat to International Peace, 68 A. J. I. L. 410 (1974), p. 
414; McDougal & Feliciano op. cit, supra n. 38, pp. 190-6; Neff Joc. cit. supra n. 1, pp. 140,146; 
Farer, 79 A. J. I. L. 405 (198 
, 
p. 413. 
45 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, at pp. 97-100, paras 183-188. 
46 Text of the Proposals in U. N. C. I. O. vol. 3, p. 3. 
47 U. N. C. I. O. vol. 6, p. 559. 
48 Ibid. pp. 334-5. The Brazilian amendment was rejected by 2 votes to 26. 
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number of jurists49 take the view that economic force falls under the 
prohibition of Art. 2(4) mainly due to the lack of clarity of the reasoning 
behind the rejection of the Brazilian amendment and the statement made by 
the U 
. 
S. delegate that the phrase "or in any other manner [inconsistent with 
the purposes of the United Nations]" was designed to ensure that there 
should be no loopholes in the application of Article 2(4)50. 
During the quest for the definition of Aggression by the Special 
Committee on the Definition of Aggression in 1953, two attempts by Bolivia51 
and the U. S. S. R. 52 to introduce economic coercion therein failed to be 
adopted. Moreover G. A. Res. 3314 (XXIX) of 1974 does not include any 
reference whatsoever to economic aggression. Article 5 of the Definition 
provides inter alia that no no economic consideration may serve as a 
justification for aggression. This, however, is far from prohibiting economic 
coercion. instead, it expressly prohibits the use of armed force to repel such 
conduct or to advance a State's economic interests53. 
The question of the prohibition of economic coercion under Article 
2(4) was very widely debated in the course of the drafting by the special 
Committee on Friendly Relations, of the Declaration on Principles 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations (G. A. Res. 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 
1970). 
ty See Bucheit, The Use of Non Violent Coercion: A Study in Legality under Article 2(4) of the 
Charter of the United Nations, 122 U. Pa. L. R. 983 (1974), p. 1010; Zedalis, Some Thoughts on 
the United Nations Charter and the Use of Military Force against Economic Coercion, 17 Tusla 
L. J. 487 (1982), p. 493; Paust & Blaustein, 68 A. J. I. L. 410 (1974), pp. 417-8. 
," 
Contra Brownlie, International Lain and the Use of Force by States, 1963, p. 362; Bowett, 
Self-Defence in International Law, 1958, p. 148; Goodrich, Hambro, Simmons op. cit. supra n. 
34, p. 49; Lillich, Economic Coercion and the "New International Economic Order": A Second 
Look at Some First Impressions, 16 Va J. 11.232 (19176), p. 236; Stone, 4gglessioit and World 
Order, 19.58, p. 59; Dinstein, War, 4, ggresion and Self-Defeo e, 1988, p. 84; c". Arangio-Ruiz, 
The United 
_Natrous Declaration on Fririadly Relations and the System of Sources of International Law, 1979, p. 100. 
51 Doc. AC. 66/ L. 9,15 September 1953, para 3. 
52 Doc. A/ A C. 66 / L. 11,14 October 1953, p_ 2. 
53 The attempts by the delegates of Latm American and developing States to include economic 
coercion in the draft Dehnilion of Aggression were unsuccessful. See G. A. O. R. 29th session, 
Sixth Committee, Summary Records of Meetings 18 Sept. 
-9 Dec. 1974, pp. 54 (Peru), 55- 
6(Kenya), 69(Pakistan), 72(Argentina), 73(Bolivia), 85(Cuba). Cf. p. 44 (Sweden). See also 
Farer, 79 A. J. I. L. 405 (1985), pp. 410-411; Contra Stone, Conflict Through Consensus, 1977. 
130 
Two opposing views by two different groups of States were put forward 
with regard to the alleged prohibition of economic pressure by Article 2(4) of 
the Charter53a 
. 
The Latin-American, Socialist and developing States 
supported that economic force was included in the prohibition of the threat 
or use of force under Article 2(4) and the relevant arguments may be 
summarized under the following points54 : 
First, the text of Article 2(4) was not clearly limited either textually or by 
necessary implication to a prohibition of armed force alone. Where the 
Charter of the U. N. meant armed force it used that term expressly- viz. the 
Preamble and Article 46 of the Charter. 
Secondly, since the Security Council could apply either economic or other 
measures under Article 41 of the Charter it was clear that the Charter did not 
intend to make a sharp distinction between armed and other forms, of force. 
't'hirdly, the rejection of the Brazilian amendment in the San Francisco 
Conference did not imply that 'States at the Conference did not agree with 
idea-, contained in that amendment. 
Fourthly, economic force was a force to be reckoned with. Therefore the 
Charter should be interpreted in the light of current developments, and needs 
so that the principles and purposes of the Charter be given their fullest effect. 
['he Western States opposed the above view and their line of argument 
was the following 
First, the term "force" in Article 2(4) refers to armed force only and this 
interpretation is in accordance with the Preamble of the Charter which states, 
that "armmied force shall not be used save in the common interest". 
Secundlv, were economic and political pressure to be embraced by Article 2(4) 
there would be a lacuna in the Charter, namely, that there would be a whole 
series of situations with which the Organisation would be unable to deal 
effectively. The Security Council could hardly categorize most cases of 
economic or political coercion as breaches of peace or threats to peace under 
, 
Article 39 of the Charter. Moreover, there was no foundation in the practice 
of States for the interpretation that economic measures taken by 
53a L f. Neff, tor- cit. supra n. ?, pp. 1? 4-9,137-140,145. 
54 G. A. O. R. 20th session, 1965, L. N. G. A. Annexes, pp. 88-90; Id. 21st session, 1966, pp. 35-37; 
Id. 22nd session, 1967, pp. 14-15. 
55 Ibid. 
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virtue of Article 41 of the Charter constituted prohibited use of force. Lastly, 
there was the danger of broadening the content of the right of self-defence. 
Thirdly, at the San Francisco Conference an amendment submitted by Brazil 
to extend the prohibition of Article 2(4) was rejected. 
Fourthly, it would be difficult to distinguish between economic and and 
political pressure of a degree likely to imperil "the territorial integrity or 
political independence" and less severe economic or political pressures to 
which States resort in the course of their diplomatic relations. To lay down a 
general rule in advance might result to interfering with the right of States to 
regulate their economic relations with one another. 
Finally, there were certain forms of economic coercion that clearly violated 
the principles of international law, which, however, should be considered 
within the context of intervention and not the use of force. 
From the final text of G. A. Res. 2625 (XXV) of 1970 it becomes clear that 
the consensus reached was, that economic pressure were to be dealt with 
under the principle of non-intervention and not that of the rnon-use of force. 
The relevant passage of the Resolution reads as followvs55a : 
"No state may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of 
measures to coerce another state in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its 
sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind. " 
The same wording appears in operative paragraph 8 of G. A. Res. 42/22 
of November 18,1987, Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness 
of the Principle of Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force in International 
Relations5h 
. 
Indeed, both the above texts constitute verbatim restatements of 
operative paragraph 2 of G. A. Resolution 2131 (XX) of 21 December 1965, 
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of 
States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty57. 
Finally, in the Nicaragua Case the Court found that the principles as to 
the use of force incorporated in the Charter 
- 
and the fundamental principle 
55a G. A. Res. 2625 (XXV) G. A. O. R. 25th session, Suppl. No 28, p. 121. 
56 G. A. Res. 42/22, G. A. O. R. 42nd session, Suppl. No 49, p. 287. 
5i G. A. Res. 2131 (XX) G. A. O. R. 20th session, Suppl. No 14, p. 11. 
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in this area is that expressed under Article 2(4) 
- 
"correspond, in essentials, to 
those found in customary international 1awv". 5'' The question of economic 
coercion was not dealt with in the context of the principle of non-use of force 
and this could not have been the case at all because Nicaragua, the plaintiff, 
asserted that the U. S. A. was responsible for an indirect forum of intervention 
in its internal affairs inasmuch it has taken certain action of economic nature 
against Nicaragua, namely, the cessation of economic aid in 1981, the 90% 
reduction in the sugar quota for U. S. imports from Nicaragua and the trade 
embargo of 19855'. The Court in finding that there was no breach of the 
customary rule of non-intervention with regard to the economic measures 
imputed to the U. S. A. 
, 
clearly distinguished between economic coercion in 
violation of specific treaty provisions 
- 
such as Article 19 of the O. A. S. Charter 
- 
and economic force under customary law which was dealt with under the 
principle of non-interventiunh0' 
. 
It may thus be submitted in conclusion that economic conduct of a 
certain nature may be rather injurious and detrimental to the State against 
which it is directed. Certainly, such economic pressure is not licit and is not 
exonerated under customary international law. Whether the unlawful 
character of such economic pressure is based on the intent of its author, or on 
its effect upon the target-State, or on both, or on a so-called bond of reliance, 
its prohibition is formulated on the basis of the principle of non-intervention 
and not that of the non-use of force. Indeed, as we have already seen, 
economic relations between States are multifarious and it is often difficult to 
pronounce upon the lawfulness or not of such or such economic conduct. 
A flexible and broad aspect of inter-State relations of this sort is best, in the 
present author's view, regulated by the principle of non-intervention. Indeed 
it has been said that "[A] reader, after perusing Phillimore's chapter upon 
intervention, might close the book with the impression that intervention 
may be anything from a speech of Lord Palmerston's in the House of 
Commons to the partition of 
58 I. C. 1.. Rep. 1986, p. 14, at p_ 99, Para 189. 
59 Ibid. pp. 125-6, paras 244-245. 
" Ibid. p. 126, para 245. Indeed, due to the multilateral treaty reservation of the U. S. A. in 
accepting the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 36(2) of the I. C. J. Statute, the Court was 
prevented from applying such multilateral treaties like the O. A. S. Charter or the GATT 
agreement. 
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Poland"'-i 
. 
Each economic activity of allegedly coercive nature could be 
considered according to the standards set by various jurists and if found 
injurious it could be condemned as a violation of the principle of non- 
intervention. 
By, contrast the prohibition of the threat or use of force is of an a priori 
absolute and rigid character in that, it is submitted, it refers to a particular 
action from the moment of its initiation; armed force seems to fulfil this 
requirement. The brand of intervention by contrast may not be attributed to a 
particular action from its very initiation and there, in the 
present author's view, lies the reason for considering the regulation of 
economic coercion under the principle of non-intervention. The coercive 
nature of an interventionary activity may not be prirna facie discernible and 
this has been very comprehensively stated by Sir Ian Sinclair in the course of 
the drafting of Resolution 2625 ! '' 
"In considering the scope of intervention it should be recognized that in an 
interdependent world it is inevitable and desirable that states will be concerned with and will 
seek to influence the actions and policies of other states and that the objective of international 
]a%, \- is not to prevent such activity but rather to ensure that it is compatible with the sovereign 
equality, of states and the self-determination of their peoples" 
61 See k\ infield, The History of Intervention in International Law, 3 B. Y. I. L. 730 (7922-23), p. 
130. 
b2 See Doc. A/ AC. 119/ L. S, G. A. O. R. 20th session, Annexes, p. 116. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE USE OF FORCE IN THE "INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS" OF 
STATES. SELF-DETERMINATION OF COLONIAL PEOPLES AND 
ARTICLE 2(4) OF THE CHARTER. 
1. Introduction 
. 
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter imposes on Member 
States the duty to refrain "in their international relations" from the threat 
or use of force. It can be logically inferred, therefore, from the wording of 
Article 2(4) that the prohibition of the use of force by States applies only 
with regard to situations of resort to armed force on the international 
plane. Consequently, the use of armed force by a State within its territory 
and against its citizens does not run contrary to Article 2(4) of the Charter' 
. 
Thus, a State may use force in a variety of situations which range from 
the dispersing of demonstrations by its police or armed forces, as it was the 
case in the Chinese capital Beijing in June 1989 and in Romania in 
December 1989, to the suppression of a rebellion or insurrectionist 
movement, as it is the case of the force used by the Nicaraguan 
Government against the contra guerrilla movement. 
Controversy has arisen with regard to the lawfulness of the use of 
force by the incumbent Government and its character as force used in the 
internal relations of the State, in cases of armed struggle of colonial 
peoples against the State administering their territories- in other words, 
struggle for the realization of the right of self-determination of those 
peoples. 
2. The Concept of Self-Determination in International Law 
. 
In Verzij12 the following passage occurs: 
1 The use of armed force against the nationals of another State falls within the 
international relations of States( as is the case with treatment of aliens in general ). 
Moreover, the use of force against the armed forces of a State stationed within the territory 
of another State by virtue of prior agreement between the two States again constitutes use of 
force in international relations. See Article 3(d) of the 1974 Definition of Aggression, G. A. 
Res. 3314 (XXIX) G. A. O. R. 29th session, Suppl. No 31, p. 142. 
2 Verzijl, International Lall, in Historical Perspective, vol. i, 1968, p. 321. 
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"Seldom has there been advanced as a legal right a claim so obviously of a 
political nature and of such a slogan-like quality as the so-called right of self- 
determination" 
The concept of self-determination has become the object of great 
doctrinal debate with regard to its legal nature, its beneficiaries and its 
content3 
. 
Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the process of decolonization 
the nature of self-determination as a legal right can hardly be denied. 
The first contractual instrument, where self-determination was 
cited, was the Charter of the United Nations. Articles 1(2) and 55 thereof 
refer to the "principle of self-determination" as a basis for the 
development of friendly relations among nations. Prior to the Charter of 
the United Nations self-determination was recognized as a principle 
having political tenor only. The International Committee of Jurists which 
was appointed by the Council of the League of Nations, stated in its Report 
on the Aaland Islands dispute4 
"Although the principle of self-determination of peoples plays an important part in 
modern political thought, especially since the Great War, it must be pointed out that there 
is no mention of it in the Covenant of the League of Nations. The recognition of this 
principle in a certain number of international treaties cannot be considered as sufficient to 
put it upon the same footing as a positive rule of the Law of Nations". 
Despite the weak formulation in the United Nations Charter, self- 
determination evolved from a mere principle into a legal right through 
the practice of the Organisation in the context of decolonisation by way of 
General Assembly Resolutions, and the attitude of Member States, mainly 
the Colonial Powers, to the said practice. 
The turning point of the recognition of a right to self-determination 
of the colonial peoples came about by the Declaration on the Granting of 
3 Authors who take the view that self-determination constitutes a right include: Higgins, 
The Development of International Law through the Practice of the Political Organs of the 
United Vations, 1963, p. 103; H. Wilson, International Law and the Use of Force by 
National Liberation Movements, 1988, pp. 58-76; Umozurike, Self-Determination in 
International law, 1972 ; R. C. A. White, Self-Determination: Time for Reassessment?, 28 
N. I. L. R. 147 (1981) 
. 
Contra Verzij] op. cit. supra n. 2; Pomerance, Self Determination in 
Law and Practice, 1982 ; Emerson, Self-Determination, 65 A. J. I. L. 459 (1971), p. 462; Blum, 
Reflection on the Changing Concept of Self-Determination, 10 Israel L. R. 509 (1975). 
4 L. N. O. J. 1920, Spec. Suppl. No 3, p. 5. 
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Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (G. A. Res. 1514 (XV) of 14 
December 1960) 5, which declares the following: 
The General Assembly.......... 
Declares that: 
1. The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation 
constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United 
Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of World Peace and co-operation. 
2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development. 
.................... 5. Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing or all other 
territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples 
of those territories..... 
On 16 December 1966 the United Nations General Assembly 
adopted the two International Covenants on Economic, Social, Cultural 
and Civil and Political Rights respectively6 
. 
Common Article 1(1) to both 
instruments reads as follows: 
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they 
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.... 
Lastly, the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations (G. A. Res. 2625 
(XXV) of 1970)7 includes self-determination as the fifth of the seven 
principles stated therein, and "solemnly proclaims" that 
"... By virtue of the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples 
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have the right freely to 
determine, without external interference, their political status and to pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development and every state has the duty to respect this right 
in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.... " 
5 G. A. Res. 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, G. A. O. R. 15th session, Suppl. No 16, p. 66. 
Voting: 89: 0: 9 abstentions ( Australia, Belgium, The Dominican Republic, France, Portugal, 
Spain, South Africa, U. K. 
, 
U. S. A. ) 
6 U. K. T. S. 6, (1977) Cmnd 6702; 6 I. L. M. 360,368 (1966). 
7 G. A. Res. 2625 (XXV), G. A. O. R. 25th session, Suppl. No 28, p. 121. 
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A plethora of other General Assembly Resolutions referring to ad 
hoc colonial situations reiterated and affirmed the right of self- 
determination of peoples8 
. 
Resolution 1514 (XV) constitutes the starting point and the 
foundation on which the development of the right of self-determination 
has been effected. The International Court of justice, moreover, affirmed 
the status of self-determination as part of positive international law. In the 
Namibia Advisory Opinion 9 the Court held that Resolution 1514 (XV) 
constituted an important stage in the development of international law 
related to non-self-governing territories which made the principle of self- 
determination applicable to all of them and concluded: 
"... ln the domain to which the present proceedings relate, the last fifty years have 
brought important developments. These developments leave little doubt that the ultimate 
objective of the sacred trust was the self-determination and independence of the peoples 
concerned. In this domain, as elsewhere, the corpus juris gentium has been considerably 
enriched, and this the Court, if it is faithfully to discharge its functions may not ignore 
«10 
In the Western Sahara Advisory Opinion 11 the Court reiterated the 
findings of the Namibia Opinion and held that Resolution 1514 (XV) 
served as the basis for decolonisation that started during the 1960S12. 
Judge Dillard in his Separate Opinion13 was very explicit in submitting 
that " 
... 
[T]he pronouncements of the Court thus indicate,....., that a norm 
of international law has emerged applicable to the decolonisation of those 
non-self-governing territories which are under the aegis of the United 
Nations 
... 
". 
The 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations has been held by the 
I. C. J. in the Nicaragua Case 14 to be declaratory of customary international 
law. Although the Court was mainly dealing with the 
8 See for instance G. A. Res. 1699 (XVI) of 19 December 1961, "Non-Compliance of the 
Government of Portugal with Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations and with 
the General Assembly Resolution 1F42(XV)", G. A. O. R. 16th session, Suppl. No 17, p. 38; 
G. A. Res. 1742 (XV1) of 30 January 1962, "The Situation in Angola", G. A. O. R. 16th session, 
Suppl. No 17, p. 67; G. A. Res. 2379 (XXIII) of 28 October 1968, "The Situation in Southern 
Rhodesia", G. A. O. R. 23rd session, Suppl. No 18, p. 57. 
9 I. C. J. Rep. 1971, p. 16. 
10 Ibid. p. 31, para 53. 
11 1. C. J. Rep. 1975, p. 12. 
12 Ibid. pp. 32-33, para 57. 
13 Ibid. p. 121. 
14 1. C. j. Rep. 1986, p. 14. 
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customary law on the prohibition of the use of force it found that: 
"... The effect of consent to the text of such resolutions cannot be understood as merely 
that of a reiteration or elucidation of the treaty commitment undertaken in the Charter. On 
the contrary it may be understood as an acceptance of the validity of the rule or set of rules 
declared by the resolution by themselves. The principle of the use of force, for example, 
may thus be regarded as a principle of customary law... "15 
In the present author's view the comprehensive tenor of language 
in the above finding of the Court and, in particular, the treatment of the 
rule of the prohibition of the use of force as part of an integral "set of 
rules" declared by General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV), supports the 
submission that the Court referred to the 1970 Declaration as a whole and 
not for the purposes of the principle of the use of force only. 
Furthermore, because of the fact that the right of self-determination 
was developed almost exclusively through General Assembly Resolutions 
the status of the concept as a legal norm was disputed on the grounds of 
the non law-binding effect of the resolutions of the General Assembly1' 
'Without attempting to discuss this highly controversial issue, which 
as such can be the subject of a separate study, the present author takes the 
view that although General Assembly re, olutiorns do not as such have any 
law-creating effect, due toi the provisions of Articles 10 
- 
14 of the United 
Nation, Charter and unless it is specifically provided so therein, they may 
be evidence of the state of customary international law. This is the case, if 
the circumstances of their adoption, namely, the lack of opposing votes, 
very few-, - abstention-,, adoption by consernsus, statements of the 
representatives of Member States, reveal a certain degree of consent to 
their provisions. This is clearly implicit in the judgment of the Court in 
the Nicaragua Case 11' 
. 
The attitude of some of the Colonial Powers is of great significance 
with regard to the transformation of self-determination from a "principle" 
to a "legal" right under international law. Both the United Kingdom and 
France, the countries with the largest colonial possessions, abstained when 
15 Ibid. pp. 99-100, para 188. 
16 L. Gross, The Right of Self-Determination in International Law, in M. Kilson (ed. ), Nein 
States in the Modern World, 19: 5, p. 176 et se9_ 
17 Supra n. 15; also see Higgins op. cit. supra n. 3, p. 101; White loc. cit. supra n. 3; Wilson 
op. cit. supra n. 3, pp. 68-9; cf. 
. 
Arangio-Ruiz, United 
, 
Nations Declaration on Friendly 
Relation and the Sc/stcrr1 of Sources of international Iliw, 191719, pp. 92-6. 
1 zn 
Resolution 1514 (XV) was adopted. Nevertheless, not long after the 
adoption of the above-mentioned resolution, their view that self- 
determination as promulgated 
by the 1960 Declaration on Colonialism was merely a hortatory 
pronouncement and that their policy with regard to non-self-governing 
territories should exclusively rest on Article 73 of the United Nations 
Charter, seemed to have changed18. In a debate in the Fourth Committee 
of the General Assembly on the Portuguese African colonies, the U. K. 
representative stated that "colonialism was dead and that the current 
policy of the Portuguese Government was wrong"19. 
Moreover, at a meeting of the Security Council in Addis-Ababa 
where the situation in the Portuguese territories was debated the U. K. 
representative agreed that "the peoples of the Portuguese territories 
should, if it is their wish, be enabled to exercise their inalienable right to 
self-determination and that the Government of Portugal, in accordance 
with Chapter XI of the Charter, had the responsibility to lead its dependent 
peoples towards that goal"20. Similarly, France followed the same line of 
argument referring to the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique 
and Guinea-Bissau21 
. 
Self-determination is furthermore surrounded by controversy with 
regard to the beneficiary of the right. Resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2625 
(XXV) as well as Article 1 of both the United Nations Covenants on 
Human Rights postulate self-determination as a right belonging to "all 
peoples". What exactly is meant by the term "peoples" is quite unclear. 
There are "peoples" that live within territories geographically separate 
from the territory of the administering State and that are ethnically and 
culturally distinct from the population of the latter, or "peoples" that live 
within the territory of the administering State and are ethnically and 
culturally distinct from the rest of the population22. 
In view of the fact that the right to self-determination has rather 
broad a content, ranging from the granting of constitutional rights on the 
part of the incumbent Government to the attaining of self-government of 
a section of the people of the State in the form. of the creation of a new 
18 N. Ronzitti, Resort to Force in Wars of National Liberation, in Cassese (ed. ), Current 
Problems of International Laug, 1975, p. 319 at pp. 338-341; cf 
. 
Emerson loc. cit. supra n. 3- 
19 See G. A. O. R. 23rd session, Fourth Committee, 1793rd mtg., para 20. 
20 S. C. O. R. 27th yr. 1677th mtg. para 67. 
21 Ibid. para 59. 
22 Pomerance op. cit. supra n. 3, p. 2 et seq. 
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State for example, the controversy related to the beneficiary of the right is 
further multiplied. According to General Assembly Resolution 1541 
(XV) a full measure of self-government could be effected by one of the 
following means23 : 
(i) Emergence as a sovereign independent state. (ii) Free association with an independent state. (iii) Integration with an independent state. 
The above alternative situations stand in direct conflict with one of 
the best established principles of international law, namely, the principle 
of the territorial integrity of States. They entail the practical consequence of 
dismembering the territory of a State. 
The practice of States and of the United Nations indicates that self- 
determination amounting to one of the above three situations 
contemplated by Resolution 1541(XV) may be exercised only in cases 
of non-self-governing or colonial territories 
, 
namely, territories that are 
"... geographically separate and distinct ethnically and / or culturally 
... 
"24 
from the State administering them. Consequently, this implies that 
minorities living within the boundaries of established States do not 
possess a right to self-determination similar to that of colonial peoples and 
that secession of part of the territory of established States is prima facie 
inadmissible. According to H. Gros-Espiel, Special Rapporteur of the Sub- 
Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, "[P]eople and nation are two closely related concepts; they may 
be one and the same but they are not synonymous. The right has been 
attributed to peoples and not to nations"25 
Judge Nagendra ! iiigh in his Declaration appended to the Advisory 
Opinion of the I. C. J. in the Western Sahara Case took the view that the 
23 G. A. Res. 1541 (XV) of 15 December 1960, G. A. O. R. 15th session, Suppl. No 16, p. 29. 
24 Principle (V) of G. A. Res. 1541 (XV); also see Higgins op. cit. srupra n. 3, p. 104; Wilson 
op. cit. supra n. 3, pp. 80-1; White, 28 N. I. L. R. 747 (7987), pp. 150-1; Brownlie, The Rights 
of Peoples in Modern International Law, in Crawford (ed. ), The Rights of Peoples, 1988, p. 
5; R. Falk, The Rights of Peoples (in Particular indigenous Peoples ), in ibid. p. 26; 
Koteswara-Rao, Right of Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial Era: A Survey of Juristic 
Opinion and State Practice, 28 J. J. J. L. 58 (7988) ; Thornberry, Self-Determination, 
Minorities, Human Rights: A Review of International Instruments, 38 I. C. L. Q. 867 (1989), p. 
874; The Right to Self-Determination. Implementation of the United Nations Resolutions, 
H. Gros-Espiel, Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, U. N. Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/405/Rev. 1, para 90. 
Cf. Kelsen, The Luis of the United Nations, 1951, pp. 555-6; Pomeranee op. cit. supra n. 3, 
4 et seq. 
Loc. cit. supra n. 24, para 56; also see U. N. C. I. O. vol. 6, p. 296, Doc. 343 1/1/16, May 16, 
1945. 
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right of self-determination does not apply in cases where the territorial 
integrity of States is involved26 
. 
With regard to the United Nations 
Organisation the above position is epitomized in the statement made by 
Secretary General U-Thant: 
"So far as the question of secession of a particular section of a Member State is 
concerned the United Nation's attitude is unequivocal. As an international Organisation 
the United Nations has never accepted and does not accept and I believe will never accept 
the principle of secession of a part of a Member State. "27 
The practice of States seems to assent to the above statement; the 
Biafran and the Katangese secessionist movements failed to attract the 
support of the international community28 
. 
Only in the case of 
Bangladesh ( formerly, East Pakistan) did secession prove successful and it 
was recognized by the international community. The fact that East 
Pakistan satisfied the criteria of Resolution 1541 (XV) for non-self- 
governing territories, namely, geographical separateness and ethnic 
distinctiveness, though it had never been considered as such, as well as 
the fact that it was economically and administratively subordinate to the 
central government in West Pakistan seem to have qualified 
it as a self-determination unit29 
26 I. C. J. Rep. 1975, p. 12, at p. 80. 
27 U. N. Monthly Chronicle, February 1970, p. 36. 
28 The staunchest opponents of secession are the Afro-Asian States which acceded to 
independence in the 1960s and 1970s. At the Conference of Heads of State or Government of 
the Non-Aligned countries which took place in Cairo in 1964, the distinction between self- 
determination and secession was expressly drawn. See Wilson op. cit. supra n. 3, pp. 82,84, 
but cf. p. 85. 
29 Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, 1979, pp. 116-7; Nanda, Self- 
Determination in International Law, 66 A. J. I. L. 321 (1972), pp. 321-6; Mani, The 1971 War 
on the Indian Sub-Continent and International Law, 12 I. I. I. L. 83 (1972), pp. 83-99; Wilson 
p. 82. Contra East Pakistan Staff Study, 8 Rev. In t. Coin. Jurists 23 (1972), pp. 51-2. Cf. G. A. 
Res. 2625 (XXV). Under the Principle of Equal Rights and Self-Determination of Peoples 
the following passage occurs. 
" 
... 
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or 
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair totally or in part the territorial 
integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States, conducting themselves in 
compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as 
described above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people 
belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour 
... 
" 
The above extract seems to suggest that secession and fragmentation of the territory 
of a State may be admissible if the government of a State is not representative of the 
population thereof and practices discrimination. See White, 28 N. I. L. R. 147 (1981), p. 159; 
Gros-Espiel, Spec. Rapp., loc. cit. supra n. 24, para 90. 
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The right of self-determination is also purported to apply to peoples 
under "alien domination". Apart from colonial situations which certainly 
seem to fall under the above rubric the term appears to contemplate cases 
of military occupation of a territory as being a violation of the right of self- 
determination30 
, 
such as the case of the Palestinian people31 and the black 
population of South Africa. 
The territorial factor seems to play an important role in the exercise 
of the right of self-determination, especially in the practice of the General 
Assembly. Although the I. C. J. in the Western Sahara Case took the view 
that the expression of the will of the people was paramount32 
, 
territorial 
claims may affect the policy of decolonisation to be followed33 
. 
Conversely, and notwithstanding the fact that the colonial territory which 
is to accede to independence is in principle viewed as a whole, the practice 
of the United Nations is not characterized by rigid consistency as to the 
process whereby 
independence is finally achieved. The former Belgian colony of Rwanda- 
Urundi became independent as two separate States, Rwanda and Burundi, 
while in the former British Cameroons different referenda were held in 
the Northern and Southern regions with the result of the former being 
integrated with Nigeria and the latter with the independent State of 
Cameroon34. By contrast in the case of the Comoros Archipelago the 
people of the island of Mayotte were not recognized the right to remain 
under the Administration of France35 
. 
3. Awned Struggles for Self-Determination and the concept of Domestic 
Jurisdiction 
. 
In the 33rd session of the U. N. Commission on Human Rights the representative of 
Pakistan stated tat. "The right of self-determination was applicable to all peoples whose 
freedom has been suppressed by external forces 
.... 
but that freedom did not include secession 
of part of a State unless the association in question had been accomplished illegally 
against the wishes of the peoples concerned", U. N. Doc. E/CN. 41SR. 1411, para 4. 
3 Gros-Espiel, Spec. Rapp., supra n. 24, para 45 notes 18,20, cf. n. 23. 
31 Ibid. pp. 50-51; Morphet, The Palestinians and their right to Self-Determination, in R. J. 
Vincent (ed. ), Foreign Policy and Human Rights, Issues and Responses, 1986, pp. 85-103; 
Wilson p. 119. 
32 I. C. J. Rep. 1975, p. 12, at pp. 36-37, para 72. 
33 Ibid. p. 39, para 85; per Judge Petren 
, 
p. 114. 
34 Pomerance p. 19. 
35 Gros-Espiel loc. cit. supra n. 24, pp. 47-8. 
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Self-determination as the emergence of independent States has 
often been attained after a period of armed struggle of peoples against the 
Power administering their territories 
- 
see for instance, Algeria, Angola, 
Cyprus, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Mozambique, Namibia, Vietnam. 
Colonial Powers faced with such situations resorted to force in order to 
suppress the armed struggle undertaken by the peoples aspiring to self- 
determination and independence. They, moreover, sought to preserve 
absolute immunity from the concern of the international community, and 
more specifically of the United Nations Organisation, with regard 
to the armed conflict within the boundaries of the territories under their 
administration. This was attempted by invoking the principle of domestic 
jurisdiction and hence the inadmissibility of interfering with and 
deliberating on situations of anti-colonial struggle on the international 
plane. The provision that has been invoked in abundantia is Article 2(7) 
of the United Nations Charter which reads: 
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or 
shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; 
but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under 
Chapter VII. 36 
It is generally accepted that a matter which has become the subject of 
international obligations undertaken by a state37, or a matter that 
constitutes an actual or potential threat to international peace and 
security3s 
, 
or a matter which involves the interpretation and application 
36 Article 15(8) of the Covenant of the League of Nations provided: 
If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is found by the 
Council, to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic 
jurisdiction of that party, the Council shall so report and shall make no recommendation as 
to its settlement. 
37 Tunis-Morocco Nationality Decrees A. O. 
, 
P. C. I. J. Series B, No 4, pp. 23-4. 
38 See the Consideration of the Spanish Question by the Security Council. The Sub- 
Committee appointed by the Security Council expressed the view in its report that 
although the Franco regime in Spain posed no actual threat to the peace in the sense of 
Chapter VII of the Charter, the continuation of a situation likely to endanger international 
peace and security took the matter beyond domestic jurisdiction; S. C. O. R. Ist yr., 1st series, 
Spec. Suppl., pp. 1-2,8-10, paras 4,22,24,28. 
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of principles of international law39 
- 
interpretation of treaties for instance 
- 
is not a matter that falls under the domestic jurisdiction of a state40 
Forty-five years after the introduction of the United Nations 
Charter, with self-determination being acknowledged as a legal right 
under international law, there is no doubt that matters pertaining to the 
realization of the said right of non-self-governing territories 
are matters outside the domestic jurisdiction of the State. This submission, 
however unreservedly stated at present, was met with staunch opposition 
by certain colonial States during the first three decades of the work of the 
United Nations. 
In 1947 the Netherlands resorted to force against the Republic of 
Indonesia which had been proclaimed in 1945 upon the withdrawal of the 
Japanese occupation forces. The Netherlands, whose colonial possession 
Indonesia had hitherto been, only recognized the Government of the 
Indonesian Republic as exercising de facto authority over the islands of 
Java, Madura and Sumatra while considering herself as the de jure 
sovereign of the territory41 
. 
When the matter was brought to the 
attention of the Security Council by Australia and India42 
, 
the 
Netherlands opposed the adoption of a draft resolution submitted by 
Australia43 on the grounds that there was no threat to or breach of peace 
in the sense contemplated under Chapter VII of the 
Charter, that the Republic of Indonesia was not a sovereign State but "a 
constituent element" of the Netherlands and hence the matter fell 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the latter44 
. 
The Security Council without dealing with the issue of domestic 
jurisdiction expressly, adopted a resolution45 calling on both parties to "... 
cease hostilities forthwith... " and to settle their disputes by peaceful means. 
In the course of the Algerian war of Independence 
, 
France 
persistently opposed the consideration by the United Nations of the 
39 Interpretation of Peace Treaties 
. 
4.0. 
, 
I. C. J. Rep. 1950, pp. 70-71 but cf. per Judge 
Krylov, pp. 111-3; Interhandel Case, I. C. J. Rep. 1959, pp. 23-26. 
40 Lauterpacht, The International Protection of Human Rights, 70 H. R. C. 5 (1947 1), pp. 
25-51; Preuss, Articte 2, paragraph 7 of the United Nations Charter and Matters of 
Domestic Jurisdiction, }4H. R. C. 553 (1949 1) ; Higgins pp. 56-136; Goodrich, Hambro, 
Simons, The Charter of the United Nations, 3rd ed. 1969, pp. 64-70; Schachter, The United 
Nations and Internal Conflict, in Moore (ed. ), Law and Civil War in the Modern World, 
1974, p. 422; J. P. Cot & A. Pellet, La Charte des Nations Unies, 1985, pp. 153-4. 
41 See Wilson p. 106. 
42 Letters of 20 July 1947, S. C. O. R. 2nd yr., Suppl. No 16, S/447 & S/449, pp. 149-150. 
43 S. C. O. R. 2nd yr. No 67,171st mtg. p. 1626. 
44 Ibid. pp. 1619-20,1645-6; 181st mtg. pp. 1920-3; 185th mtg. p. 2011. 
45 S. C. Res. 27 (1947) of 1 August 1947; also see, S. C. Res. 63 (1948) of 24 December 1948. 
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situation in Algeria on the ground that Algeria constituted an integral part 
of France and, therefore, the matter fell under the domestic jurisdiction of 
the latter46 
. 
The view taken by the U. N. General Assembly was opposite 
in that G. A. Res. 1573 (XV) of 19 December 1960 recognized the right of the 
Algerian people to self-determination47 
Similarly, Portugal had taken the view before 1974 
- 
75 
, 
when she 
withdrew from all her colonial possessions, that she had been admitted as 
a Member of the United Nations with all her territories as defined in the 
Portuguese constitution and that the Organisation should desist from 
questioning the territorial integrity of the Portuguese state48. Again, the 
General Assembly took the opposite view in Resolution 1542 (XV) of 1960 
in that it listed the Portuguese colonies as non-self-governing territories 
and asserted the obligation of Portugal under Chapter XI of the Charter to 
report to the United Nations information concerning them49 
. 
Higgins50 submitted that "for a state to declare that an overseas 
possession, whose population is of different race and often in highly 
organised opposition, to be part of the metropolitan area may well be 
arbitrary and at variation both with the facts and the common sense"; this 
seems to constitute the present view of the entire international 
community. The 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations51 states that: 
... 
The territory of a colony or other non-self-governing territory has a status 
separate and distinct from the territory of the State administering it 
... 
In any case the practice of the United Nations organs with regard to 
the issue of the plea of domestic jurisdiction in cases of armed struggle 
against colonialism seems to fall in context with the Advisory Opinion of 
the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Tunis 
- 
Morocco 
Nationality Decrees Case 52 in view of the fact that "friendly relations 
4b Fraleigh, The Algerian Revolution as Case Study in International Law, in Falk (ed. ), 
The Internthonaul Laze of Civil War, 1971, p. 191; I. L. Claude Jr., Domestic Jurisdiction and 
Colonialism, in Kitson (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 16, p. 129. 
47 G. A. Res. 1573 (XV) of 19 December 1%0 "Question of Algeria", G. A. O. R. 15th session, 
Suppl. No 16, p. 3. 
48 Repertory of Practice of the United Nations Organs, Suppl. No 4, vol. 1, pp. 58,60. 
49 G. A. Res. 1542 (XV) of 15 December 1%0 "Transmission of Information under Article 73 e 
of the Charter", G. A. O. R. 15th session 
, 
Suppl. No 16, p. 30. 
50 Op. cit. supra n. 3, p. 98. 
51 G. A. Res. 2625 (XXV), G. A. O. R. 25th session, Suppl. No 28, p. 121. 
52 Supra n. 37; also see Claude Jr. loc. cit. supra n. 46, p. 132. 
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between States on the basis of respect for the principle of self 
- 
determination" constitutes a purpose of the U. N. Charter and also a 
contractual obligation the promotion of which the entire Membership of 
the Organisation has the duty to observe53. 
4. Armed Struggles for Self-Determination and Jus ad Bellum 
. 
Armed struggles against colonialism have been a matter of 
international concern for three reasons that fall under the issue of the use 
of armed force in international law. 
First, the authority of the administering Power to use force against a 
self-determination or national liberation movement. 
Secondly, the alleged right of self-determination movements under 
international law to use force. 
Finally, the line of action that third States may follow with regard to 
both the colonial States and the self-determination movements, namely 
the question of whether they are legitimised to assist either of the 
contestants. 
4. (i) Authority of the Administering Power to Use Force 
. 
As it has already been stated, the prohibition of the use of force by 
States in their international relations implies a duty of non-use of inter- 
State armed force as opposed to the right of States to use force within their 
territory to suppress acts of rebellion54. Armed struggles for self- 
determination are clearly not a matter of concern for the colonial Power 
only 
.A war of national liberation seems on the face of it to be akin to an 
ordinary civil war. It is submitted that this is not the case. The aim of such 
an armed struggle is self-determination of a people that is subjected to 
colonial or racist or alien rule55 
. 
To admit that forcible action against 
liberation movements is permitted on the part of the administering State 
would amount to a non sequitur in that a legal right under international 
law would be the object of suppression by the use of means, both material 
and legal, which would in practical terms assimilate the said right with an 
offence punishable under the 
53 Schwarzenberger, International Lazo as Applied by International Tribunals, 1945, p. 45; 
Q. Wright, 48 A. S. I. L. Proceedings 23 (1954), pp. 29-31. 
54 Oppenheim, International Law, vol. ii, 7th ed. by Lauterpacht 1952, p. 153 
55 Ronzitti loc. cit. supra n. 18, pp. 320,343. 
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municipal law of the State, such as rebellion, sedition, secession and so 
on56 
. 
The 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations clearly militates against 
such a possibility57 
. 
The seventh paragraph of the principle of the non-use 
of force provides that: 
... 
Every state has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives 
peoples referred to in the elaboration of the principle of equal rights and self- 
determination of their right to self-determination and freedom and independence... 58 
During the drafting of the Declaration Czechoslovakia59 submitted a 
proposal which read: 
... 
3. Every State has the duty to refrain from all armed actions or 
repressive measures of any kind directed against peoples struggling against colonialism for 
their freedom and independence. 
Moreover Chile" suggested in another proposal that: 
...... 
(b) The expression "in their international relations" in the 
above-mentioned Article 2(4) shall exclude from the prohibition the domestic activities of 
states the prohibition shall become applicable in the case of a community of human beings 
struggling for its freedom and independence. 
Thus the threat or use of force by a colonial Power against a group of human beings 
under its domination which is struggling for its freedom and self-determination shall be 
prohibited.... 
Those proposals were supported on the grounds of safeguarding the 
rights of colonial peoples and of the struggle for self-determination being 
part of international relations and thus falling under the ambit of Article 
2(4) of the Charter6l 
In reply to the above argument it was stated that the above 
56 Ibid. p. 320. 
57 Also see G. A. Res. 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, para 4; G. A. Res 2131 (XX) of 1965, 
Para 3. 
See supra n. 51. 
5`4 Doc. A (AC. 125/ L. 16, part 1, G. A. O. R. 21st session Annexes, p. 30. 
60 Doc. A/AC. 125/L. 23 in ibid. ; also see the Proposal by Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, 
Mexico and Venezuela, A/ AC. 125/ L. 49/ Rev. 1, para 2(g), G. A. O. R. 22nd session, Annexes, 
p. 10. 
61 G. A. O. R. 21st session, Annexes, p. 40. 
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proposals should be considered under the principle of self-determination 
rather than that of the use of force62 
. 
Whereas the Socialist and 
developing countries argued that it was by virtue of Article 2(4) of the 
Charter that such acts would be prohibited, the Western countries 
maintained that it was primarily the right 
- 
hitherto "principle" 
- 
of self- 
determination that militated for such conclusion. 
The present author takes the view that what Article 2(4) of the 
Charter contemplates is the use of armed force between States. At the 
moment when armed struggle is initiated within the boundaries of a non- 
self-governing territory, the national liberation movement operating 
therein has no international status whatsoever. It is only its right to self- 
determination that brings international law into operation and, 
furthermore, it is the duty of the administering Power under Articles 1(2), 
55,73 of the Charter that makes armed struggles for self-determination 
part of its international relations and not the action as such of national 
liberation movements. 
What the Socialist and developing States seem to argue is that the 
existence of the right of self-determination renders national liberation 
movements a priori beneficiaries of the principle of the non-use of force. 
In reality, it is submitted, it is the combination of the right of 
self-determination and the duty of the administering Power to respect it as 
an object of treaty obligation that renders the use of force against 
self-determination movements inadmissible. Indeed, the Charter of the 
United Nations is an international treaty and the use of force to suppress a 
struggle for self-determination would violate one of the purposes of the 
said instrument, namely, the respect of self-determination of peoples as 
the basis of friendly relations among nations63 
. 
4. (ii) The Authority of National Liberation Movements to Resort to Force 
The existence or not under international law of a right of national 
liberation movements as such to use armed force has become the subject 
of great doctrinal controversy. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ronzitti loc. cit. supra n. 18, p. 349 but cf. pp. 321-4,348; Schwebel, Wars of Liberation 
as Fought in the United Nations Organs, in Moore (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 40, p. 453; id. 
Aggression, Intervention and Self-Defence, 136 H. R. C. 419 (1972 11), p. 485; Crawford op. 
cit. supra n. 29, pp. 111-2; cf. Arangio-Ruiz op. cit. supra n. 17, pp. 137-8; Wengler, L' 
Interdiction de Recourir a la Force, 7 Revue Belge D. I. 401 (1971), p. 429. 
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The preparatory work of the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations 
reveals an unbridgeable disagreement between Socialist and developing 
States on the one hand and Western States on the other over the issue of 
whether national liberation movements are legitimised under 
international law to resort to armed force. 
Proposals64 submitted by the Socialist and developing countries 
during the work of the Special Committee on Friendly relations which 
asserted the right of colonial peoples to resort to armed force in self- 
defence against colonialism were justified on the grounds65 that the 
practice of the United Nations did not regard the armed struggle of 
colonial peoples for liberation as a violation of the prohibition of the use 
of force; that the right of self-determination would have been meaningless 
if it could not be defended against a colonial Power which attempted to 
deny it by force; that colonial domination and oppression constituted 
aggression against colonial peoples; that the prohibition of Article 2(4) did 
not apply to force in a manner consistent with the purposes of the United 
Nations66 
. 
The Western Powers67 vehemently opposed the above line of 
argument by retorting that while the right of self-determination of peoples 
o4 G. A. O. R. 20th session: Proposals by Czechoslovakia A/AC. 119/L. 6, para 5; Yugoslavia 
A/ AC. 119 / L. 7, para 4; Ghana, India, Yugoslavia A/ ACA 19/ L. 15, para 3. 
G. A. O. R. 21st session: Proposals by Czechoslovakia A/AC. 125/L. 16, para 7; Algeria, 
Burma, Cameroon, Dahomey, Ghana, India, Kenya, Madagascar, Nigeria, U. A. R., and 
Yugoslavia A/AC. 125/L/21 and Add. 1, para 6; 
G. A. O. R. 22nd session: Proposal by Algeria, Cameroon, Ghana, India, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Nigeria, Syria, i,. A_iR., and Yugoslavia A/ AC. 125/ L. 48, para 6. 
65 G. A. O. R. 20th session, Annexes, pp. 92-3; G. A. O. R. 21st session, Annexes, pp. 40-1,43-4; 
G. A. O. R. 22nd session, Annexes, pp. 18-9,20-1; G. A. O. R. 23rd session, Annexes, pp. 7-8. 
66 See J. C. Nkala, Legality of the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements; New 
Perspectives and Conceptions of International Law; An Afro-European Dialogue; Austrian 
Journal of International Law, Suppl. 6,186 (1983), pp. 192-3; T. S. Pekane, Reflections on 
Apartheid and the Legal Status of National Liberation Movements, ibid. p. 181; 
Obradovic, Prohibition of the Threat or Use of Force in Sahovic (ed. ), Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation, 1972, p. 51 at pp. 115-7; 
Röling, International Law and the Maintenance of Peace, 4 N. Y. I. L. 1 (1973), p. 65; Zourek, 
L' Interdiction de 1' Einploi de la Force en Droit Internatiotwd, 1974, p. 110; J. Toman, La 
Conception Soviefique des Guerres de Liberation Nationale, in Cassese (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 
18, p. 357; Tunkin, "Aheerry of International Law, translation by Butler, 1974, p. 67; Abi-Saab, 
Wars of National Liberation and the Laws of War, 3 Annales d' etudes Internationales 101- 
3 (1972) ; id. Wars of National Liberation and the Geneva Conventions and Protocols, 165 
H. R. C. 363 (1979 IV), pp. 371-2. Cf. J. Faundez, International Law and Wars of National 
Liberation: Use of Force and Intervention, 1 African J. Intern. & Comp. L. 85 (1989), pp. 94- 
97. 
67 Supra n. 65; also see Dugard, The Organisation of African Unity and Colonialism: An 
Inquiry into the Plea of Self-Defence as a Justification for the Use of Force in the 
Eradication of Colonialism, 16 I. C. L. Q. 157 (1967), pp. 168-173. 
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was recognized as such, revolution was a political and not a legal concept. 
It was argued, moreover, that Article 2(4) did not deal with revolution 
and it did not confer the right to engage therein. On the other hand Article 
2(4) of the Charter prohibited the use of armed force only between States, 
namely, entities having legal personality in international law. Moreover, 
to admit a so-called right of self-defence against colonial domination 
would have the result of greatly 
increasing tensions and would be detrimental to international peace and 
security; also, the right of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter 
applied not to "peoples" but only to States and to hold otherwise would 
amount to a de facto amendment of the Charter in contravention of 
Article 108 thereof. 
Controversy persisted in the context of the long endeavour to 
achieve consensus. cri a definition of Aggression. 
The 1974 Definition of Aggression68 provides in Article 7 that 
Nothing in this Definition, and in particular Article 3, could in any way 
prejudice the right to self-determination, freedom and independence, as derived from the 
Charter, of peoples forcibly deprived of that right and referred to in the Declaration on 
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among 
Nations, particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes or other forms of alien 
domination; nor the right of those peoples to struggle to that end and to seek and to receive 
support in accordance with the principles of the Carter and in conformity with the above- 
mentioned Declaration.... 
Although the above provision does not expressly refer to a right of 
people-, under colonial, racist and other alien domination to use armed 
force and, similar, zr, to "struggle" does not necessarily seem to suggest that 
it amounts to "armed struggle", Socialist and developing States 
interpreted Article 7 of the Definition as not affecting the alleged rights of 
peoples to forcibly realize their right to self-determination and the 
legitimacy of the use of force to this end under the right of self-defence68. 
By contrast, the Western States maintained that all that Article 7 
purported to achieve was the safeguarding of the legitimacy of the right of 
68 G. A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), 29th session, Suppl. No 31, p. 142. 
6ý5 G. A. O. R. 27th session, Suppl. No 19, Doc. A/8719, Report of the Special Committee on 
the Question of Defining Aggression (31 January-3 March), p. 19 (Syrian proposal); Report 
of the Sixth Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression (Mr. Simon Bozanga, 
Rapporteur), Doc. A/9411, G. A. O. R. 28th session, p. 12; Statements by the Representatives 
of Romania, Yugoslavia, U. S. S. R., Egypt, Syria, in G. A. O. R. 29th session, Suppl. No 19, 
Doc. A/9619, pp. 18,20,26,27,37,40. 
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peoples to self-determination. These States strongly refused to accept any 
right of peoples to resort to force; in fact, they, upheld the view that self- 
determination should be exercised by non-violent means so as violence 
on the international plane be restrained rather than encuuraged69 
. 
This 
attitude of Western States was consistently maintained in that resolutions 
of the U. N. General Assembly reaffirming the legitimacy of the struggle of 
peoples for independence by all means available, including armed 
struggle, have been met with the Western States abstentions or negative 
votes'O 
. 
The present author thinks that a discussion of whether or not 
peoples under colonial or racist or alien domination have a right in 
international law to resort to force against the State administering their 
territories is rather unnecessary. 
Vattel'1 seems to accept the right to revolution of a people. He 
wrote that the Nations "may depose a tyrant and refuse 
obedience to him" but at the same time he conceded that the sovereign, 
whose right-, were deemed identical with those of the State, had the right 
to use force to quell acts of disorder within the State72. 
There is no warrant, therefore, to argue that under customary law 
the administered people have a legal rather that a political right to use 
force against the authorities of the administering Power. This is made 
clear by the fact that the concept of "people" is not identified 
with that of the State; it is rather the latter that has the right to use or 
desist from using force both within and outside its territory udder both 
municipal and international law. It is also clear that when the 
See Report of the Sixth Committee supra n. 68. Statements by the representatives of 
France, U. S. A., Australia, Canada in G. A. O. R. 29th session, Suppl. No 19, Doc. A/9619, pp. 
22,24,33,35. Cf 
. 
The statement of the U. K. representative. He said that his delegation 
"interpreted the Article [Art. 71 as doing no more than emphasizing the propriety of the 
legitimate exercise of that right and of action taken by peoples forcibly deprived of it to 
resist such forcible deprivation and, in so doing, to seek and receive support from others", 
ibid. p. 32. Although it is not specified that "action" means "armed action" the above 
statement may suggest that forcible exercise of self-determination seems likely only in 
cases of prior forcible action on the part of the Administering Power. Still, however, this 
possibility was not premised on the right of self-defence under Art. 51 of the Charter. Also 
see Pomerance op. cit. srgna n. 3, p. 58- 
70 Wilson p. 102. 
71 Vattel. Droit des Gens, Book 1, Ch. IV, para 51. Also see Oppenheim op. cit. supra n. 54, 
p. 249; Wehberg, 63 H. R. C. 7 (1938 I), p. 9; Schwebel, 136 H. R. C. 419 (1972 1I), pp. 484-5; 
Schachter loc. cit. supra n. 40, p. 404. Cf 
. 
Falk, Janus Tormented: The International Law of 
Internal War in Rosenau (ed. ), Interruitiotuil Aspects of Civil Strife, 1964, p. 210 et seq. 
Contra Moore, 9 Va Q. I. L. 209 (1969), pp. 252-3. 
'- Vattel op. cit. supra n. 71, Book III, Ch. XVIII, para 287. 
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people of a State or a territory that is administered by the State take up 
arms against the authorities therein they aspire to a change of government 
which in its turn may amount in the latter situation, to the establishment 
of an independent State. The causa 
, 
therefore, of the initiation of an 
armed struggle is self-determination and the alleged right of a people to 
revolt is to be deduced therefrom and not from the rules of international 
law pertaining to the use of force73. 
National liberation movements have not the position of States in 
international law and this fact has caused both them and the States that 
advocate their right in international law to resort to force, to take a more 
traditional line of practice, namely, the proclamation of independent 
statehood of their territories seconded by the recognition of the proclaimed 
State by countries which support the cause of those movements. 
In the case of Indonesia there was the proclamation of the 
Indonesian Republic in 1945, prior to the resort to force by the 
Netherlands, and the recognition accorded to it by some States, including 
its recognition as the de facto authority by the Netherlands, and it seems 
that the Security Council considered the matter "at least in part on the 
status of the Republic"74. 
Similar practice was followed by the national liberation movements 
in the cases of Algeria 75 
, 
Guinea-Bissau 76 
, 
Western Sahara 77 and 
Palestine 78 
. 
In the case of the Guinea-Bissau the General Assembly of the 
United Nations went as far as to condemn Portugal, the administering 
Power of the territory, for repeated acts of aggression against Guinea- 
73 See Skubiszewski, Use of Force and International Law, in Sorensen (ed. ), Manual of 
International Lazy, 1968, p. 771; Gross loc. cit. supra n. 16, p. 154; Ronzitti loc. cit. supra n. 
18, pp. 350-1. Contra Nkala loc. cit. supra n. 66, p. 192. 
74 Wilson p. 107 but cf. p. 108. 
75 In September 1958 the Front National de la Liberation Algerienne (F. L. N. ) established 
the provisional Government of the Algerian Republic in Tunis. See Bedjaoui, Law and the 
Algerian Revolution, 1961, pp. 73-5,110-175; Wilson pp. 108-111; cf 
. 
Fraleigh loc. cit. 
supra n. 46, p. 190. 
76 The Partido Africano da indepedencia da Guine e Cabo Verde (P. A. I. G. C. ) declared the 
independence of Guinea-Bissau on 26 September 1973 which was recognised by 84 States by 
31 May "1974. See Wilson pp. 111-112. 
77 On 26 February 1976 the POLISSARIO Front proclaimed the formation of the Saharan 
Arab Democratic Republic with a Government-in-exile based in Algiers. See Wilson pp. 
113-116. 
78 At the 19th session of the Palestine National Council in Algiers from 12-15 November 
1988, the independent State of Palestine was proclaimed, with Jerusalem as its capital. All 
Arab States, except Syria, a number of Non-Aligned States and China immediately 
recognised the Palestinian State. The U. S. S. R. recognised the proclamation of the State but 
not the State itself. See Keesing's 1988, pp. 36257,36321. 
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Bissau and for illegal occupation of portions of its territory after having 
affirmed the terms of Article 2(4) of the Charter79. 
The above practice seems analogous to the traditional concept of 
recognition of belligerency, accorded to insurgents in a civil war, which 
was deemed as having the legal effect of the recognition of the rebel party 
as possessing international personality for the purposes of the internal 
armed conflict, but not full sovereign rights similar to those of 
independent States80 
. 
However, the practice of certain national liberation 
movements appears to have circumvented the classical international law 
consequences of the recognition of belligerency by asserting outright 
sovereign statehood and by being accorded 
recognition to this end by certain States. Indeed, it has been the view of the 
Socialist and developing States that such recognition renders a "people" 
that has the right to self-determination a separate entity in international 
law with the authority to use force analogous to that of sovereign States81 
Western States have opposed this view on the grounds that the 
right of self-determination must be pursued by peaceful means and that 
recognition is accorded to governments only if the latter establish effective 
control over the population and territory which they purport to 
represent82 
. 
National liberation movements have also been recognized as the 
legitimate representatives of their peoples. Indeed, liberation movements 
such as the P. L. O. and S. W. A. P. O. were invited and did participate in the 
work of various international organisations; the U. N. General Assembly, 
more specifically, granted observer status to both of the above-mentioned 
liberation movements in 1974 83 and 1976 84 
, 
respectively. 
Moreover, several national liberation movements participated in 
the drafting and signed the final act of the two Additional Protocols (1977) 
to the Geneva Conventions of 194985 
. 
With regard to the observer status granted to some of those entities 
it is rightly pointed out that it does not amount to formal 
79 G. A. Res. 316) (XXVfT L G. A. O. R. 28th session, Supp). No 30, p. 2. 
80 See Oppenheim op. cit. supra n. 54, pp. 248-253; Lauterpacht, Recognition in 
International lain, 1948, pp. 175-268; Castren, Civil War, 1966, p. 153; Khairallah, 
Insurrection under International Law, 1973, p. 37. 
81 Wilson pp. 116-7; Wengler, 7 Revue Belge D. I. 401 (1971), pp. 422-8. 
82 See Wilson supra n. 81; D. J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Lain, 4th ed. 
1991, pp. 142-8. 
83 G. A. Res. 3210 (XXIX), G. A. O. R. 29th session, Suppl. No 31, p. 3. 
84 G. A. Res. 31 / 152 (XXXI), G. A. O. R. 31st session, Suppl. 39, p. 136. 
85 Wilson p. 128, n. 123. 
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representation of the territory which rests with the Administering 
Power86 
. 
Equally, the participation of some national liberation 
movements in the drafting and signing of the 1977 Protocols must not be 
taken as recognition of those movements as representatives of sovereign 
States. The International Committee of the Red Cross has never cited 
them amongst the parties to the said Protocols in its Annual ReportS87 
. Both instruments are international treaties and as such constitute 
according to Article 2(1)(a) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, agreements between States only. Moreover, the provisions of the 
above Protocols address situations of jus in bello 
, 
namely, of armed 
conflict in progress irrespective of the lawfulness or not of its initiation. It 
is submitted that it is extremely tenuous an interpretation to extract an 
affirmative conclusion from the 1977 Protocols as to any authority of 
national liberation movements to a jus ad bellum ; the latter is solely 
regulated in international law by the provision 
of Article 2(4) of the Charter, which addresses itself to States only". 
In the cases of Portuguese action against Zambia, Senegal and 
Guinea in 1969 the alleged right of national liberation movements to 
resort to force and to receive moral and material support was reasserted89. 
It is significant, however, that the Security Council in all three resolutions 
adopted in the above cases has made no reference to any such alleged 
rights but based its condemnation of the Portuguese action on the 
provision of Article 2(4) of the Charter and on its grave concern for the 
danger inherent in such incidents for international peace and security9" 
. 
Similarly in the case of the South African action against Angola in 
1976, S. C. Resolution 387(1976) of 31 March 197691 which formally 
stigmatised South Africa as the aggressor, was based on the principle of 
non-intervention in the internal or external affairs of another state92 
Indeed, it appears from the practice of the United Nations organs 
that they would only condemn the action of an Administering Power 
against the colonial people, as an autonomous entity only, in cases of 
86 Ibid. pp. 121-2. 87 Annual Report of the I. C. R. C. 
, 
Geneva 1987, pp. 107-110; cf. the case of Namibia, see 
Gros-Espiel loc. cit. supra n. 24, pp. 49-50. 
88 Cf. Wilson p. 129. 
89 Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs, Suppl. No 4, vol. 1, p. 59, paras 134-5. 
90 See S. C. Res. 268(1969) with regard to Zambia; S. C. Res. 273(1969) with regard to 
Senegal; S. C. Res. 275(1969) with regard to Guinea. 
91 Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1976, S. C. O. R. 31st yr., p. 10. 
92 Stone, Conflict Through Consensus, 1977, pp. 82-3. 
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unilateral proclamation of independence by liberation movements that 
has attracted recognition by considerable number of States93 or in case of 
an arbitrary proclamation of independence by a minority of the population 
of the hitherto non-self-governing territory which do not reflect the 
aspirations of the majority of the people living in the territory 
- 
viz.. the 
case of Southern Rhodesia94 
. 
4. (iii) Assistance by Third States to Liberation Movements 
. 
The alleged right of self-determination movements to lawfully use force 
against colonial, racist or alien regimes gives rise to the issue of whether 
third States have the right to render assistance to those entities. 
It is not surprising that those who advocate a right of liberation 
movements to resort to force have justified it on the basis of the right of 
self-defence` 5. Indeed, if this were accepted third States would be 
legitimised in rendering assistance by using armed force in collective self- 
defence against the administering Power. There is no instance in the 
practice of States of force being used on the basis of such contingency and 
the matter remains the object of academic debate. On the other hand 
assistance to self-determination movements by arming, financing, 
providing bases on their territories to them, has been as far as third State-, 
were prepared to act. This situation cut-, across the well established duty 
under international law that States must refrain from 
assisting armed bands that operate on the territory of another State. 
The said rule has been enshrined in three major Resolutions of the 
General Assembly of the United Nations. 
G. A. Resolution 2131 (XX) of 196596 provides in its second 
paragraph that: 
... 
2. No state shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, 
terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of 
another state. 
93 See supra n. 79. 
94 See S. C. Res. 253(1%8) of 29 May 1968, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 
1968, S. C. O. R. 23rd yr. 
, 
p. 5. 
4ý; See supra n. 66. 
9' G. A. Res. 2131 (XX), G. A. O. R. 20th session, Suppl. No 14, p. 11. 
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The 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations97 which interprets 
Article 2(4)of the Charter states: 
..... 
Every state has the duty to refrain from organising, instigating, 
assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts within 
another state... 
Finally, according to Article 3(g) of the 1974 Definition of 
Aggression", 
The sending by or on behalf of a state of armed bands, groups, irregulars or 
mercenaries which carry out acts of armed force against another state or its substantial 
involvement therein.... 
shall constitute a case of aggression. 
At the same time, however, both the 1970 Declaration and the 
Definition of Aggression provide that peoples "in pursuit of the exercise of 
their right to self-determination 
..... 
are entitled to seek and to receive 
support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter"99. 
It is the combination of these two opposing situations as well as the 
fact that national liberation movements have operated in guerrilla 
manner that give rise to controversy. The fact, moreover, that the aim of 
the struggle is self-determination does not diminish at all the conspicuous 
contradiction of the alleged right of liberation movements to receive 
assistance from third States with the above 
- 
mentioned duty; the concept 
of the justice of the cause of the use force has ceased to be part of 
international law ever since the nineteenth centurylo° 
. 
In the Nicaragua case 101 the International Court of Justice has dealt 
at considerable length with the activities of armed bands on the territory of 
a State, the lawfulness of the assistance accorded to those armed bands by 
third States and the ways of response that the target-State of the action of 
armed bands is entitled to resort to against both the guerrillas and the 
97 G. A. Res. 2625 (XXV), G. A. O. R. 25th session, Suppl. No 28, p. 121. 
98 G. A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), G. A. O. R. 29th session, Suppl. No 31, p. 142. 
' See Cot & Pellet, La Charte des Nations Unies, 1985, pp. 122-3. 
10000 See supra Part One, Chapter 1. Also see Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-defence, 
1988, p. 69; Pomerance op. cit. supra n. 3, p. 48; Q. Wright, The Goa Incident, 56 A. J. I. L. 617 
(1962), pp. 618-9; Kunz, Bellum Justum and Bellum Legale, 45 A. I. I. L. 528 (1951), pp. 532-5. 
101 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14. 
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assisting State or states102 
. 
Admittedly, the Court was not concerned with 
the activities of a national liberation movement "in the process of 
deculun. isatiun"103. Whether this point suggests or not that cases of 
guerilla armed action promoting decolonisatinn and self-determination 
fall outside the Court's findings with regard to the contra activities against 
the Government of Nicaragua is something which is not warranted by the 
Judgment of the Court. The latter simply stated that the question was not 
at issue before it. 
judge Schwebet however, was seized with the question in his, 
dissenting Opinion and stated that: 
" At is lawful for a foreign state to give people struggling for 
self-determination moral, political and humanitarian assistance; but it is not lawful for a 
foreign state to intervene in that struggle with force 
. _. 
"104 
Moreover, the present author believes that the Judgment of the 
Court seems to offer guide-lines, albeit by Nvajy of nbiter dictum 
, 
due to the 
completion of decolonisation over the past three decades, which would 
compromise the struggle of peoples for self-determination with the 
prohibitive norm of customary international law with regard to the 
assistance to armed bands. 
First, it is dear that the existence of a self-determination movement 
within a non-self-governing territory does not and cannot constitute an 
armed attack due to the fact that liberation movements have always 
sprung from within the population of the colonial territory rather than 
being extra-nationally sent and controlled. The colonial Power, therefore, is 
not entitled to resort to force in individual and collective self-defence 
against the assisting State. 
Humanitarian assistance to the national liberation movement is by all 
means lawful. 
The possibilitN, of material assistance to the liberation movement by 
way of provision of arms, training, funds and logistical support seem to be 
the more problematic.. At the outset it is submitted that third States should 
refrain from arming, training, advising, and providing sanctuary to self- 
determination movements as well as funding them, for otherwise the 
102 See supra Ch. 2 and infra Part Two, Ch. 9, Second Title. 
103 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, at p. 108, para 206. 
104 Ibid. per judge Schinebel p. 351, para 180. 
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duty to refrain from the use of armed force and intervention would be 
completely sacrificed to the cause of self-determination with most grave 
consequences for international peace and security1p5 
. 
However, if such assistance is accorded to a national liberation 
movement, it is submitted that the administering Power is entitled to 
resort to counter- measures against it that must as a rule fall short of the 
use of armed force106 
. 
Forcible counter-measures in the sense of 
mounting elaborate military operations against a people struggling for 
self-determination would be contrary to the principle enunciated by the 
1970 Declaration, namely that force shall not be used to deprive peoples of 
their right of self-determination. By contrast, force used strictly for the 
defence, and that only, of individual member-, or units of the 
administering Power's armed forces if they were attacked by members of 
the liberation movement, should be allowed. It would be unrealistic to 
hold otherwise. Such strictly defensive use of force may be said to partake 
the character of proportionate counter-measures against uses of force short 
of an armed attacklo6,1 
. 
The practice of States shoxvs that the use of force by a colonial power 
against a State whose government supported a national liberation 
movement fighting against the former was met with either express 
condemnation or proposals for the settlement of the dispute by 
investigation and conciliation on the part of the Security Council or by the 
offer of good offices on the part of other States, but never with approval of 
the action of the colonial Power. 
In the Sakiet-Sidi-Yous±e{ (Feb. 8,1958) and the Remada (May 19, 
1958) incidents where France resorted to force against Tunisia under the 
justification that the latter was assisting the Algerian rebels the matter was 
settled by direct negotiations between the two States after the U. K. and the 
U. S. A. had offered their good offices107. 
In the case of the Portuguese armed action against Zatnbia, Senegal 
and Guinea in 1969 it was argued by some representatives during the 
105 
, (one, (__Oil-t ict Through Consensus, 1,977, pp. 66-86; Dinstein, l'V r, Aggression and Sel f- 
157 Defince, 1988, pp. 125-6; Schwebel, 136 H. R. C. 419 (1972 1i), p. 486; Dugard, 16 I. C. L. Q. 
(19t ), pp. 161-i; R. C. A. White, 28 N. I. L. R. 747 (1987), pp. 152-3; Pomerance op. Cit. supra 
n. 3, pp. 50,57-60; N. D. White, The Legality of Intervention Following the Nicaragua 
Case, ix Intern. Rel. 535 (7989), p. 547. Contra Farer, The Regulation of Foreign Intervention 
in Civil Armed Conflict, 142 H. R. C. 297 (1974 II), pp. 367-386. 10' See infra Part Two 
, 
Ch. 9, Second Title. 
106a Ibid. 
107 S. C. O. R. 13th yr. Siith mtg. para 55; 826th mtg. para 12 
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debates at the Security Council that rendering assistance to a self- 
determination movement in a non-self-governing territory should not 
serve as a cause of resorting to the use of armed force against the State that 
accorded it108 
4. (iv) Active Military Assistance to the Administering Power 
. 
The last issue of the present section is whether the administering 
Power has the right to request the assistance of another State in order to 
suppress the struggle of the people of a colonial territory to attain self- 
determination. 
Although under classical international law States have the right to 
intervene in an internal strife at the request of the lawful government109 
the rule doe-, not seem to apply in cases of self-determination armed 
struggles. So ling as the administering Power doe-, not have the right to 
use force herself to deprive a people of the exercise of its right to self- 
determination, she cannot use force in concert with another State either. 
Be that as it may, there is no instance in practice of former colonial states 
that would militate against such conclusion. 
5. Resort to Foren by a State against a Colonial Power to promote Self- 
])tfermination 
. 
There are some instances in the practice of States where 
decolonisation and the realization of the right of self-determination were 
effected or attempted to be effected by the use of armed force on the part of 
a State against the colonial Power. 
in December 1961 India invaded the Portuguese territories of Goa, 
I)ainao and Diu which were surrounded by Indian territory. Portugal had 
recourse to the Security Council and complained of the Indian aggression 
against Portugal in violation of Articles 2(3) and 2(4) of the United Nations 
Chartert f (' 
. 
The representative of India111 justified the action taken by his 
country on the grounds that Portugal had no sovereign right over the 
above territories,, its presence therein being illegal ab mnitin and even 
more so after the adoption by the General Assembly of the United Nations 
1()8 Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs, Suppl. No 4, vol. 1, pp. 56-7, paras 115- 
117,126. 
109 See infi-a Part Three 
, 
Ch. 12, First Title. 
>> ýý S. C. O. R. 16th vr. 987th mtg. para 11. 
ilt Ibid. paras 32, '37-39,44,46. 
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of Resolution 1514 (XV) of 1960. It was moreover argued that the Indian 
action could not constitute aggression because the illegality of the 
Portuguese possessions on Indian territory rendered the frontier between 
India and the Portuguese colonies non-existent and consequently there 
could be no "question of aggression against 
your own frontier or against your own people... "112. Finally, the Indian 
representative relied on the right of self-defence by arguing that the 
"Charter itself does not completely eschew force in the sense that force can 
be used in self-defence for the protection of the people of a country, and 
the people of Goa are as much Indians as the people in any other part of 
India"113. 
The Indian arguments failed to persuade the representatives of the 
Western and Latin American States on the Security Council. The principal 
advocate against the Indian action in Goa during the Security Council 
debate became the representative of the U. S. A. who maintained that the 
point at issue before the Security Council was not decolonisation but a 
bold violation of the principle of the non-use of force enunciated in 
Article 2(4) of the Charter, which was law of universal application114. He 
concluded his country's position with regard to the use of force by a State 
in relation to promoting self-determination by stating that: 
"... Resolution 1514 (XV) does not authorise the use of force for its 
implementation. It does not and it should not and it cannot under the Charter 
.... 
Resolution 
1514 does not and cannot overrule the Charter injunction against the use of armed 
force... "115 
A draft resolution proposed by the Western Members on the 
Security Council deploring the Indian action and calling for the 
withdrawal of the Indian forces from Goa was defeated due to the negative 
vote cast by the U. S. S. R. The fact that India escaped condemnation by the 
Security Council does not by any means imply that she had been 
112 Ibid. para 46. 
113 Ibid. para 77. In support of the Indian position see 987th mtg. päras 93-95 (Liberia), 125 
(U. A. R. ), 137-138 (Ceylon). Cf. 987th mtg. para 3 (U. S. S. R. ) and 988th mtg. paras 12 (Equador) and 30 (Chile). Equador and Chile upheld the right of self-determination of the 
people of Goa, Damao and Diu but condemned the se of force by India. The U. S. S. R. 
opposed the debate of the question by the S. C. on the basis of the principle of domestic jurisdiction. 
114 S. C. O. R. 16th yr. 987th mtg. paras 75,80.1\ 
115 Ibid. 988th mtg. para 93; Q. Wright loc. cit. supra n. 100. 
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exonerated or that her action had been legitimised, for the majority of the 
Members of the Security Council (7 out of 11) condemned 1t11". 
In November 1975 and following the publication of the Advisory 
Opinion of the International Court of justice on the question of Western 
Sahara 
, 
the territory of the said former Spanish colony whose population 
were to exercise their right of self-determination, was "peacefully" 
invaded by Moroccan nationals, elements of her armed forces and official 
authorities. Morocco, despite the finding of the I. C. J. to the contrary, 
maintained that the so-called "green march" constituted an exercise of 
Morocco's inalienable sovereign rights and that the population of Western 
Sahara had always been part of the Moroccan nation117. Moreover, 
according to the Moroccan Government11" self-determination according 
to Resolution 1514 (, W) could never be contrary to the unity and 
territorial integrity of States. 
The Security Council condemned Morocco and called upon her to 
immediately withdraw from the territory of Western Sahara119. 
In December 1975 the Indonesian army forcibly invaded the 
Portuguese territory of Fast Timor 
. 
According to the representative of 
Portugal this act would result in inhibiting the exercise of the right of self- 
determination, freedom and independence by the people of Timor120 and 
amounted to an act of aggression in violation of Articles 2(3) and 2(4) of 
the Charter121 
. 
The population of East Timor were to exercise their right 
to self-determination in pursuance of the policy of decolonisation 
launched by Portugal in April 1974. In August 1975 fighting broke out 
between two opposing political organisations on the island, FRFTILIN, 
which advocated independence for East Timor, and UDT 
- 
APODETI 
which militated for the incorporation of the territory with the Republic of 
Indonesia122. 
116 See also Q. Wright, 56 A. I. I. L. 677 (7962), p. 617; Higgins p. 188; Henkin, Force, 
Intervention and Neutrality in Contemporary International Law, 57 A. S. I. L. Proceedings 
147 (1963), p. 153; Dugard, Ib 1. C. L. Q. 757 (7967), pp. 174-6; Pomerance p. 49. 
1, S. C. O. R. 30th yr. 1854th mtg. paras 28-60. 
118 Ibid. 1849th mtg. paras 28-60. 
119 S. C. Res. 380(1975) of 6 November 1975, Resolutions and Decisions of the S. C. 1975, 
S. C. O. R. 30th yr. 
, 
p. 9. 120 Letter dated 7 December 1975 from the representative of Portugal to the President of 
the Security Council, Doc. S/ 11899, S. C. O. R. 30th yr. Suppl for Oct. 
-Dec. 1975, pp. 53-54- 121 S. C. O. R. 30th vr. 1864th mtg. paras 8-64. 
122 Ibid. pars 22. 
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The representative of Indonesia after emphasizing his country's 
geographic, ethnic and cultural ties with East Timor justified the use of 
force on the ground inter alia of re-establishing order in the territory and 
enabling the people of the area to exercise their right of self- 
determination] 23 
. 
The Security Council deplored the Indonesian action 
and called for the withdrawal of all Indonesian armed forces from the 
terrltoryl 24 
In the cases of Goa, the Western Sahara and Timor three 
neighbouring States exercised force in order to bring about decolonisation 
by incorporating the non-self-governing, in each case, with their own 
national territory. India and Morocco claimed legal ties of territorial 
sovereignty between themselves on the one Hand and Goa and Western 
Sahara, on the other, while Indonesia insisted, more subtly, that 
Indonesian "volunteers", not her armed forces, were assisting the 
Provisional Government of East Timor, which interestingly enough had 
been set up by the pro-Indonesian UDT 
- 
APODETI organisation, in the 
rehabilitation of the countrv1'; 
In all three cases, moreover, decolonisation was effected in a way 
which although was envisaged by and was compatible with Resolution 
1541 (XV), namely, incorporation in an independent State, was either in 
direct contrast with the wishes of the entirety or the majority of the 
population of the territories in question ( East Timor, Western Sahara) or 
failed to take into account wvhat the population aspired to (Goa). 
Moreover, the incorporation of these territories was also unilaterally and 
forcibly asserted by the States concerned. Although the right 
of self-determination is exercised on the basis of an existing territorial unit 
as a whole, it is a right that belongs to the people of the territory and it 11; 
for the latter "to determine the destiny of the territory and not the 
territory the destiny of the people"12ý 
. 
The forcible character of effecting decolonisatiian in the Goa, 
Western Sahara and East Timor cases was met with disapproval on the 
part of the other Members of the Security Council. In the case of Western 
Sahara the Chairman of the Security Council expressed concern that 
123 ]bid. paras 67-94. 
124 See S. C. Res. 384(1975) of 22 December 1975; also see G. A. Res. 3485 (XXX), G. A. O. R. 
30th session, Suppl. 34, p. 118. 
125 Statement of the Indonesian representative, S. C. O. R. 31st yr. paras 5-26. 12h Westen, Sahara 
. 
-i. 0. ( per Judge Dillard ), I. C. J. Rep. 1975, p. 12, p. 121. 
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unless the "green march" had ceased it might have led to violent 
confrontations with the possibility of a conflict between Morocco and 
Spain127 
What eventually happened was armed confrontation between the 
Moroccan armed forces and the POLISARIO Front established by the 
population of Western Sahara. 
In the case of East Timor the Indonesian use of force was expressly 
condemned by the Chinese representative on the Security Counci 128 and 
disapproved of, though not explicitly condemned, by the majority of other 
representatives who called for the withdrawal of the Indonesian forces 
from the territory] 29. 
Decolonisation was also attempted to be effected regardless of the 
fact that the territory under question was inhabited by a people that had 
opted to remain under the sovereignty of the administering Power. In 
April 1982 the armed forces of Argentina invaded and occupied the 
Falkland Islands which were part of the U. K. 
Argentina justified its action as purporting to overturn an 
unlawful situation, namely, the "usurpation of its national territory, 
usurpation carried out by unacceptable and illegal means" 130. At the 
same time the 1,800 inhabitants of the Falklands were not considered as a 
"people" having the right to self-determinationl31 
With the exception of Panama, all the other States other than the 
parties to the dispute, that took part in the debate at the Security Council 
condemned the use of force by Argentina and what is more significant is 
that condemnation came from developing States in what 
seemed to be a change of position twenty years after the Goa incident132. 
Of great interest is the statement made by the Ugandan representative 
with regard to Argentine use of force: 
11 
.... 
Uganda regrets this latest development because we are conscious of the fact 
that there are similar, though not identical disputes in other parts of the world. It would 
127 S. C. O. R. 30th yr. 1845th mtg. paras 2-6. 
128 Ibid. 1865th mtg. paras 3-9. 
129 Ibid. 1867th mtg. paras 5-26 (Tanzania), 41-48 (U. S. S. R. ). S. C. O. R. 31st yr. 1915th mtg. 
paras 28-32 (U. K. ). 
'130 S. C. O. R. 37th yr. 2350th mtg. pp. 3-5,11. 
131 Ibid. pp. 7-8; also see E. Jimenez de Arechaga, International Law in the Past Third of 
the Century, 159 H. R. C. 5 (1978 1), p. 107. 
132 S. C. O. R. 37th yr. 2350th mtg. pp. 96 (Togo), 23 (Guyana), 26 (Jordan). 
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be a dangerous precedent if the impression were to be given that the use of force is 
acceptable as a method of settling those disputes... "133 
In the twenty-one years that separate the Goa from the Falklands 
incident the practice of States seems to have evolved to a general 
consensus that decolonisation is not to be realized by the use of force by 
States in violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter, aiming at recovering 
territories lost to the colonial Powers during the 16th 
- 
19th centuries134. 
Moreover, in all the above instances of State practice forcible extra- 
national decolonisation seems to have been conceived as recovering 
territory rather than promoting the right of self-determination of the 
peoples living therein. In fact, the wishes of the 
people were either ignored 
- 
viz. Western Sahara, East Timor, the 
Falklands 
- 
or were presumed to be the same with the wishes of the State 
that used force 
- 
viz. Goa. In the latter case the representative of India did 
not even give any consideration whatever to the possibility that the 
people of Goa, Damao and Diu might have contemplated self- 
determination by way other than incorporation with India; in fact the 
assertion that the people of Goa were as much Indian as the people of any 
part of India seems to unilaterally render any other alternative way of 
achieving self-determination as by definition redundant135. 
Argentina and Morocco have summarily dismissed any wishes of 
the populations of the Falklands and Western Sahara on grounds of legal 
title to territorial sovereignty. 
Indonesia seems to have followed a "half-way house" approach in 
the case of East Timor; while asserting close geographical ties between 
herself and the latter the assistance given to the Provisional Government 
of East Timor seems on the face of it to constitute respect for the wishes of 
the people. However, according to Mr Fry, Member of the Australian 
House of Representatives and head of a delegation of Australian MPs that 
visited East Timor, the Provisional Government did not represent the 
wishes of the people of Timor 36 
It can be concluded, therefore, that the use of force by States having 
as its object colonial territories seems in reality to constitute a case of 
133 Ibid. p. 91. 
134 See Rubino, Colonialism and the Use of Force by States, in Cassese (ed. ), The Current 
Leal Regulation of the Use of Force By States, 1986, p. 142. 
13 S. C. O. R. 16th yr. 988th mtg. para 77. 
136 S. C. O. R. 31st yr. 1909th mtg. paras 58-84. 
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forcible territorial change rather than promoting the right of self- 
determination of the people of the non-self-governing territory. 
6. Conclusion 
. 
The conclusion that may be drawn from the State practice of the 
past forty-five years with regard to decolonisation and the realisation of 
the right of self-determination of peoples in the light of the prohibition of 
the threat or use of force by Article 2(4) of the Charter may be summarized 
in the following points: 
First, an armed struggle of a colonial people against the 
administering Power within the boundaries of a non-self-governing 
territory is a situation which belongs to the sphere of "international 
relations" for two reasons. First, the use of force by the administering 
Power to suppress a self-determination movement is not and cannot be a 
matter within its domestic jurisdiction, for the use of force is aimed 
against the very realization of the right of self-determination which is a 
right under international law and which Member States of the United 
Nations organisation, namely, virtually the entire international 
community, have pledged to respect by adhering to the Charter. Secondly, 
the fact that national liberation movements have operated in guerilla 
fashion and the fact that have received material support from third States 
brings the whole issue of struggles for self-determination in direct 
contradiction with the rule that assistance to armed bands constitutes a 
violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter. 
Secondly, the assertion of the Socialist and Developing States that 
national liberation movements have a right of jus ad bellum in 
international law on the grounds of the exercise of the right of self-defence 
was merely an unsuccessful attempt to introduce an exception to Article 
2(4) of the Charter which aspired to reconciling the norm of the 
prohibition of assisting armed bands with the struggle of colonial peoples 
for self-determination. The parallel practice of proclamations of 
independence and recognition seems to constitute evidence that the very 
advocates of the right of liberation movements to lawfully resort to force 
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did not consider their thesis to be as water-tight as to stand by itself. 
Instead, the return to the traditional practice of recognition, albeit with 
further reaching effects than the classical concept of recognition of 
belligerency is implicit of the principle that revolution against the 
Government of a State, whether colonial or not, is a political right and 
totally irrelevant to international law. 
Moreover, the persistent objection on the part of Western States 
seems to have precluded the above assertion from becoming part of 
customary law. 
Thirdly, the Judgment of the International Court of Justice in the 
Nicaragua Case may serve as a model for reconciling the contradiction 
between self-determination struggles and the prohibition of sending or 
assisting armed bands operating on the territory of a State. Any other 
formulation seems to the present author to be rather precarious in that it 
may amount to the absolute overruling of one principle of international 
law in favour of the other, it may result to a rupture in the continuity and 
evolution of international law as a body of law and it would constitute a 
de lege ferenda position which does not correspond to the practice of 
States and the pronouncements of the I. C. J. 
Fourthly, the use of force by States against colonial Powers with the 
purpose of ending colonialism is not admitted as lawful in the practice of 
States. Indeed, the practice of those States that resorted to force under such 
a contingency indicates that their motive was not decolonisation in the 
sense of realizing the right of self-determination of the peoples living in 
the "liberated" territories but rather pure self-interest in an attempt to 
effect territorial changes by using force under the "gloss" of decolonisation 
and self-determination or under an alleged legal title to territorial 
sovereignty. What situations like Goa indicate is that the plea of self- 
determination purports not to cure illegality but to "allow illegality to be 
more readily accommodated through the processes of recognition and 
prescription 
... 
"137 
137 Crawford, The Creation of Sates in International Lau?, 1979, p. 113; Q. Wright, 56 
,4. I. I. L. 617 (1962), p. 632. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND 
POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF STATES. 
1. Introduction 
. 
The phrase "territorial integrity and political independence" has 
been the object of controversy as to its meaning in relation to the 
prohibition of the use of armed force in Article 2(4) of the Charter. 
Force against the "territorial integrity" refers to the physical element 
of the State and the question of its meaning shall be dealt with in the 
subsequent sections. 
"Political independence" is more pertinent to the "decision- 
making" process i -ithin the State and encompasses every function of the 
governmental authority with regard to the internal and external relations 
of the Stater 
. 
Thus, the concept acquires a very wide range of content 
which may be impaired by both forcible and non-forcible activity (in the 
latter case it constitutes a breach of the duty of non-intervention)2 
. 
The use of armed force against the "political independence" of the State is 
usually directed against its territorial integrity as well, and takes the form 
of direct or indirect curtailment of government functions within or 
without the State or the overthrow of the Government of the State3 
. 
An illustration of direct use of armed force against the "political 
independence" of a State is the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on 2 August 
1990 which resulted in the overthrow of the Government of Emir Al- 
Sabah and its replacement by a "puppet" Government subservient to the 
Iraqi regime4 
. 
Instances of overthrow of Government also occurred in the 
cases of the U. S. interventions in Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989), and 
the Soviet interventions in Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and 
Afghanistan (1979). Moreover, attacks on government vessels on the high 
seas constitute a kind of use of force against the "political independence" 
1 See McDougal & Feliciano, Lv and Mmirnum Public Order, 1961, p. 177; Bowett, Self- 
Defence in International Law, 1958, p. 43; Asrat, Prohibition of Force under the United 
Nations Charter, A Study of Article 2(4), 1991, pp. 157-176; cf. Pompe, Aggressive War: an 
International Crime, 1949, p. 106. 
2 See Bowett op. cit. supra n. 1, p. 44 et seq. 
3 McDougal & Feliciano op. cit. supra n. 1; Bowett op. cit. supra n. 1, pp. 44-67; Asrat op. 
cit. supra n. 1. 
4 See S. C. Res. 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, para 2; S. C. Res. 662 (1990) of 9 August 1990, 
preambular para 4. 
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of the State 
, 
because they impair the freedom of the State in relation to the 
unrestricted use of the high seas4a 
. 
Indirect use of force against the "political independence" of a State 
occur-, in the cases of material support provided by a State to the armed 
opposition that is fighting against the Government of another State and 
aims at its overthrow. 
lt is submitted infra that both "territorial integrity" and "political 
independence" are part and parcel of the concept of territorial sovereignty 
that is violated as long as force is used on the territory of a State without 
its consents 
. 
Therefore, the use of force against the territory of a State 
affects at the same time its "political independence" and its "territorial 
integrity" 
. 
It is, however, the latter that in the majority of instances of use 
of force in State practice constitutes the the object of infringement. It is for 
this reason that the present author shall basically deal with issues 
pertinent to the relation between the use of force and the territory of the 
State. 
A final point to be made at this juncture is the concluding phrase of 
Article 2(4) that force is prohibited "in any other manner inconsistent with 
the purpose-, of the United Nations". The phrase has been invoked in 
order to support claims of promoting some purposes of the United 
Nations (viz. the maintenance of international peace and security, and 
respect for human rights) by way of unilateral resort to force. State practice 
is conclusive that such action is inadm ssible if it iss pursued in violation 
of the principles of the organisation, one of Nvhich is Article 2(4)" 
. 
2. Inviolability/ of Frol'itierc and Demarcation Line.. 
lt is not an exaggeration to observe that all cases of the use of armed 
force in the practice of States, both prior and subsequent to the adoption of 
the United Nations Charter, involve infringement of the territory of the 
State-victim of violence which ranges from the mere violation of its 
frontiers to the permanent loss of part or the entirety of its territory. 
Indeed, as Wehberg7 observed the invasion of the territory of a State 
constitutes the c)ascical example of resort to force. It is, therefore, most 
logical that Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter would proscribe the 
4a See Asrat op. cit. supra n. 1, pp. 159,160. 
5 Cf. in fl a Part Three 
, 
Ch. 12, First Title. 
h See Id. Second Title. 
Wehberg, L' Interdiction du Recours a la Force. Le Principe et les Problemes qui se posent, 
7 H. R. C. 7 (1951 1), p. 75. 
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use of armed force "against the territorial integrity and political 
independence" of States. 
Controversy has arisen with regard to the meaning of the above 
phrase, namely, whether it constitutes a limitation to the prohibition of 
the use of force only in those cases where armed violence is aimed at the 
mutilation of the territory of a State or it covers every violation of a State's 
frontiers irrespective of ultimate loss of territory. 
Bowett8 takes the view that territorial integrity is not a right of 
absolute and unqualified rigidity but rather "relative" to the rights of other 
States; accordingly, territorial integrity of States is seen as conditional on 
the absence of any real threat to the security of another State and it is by 
consequence not synonymous to territorial inviolability, in general. The 
above interpretation does not seem to be 
warranted in view of substantial body of State and judicial practice. 
The phrase "against the territorial integrity and political 
independence" of States was not included in the original Dumbarton Oaks 
Proposals and was inserted in what became Article 2(4) of the Charter at 
the San Francisco Conference upon insistence of the small States on a 
more specific guarantee with regard to their territorial integrity in view of 
strengthening the prohibition of Article 2(4)9. Indeed, this seems hardly 
surprising if account is taken of the express guarantee of the territorial 
integrity of Member States of the League of Nations which was contained 
in Article 10 of the Covenant of the League'() and the fact that the gravest 
instances of the threat or use of force during the period of the League, such 
as the Sino-Japanese and Ethiopian conflicts, as well as the incorporation 
of Austria and Czechoslovakia to Germany and of the Baltic States to the 
8 Bowett op. cit. supra n. 1, pp. 31-4,150-2; Stone, Aggression and World Order, 1958, p. 43; 
cf 
. 
Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations, 1947, pp. 162-3. 
9 See U. N. C. I. O. vol. 3, pp. 63,65 (Mexico), 237,246 (Brazil), 399 (Equador), 454 (Egypt), 
497 (Cuba), 558 (Ethiopia), 578 (Bolivia), 588 (Colombia). The final formulation of Article 
2(4) did provoke serious discussion. The representative of Norway felt that the phrase 
"against the territorial integrity and political independence" should be omitted since it 
was a permanent obligation under international law and was covered by the phrase 
"sovereign equality" of States in Artide 2(]); see U. N. C. I. O. vol. 6, p. 267. Also see 
Wehberg loc. cit, supra n. 7, p. 77; Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by 
Individual States in International Law, 81 H. R. C. 455 (1952 11), p. 493; Brownlie, 
International Law and the Use of Force by States, 1963, p. 267; Cot & Pellet, La Charte des 
Nations Unies, 1985, pp. 123-4. 
10 Bowett bases his argument that Article 2(4) of the Charter does not purport to prohibit 
territorial inviolability on the fact that Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations referred only to ultimate loss of territory; op. cit. n. 1, p. 33. Also see Fischer- 
Williams, Some Aspects of the Covenant, 1934, p. 122. 
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Soviet Union, resulted in partial or complete territorial annihilation of 
the victim States. 
The preparatory work of the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations 
reveal that that the prohibition of force against the territorial integrity and 
political independence of a State is not restricted solely to armed force that 
purports to achieve seizure of territory in the sense of acquisition of 
territory by conquests' 
. 
Moreover, paragraph 4 of the principle of the non- 
use of force in the 1970 Declaration12 provides that: 
Every State has the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force to violate the 
existing international boundaries of any State. 
Similarly, the 1974 Definition of Aggression13 reaffirmed in its 
seventh preambular paragraph that: 
... 
The territory of a State shall not be violated by being the object, even 
temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State in 
contravention of the Charter... 
The Helsinki Final Act of 197514 which was held to reflect existing 
customary law on the use of force by the International Court in the 
Nicaragua Case 15, expressly stipulates the inviolability of frontiers. 
Principle III Guiding Relations between Participating States provides that: 
The participating States regard as inviolable all one another's frontiers as well as 
the frontiers of all States in Europe and therefore they will refrain now and in the future 
from assaulting these frontiers. 
The International Court of justice has dealt with the issue twice and 
has ruled in favour of the non-restrictive interpretation of Article 2(4). 
In the Comic Channel Case Counsel for the United Kingdom argued 
that the "Operation Retail", the mine sweeping operation carried out by 
II G. A. O. R. 20th session Annexes, p. 86; G. A. O. R. 21st session Annexes, pp. 38-9; G. A. O. R. 
22nd session Annexes, pp. 17-8; G. A. O. R. 23rd session Annexes, p. 6. 
12 G. A. Res. 2625 (XXV) G. A. O. R. 25th session, Suppl. No 28, p. 121. 13 G. A. Res. 3314 (XXIX) G. A. O. R. 29th session, Suppl. No 31, p. 142. 14 14 I. L. M. 1294 (1975). 
15 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, at p. 100, para 189. 
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the British Navy in the territorial waters of Albania, " 
... 
threatened 
neither the territorial integrity nor the the political independence of 
Albania... " because " 
... 
Albania suffered thereby neither territorial loss nor 
of any part of its political independence... ", that the action was taken "... to 
safeguard evidence necessary for the purposes of justice... " and that "... a 
properly limited right of self-help remains in modern international law... " 
to this effects 6. 
The Court rejected the U. K. argument and ruled: 
"... The Court cannot accept such a line of defence. The Court can regard the alleged 
right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy of force, such as has, in the past, given 
rise to most serious abuses and such as cannot, whatever be the present defects in 
international organisation, find a place in international law. Intervention is perhaps still 
less admissible in the particular form it would take here; for from the nature of things it 
would be reserved for the most powerful States and might easily lead to perverting the 
administration of international justice itself. 
The United Kingdom Agent, in his speech reply, has further classified "Operation 
Retail" among methods of self-protection or self-help. The Court cannot accept this defence 
either. Between independent States respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential 
foundation of international relations... " 17 
Similarly, in the Nicaragua Case the Court referred to the principle 
of respect for State sovereignty as being "... closely linked with the 
principles of the prohibition of the use of force and of non- 
intervention... " 1s 
. 
Furthermore, when the Court appraised the facts of the 
case in the light of the principle of the non-use of force it held that: 
" 
... 
The effects of the principle of respect for territorial sovereignty inevitably 
overlap with those of the principles of the prohibition of the use of force and of non- 
intervention. Thus, the assistance to the contras as well as the direct attacks on Nicaraguan 
ports, oil installations etc.... not only amount to an unlawful use of force but also constitute 
infringements of the territorial sovereignty of Nicaragua, and incursions into its territorial 
and internal waters. Similarly, the mining operations in the Nicaraguan ports not only 
constitute breaches of the principle of the non-use of force but also affect Nicaragua's 
sovereignty over certain maritime expanses. The Court found that these operations were 
carried on in Nicaragua's territorial or internal waters or both and accordingly they 
constitute a violation of Nicaragua's sovereignty. The principle of respect for territorial 
sovereignty is also directly infringed by the unauthorized overflight of a State's territory 
by aircraft belonging to or under the control of the Government of another State... "19 
16 I. C. J. Pleadings 1950, vol. iii, p. 296. 
17 I. C. J. Rep. 1949, p. 4, at p. 35; also see Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed 
Force, 82 Mich. L. R. 1620 (1984), p. 1626; Asrat op. cit. supra n. 1, pp. 149-153. 
18 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, at p. 111, para 212. 
19 Ibid. p. 128, para 251. 
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The significance of the above pronouncements of the Court is in the 
opinion of the present author very important in three respects. 
First, territorial inviolability is safeguarded not only against direct 
physical acts of force such as invasion of territory, penetration in the air 
space or territorial waters of a State, laying of mines in the territorial or 
internal waters of a State but against indirect interventionary activities by 
States such as assistance to armed bands as well. 
Secondly, all the above instances do not constitute cases of violation 
of the territorial integrity of a State tout court ; they constitute violations 
of the territorial sovereignty of a State, namely, 
infringement of both the physical elements of land, sea and air and the 
totality of the competence of a State as a legal person20. 
According to Komarnicki21 
" 
... 
La violation des frontieres d' un Etat est la violation de la competence 
essentielle de cet Etat, c' est par consequant la violation par excellence des limites posees 
par le droit... " 
Indeed, force that takes place on the territory of a State cannot be 
exercised in abstracto but it is aimed against the entirety of an 
international legal entity, namely, its political organisation, population 
and territory-'= 
. 
Principle IV of Part 1 of the Helsinki Final Act, 197523 
seems to concur with the above view in providing that: 
The participating States will respect the territorial integrity of each of the 
participating States. They will likewise in all circumstances refrain from any other act of 
military or of political, economic or other coercion designed to subordinate to their own 
interest the exercise by another participating State of the rights inherent in its sovereignty 
and thus to secure advantages of any kind. Accordingly, they will, inter alia 
, 
refrain from 
direct or indirect assistance to terrorist activities or to subversive or other activities 
directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another participating State. 
20 See Brownlee op. cit. supra n. 9, p. 268; id., Principles of Public International Law, 4th 
ed. 1990, p. 287 et seq. 
21 Komarnicki, La Definition de I' Agresseur dans le Droit International Moderne, 75 
H. R. C. 5 (1949 11), p. 55; Asrat op. cit. supra n. 1, p. 153. 
22 G. A. O. R. 20th session Annexes, p. 86; cf. Asrat op. cit. supra n. 1, pp. 159-160. 
23 Supra n. 14. 
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Lastly, the BoNvett thesis seems to be at variance with judicial 
precedent and State practice in that it is based on the general and quite 
vague concept of "relativity of rights", rather than the Charter and 
customary law. ww23hls 
. 
It, moreover, seems to evade the fact that the position 
of the law with regard to the use of force on the international plane stands 
adamantly on the premise that unilateral resort to force is in principle 
prohibited. This is the rule to which there is only one universally accepted 
and undisputed exception, namely, resort to force in self-defence. 
In the latter case violation of the territorial integrity of the State 
against which defensive action is taken may certainly be involved but it is 
always to be kept within the context of the exceptional situation of self- 
defence. It is the necessity, "instant and overwhelming leaving no choice 
of means and no moment of deliberation"24 and proportionality25 of the 
use of armed force in self-defence which condition the exceptional and 
extraordinary derogation from the rule of territorial inviolability by force 
in this case. Indeed both the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations- and 
the 1974 Definition of Aggression seem to allow this by referring to the 
inadmissibility of military occupation of the territory of a State "resulting 
from the use of force in contravention of the Charter"21' 
To attribute to the phrase "against the territorial integrity and 
political independence of any State" its "plain meaning" and consequently 
interpret it restrictively" constitutes nothing else but placing in the very 
body of Article 2(4) the exception to the rule of non-use force and thus 
dispensing with every need for a clearly stipulated proviso thereto. In fact, 
this, seem-, to imply that the ultifna ratio of the regulation of the use of 
force by States is any 'potential threat to the security of the State, rather 
than the total prohibition of the use of force28 
. 
Moreover, if this is 
accepted as part and parcel of Article 2(4) of the Charter then its juridical 
force is virtually reduced to a minimum. For the concept of the security of 
the State is farther reaching, than the necessity, of self-defence and it allows, 
for the adrnicsion as lawful- in terms of their compatibility with the 
phrase "against the territorial integrity and political independence"- of 
forms of resort to armed 
23bis See Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 9, p. 430. 
24 See The Caroline in Moore, Digest of International Law, vol. ii, p. 409 et seq.; id. vol. 
vii, p. 919 et seq. 
25 See I. C. I. Rep. 1986, p. 14, p. 103, para 194. 
26 See supra notes 12,13. 
2' Bowett op. cit. supra n. 1, pp. 150-2. 
-'S Ibid. p. 33. 
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force which in State practice are surrounded by controversy. This is the 
case with the use of force for the protection of nationals abroad". 
Furthermore, restrictive interpretation of Article 2(4) on the basis of 
the relativity of the right of territorial inviolability due to requirements of 
State security would encourage prolonged military occupation of another 
State's territory which may serve as the prelude for the ultimate 
acquisition of territory by the occupant 
- 
viz. the Israeli annexation of East 
Jerusalem and the Golan Heights 
- 
or the secession of the territory durarite 
occlLpatwne and the assertion by its inhabitants of independent statehood 
- 
viz. the proclamation of the so-called "Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus" in the part of the Republic of Cyprus occupied by the Turkish 
armed forces. Indeed, the annexation of the Golan Heights by Israel was 
justified on the strategic importance of the territory for the security of the 
State of Israelit' and this bears wvitness to the detrimental nature of the 
concept of the threat to the security of the State as a qualification of that of 
territorial inviolability inasmuch as it allows transgression of boundaries 
and possession of parts, of the territory of a State on a purely subjective 
basis. 
Admittedly, there is no doubt that States as political units are 
concerned with their security; it is submitted, however, that the law, 
formulated in accordance with the practice of States, has admitted the right 
of self-defence as the only universally accepted means of protecting the 
security of States against any extraneous and physically manifest forcible 
action directed thereat. It is the necessity of self-defence that activates the 
need for the protection of the security of the State and not the latter that 
activates the right to resort to force. If the concept of the security of the 
State is admitted as the ultimate qualifying condition of the inviolability 
of territory then it may be elevated to a form of national policy to be 
pursued rather than a state of fact to be protected. An illustration of this is 
the occupation of the Golan Heights, the West Bank of the river Jordan, 
the Gaza Strip and the Sinai peninsula by Israel in the aftermath of the 
Six-I)ay war of June 1967. The justification of the occupation of these 
territories was in the \fords of Mir A_ Eban, the Israeli Foreign Secretary the 
" 
... 
(irm resolve never to retuni to the danger and vulnerability from 
which Nye i1sraell have emerged. This resolve must prevail over every 
29 See infra Part Three 
, 
Ch. 11, First Title. 
30 See S. C. O. R. 36th ),, r. 2316th mtg. paras 21-42. Also infra Part Two, Ch. 9, First Title. 
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other consideration. To avoid a return to any of the conditions which 
prevailed on 4 June is a supreme national purpose, worthy of every effort 
and every consequence... "31 
. 
The "consequence" Mr Eban referred to came 
about fourteen years later with the annexation of the Golan Heights and 
the rationale of his argument seems to apply unabated to the continuing 
occupation of the rest of the territories, with the exception of the Sinai 
peninsula which was returned to Egypt in 1979, to the present day. 
The military presence of Israel in the above territories was effected 
subsequent to the use of force. It becomes clear from the Security Council 
session of 13 November 1967 that the continuation of the military 
occupation of these territories was decided upon consideration of security 
as a national policy the forcible exercise of which is not admitted in State 
practice ever since the conclusion of the Pact of Paris of 192832. No State 
seems to have accepted the Israeli thesis with regard to the occupation of 
the Arab territories in 1967. The U. K. Foreign Secretary Brown said with 
reference to Article 2(4) of the Charter that " 
... 
the words 'territorial 
integrity' have a direct bearing on the question of withdrawal 
... 
" of the 
Israeli armed forces33 
. 
The Malaysian representative stated more explicitly 
that the " 
... 
territorial integrity of States is inviolable 
... 
1134 
. 
In fact military 
occupation of a State's territory seems to be regarded with high suspicion 
in State practice as the first step towards the eventual annexation of 
territory and withdrawal of troops from occupying territories to the lines 
of the status quo ante features as the first practical step towards the 
avoidance of such possibility. Thus respect for the inviolability of the 
territory of a State, which is infringed in cases of military occupation 
, 
seems to constitute a primary guarantee against the acquisition of territory 
by force35. 
On November 22,1967 the Security Council adopted unanimously 
Resolution 242 which calls for the withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces 
from Arab territories occupied in June 196736 
. 
The French representative 
31 S. C. O. R. 22nd yr. 1357th mtg. para 13. Also see Mr. Eban's statement before the G. A. 
, G. A. Fifth Emergency Special Session, ES-V Plennary Meetings, 1526th mtg. para 87. It 
appears that the same reasoning lies behind the decision of the Israeli Government, on 19 
April 1985, to proclaim a security zone in Southern Lebanon ; Keesing's 1985, p. 33688. 
32 See G. A. ES-V, 1539th plen. mtg. 
, 
para 15 (Equador). 33 Id. 1529th Alen. mtg. 
, 
para 15. 34 Id. 1541st plen. mtg. 
, 
para 51. 
35 Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations to the General Assembly at its 
22nd session, G. A. O. R. 22nd session, Suppl. 1A, para 47. 
36 S. C. Res. 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security 
Council 1%7, S. C. O. R. 22nd yr., p. 8. 
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commenting on the text of the Resolution stressed the importance of the 
connection drawn between the Israeli withdrawal and the inadmissibility 
of the acquisition of territory by force37. 
During the Security Council debate on the proclamation of the so- 
called "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" the French representative38 
called for the withdrawal of all foreign occupation forces while the 
representative of the Netherlands39 stated that the real issue in this case 
was the continuing presence of foreign forces on Cypriot territory. 
In operative paragraphs 3 and 1 of S. C. Res. 582 (1986) of 24 February 
1986 and S. C. Res. 598 (1987) of 20 July 1987, respectively, with regard to 
the Iran-Iraq conflict the Security Council, acting in the case of the second 
Resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter, demanded the withdrawal of 
all forces to the internationally recognized boundaries without delay40. 
Finally, the Security Council adopted S. C. Res. 660 (1990) in relation 
to the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by the armed forces of Iraq on 2 
August 1990. Operative paragraph 2 of the Resolution demanded the 
"unconditional withdrawal" of the Iraqi troops from Kuwait41 
. 
3. Territorial Disputes 
. 
The general rule of the prohibition of forcible violation of State 
boundaries accepted in the practice of States may be blurred in cases where 
the boundaries violated are the object of a dispute between the contending 
States or in cases where they have never been conclusively determined 
and constitute mere demarcation lines. If neither of the contestants 
recognizes the line between them as a boundary separating their respective 
territories then a violation of each other's territory across the purported 
boundary would be disclaimed. 
37 S. C. O. R. 22nd yr. 1382nd mtg. para 112. Also see id. paras 119 (U. S. S. R. ), 137-141 
(Bulgaria), 162 (Argentina), 189 (Mali). The need for withdrawal of troops was also 
emphasised during the plennary meetings of the Fifth Special Emergency Session of the 
General Assembly. See G. A. ES-V Plennary Meetings, 1529th mtg. paras 15 (U. K. ), 71 
(Denmark); 1530th mtg. paras 130-131 (Italy); 1531st mtg. para 56 (Belgium); 1537th mtg. 
Para 128 (Finland); 1539th mtg. para 21 (Equador). 
U. N. Monthly Chronicle, January 1984, vol. xxi, No 1, p. 7. 39 Ibid. p. 78. 
40 S. C. Res. 582 (1986), Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1986, S. C. O. R. 
41st yr. 
, 
p. 11; S. C. Res. 598 (1987), Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1987, 
S. C. O. R. 42nd yr., p. 5. 
41 S. C. Res. 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990, text in Lauterpacht & others (eds. ), The huznait 
Crisis-Basic Documents, 1991, p. 88. 
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In the Goa incident India denied that the line separating the Portuguese 
dependencies from her territory constituted an international frontier42 
. 
When Iraq resorted to force against Iran in 1980 she asserted that her 
objective was to maintain her territorial integrity and her sovereignty 
over her national waters, thus considering her action not to be in 
violation of the territorial integrity of Iran43 
. 
The invasion of the Falkland Islands was equally claimed by 
Argentina not to be directed against the territorial integrity of the U. K. 44 
In the aftermath of the invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, Iraq asserted 
a historic claim of territorial sovereignty over the entirety of the territory 
of the Emirate45 
. 
Moreover, the Kashmir and the Middle East situations 
illustrate cases where force is resorted to across cease-fire or armistice lines 
drawn after cessation of hostilities had been agreed between the warring 
parties. 
(n all the above cases the central point at issue is the dispute over 
the boundaries of the territory. %, here force takes place. This very dispute 
offers the grounds of justification for the use of force to both sides. The 
State that has resorted to force may argue that it either defends national 
territory or that it is inconceivable to use force against one's own 
territory4t' 
, 
However, what the use of force in reality purports to achieve 
in such cases is virtually to promote the settlement of dispute between the 
two parties in favour of tl, e State that finds itself in de facto possession of 
the territory under dispute. 
The successful occupant of the disputed territory often vests its 
claim with concepts which individually constitute undisputed rights in 
international law, with or without direct bearing on the prohibition of the 
use of force. Self-determination and decolonisation feature prominently 
42 S. C. O. R. 16th yr. 987th mtg. paras 46-47. 
43 See Documents S/ 14191, S/ 14192, S/ 14199, S. C. O. R. 35th yr. Suppl. for July-Sept. 1980, 
pp. 114-115,119; S. C. O. R. 2247th mtg. para 37; M. Ferretti, The Iran-Iraq War: United 
Nations Res+alution of Armed Conflict, 35 Villanova L. R. 197 (1990). 
44 S. C. O. R. 37th yr. 2350th mtg. p. 11. 
45 The Iraqi claim was first asserted in 1961 when Kuwait became an independent State 
and was resurrected, not before or at the time when the invasion took place, but only after 
the purported voluntary "merger" of the two countries. See Press Release by the Press Office 
of the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq, London, 12 September 1990, in Lauterpacht & others 
(eds. ) op. cit. supra n. 41, p. 74 et seq. On the Iraqi historic claim on Kuwait see ibid. pp. 3- 
71; Greenwood, New World Order or Old? The Invasion of Kuwait and the Rule of Law, 55 
Modern L. R. 153 (1992), pp. 155-7. 
46 See Arangio-Ruiz, The United Nations Declaration on Friendly Relations and the 
System of the Sources of International Lain, 1979, p. 104. Also see supra notes 42-44. 
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in the practice of States that resorted to force in cases of disputed 
territories- viz. Goa, the Falklands, Kashmir. Self-defence constitutes the 
other prominent justification for the continuance of the military 
occupation or the annexation of the territory of a State 
- 
viz. the Israeli 
occupation of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the annexation of the 
Golan Heights. 
In both situations force serves as the means of settling the territorial 
dispute and this runs contrary to Article 2(3) of the Charter according to 
which States have the obligation to settle their disputes by peaceful means. 
This, it is submitted, constitutes an obligation under customary 
international law. It has been enshrined in numerous treaties between 
States47 
, 
it has featured in statements of Governments48 and United 
Nations Resolutions. In the latter case the 1970 Declaration on Friendly 
Relations (G. A. Res. 2625 (XXV) of 1970) includes as its second principle 
that States shall settle their disputes by peaceful means. Moreover, the 
fourth paragraph of the principle of the non-use of force states: 
... 
Every State has the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force 
..... 
as a means 
of solving international disputes, including territorial disputes and problems concerning 
frontiers of States.... 49 
It is only the obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means that is 
binding on States, not the specific means to be used to that effect, whether 
it be settlement of a dispute by adjudication or arbitration, mediation, 
conciliation, negotiations. The latter are the object of the free choice and 
discretion of States. 
With regard to territorial and boundary disputes the practice of 
States shows an increasing preference for peaceful means of 
47 See for instance the Pact of Paris of 1928. 
48 The representative of the U. K. in the Security Council stated with regard to the Israeli 
occupation of the Arab territories that " 
... 
Britain does not accept war as a means of 
settling disputes 
... 
", S. C. O. R. 22nd yr. 1381st mtg. para 20. Also see G. A. ES-V Plennary 
Meetings, 1531st mtg. para 102 (France), 1537th mtg. para 119 (Argentina). 
Similar statements were made in the course of the consideration by the S. C. of the Indian- 
Pakistan crisis over Kashmir in 1965. See S. C. O. R. 20th yr. 1237ty mtg. paras 147 (Netherlands), 154 (U. K. ), 197-199 (U. S. A. ). 
49 G. A. Res. 2625 (XXV), G. A. O. R. 25th session, Suppl. No 28, p. 121. See also I. C. J. Rep. 
1986, p. 14, at pp. 99-100, para 188. 
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settlement50 
. 
It is not surprising therefore that States which have 
used force in cases of disputed territory sought to present their action as 
promoting self-determination or being required by a necessity of self- 
defence. 
Self-determination seems to be the underlying basis of the Kashmir 
dispute between India and Pakistan. The accession of Jammu and Kashmir 
to India in 1947 was considered by the Pakistani Government51 as a "coup 
d' etat" based on "violence and fraud against the wishes of the Muslim 
majority of the population". 
Defence of national security is the crux of the Israeli argument 
with regard to the occupied Arab territories. Iraq also justified its action 
against Iran in September 1980 as self-defence52. 
Turkey justified the presence of her armed forces in Cyprus during the 
Security Council debate on the proclamation of the Turkish Cypriot State 
as required by the principle of legitimate individual defence53. 
No State has claimed force as a legitimate means in itself for 
promoting the solution of territorial disputes; on the contrary, the use of 
force has been presented as compelled by reasons of defensive necessity or 
promotion of the right of self-determination. 
An additional argument advocating the interpretation that Article 
2(4) is violated only in the case of crossing international boundaries has 
been claimed by Israel with regard to her action in 1967 and the 
continuance of the occupation of the Arab territories ever since. The 
Israeli Foreign Secretary A. Eban stated before the Security Council "the 
necessity of applying the principle of territorial integrity to accepted and 
secure international frontiers and not to fragile armistice lines"54 
Armistice lines are certainly "fragile" in the sense that they do not possess 
the permanence of international boundaries. Whereas the latter purport 
to delimit definitively the territories of different States, armistice lines aim 
50 See for instance The Island of Palmas Award 
,2R. I. A. A. , p. 829; Fasten, Greenland Case, P. C. I. J. Series A /B No 53; Burkina Faso v. Mali Case, I. C. J. Rep- 1986, p. 554; The 
Tatra sward 
, 
27 I. L. M. 1421 (1988). 
51 Letter dated 15 January 1948 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan to the 
President of the Security Council, Doc. S/646 and Corr. 1, Annex 6, S. C. O. R. 3rd yr. Suppl. 
for Jan. 
-March 1948, pp. 80,82-3. 52 See supra n. 43. 
53 Loc. cit. supra n. 38, p. 77. 54 S. C. O. R. 22nd yr. 1357th mtg. para 46; also see S. C. O. R. 36th yr. 2316th mtg. paras 21- 
42. The same view was taken by Arab States; see S. C. O. R. 22nd yr. 1345th mtg. para 84 (Jordan). 
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at guaranteeing the cessation of hostilities as a first step towards the 
settlement of disputes55 
. 
Withdrawal of troops is a following step and 
ultimate peaceful consideration of the merits of each party's claims seems 
to be the conclusion. 
To use force across an armistice line entails the same effect as the 
crossing of existing and permanent boundaries in every respect but for the 
name of the line crossed. For, in both cases force serves as the means to 
promote settlement of the dispute unilaterally by the imposition of the 
claim of the State that resorts to force against the other party to the dispute 
without the latter being offered any opportunity whatever to argue its 
case56 
. 
Moreover, resort to force in both cases may escalate into a major 
conflict in view of possible arguments on both sides that they act in self- 
defence which implies the likelihood of the involvement of third States 
in the conflict under the justification of collective self-defence. Bowett57 
suggests that peaceful possession of territory or de facto authority over 
territory constitutes a sufficient basis upon which action in self-defence 
can be justified. The same contingency has been included in the Rio Treaty 
of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 58 
. 
Article 9(b) provides that "[I]nvasion 
by the armed forces of a state.... affecting a region which is under the 
effective jurisdiction of another State" shall be considered an act of 
aggression. Admittedly, the above thesis may constitute a satisfactory basis 
of departure with regard to the regulation of the use of force in case of 
controversy as to the title to territorial sovereignty with regard to the 
geographical area where forcible action takes place. Its weakness, however, 
lies in the fact that what is protected seems to be the peaceful possession 
and the de facto exercise of authority over the territory in dispute, which 
may serve as bases for acquiring title to the territory in question by 
effective occupation. The danger becomes more visible in cases of de facto 
and peaceful possession of territory in a situation of prolonged military 
occupation subsequent to the use of force, lawful or unlawfu159 
. 
If what is 
really protected is the peaceful authority of the occupant then the 
possibility of adjudicating title to territory may become real; at the same 
time, it incurs the danger of disregarding the well established rule in 
55 See Y. Blum, The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the Status of Judea and Samaria, 3 
Israel L. R. 279 (1968), p. 288. 
56 See K. H. Kaikobad, The Shat-al-Arab Boundary Question, 7988, p. 108. 57 Op. cit. supra n. 1, p. 35; also see Q. Wright, The Goa Incident, 56 A. ]. 1. L. 617 (1962), p. 
623; Asrat op. cit. supra n. 1, pp. 154-7. 
58 Text in 43 A. J. I. L. Suppl. 53 (1949) 
. 59 Cf. Asrat op. cit. supra n. 1, p. 154. 
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customary international law that acquisition of territory by force is 
inadmissible. 
Roberts6° suggests with reference to the Middle Eastern 
situation that in cases of prolonged military occupations that occur due to 
"ancient rivalries and deep seated territorial-cum-political disputes there 
may well not be a status quo ante to which States can easily revert as part 
of a diplomatic settlement". It is because of this likelihood that the best 
approach in the present author's view seems to be suggested by- the 1970 
Declaration on Friendly Relations which provides in the fifth paragraph of 
the principle of the non-use of force that: 
... 
Every State likewise has the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force to 
violate international lines of demarcation, such as armistice lines, established by or 
pursuant to an international agreement to which it is a party or which it is otherwise bound 
to respect. Nothing in the foregoing shay] be construed as prejudicing the positions of the 
parties concerned with regard to the status and effects of such lines under their special 
regimes or as affecting their temporary character... 61 
It becomes obvious from the summary records of the preparatory 
work of the Declaration that armistice lines are equated with official 
frontiers of States only for the purposes of the prohibition of the use of 
force which is totally unrelated to the question of the duration of those 
lines and that the raison d' etre for this formulation is "to help ensure 
that they would serve their purpose which in many cases, had been to 
bring about a halt in the use of force so that the methods of peaceful 
settlement envisaged in the Charter could operate"62. 
This clearly indicates that what matters in territorial disputes is to 
bring about a peaceful settlement thereof and to eliminate in the highest 
degree possible any obstruction towards such settlement by the unilateral 
resort to force. Moreover, the fact that force is prohibited against lines 
separating the two disputant parties rather than against their authority as 
effective administrators of the territory under dispute seems to preclude 
any assertions attributing to prolonged military occupations, justified on 
the basis of their resulting from lawful use of force, the law-making effect 
of the peaceful exercise of sovereign authority over the territory in 
('O Roberts, Prolonged Military Occupation; The Israeli-Occupied Territories since 1967,84 
A. I. 1. L. 44 (1990), p. 75. 
61 See also G. A. Res. 378 (V), G. A. O. R. 5th session, Suppl. No 20, pp. 12-13. 
62 G. A. O. R. 21st session Annexes, p. 39; G. A. O. R. 22nd session Annexes, p. 17. 
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dispute63 Whether the occupant takes possession of and effectively 
administers the territory under dispute subsequent to lawful resort to force 
bears no significance whatever 
on the merits of the case with regard to title to the territory under 
dispute64 
. 
Mr. Monroe the Legal Adviser to the U. S. Department of State 
said that: 
"It is difficult to justify a rule that the use of force in self-defence may, during any 
resulting occupation, give the occupant rights against the enemy sovereign not related to 
the original self-defence requirement or not required as concomitants of the occupation itself 
and the occupant's duties"65 
In 1967 Israel crossed the 1949 Armistice Lines acting, according to 
the justification of her Government, in self-defence, and found herself in 
possession of territories which either belonged to 
- 
viz. the Golan Heights 
and the Sinai 
- 
or were de facto administered by her neighbouring Arab 
States-viz. the West Bank of the river Jordan, East Jerusalem, the Gaza 
Strip. If the almost quarter-of-a-century old Israeli occupation and de facto 
administration of the Arab territories is considered in conjunction with 
the right of self-defence then the merits of any territorial claims of Israel or 
the neighbouring Arab States over those disputed areas of the old 
Palestine Mandate will be inevitably linked with the concept of legitimacy 
or not of the use of force in international relations. It is submitted that 
this is to be judged according to the actual territorial position of the parties 
with regard to the lines dividing their respective areas of control. As for 
the latter, its merit as effective administration conferring sovereign title to 
territory in dispute is totally irrelevant to the lawfulness or not of the use 
of force which resulted in the taking of possession of territory and it 
''3 Contra Blum, Secure Boundaries and the Middle East Peace, 1971, p. 90; id. 
,3 Israel L. R. 279 (1968) ; Schw ebel, What Weight to Conquest? 
, 
64 A. JJ. L. 344 (1970), 345-6; E. 
Lauterpacht, Jerusalem and the Holt Places, Anglo-Israeli Association, Pamphlet No 19, 
1968, p. 52; Stone, Israel and Palestine; Ä ssault on the Lv of Nations, 1981, pp. 51-54; id. 
Conflict Through Consensus, 1977, pp. 68,72; Feinberg, The Legality of the Use of Force to 
Recover Occupied Territory, 15 Israel L. R. 160 (1980), pp. 173-4; Goodhart, International 
Law Relating to Occupied Territory, 87 L. Q. R. 293 (1971), pp. 293-5. 
64 See Q. Wright, The Middle East Problem, 64 A. J. I. L. 270 (1970), p. 272; Bowett, 
International Law Relating to Occupied Territory; A Rejoinder, 87 L. Q. R. 473 (1971), p. 475; 
Kaikobad op. cit. supra n. 56, pp. 109-114. 
65 Digest of the U. S. Practice in International Law, 1976, pp. 700-6. 
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should not be taken into account in a future settlement of the dispute by 
wati, of one of the means accepted in the practice of States". 
Furthermore, refusal to withdraw from an occupied territory 
sovereignty over which has been a matter of dispute under the 
justification that would be prejudicial to the future establishment of 
permanent boundaries", is objectionable because it renders a mere nullity 
of any purported function and practical significance of demarcation line. -, 
in respect to the prohibition of the use of force and disregards the fact that 
the continuing military occupation of the territory entails a factual 
situation which may be detrimental for the case of the other party in a 
future dispute settlement. 
4. Forcible Recn, 
-)eer/ of Occupied Territory 
. 
The provision on the prohibition of the use of force across 
boundaries or demarcation lines in the 1970 Declaration on Friendly 
Relations raises- the question of the admissibility of resort to force by the 
lawful sovereign to recover territory occupied by another Poiver. 
Thi is in principle admitted in the practice of States provided that 
title to territorial sovereignty is not disputed ab irnritio with regard to the 
State that purports to have sovereignty over the territory in question' 
and the action taken in such a case by the lawful sovereign falls within the 
factual requirements of tile right to resort to to force should a necessity of 
self-defence arises"" 
. 
Such is the case with regard to the resort to force by 
the U. K. in 
-april 1982 m view of expelling the , -\rgeritine occupation 
force,, from the Falkland Islands. 
t'0 Kaikobad op. cit. supra n. 56, p. 111; Dinstein, Opening Remarks in the Symposium on 
Human Rights and Israeli Rule in the Territories, 21 N. Y. U. I. I. L. D. 451 (1989), p. 459. 
h' See statement by Mr. A. Eban in S. C. O. R. 22nd vr. 1375th mtg. para 51; also see 1377th 
intg. Para 65 (U. S. A. ). Also see Weil, Territorial Settlement in Resolution of 22 November 
1967, in j. 'ý. Moore (ed. ), The Arab-Israeli Conflict, 7974, vol. ii, p. 319; cfi 
_ 
S. C. Res. 476 
(1980) of 30 June 1980, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1980, S. C. O. R. 35th 
r. 
, 
p. 13. 
Schachter, 82 Mich. L. R. 1620 (1964?, pp. 1627-8; Jennings, The 4cifnisttion of Territory 
in Inter»atioiial Law, 1963, p. 72. The same is the case with regard to title to territory 
which was admissible in international law at the time when the title was established. An 
illustration of this contingency is the concept of conquest which prior to the Covenant of the 
League and the Pact of Paris was a legitimate mode of acquisition of territory. The 
subsequent outlawry of acquisition of territory by force does not invalidate retroactively 
titles to territorial sovereignty based on conquest 
- 
viz. the case of the Falklands. See D. J. 
Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 4th ed., 1991, p. 201 but cf. pp. 196-8. ý'" See inh-a Part Two 
, 
Ch. 9, First Title. 
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The position in State practice seems to be different in cases of 
military occupation of territory sovereignty over which has been disputed 
ab initio 
. 
It is mainly in such cases where demarcation or cease-fire lines are 
drawn for the purpose of facilitating the peaceful settlement of disputes. In 
the Kashmir situation sovereignty over the territory has been in dispute 
since 1948, when former British India acceded to independence, and as a 
result hostilities broke out. The Security Council was seized with the 
Question and appointed a Commission to mediate between the disputant 
parties, India and Pakistan, for a settlement of the dispute70 and a cease- 
fire line was established on 13 August 194871. In September 1965 the 
Pakistani Army launched a large-scale attack across the cease-fire line. 
Statements by representatives of States 
during the Security Council debates72 as well as a series of Resolutions73 
by the latter reveal disapproval of the Pakistani argument that "... there is 
no international frontier between Pakistan and Indian occupied 
Kashmir"74 
. 
A third and most interesting situation arises in a case where, 
although sovereignty over the territory which is aspired to being 
"liberated" is not disputed with regard to the author of violence, the resort 
to force is seen as part of a prolonged political conflict, which is endemic in 
a certain geographical region in which most of the States therein are 
involved and which has erupted in overt military action. Such case is 
reflected by the situation in the Middle East. 
In October 1973 Egypt and Syria launched a large scale attack against 
the Israeli positions in the Sinai and the Golan Heights, respectively, 
which had been occupied by Israel as a result of the Six-Day war of 1967. 
Although the Egyptian representative on the Security Council justified the 
use of force resorted to as action in self-defence against an Israeli attack on 
70 S. C. Res. 39 (1948) of 20 January 1948, in Djonovich (ed_), United Nations Resolutions 
series 11, Security Council, vol. ii 1948-1950, p. 12. 
71 Text of the Agreement in Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967. Documents 
and Commentary, vol. 2 Asia, 1970, p. 323. 
72 Supra n. 48. 
73 See S. C. Res. 210 (1965) of 6 September 1965; S. C. Res. 211 (1965) of 20 September 1965; 
S. C. Res. 214 (1965) of 27 September 1965; S. C. Res. 215 (1965) of 5 November 1965, calling 
for respect for the ceasefire and withdrawal of troops. Also see the identical telegrams 
dated 1 September 1965 from the Secretary General of the U. N. to the President of Pakistan 
and the Prime Minister of India, Doc. S/6647, S. C. O. R. 20th yr. Suppl. for July-Sept. 1965, 
p 233-4. 
7ý S. C. O. R. 20th yr. 1238th mtg. para 29. 
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the Egyptian positions at the Suez Cana175 it appeared that the real aim of 
the Egyptian 
- 
as well as Syrian 
- 
action was the recovery of the territories 
occupied by Israel as a result of the Six-Day War of 196776 
. 
The above 
contingency was supported by a certain number of States77 and seems to 
have been rejected by others78 in the latter case, on the basis of a peaceful 
settlement of the Middle East Crisis according to the principles of S. C. 
Resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967. The latter view seems to have 
prevailed due to the fact that S. C. Res. 338(1973) of 22 October 1973 which 
was adopted unanimously by the Security Council called for a cease-fire, 
the implementation of S. C. Res. 242 (1967) and negotiations for the 
achievement of peace79 
. 
Notwithstanding the fact that both Syrian and Egyptian sovereignty 
over the Golan Heights and the Sinai peninsula respectively was 
undisputed, the Security Council seems to have viewed the specific 
conflict of 1973 against the whole of the Middle East crisis in terms of 
territorial sovereignty; for, ever since 1948 the boundaries and indeed the 
very right of existence of the then newly established State of Israel became 
the object of dispute with the result of permanent tension in the area, five 
major armed conflicts79 and numerous acts of force on the part of both 
Israel and the Arab States. 
Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) clearly stipulated that the 
right of every State in the region to live in peace within secure and 
recognised boundaries was a prerequisite for the establishment of a just 
and lasting peace in the Middle East. The achievement of such peace with 
regard to the occupied Arab territoriesg" by Israel must folloNv the general 
pattern of settlement envisaged in Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 
which expressly refers in its third preambular paragraph to Article 2(3) of 
the Charter, namely, the duty of peaceful settlement of disputes, among 
States and the prohibition of the use of force in international relations 
S. C. O. R. 28th yr. 1743rd mtg. paras 37-39. 
76 Namely, the Sinai peninsula (Egypt) and the Golan Heights (Syria). See Ibid. para 52; 
also see 1744th mtg. paras 44-87 (Syria). Cf. infra Part Two 
, 
Ch. 9, First Title. 
See id. 1743rd mtg. p gras 53-58 (China); 1744th intg. paras 179-180 (India), 199 (Sudan); 
1745th mtg. paras 38-39 (Guinea), 5/1-58 (Peru), 159 (U. S. S. R. ); 1746th mtg. paras 9 
(Nigeria), 19 (Kenya). 
78 See id. 1743rd mtg. paras 70-72 (U. K. ); 1744th mtg. paras 27 (France), 39 (Austria); 
I746th mtg. para 32 (Australia). 
79 S. C. Res. 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 
1973, S. C. O. R. 28th y-r. 
, 
p. 10. 
79a Namely, in 1948-49 (Israel %var of Independence), 1956 (The Sinai Campaign), 1967 
(The Six Day War), 1973 (The Yon Kippur War), 1982 (The Israeli invasion of Lebanon). 
80 The Sinai was restored to Egypt after the 1979 Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel. 
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[Article 2(4)181. Moreover, by virtue of the Disengagement of forces 
Agreements signed by Israel on 31 May 1974 and 4 September 1975 with 
Syria and Egypt, respectively82 
, 
the parties thereto undertook to observe 
the cease-fire and to refrain from all military and paramilitary activities 
against each other. 
5. The Prohibition of Acquisition of Territory by Force 
. 
The prohibition of the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity and political independence of any State has as its corollary the 
inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by States as a result of the 
threat or use of force and the disinclination in the practice of States to 
recognise such acquisition or the statehood of entities which emerge as a 
consequence of the use of force against the State whose territory they have 
hitherto formed part of83 
. 
Both situations are examined in the context of the concept of 
non-recognition of territorial changes as the result of the use of force. 
According to Langer84: 
" 
... 
The essence of non-recognition of a territorial transfer is the refusal, on the part 
of the non-recognizing Power to regard the sovereignty of the dispossessed Power 
superseded by that of the dispossessing Power and to give to acts of the latter the effects 
attaching to the acts of a rightful sovereign 
... 
" 
Moreover, non-recognition rests on the fact that the territorial 
change against which it is directed is the result of an act in violation of 
International law; indeed, it seems that non-recognition constitutes an 
application of the principle ex injuria jus non oritur 85 
. 
The function of 
non-recognition in International law has been suggested by Lauterpacht86 
to constitute in the following passage: 
81 See Feinberg, 15 Israel L. R. 160 (1980), p. 160; Wengler, 7 Revue Belge D. I. 401 (1971), pp. 
407-8. 
82 Feinberg, 15 Israel L. R. 160 (1980), pp. 161-2. 
83 See Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, 1979, pp. 106-7. 84 Langer, Seizure of Territory, First Greenwood Reprinting, 1969, p. 96. 85 Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 9, p. 410. 
86 Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, 1948, pp. 411-412; also see Chen, The 
International Law of Recognition, 1951, pp. 430-433; Patel, Recognition and the Law of 
Nations, 1959, pp. 11-115. 
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" 
... 
Recognition is unnecessary and irrelevant only when the lawfulness of an act 
giving rise to the pretended title is clear and undisputed 
- 
lawfulness meaning either its 
conformity with general international law or with particular legal rights of other States. 
But recognition of a new title acquires definite significance as soon as the legality of the act 
or the existence of the legal title on which the act is based becomes a matter of doubt or 
dispute. When this happens, recognition removes the uncertainty by acknowledging the 
conformity of 
the title in question with international law. The position is altogether different when the 
facts giving rise to the pretended new title are in violation of international law. In such 
cases recognition fulfils a function altogether distinct from other aspects of recognition. It is 
no longer an act of administration of international law; it is a political function. While not 
intended to do away with the moral or legal opprobrium attaching to the original 
illegality, it validates its consequences. It is against recognition of this nature that the 
policy or the obligation of non-recognition is directed 
... 
" 
The unilateral use of force by States in their international relations 
has become illegal by the evolution of customary international law that 
started with the the introduction of the Covenant of the League of Nations 
and the conclusion of the Pact of Paris of 1928 and culminated in Article 
2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations. Conquest which had hitherto 
been admitted in State practice as one of the means of acquiring territorial 
sovereignty has been rendered unlawful87. Furthermore, the creation of 
States under conditions brought about by way of inter-State use of force is 
considered prima facie inadmissible. Non-recognition appeared in the 
practice of States prior to 
the League of Nations although it seems that it was prompted by breaches 
of specific contractual obligations rather than violations of a rule of 
general international law. Thus, the refusal of the British Government to 
recognise the annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina by Austria-Hungary in 
1908 was justified on the breach of the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, rather than 
the inadmissibility of conquest in International law88 
. 
The advent of the League of Nations and more specifically Article 
10 of the Covenant of the League, which stipulated the guarantee of the 
territorial integrity of Member States against external aggression and the 
conclusion of the Pact of Paris of 1928 gave rise to the development of the 
law which resulted in non-recognition becoming a duty under 
International law. 
This development was given impetus by instances in the practice of 
States during the 1930s amounting to territorial mutilation of States as a 
result of the threat or use of force, that took the form of either outright 
87 Sees upra n. 68. 
88 Langer op. cit. si qn-a n. 84, p. 13. 
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annexation of the victim's territory 
- 
viz. the Italian annexation of Ethiopia 
in 1936 and Albania in 1939, the German annexation of Austria (1938) and 
Czechoslovakia (1939), the Soviet annexation of Western Poland (1939), 
the Baltic States (1940) and Bessarabia (1940)- or the creation of a new State 
out of a part of the victim's territory 
- 
viz. Manchukuo'89 
. 
Moreover, non-recognition in the period of the League of Nations seemed 
to be directed against situations that constituted violation of rules of 
international law pertaining to the use of force by States, which although 
were vested with the character of treaty-obligations, were of general 
application, due to the large number of contracting parties thereto, and 
entailed the curtailing of the freedom inherent in the sovereignty of States 
to use force. 
Non-recognition emerged as a statement of policy in the famous 
Note addressed to the Governments of China and Japan by the United 
States Secretary of State Stimson on 7 January 193290. 
However, it seems that non-recognition soon evolved into an 
obligation in that the practice of State-, reveals a number of instances in 
which it was envisaged as such. 'Ehe Note of 16 February 1932 of the 
Members of the Council of the League other than China and Japan to the 
Governments of the latter, the Resolution of the Assembly of the League 
of 11 ! larch 1932, the Chaco Declaration by nineteen American States, 
indicate by their wording that non-recognition was seen as, a legal 
obligation'l 
. 
The British de irrreg recognition of the Italian annexation of 
Ethiopia although prima facie in complete contradiction with any 
obligation of non-recognition was adopted against the background of 
diplomatic activity on the part of the British Government which reveals 
the wish of the latter to achieve some kind of release from an obligation of 
non-recognition"2 
. 
Multilateral treaties concluded in the Americas, but 
participation to which was not confined to American States only, 
incorporated non-recognition as an express treaty obligation. 
Rrownhe ap.. cit. -FIpra n.. 9, pp. 412-ß. 
Whiteman, Digest of luiteunationaI Law, vol. 5, pp. 874-5. The Stimson Note did not 
imply as such an obligation of non-recognition. See Lauterpacht op. cit. supra n. 86, p. 416; 
Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 9, p. 418. 
91 Lauterpacht op. cit. supra n. 86, p. 417; Brownlie, p. 419; Remarks by Ambassador 
Jacovides and K. loannou, Cyprus: International Law and Prospects of Settlement, A. S. I. L. 
Proceedings 707 (7984), pp. 118,129-130. 
`') Lauterpacht, p- 418. 
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Article 2 of the 1933 Rio Anti-War Treaty (the Saavedra Lamas 
Pact)93 
, 
which was adhered to or ratified by eleven European States, 
provides that the signatories and adherents thereto, "... will not recognize 
any territorial arrangement which is not obtained by pacific means, nor 
the validity of an occupation or acquisition of territory that may be 
brought about by force... " 
Article 11 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and 
Duties of States94 provides that: 
The contracting States definitively establish as the norm of their conduct the 
precise obligation not to recognize territorial acquisitions or special advantages which 
have been obtained by force whether this consists in the employment of arms, in 
threatening diplomatic representations, or in any other effective coercive measure. 
The fifth principle of the Act of Chapultepec95 of 1945 declared: 
... 
(a) The proscription of territorial conquest and the non-recognition of all 
acquisitions made by force 
... 
Furthermore, the Charter of the Organisation of American States" 
provides in Article 17 that: 
No territorial acquisitions or special advantages obtained either by force or by 
other means of coercion shall be recognized. 
The United Nations Charter does not expressly impose on the 
Members of the Organisation an obligation of non-recognition of forcible 
territorial changes; however, the combined effect of the obligations under 
Articles 2(3) and 2(4) can hardly render any forcible acquisition of territory 
compatible with these obligations97. 
93 163 L. N, T. 5.393. 
94 165 L_N. T. S. 19. 
95 39 A. I. I. L. Suppl. 266 (1945). 
9(' 30 U. N. T. S. 4-49. 
97 Thomas & Thomas, Non-Intennention, 1956, p. 270; statement by Mr. Yepes in the course 
of the preparation of the Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States that non- 
recognition enshrined the principle contained in Article 2(4) of the Charter, I. L. C. Ybk. 
1949, Vol. 1,14th mtg. para 120. 
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The Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States98 prepared 
by the International Law Commission in 1949 provides in Article 11 that: 
Every State has the duty to refrain from recognizing any territorial acquisition by 
another State acting in violation of Article 9 [namely, the duty to refrain from resort to war 
as an instrument of national policy and from the threat or use of force. ] 
Paragraph 8 of Article 2 of the International Law Commission Draft 
Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind99 included 
"[T]he annexation by the authorities of a State of territory belonging to 
another State, by means of acts contrary to international law" among the 
acts constituting offences against the peace and security of mankind. 
The 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations10° includes in the tenth 
paragraph of the principle of the non-use of force the provision that: 
... 
The territory of a State shall not be the object of military occupation resulting 
from the use of force in contravention of the provisions of the Charter. The territory of a 
State shall not be the object of acquisition by another State resulting from the threat or use 
of force. No territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be 
recognized as legal 
... 
Article 5(3) of the 1974 Definition of Aggression101 likewise 
provides that "[Njo territorial acquisition or special advantage resulting 
from aggression is or shall be recognized as lawful". 
Finally, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act1 02 declares that the participating 
States "... will refrain from any demand for or act of seizure and usurpation 
of part or all of the territory of any participating State 
... 
" and furthermore 
that they " 
... 
will.... refrain from making each other's territory the object of 
military occupation or other direct or indirect measures of force in 
contravention of international law or the object of acquisition by means of 
such measures or the threat of them. No such occupation or acquisition 
will be recognized as legal 
... 
If. 
98 I. L. C. Ybk. 1949, Vol. 11, Part Two, p. 288. 99 I. L. C. Ybk. 1954, Vol. 11, Part Two, p. 151. 100 G. A. Res. 2625 (XXV), G. A. O. R. 25th session, Suppl. No 28, p. 121. 101 G. A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), G. A. O. R. 29th session, Suppl. No 31, p. 142. 102 Principles III (2) and IV (3), 14 I. L. M. 1292 (1975). 
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Despite the inconsistencies in the practice of non-recognition in the 
League period103 the practice of States in the post-Charter period has 
consolidated non-recognition as an obligation under general international 
law. 
Resolution 242 (1967) adopted unanimously by the Security Council 
on 22 November 1967 and purporting to lay down the principles for the 
establishment of just and lasting peace in the Middle East emphasized the 
"inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war"104. 
The annexation of East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights by Israel in 
1980 and 1981 respectively was met by universal condemnation. The 
Security Councils 05 reaffirmed the inadmissibility of the acquisition of 
territory by force "in accordance with the United Nations Charter, the 
principles of International law and relevant Security Council 
Resolutions"106 
. 
By virtue of operative paragraph 1 of S. C. Res. 497 of 17 
December 1981 on the annexation of the Golan Heights the Security 
Council decided that the Israeli act " 
... 
is null and void and without 
international legal effect 
... 
"; likewise, operative paragraph 5 of S. C. Res. 
478(1980) stipulated the non-recognition of the effects of the "Basic Law" 
enacted by the Israeli Knesset and by virtue of which East Jerusalem was 
incorporated into Israel, and determined that it was 
null and void. 
Furthermore, the Security Council in its Resolution 582 of 8 October 
1986 with respect to the Iran-Iraq conflict emphasized once more "the 
principle of the non-acquisition of territory by force"107. 
Finally, a more recent pronouncement by the Security Council on 
the illegality of forcible acquisition of territory occurred during the Kuwait 
crisis of August 1990. On 2 August 1990 the armed forces of Iraq invaded 
and occupied Kuwait. On 8 August 1990 the "comprehensive and eternal 
merger" of Kuwait with Iraq was announced10 
. 
103 Waldock, 81 H. R. C. 455 (1952 11), p. 481; Brownlie, pp. 413-8. 
104 See S. C. O. R. 22nd yr. 1382nd mtg. paras 76 (Nigeria), 112 (France), 119 (U. S. S. R. ), 127 
(Brazil), 137-139 (Bulgaria), 163 (Argentina), 173 (Japan). Cf. Stone, Israel and Palestine; 
Assault on he Law of Nations, 1981, p. 54;. t Veil, Territorial Settlement in Resolution of 
November 22,1967, in Moore (ed. ), The Arab-Israeli Conflict, vol. ii, 1974, p. 319. 
105 S. C. Res. 476 (1980) of 30 June 1980 and S. C. Res. 478 (1980) of 20 August 1980 on East 
Jerusalem. The U. S. A. abstained in both resolutions. Texts in Resolutions and Decisions of 
the Security Council 1980, S. C. O. R. 35th yr. 
, 
pp. 13,14; S. C. Res. 497 (1981) of 17 December 
1981 on the Golan Heights (adopted unanimously), text in Resolutions and Decisions of the 
Security Council 1981, S. C. O. R. 36th yr. 
, 
p. 6. 
106 S. C. Res. 497 (1981) of 17 December 1981. 
107 Text in Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1986, S. C. O. R. 41st yr. 
, 
p. 11. 
108 Keesing's 1990, p. 37635. 
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On 9 August the Security Council adopted unanimously S. C. Res. 
662 (1990) which provided, inter alia 
, 
that: 
The Security Council 
................................................... 
1. Decides that the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq under any form and whatever 
pretext has no legal validity, and is considered null and void. 
2. Calls upon all States, international organizations and specialized agencies not to 
recognize that annexation and to refrain from any action or dealing that might be 
interpreted as an indirect recognition of the annexation............ 109 
Statements by individual members of the Security Council 
reiterated the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by force. The 
representative of Malaysia stated that: 
" 
... 
The world has come a long way from the history of wars and miseries brought 
about as a result of ambitions and imperatives of States to expand and annex other States 
around them. The annexation of Kuwait is totally unacceptable 
... 
"110 
According to the representative of Finland: 
" 
... 
The acquisition of territory of another State by the use of force contradicts one 
of the most basic and firm principles of international law 
... 
"I 11 
Finally, the representative of Colombia expressed the view that: 
" 
... 
The use of force can never legitimise the occupation and subjugation of 
territory 
... 
"112 
It is, moreover, noteworthy that Iraq did not purport to annex 
Kuwait, but it claimed that the "merger" was effected at the request of the 
"Provisional Free Government of Kuwait"113 
. 
The Iraqi argument was 
outright refuted in the Security Council114 and the majority of States 
maintaining diplomatic missions in Kuwait refused to comply with the 
109 Text in Lauterpacht & others (eds. ), The Kuwait Crisis-Basic Documents, 1991, p. 90. 
110 S. C. O. R. 45th yr. S/ PW. 2934 (9 August 1990), in Lauterpacht & others (eds. ), op. cit. 
supra n. 109, p. 107. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Press Release by the Press Office of the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq, London, 12 
September 1990, in Lauterpacht & others (eds. ), p. 73. 11 See Lauterpacht & others (eds. ), pp. 105-9. Also see Greenwood, 55 Modern L. R. 153 (1992), p. 157-8. 
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order of the Iraqi Government to close down their missions in Kuwait 
City and transfer them to Baghdad] 15. 
Emergence of "independent" States the territory of which consists of 
the part of the victim-State's territory which is under the military 
occupation of the State that resorted to force, constitutes a more subtle 
means of effecting territorial changes in that it is prima facie not a case of 
outright annexation of territory by the State-author of violence. It can, 
furthermore, be vested with claims of exercising the right- of self- 
determination on the part of the population- most likely an ethnic 
minority group- of the area which proclaims its independence. 
"Manchukuo" and the so-called "Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus" constitute two illustrations of such territorial change in the 
practice of States. 
Both of them emerged during a situation of military occupation of 
parts of the territories of States they belonged to, namely, China and 
Cyprus, respectively. In both cases the occupant Powers namely, Japan116 
and Turkey117 strongly denied any territorial ambitions with regard to the 
territories under occupation; instead, the new "States" appeared as the 
realization of the right of self-determination118 which constitutes a plea 
that undoubtedly may arouse the sympathy of various quarters of the 
international community towards the newly established entitiesl19 
. 
However, it is submitted, that unless the emphasis is placed on the 
fact that a State is deprived of a part of its territory pursuant to an instance 
of use of force, the real significance of non-recognition of such entities 
cannot be appreciated. For what matters in these cases is not the 
aspirations of the population of the area to exercising their right of self- 
determination or the question whether they may be the beneficiaries of 
this right, but, rather, the fact that this is materialised 
115 Keesing's 1990, p. 37639; also see S. C. Res. 664 (1990) of 18 August 1990 para 3; S. C. Res. 
667 (1990) of "t6 September 1990 pares 1,3,4. Texts in Lauterpacht & others (eds. ), pp. 90, 
92-3. 
116 L. N. O. J. 1931, p. 2280. 117 U. N. Monthly Chronicle, Jan. 1984, vol. xxi, No 1, p. 77. 
118 Letter dated 15 November 1983 from Mr. R. Denktas 
- 
the leader of the Turkish- 
Cypriot community 
- 
appended to the letter dated 15 November 1983 from the 
representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General, Doc. S/ 16148, S. C. O. R. 38th yr. Suppl. 
Oct-Dec. 1983, p. 91. 
119 See U. N. Monthly Chronicle, Jan. 1984, vol. xxi, No 1, p. 78. 
194 
within a situation which constitutes the direct result of the use of force, 
namely, a state of military occupation which in itself is inherently forcible 
as we11120. 
The "birth" of Manchukuo provided the factual basis for the 
initiation and development of the duty of non-recognition by relying on 
the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Pact of Paris both of which 
have a direct bearing on the regulation of the use of force by States121 
. 
The "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" was proclaimed on 15 
November 1983. At the time of the declaration of independence the 
territory of the new "State", namely, the northern part of the Republic of 
Cyprus 
- 
independent State and Member of the United Nations since 1960 
- 
was occupied by the Turkish armed forces which intervened in Cyprus on 
21) July 1974 under Article IN" of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee sighed 
between Cyprus on the one hand and Greece, Turkey and the United 
Kingdom on the other122 
. 
The proclamation of the "Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus was met with universal condemnation on the part the 
international community, i-vith the exception of Turkey which has been 
the only State that recogn_i7ed the new entity. During the Security Council 
debate on the situation the representative of Guyana123 considered the act 
of the Turkish Cypriot community as "an attempt to consolidate and give 
legitimacy to a situation created by invasion and occupation"124 
. 
Finally, 
S. C. Resolution 541 (1983) of 18 November 1983 called expressly for the 
non-recognition of the Turkish-Cypriot State-12 
. 
Moreover, the ten 
Member States of the F. F. ('. in a common statement issued in Athens on 
16 November 1983 strongly deplored 
the establishment of the Turkish Cypriot State and called for its non- 
recognition 26 
. 
Furthermore, the continuing sovereignty of the 
Government of the Republic of Cyprus over the entirety of the territory of 
120 Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, 7979, p. 107. 
121 See Brownlie, p. 413 n. 7. 
122 See infa Part Three 
, 
Ch. 12, Second Title. 
1 Loc. cit. srupra n. 119, p. 77. 
124 For similar statements see ibid. pp. 76 (Greece), 77 (France), 78 (The Netherlands), 79 
(U. K. ), (Zimbabwe). 
125 Voting 13: 1(Pakistan): 1 abstention (Jordan). Text in Resolutions and Decisions of the 
Security Council 1963, S. C. O. R. 38th yr., p. 15. 'See Crawford op, cit. supra n. 120, p. 118 n. 
157; Brownhe, The United Nations Charter and the Use of Force, 1945-1985, in Cassese 
(ed. ), The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force, 1986, p. 491, at p. 492. Contra 
. Necatigil, The Ci1prii Question and the Turkish Position in International Line, 1988, pp. 
285-6. 
121 Appended to the letter dated 16 November 1983 from the representative of Greece to 
the President of the Security Council, Doc. S/ 16155, S. C. O. R. 38th yr. Suppl. for Oct. 
-Dec. 
1983, p. 99. Also see letters from the representatives of France (S/ 16153), ibid. p. 98; 
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the State has been implicitly affirmed by two decisions of the European 
Commission of Human Right (ECHR) concerning the admissibility of 
respective application. -, of the Republic of Cyprus v. Turkey in 1975 and 
1978. The FCHR rejected the argument invoked by Turkey that it «gas not 
competent to deal with the applications on the grounds of non- 
applicability of Article I of the European Convention of Human Rights 
. 
The respondent claimed that the requirement of ratione loci was lacking 
due to the fact that Northern Cyprus had not been annexed by Turkey and 
that the only competent authority therein was the so-called "Turkish 
Federated State of Cyprus" which was proclaimed in 1975. In rejecting the 
above argument the ECHR implicitly relied upon the fact that Turkey's 
position in Cyprus was that of a belligerent occupant administering the 
territory under occupation127 
. 
The duty of non-recognition of forcible territorial change has 
become the object of severe criticism with regard to both its legal basis and 
its effectiveness as a means of respect for the law ever since its enunciation 
in 1932-1'' 
. 
What, mores. >ver, is rather problematic with regard to the 
practice of non-recognition is the fact that certain decisions of English 
Courts pertaining to acts of entities which are 
not recognised by the U. K. Government seebi to be completely at variance 
with the policies of the executive129 
. 
It is very doubtful, how-wwever, that 
those judicial pronouncement-, are of any conclusive value with regard to 
the recognition of forcible territorial changes on the international plane, 
which constitute- the prerogative of the executive130 
. 
Moreover, what 
Nicaragua (S/ 16158), p. 101; Sierra-Leone (S/ 16162), p. 103; Hungary (S/ 16165), p. 105; 
Bulgaria (S/ 16170), p. 109; Mongolia (S/ 16172), p. 110; Viet-Nam (S/ 16174), p. 111; 
Portugal (S/16175) and Jamaica (S/16183), p. 115 
1, Cyprus v. Turkey, E. C. H. R. D. R. vol. 2, December 1975, p. 137 para 10, and vol. 13, July 
1978, pp. 148,150, paras 18,24. 
1's See Fischer-Williams, The New Doctrine of "Recognition", 18 Clot. Soc. Proceedings 
709 (7932); id. 4 H. R. C. 20, ', (793-3 [1), p. 281; j. 8. Moore, Fifty Years of International Law, 
50 Hal z'. L. R. 393 1937), p. 436; McNair, The Stinson Doctrine of Non-Recognition, 14 
13.1". 11.65 (1933), pp. 71-74; Briggs, Non-Recognition of the Title by Conquest and 
Limitations of the Doctrine, A. S. I. L. Proceedings 72 (1940); Rousseau, Droit Internatiolial 
Public, vol. iii, 7977, p. 526; Kelsen, Principles of International Law, 2nd ed. tn/ Tucker, 1967, 
pp. 420-433. Cf. Blix, Contemporary Aspects of Recognition, 130 H. R. C. 593 (1970 11), pp. 
664-5; Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, 1988, pp. 160-1. 
129 See Carl Zeis-. Stiftung v. Rayner and Keeler Ltd. [1967] A. C. 853; Hesperides Hotels 
Ltd. and another i). Aegean Turkish 1-Holidays Ltd. and another (per Lord Denning ), 119781 1 
All E. R. 283, e-f; G. U. R. Corporation v. The Trust bank of Africa Ltd. [19861 3 W. L. R. 583. 
Contra 
. 
Me Arantzazu Mendi (per Lord Atkin ), [1939] A. C. 256,264. Also see Mann, 
Further Studies in lnternutiuruºl Lino, 1990, pp. 386-8. 
130 13rownlie, Principles of Public international Law, 4t11 ed. 1990 
, 
p. 99. 
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seems to be at issue before national courts are private claims arising out of 
"acts of every-day occurrence" or "perfunctory acts of administration" 131 
by contrast, the question in the present context is that of the legality of an 
entity that is not to be assessed on the basis of "the interest of justice and 
commonsence"132 with regard to a specific private claim but rather on the 
basis of international law. It is the prohibition of the use of force as an 
illegality per se that gives rise to the duty of non-recognition and the latter 
has precisely the position of a statement of illegality which is unaffected by 
any practical necessities of private law133 
. 
The duty not to resort to force is 
a duty binding on States under customary International law and in 
upholding this, with regard to the attitude of the United States in 
particular, the 
International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua Case referred to Article 
11 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 
which expressly stipulates the non-recognition of forcible territorial 
changes, as evidence of opinio juris of the customary law prohibition of 
the use of force] 34 
. 
It may, therefore, be submitted that non-recognition of 
territorial changes by force is an inherent part of the illegality of the use of 
force135. Consequently, the above indicates that non-recognition does not 
have the place of sanction, namely, a punitive act as the result of the prior 
illegality of the use of force, although prima facie and according to some 
jurists1 36 it seems to function as such. The repeatedly stated 
inadmissibility of acquisition of of territory by force in statements of 
representatives of States, numerous Resolutions of the United Nations 
organs and in treaty practice point to the fact that the prohibition of 
forcible acquisition of territory is unlawful ab initio due to the 
proscription of the use of force and therefore non-recognition derives 
from and constitutes the external 
manifestation of the above illegality on the part of the international 
community in respect to territorial changes created by force137. As 
131 Carl Zeiss Case supra n. 129. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Lauterpacht op. cit. supra n. 86, p. 433; Waldock, 81 H. R. C. 455 (1952 II), p. 482; 
Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 9, pp. 419-422; 0' Connell, International Law, 2nd ed. 
, 
1970, p. 
147; Crawford op. cit. supra n. 120, p. 127. 
134 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, p. 100, para 189. Moreover, the Court held that the principle of 
non-use of force constituted a rule of jus cogens ; ibid. pp. 100-101, para 190. Also see Dugard, 
Recognition and the United Nations, 1987, pp. 132 et seq., 143-5,154-6. 
135 See Brownlie loc. cit. in Cassese (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 125. 
136 Rousseau op. cit. sup a n. 128. 
137 Lauterpacht op. cit. supra n. 86, pp. 413,421. 
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Lauterpacht138 points out the significance of non-recognition lies in " 
... 
the maintenance of the authority of the law 
... 
" and in the fact that it 
constitutes " 
... 
the minimum of resistance which an insufficiently 
organised but law-abiding community offer-, to illegality 
... 
". 
Furthermore, the forcible acquisition of territory is and must be 
unqualified with regard to the lawfulness or not of the use of force. With 
regard to the latter Jenningsl39 very rightly suggested that "... it ýti ould be a 
curious law of self-defence that permitted the defender in the course of his 
defence to seize and keep the resources and territory of the attacker 
... 
"; the 
above submission seems to be supported by the practice of States- viz. the 
universal condemnation of the Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights. 
Moreover, the universal nein-recognition of the "Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus" has been consistently maintained and linked directly 
with the presence of the Turkish army of occupation despite the claim 
argued by Turkey of the lawfulness of the presence of her armed force-, in 
Cyprus under Article IN' of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and the right of 
self-defencel40 
. 
6. Conclusion 
The position of customary international law with regard to the 
territorial aspect of the use of force between States indicates the following 
conclusions. 
First, conquest as a means of acquisition of title to territory has 
ceased to be part of International law. 
Secondly, the phrase in Article 2(4) of the Charter with regard to the 
territorial integrity and political independence of States must be read as a 
xvhole, namely, that the prohibition of the use of force refers to the 
territorial sovereignty of a State, namely, both the physical element of 
land, maritime and air territory and the political competence of the Sate 
therein. Consequently, force is prohibited not only in the sense of the 
acquisition of territory but in violation of the boundaries of States as well. 
Thirdly, the prohibition of the use of force has been extended to 
apply in the case of demarcation lines. Without attributing a character of 
138 Ibid. pp. 430-1. 
139 Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law, 1963, p. 55. Contra 
. 
Stone, 
Israel and Palestine; Assault on the Lau, of Nations, 1,981, p. 46; id. Conflict Through 
Consensus, 1977, p. 58; M. Halberstam, Recognition, Use of Force and the Effect of United 
Nations Resolutions under the Revised Statement of the Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States, 19 Israel L. R. 495 (1984), p. 502 et seq.; Blum loc. cit. supra n. 55. 
140 See U. N. Monthly Chronicle, Jan. 1984, vol. xxi, No 1, pp. -7-7 
-79. 
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permanence to such line. -, with reference to the question of the best title 
over disputed territory, the law seems to assimilate them with the concept 
of boundaries for the purposes of the rule of the non-use of force only. 
Moreover, this development incurs the advantage of establishing the 
illegalityv of resort to force by dispensing with the need to examine the 
merits of a territorial dispute particularly with respect to claims of exercise 
of peaceful authority ä titre de souverain in the territory under dispute. 
Fourthly, lawful resort to force in self-defence or by way of counter- 
measures may involve the violation of boundaries or demarcation lines 
or even the occupation of part of the territory of the State against which 
such action is taken; however, such forcible violation or military 
occupation of territory must be strictly confined within the necessity and 
proportionality of self-defence and counter- measures and must be 
terminated when such necessity ceases to exist141 
. 
By contrast, the 
lawfulness of resort to force is not under any circumstances whatever to 
serve as the basis for the acquisition of territory. 
Finally, the gradual evolution of the rule of the inadmissibility of 
force in international relations and the correlating illegality of conquest 
prompted the development of a duty of non-recognition of forcible 
territorial change which has the position of a statement of illegality on the 
part of the international community towards such change, not by way of 
sanction but as the external manifestation of the illegality which derives 
from and is identical with the legal character of the act of which it 
constitute-, the offspring, namely, the use of armed force. 
141 See infra Part Two 
, 
Ch. 9, First Title. 
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PART TWO 
THE RIGHT OF DEFENSIVE ACTION AS THE ONLY UNIVERSALLY 
ADMITTED EXCEPTION TO THE RULE OF NON-USE OF FORCE. 
CHAPTER 8 
THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF SELF-DEFENCE 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. 
1. The State of the Law prior to the League of Nations 
. 
In Hall the following passage occurs: 
"... In the last resort almost the whole of the duties of states are 
subordinated to the right of self-preservation. Where law affords 
inadequate protection to the individual he must be permitted, if his 
existence is in question, to protect himself by whatever means may be 
necessary; and it would be difficult to say that any act not inconsistent with 
the nature of a moral being is forbidden, so soon as it can be proved that by 
it, and it only,, self-preservation can be secured. But the right in this form 
is rather a governing condition, subject to which all rights and duties exist, 
than a source of specific rules, and properly perhaps it cannot operate in 
the latter capacity at all. It works by suspending the obligation to act in 
obedience to other principles. If such suspension is necessary for 
existence, the general right is enough; if it is not strictly necessary, the 
occasion is hardly one of self-preservation 
... 
"l 
The right of self-preservation, which constituted the stereotyped 
justification for resort to force in the period under discussion, includes 
traces of natural law as well as analogies from domestic law. It was broad 
enough to include the concept of self-defence, and it meant a general right 
of protection against "... external danger and hostility 
... 
"2. 
Cicero wrote about self-defence that "Est haec non scripta sed nata 
lex "3 
, 
and Gaius wrote that "Adversus periculum naturalis ratio 
1 Hall, International Law, 8th ed. by P. Higgins, 1924, p. 322. 
2 See Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, 
1953, pp. 31,69 et seq. 
3 Cicero, Pro Milone, IV, quoted in Giraud loc. cit. infra n. 11, p. 706. 
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perrmmettit see defenrdcre "4 
. 
Moreover, Grotius took the view that the "right 
of self-defence..... has its origin directly and chiefly in the fact that nature 
commits to each his own protection"5 
. 
Vattel wrote that "... la Nature 
donne aux lhommes le droit d' user de force, quand cela est necessaire, 
pour leur defense et pour la conservation de leurs droits"'' ; he also made a 
reference to "le. s justes bornes, que la Nature a miser ä un droit accorde 
seulement par la necessite"7 
. 
Lastly he observed: " C' est en vain que la 
Nature prescrit aux Nations comme aux particuliers le spin de se 
conserver, celui d' avaincer leur propre perfection et celle de leur etat, si 
eile ne leur donne pas le droit de se guarantir de tout ce qui peut reindre ce 
meme coin inutile"`` 
. 
The right of self-preservation was maintained by several authors of 
the 19th century 
. 
Thus Klüber took the view that self-preservation was 
one of the "droit absolus des Etats"9 
. 
Wheatun1° equated the exercise of 
the right of self-preservation with the raison d' 'tat, that is the interests of 
States conceived without any effort of accommodating the interests of 
other States l1. Rivier argued that when a conflict arose between the right 
of self-preservation of a State and the duty of that State to respect the right 
of another the right of self-preservationn overrode the duty and he 
summarized his position in the phrase prilni. tm vviz'ere -12 
Westlake took a different view and regarded self-defence as an application 
of the right of self-preservation in case of actual or apprehended attack, the 
latter, howover, being widely defined13 
. 
Furthermore, Fenwick-14 argued 
that the rights of self-defence and self-preservation derived from a 
fundamental right of existence. 
'Ehe right of self-preservation was, very closely connected, indeed 
so metinies it was identical, with the very broad concept of necessity which 
was applicable whenever action was deemed necessary for the security or 
Gaius, Fr. pare 1 ad Legern Agifilimn Dig., quoted in ibid. 
Quoted in Bowen, e [)ejýkap e in Jnferuational Law, 7 9,58, p. 4. 
6 Vattel, Le Droit des Gens, B III, Ch. J, para 3. 
7 Ibid. 
8 \'attel op. cit. ; itpr,, a X1.120, F nk fl, Ch. v7i, para 49. 
9 Klüber, Le Droit dc Gciizý, 1631, vol. i, paras 36-44. 
10 Wheaton, Element- of International Law, 1866, part ii, Ch. 1, para 61, in The Clu5-icý of 
Iliterm7tw, ial Law, 1936, No 19. 
11 Giraud, La Theorie de la legitime Defense, 49 H. R. C. 697 (7934 111), p. 723- 
12 Rivier, Principcs tic, Dwit de' Geri, 1896, vol. i, para 20. 
13 %\ estlake, Internatioiuil Law, vol. i, 1904, p. 299; see also International Alilitary 
Tribunal of the far Last, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Pal, 7956, p. 43. 
14 Fenwick, International Law, 2nd cd. 79.34, p. 146. 
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safety of the State. Moreover, as the State taking such action was 
considered to be the sole judge of the situation, necessity usually appeared 
as the expression of the concept of the raison d' Etat. Furthermore, the 
action which was instigated by necessity could involve the infringement 
of the rights of a third State in so far this was 
necessary for the protection of the rights of the State resorting to force 
against the deliquent State15. 
Thus there was no clear distinction between self-defence on one 
hand and self-preservation and necessity on the other in the period prior 
to the League of Nations and they seemed to have been regarded as 
identical by both theory and the practice of States. With regard to the latter, 
the so-called right of Hot Pursuit on land is a pertinent illustration. It 
involved the invasion of the territory of a State in pursuit of insurgent or 
marauding bands under the presumption of the inadequacy of the 
invaded State to secure to its neighbour respect for its territorial 
sovereignty and it was mainly based on necessity. The practice of the 
U. S. A. contains many illustrations such as, the invasion of West Florida 
in 1818 in pursuit of marauding Indians; the Amelia island case in the 
same year; the invasion of Mexican territory in pursuit of marauding 
Indians in 1836 and the invasion of Mexico by General Pershing in pursuit 
of Mexican insurgents who had committed acts of force in U. S. territory in 
191616. According to Westlake this "right" was justified by analogy with 
the principle of abuse of rights; however, the assertion of such a right of 
hot pursuit was derived from a limited number of cases in which the 
invaded State found itself at a disadvantage to resist the invasion and in 
no case did it admit the right of incursion17. In addition, the analogy with 
the right of Hot Pursuit on the High Seas was inexact since it could never 
involve the violation of another State's territory. Lastly, and this is more 
important, the action of the pursuing State seemed to have the character 
of reprisals rather than self-defence18 
. 
An attempt to restrict the use of force in self-defence to cases of 
direct and immediate danger arose out of the Caroline Incident 
. 
The 
steamboat Caroline that was allegedly transporting weapons and men to 
Canada during an insurgency was sunk by the British army in U. S. 
15 Bowett op. cit. supra n. 5, p. 10. 
16 Moore, Digest of International Law, vol. ii, p. 402 et seq. ; Brownlie, International Lain 
and the Use of Force by States, 1963 
, 
p. 37. 
17 Bowett op. cit. supra n. 5, pp. 39-40. 
18 Ibid. p. 40. 
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territory in December 1837. The destruction of the vessel was justified in a 
letter by the British Ambassador in Washington to the American Secretary 
of State: "The piratical character of the steamboat Caroline and the 
necessity of self-defence and self-preservation, under which Her Majesty's 
subjects acted in destroying that vessel would seem to be sufficiently 
established"19 
In a letter dated April 24,1842 the U. S. Secretary of State, Webster, 
required the British Government to show: 
"... necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming leaving no choice 
of means and no moment of deliberation........... the act justified by the 
necessity of self-defence must be limited by that necessity and kept clearly 
within it 
... 
"20 
. 
The formula stated by Webster Evas not disputed in the reply of the 
British Government21 and has been proved a valuable precedent as to the 
limits of the use of force in self-defence after the conclusion of the Pact of 
Paris and especially after the introduction of the United Nations Charter. 
But for the period under consideration it cannot be said that Webster's 
formula was a conclusive statement of the law with regard to resort to 
force in self-defence. War was absolutely permissible under International 
law while self-defence was considered either as identical with self- 
preservation or as a particular instance of it 
. 
Webster spoke of "a just right 
of self-defence [that] attaches always to nations as well as to individuals 
and is equally necessary for the preservation of both22. The Law Officers 
of the Crown dealing with the case spoke of self-preservation 
, 
the British 
Ambassador in Washington, Fox 
, 
wrote about the necessity of self- 
preservation in 1837 when the incident occurred23 and it is by no means 
clear that he had a sharp distinction between the two in mind or that self- 
defence could have been deemed to stand as an autonomous legal concept 
which had the character of qualifying a general prohibiting rule. Indeed, 
19 Jennings, The Caroline and MacLeod Cases, 32 A. I. I. L. 82 (1938), p. 85. 
20 Ibid. p. 89 
21 Ibid. pp. 89-91. 
22 Ibid. p. 91. 
23 Ibid. 
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there was no such thing as a general prohibiting rule that needed 
qualification and the practice of States was clear on this point24. 
The exercise of forcible reprisals illustrates the fact that the main 
preoccupation of Governments during this period was to avoid to the 
greatest extent possible the moral, political and legal implications of war in 
the legal sense, and it is worth observing that the state of war doctrine was 
developed to serve precisely the above concern. Moreover, a Government 
did not have to take great pains to justify its resort to armed force against 
another State. Giraud argued very correctly that if the question of self- 
defence narrowly lay with the question of the lawfulness of war then 
-in 
the period under discussion-there would be a major contradiction in 
terms, in that self-defence would operate only when an attack was 
unlawful; furthermore, he argued that so 
long as war was a prerogative of the State self-defence did not have to be 
invoked in order to justify it25 
. 
Moreover, the overwhelming majority of the authors of this period 
placed the Caroline incident under the rubric of self-preservation26 
. 
Consequently, the principles of the use of force in self-defence that were 
formulated by Webster must be confined to the specifc case and they did 
not, and could not, have any significance to the state of law in general 
until the advent of the League of Nations 
. 
2. The Right of Self 
- 
Defence tinder the Covenant of the League of 
Nations and the Pact of Paris 
. 
The Covenant itself contained no definition of, and in fact it did not 
mention the right of self-defence at all. This of course does not imply that 
there have been any doubts with regard to the existence of such right in 
International law. As Giraud wrote, the real doubt did not lie with the 
theoretical basis of self 
- 
defence but with the application of the right in the 
specific situations where the right of self-defence was deemed to arise27. 
In the Graeco 
-- 
Bulgarian dispute (1925), Greece justified the 
invasion of the Bulgarian territory before the Council of the League as an 
act of legitimate defence not prohibited by the Covenant. The Council did 
24 See Infra p. 
25 Loc. cit. supra n. 11 
, 
pp. 672,712. 
26 See references in Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 16, p. 43 n. 5. 
27 Giraud loc. cit. supra n. 11, p. 716. 
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not deny this contention and it only pointed out the danger of abuse of 
action labelled as self-defence and suggested that states should use the 
machinery of the League for the settlement of their disputes for the sake of 
international peace28. In the Chaco dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay 
the Council of the League admitted the right to take "military measures of 
defensive character-29. 
The Abortive Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance of 1923 made no 
provision for the right of self 
- 
defence while the Geneva Protocol of 1924 
provided in Article 2 for "resistance to acts of aggression". The latter 
stipulation is elucidated by the Report to the Assembly of the League by 
Politis and Benes where it was stated that "Le droit de legitime defense 
demeure respecte comme il doit 1' etre. L' Etat attaque conserve entiere la 
liberte de resister de toute ses forces aux actes d' agression dont il serait 
victime 
..... 
il peut et doit commencer pour se defendre par ses propres 
moyens"30. 
The right of self-defence was expressly reserved in Article 2(1) of the 
Locarno Treaties but instant unilateral resort to force thereunder seemed 
to have been possible only in case of a flagrant breach of Article 2 or the 
demilitarization provisions of Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of 
Versailles, due to the provision in Article 4(1) whereby every alleged 
violation of the above stipulations was to be brought before the Council of 
the League of Nations. The Treaties of Locarno were, however, marred by 
the vague concept of provocation which cor}stituted a qualification of the 
right to resort to force in self-defence provided in Article 2(1). It has been 
suggested that provocation could consist of the conduct of doluti 
inanzoeuuttreti 
, 
of the mounting of an attack or of the policy of the attacked 
state31 
, 
but such general submissions entail the broadening of the concept 
of self-defence to the point of substituting the rule by the exception and of 
creating great opportunities for abuse, detrimental to international peace. 
In fact it was not until the conclusion of the Pact of Paris that the 
right of self-defence loomed as a juridical concept constituting an 
exception to a general prohibiting rule of law. This is, moreover, 
strengthened by the fact that in the diplomatic correspondence that 
preceded the conclusion of the Pact the signatories seemed to have 
admitted that the right of self-defence would be the only instance of 
28 L. N. O. J. 1925 11, p. 1709; Bowett op. cit. supra n. 5, p. 130. 
29 L. N. O. J. 1929, pp. 72-3. 
30 Quotation in Bowett op. cit. supra n. 5, p. 126. 
31 Giraud loc. cit. supra n. 11, pp. 756-9. 
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unilateral resort to force on their part. The right of self-defence was, 
however, not expressly mentioned in the text of the Pact of Paris as it had 
been initially proposed in the French draft. Instead the U. S. Secretary of 
State, Mr Kellogg, in his Note of June 23rd, 1928 stated that: 
" There is nothing in the American Draft of an anti-war treaty 
which restricts or impairs in any way the right of self 
- 
defence. That right 
is inherent in every sovereign state and is implicit in every treaty. Every 
nation is free at all times and regardless of treaty provisions to defend its 
territory from attack or invasion and it alone is competent to decide 
whether circumstances require recourse to war in self 
- 
defence". 
This course of action, that is of keeping such vital a proviso out of 
the text of the Treaty, was criticized as amounting to the deception of 
public opinion32. Moreover self-defence was not defined at all in the 
various Government declarations prior to the conclusion of the Pact with 
the exception of the French Draft where self-defence was understood " 
... 
dans le cadre des traites existants, notamment lorsque ceux-ci la violation 
de certain de leurs dispositions ä une acte hostile"33 
. 
Furthermore, the 
lack of definition of self-defence was pointed out as unsatisfactory34 and 
the issue that consequently arose was twofold, namely, what the content of 
the right self-defence was and who was to judge whether a situation gave 
rise to action in self-defence. We propose to discuss the latter first. 
Mr. Kellogg maintained in his Note of June 23rd, 1928 that every 
state alone was competent to decide whethet circumstances required resort 
to war in self-defence. Did this imply that states were also competent to 
determine with conclusive finality the lawfulness of their action ? The 
problem may be approached under two angles: The first envisages the 
exercise of the right of self-defence according to the requirements of good 
faith35 
. 
The concept is wide enough to entail a completely subjective 
determination of the situations giving rise to the use of force in self- 
defence and it seems to refer to a limitless right the exercise of which is not 
32 See Wehberg, The Dedtlatu of War, 1931, p. 75; cf 
. 
Q. Wright, The Meaning of the Pact 
of Paris, 27 A. J. I. L. 39 (1933 
, 
(quotation of Mr. Stimson). 
33 Mandeistam, L' Interpretation du Pacte Briand-Kellogg par les gouvernements 
signataires et les parlements des Etats signataires, 41 R. G. D. I. P. 537 (1933), p. 556. 
34 Colombos, The Paris Pact, otherwise called the Kellogg Pact, 14 Grot. Soc. Proc. 87 (1928) 
Brierly, 58 H. R. C. 5 (1936 IV), p. 130; Shotwell, War as an Instrument of National Policy, 
1929, p. 211; Lauterpacht, The Pact of Paris and the Budapest Articles of Interpretation, 20 
Grot. Soc. Proc. 178 (1934) ; 23 A. S. I. L. Proc. 1929, pp. 88-109 ; de Brouckere, La Prevention 
de la Guerre, 50 H. R. C. 5 (1934 IV), p. 32. 
35 Diss. Opinion of Judge Pal, loc. cit. supra n. 13, p. 46. 
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framed within a minimum of objective legal requirements. Indeed it can 
go as far as equating self-defence with self-preservation, but the latter, as it 
has very correctly been pointed out, was incompatible with Article II of the 
Pact of Paris inasmuch as it implied the settlement of disputes by non- 
peaceful means. Moreover, in view of the fact that Article 1 of the Pact 
seemed to eliminate self-help the good faith approach is rendered rather 
unsatisfactory 36 
. 
The second approach is in terms of interpretation of treaties and 
more specifically of the principle of effectiveness. If Mr. Kellogg's 
statement was to be interpreted as every state being the sole judge in its 
own case then the Pact would have been deprived of its legal character and 
the provision in Article I would become completely illusory. Due to the 
fact that the right of self-defence was directly connected with the text of the 
Treaty and more specifically with the interpretation of the latter and as 
long as the interpretation of treaties is according to the Tunis 
- 
Morocco 
Nationality Decrees Advisory Opinion a question of international law 
suitable for adjudication37 
, 
then the justiciability of the question of self- 
defence is not to be disputed. 
The opposite position was advocated by Defence Counsel in the 
course of the Nuremberg proceedings. Dr. Jahrreiss, Counsel for defendant 
Jodi, stated with regard to Mr. Kellogg's Note: 
" 
... 
War of self-defence is permitted as an unalienable right of all 
States; without this right, sovereignty does riot exist; and every State is 
alone judge whether in a given case it is waging a war of self-defence. 
No State in this world was ready to accept foreign jurisdiction 
concerning the question of whether its decisions on ultimate questions of 
existence were justified or not. 
... 
-38 
36 Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 16, p. 240. 
37 P. C. I. J. Series B, No 4, p. 7, at p. 30. 
38 See The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Proceedings of the International Military 
Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany, Part 18, H. M. S. O. 1948, p. 86. 
A similar, but not identical, position was asserted by the U. S. A. in the proceedings 
on Jurisdidction and Admissibility in the Nicaragua Case 
. 
The U. S. A. did not expressly 
deny the justiciability of claims of self-defence. Instead, it sought to assert the 
inadmissibility of the Nicaraguan application instituting proceedings on the basis of 
exclusive competence of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the U. N. Charter to deal 
with questions of use of armed force within the United Nations framework. The Court 
rejected the U. S. contention on the following grounds: (1) Nicaragua's application to the 
Court fell within Chapter VI and not Chapter VII of the Charter. The latter would have 
been the case had the U. S. A. given notification to the Council in accordance with Ch. VII 
"... so that the issue could be tabled for full discussion before a decision were taken for the 
necessary enforcement measures to be authorised 
... 
". (2) The S. C. had primary and not 
exclusive responsibility to deal with matters of maintenance of international peace. The 
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The above view is not only pertinent to considerations of treaty 
interpretation but to the position in customary international law. Mr. 
Kellogg's Note referred to self-defence as being "inherent in every 
sovereign State" 
. 
Dr. Jahrreiss laid a great deal of emphasis on the subject 
of sovereignty in the sense of the lack of any superior authority over 
individual States, and supported his argument by illustratively referring 
to the Kellogg Note. The Defence Counsel's argument was rebutted by Sir 
H. Shawcross, the Prosecutor for the U. K. : 
" 
... 
Neither the Pact of Paris nor any other treaty was intended to 
- 
or could 
- 
take away the right of self-defence. Nor did it deprive its 
signatories of the right to determine, in the first instance, whether there 
was danger in delay and whether immediate action to defend themselves 
was imperative; and that only is the meaning of the express proviso that 
each State judges whether action in self-defence is necessary. But that does 
not mean that the State thus acting is is the ultimate and only judge of the 
propriety and of the legality of its conduct. It acts at its peril. Just as the 
individual is answerable for the exercise of his common law right of self- 
defence, so the State is answerable if it abuses its discretion, if it transforms 
"self-defence" into an instrument of conquest and lawlessness 
... 
The 
ultimate decision as to the lawfulness of action claimed to be taken in self- 
defence does not he with the State concerned, and for that reason, the right 
of self-defence, whether expressly reserved or implied, does not impair the 
capacity of a treaty to create legal obligations against war 
... 
"39 
The matter was conclusively settled i! the Judgment of the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg which held that: " 
... 
whether action taken under the claim of self-defence was in fact aggressive 
or defensive must ultimately be subject to investigation and adjudication 
delineation of competence to deal with such issues that is provided in Article 24 of the 
Charter applies only to the U. N. General Assembly and not to the Court_ The latter could 
exercise its judicial functions separately and complementarily to the Council's political 
functions. (3) The right of self-defence is a legal right and as such is subject to adjudication. 
See I. C. J. Rep. 1984 p. 393, at pp. 432-436, paras 91,93-95,98. The U. S. argument has been 
treated as amounting, in effect, to the position taken by Dr. Jahrreiss in Nuremberg because 
of the fact that the U. S. has the right of veto in the Security Council. This has the 
practicle consequence that the purported competence of the Council as the sole forum for the 
consideration of issues of use of force cannot function if there is a finding contrary to the U. S. 
political interests. See Kahn, From Nuremberg to the Hague: The U. S. Position in 
Nicaragua zv. United States and the Development of International Law, 12 Yale J. I. L. 1 
(1987), pp. 12-17. 
39 See The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Proceedings of the International Military 
Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany, Part 22, H. M. S. O. 1949, p. 425. 
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if International law is ever to be enforced 
... 
"40 
, 
and this does not seem to 
contradict the argument of the Counsel for the U. K. that what the Pact of 
Paris did according to Mr. Kellogg's Note, was that it gave its signatories 
the right to determine in the first instance only whether there was any 
danger in delay and whether immediate action to defend themselves was 
imperative41 
. 
During the period under discussion. the only precedent with 
regard to the content of the right of self-defence was the Webster formula 
which was stated in the diplomatic correspondence in the aftermath of the 
Caroline Incident 
. 
This was relied upon by the Nuremberg Tribunal when 
it discussed the German plea of anticipatory self-defence with regard to the 
invasion of Norway and Denmark42 
. 
The requirement of "instant and 
overwhelming necessity for self-defence, leaving no choice of means and 
no moment of deliberation" indicates only one aspect of the question of 
the use of force in self-defence, namely, a purely theoretical one from the 
point of view of international law; however, action in self-defence is 
largely a question of fact as well, that is a question of which situations 
would present a case of an instant and has deen debated until nowadays43 
. 
The best way to deal with the problem is to refer to some instances of the 
State and League of Nations practice. 
In the Manchurian conflict between China and Japan in 1931 the 
latter justified its resort to force as action taken in self-defence and for the 
protection of the life and property of the Japanese nationals living in 
Manchuria. At the outset of the dispute the Council of the League 
embarked on a course of action similar to the one it had taken in the 
Graeco-Bulgarian dispute, namely, the achievement of cessation of 
hostilities, withdrawal of troops and prevention of the aggravation of the 
situation, and it did not deal with the merits of the Japanese plea. It was 
not so with the parties to the dispute. Japan justified its action as having 
40 In Re Goering et al., 13 I. L. R. 210 (1946); The Trial of Ger"mmn Major War Cnrninals, 
Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany, Part 22, 
H. M. S. O. 1950, p. 436; also see In Re 1-lirota et al. 
, 
16 I. L. R. 
, 
359 (1949). 
41 Oppenheim, International law, vol. ii, 7th ed. by Lauterpacht, 1952, pp. 177-197; 
Bowett op. cit. siqna n. 5, pp, 140-1; Giraud loc. cit. supra n. 11, p. 801; Lauterpacht, 20 
Grot. Soc. Proc. 178 (1934) ; Brierty, 58 F-A_R. C. 5 (1936 IV), pp. 130-1; id_ Some Implications 
of the Pact of Paris, 10 B. Y. I. L. 208 (1929); de Brouckere, 50 H. R. C. 5 (1934 IV), p. 35; Q. 
Wright, 27 A. I. I. L. 39 (7933) ; Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual 
States in International Law, 81 H. R. C. 455 (1952 11), p. 478; Mandelstam, 40 R. G. D. I. P. 531- 
(7933), p. 603. Cf. Wehberg op. cit. supra n. 32 pp. 100-3. He took the view that defensive 
action was inadmissible without prior authorisation of the League Council. 
42 In Re Goering et al. 13 I. L. R. 210 (1946); loc. cit. supra n. 40, pp. 435,437. 
43 See infra Ch. 9, First Title. 
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been taken in self-defence by reference to past incidents, especially 
activities by the Chinese calculated to imperil the Japanese interests and 
endanger the Japanese rights in Manchuria based on international 
undertakings44 
. 
Moreover, Viscount Cecil observed that the Council of 
the League was not at that stage in possession of the facts necessary to form 
a conclusive opinion as to the dispute45 
. 
It was not until a year later (in 
1932) when the Report of the Lytton Commission of Enquiry was 
submitted to the Council of the League of Nations that the question of the 
Japanese plea of self-defence was discussed. The Lytton Report found that 
the Japanese military operations in Manchuria could not be regarded as 
measures of legitimate self-defence. This time the Japanese representative, 
in arguing against the Lytton Report before the Council of the League, 
justified the Japanese action by referring not only to the whole background 
of the Sino-Japanese relations but by relying on Mr. Kellogg's Note of June 
23rd, 1928 and the British reservation to the Pact as well46. That plea was 
finally rejected by the Assembly of the League of Nations which adopted 
verbatim the Lytton Report on Feb. 24,193347 
. 
Italy pleaded self-defence when she informed the Council of the 
League about the invasion of Ethiopia on Oct. 3rd, 1935. Moreover, on 
Sept. 4th, 1935 the Italian representative at the Council spoke of "vital 
interests", "primary importance to Italian security and civilisation" and 
finally the "liberty to adopt any measures that may become necessary to 
ensure the safety of its colonies and to safegtard its own interests-48 
. 
The 
Council of the League ignored the Italian plea of Oct. 3rd, 1935 because in 
this case the attack on Ethiopia took place in the course of a dispute 
between the two states' which originated in the Walwal incident of 
December 1934. Consequently under the Covenant and the Pact of Paris 
the settlement of the dispute should have been sought by pacific means 
only and any alleged Italian grievances should have been made from the 
very outset of the dispute. Instead, and despite an Arbitral award settling 
the dispute which arose from the Walwal frontier incident between the 
two countries, the Italian Government presented for the first time a 
detailed memorandum on September 4th, 1935 referring to what were 
supposed to be fundamental grievances against Ethiopia. 
44 L. N. O. J. 1931, p. 2267. 
45 Ibid. p. 2269. 
4' L. N. O. J. 1932, p. 1873-4. 
47 27 A. J. 1. L. Suppl. 119 (1933), p. 145. 
48 30 A. J. I. L. Suppl. 26 (1936). 
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In the Sino-Japanese dispute the issue of Japan'-, invocation of self- 
defence was complicated by the special position of this country in 
Manchuria due to concessions obtained therein by the peace treaty of 
Portsmouth terminating the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-54`' 
. 
However, 
the reliance of Japan on the entire background of the Sino-Japanese 
relations in justifying its action as self-defence rendered the necessity of 
the action destitute of being instant and overwhelming. The situation was 
more clear in the Italo-Ethiopian conflict where the background of the 
relations between the two states indicated that there was no necessity to act 
at all in view of the dispute having been brought before the League of 
Nations and submitted to arbitration. 
In both cases self-defence was equated with self-preservation, 
something which was inadmissible in view of Article II of the Pact of 
Paris. Moreover, the signatories thereto excepted unilateral use of force 
only in case of self-defence which implied that as an exception to the 
general prohibiting rule of Article I of the Pact, self-defence must have 
been understood to be restricted both with regard to the necessity giving 
rise to it and the intensity of the actual force to be used during its 
application50 
, 
and this is a fortiori supported by the fact that neither the 
Japanese nor the Italian pleas were admitted as compatible with the right 
of self-defence reserved under the Pact of Paris. 
The importance attached to the factual situations giving rise to the 
necessity of self-defence teas more co lspicuous in the attempts during the 
life of the League to formulate a universally' accepted definition of 
aggression which would constitute nothing else but a consideration of the 
problem from the side of the author of violence. The question of defining 
aggression acquired particular international significance in connection 
with the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance of 1923 but the final form of the 
text contained no definition of aggression. The Geneva Protocol of 1924 
considered as the aggressor the state that failed to comply with the 
obligations to employ the procedure of peaceful settlement of disputes 
provided thereby. Shotwell considered the Pact of Paris to define 
aggression and self-defence without a definition, the aggressor being the 
state that did not resort to peaceful means of settlement of disputes51 
. 
In 
1933 the Soviet Union submitted a detailed definition of aggression to the 
49 Northedge, The League of Nations, 1986 
, 
p. 138. 
50 Mandelstam, 40 R. G. D. I. P. 537 (793.3), p. 583 n. 93; cf. Bowett op. cit. supra n. 5, p. 135. 
51 Shotwell op. cit. supra n. 34, p. 207; Brierly seems to take the same view in 10 B. Y. I. L. 
208 (1.929) 
. 
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General Commission of the Disarmament Conference. The Soviet 
proposal was examined by the Committee on Security Question. -, of the 
General Commission with N. Politis as rapporteur and the Report of the 
Committee proposed a draft "Act Relating to the Definition of the 
Aggressor" which was finally rejected due to opposition by the U. K. and 
other states. 
Article I of the draft provided that: 
The state that was the first to commit any of the following acts 
against another state would be an aggressor: (1) Declaration of war; (2) Armed invasion; 
(3) Armed attack on the territory, naval or air forces of the other 
state. 
(4) Naval blockade; 
(5) Aid to armed bands which after having been formed in the 
territory of the aggressor state invade the territory of of another state or the 
aggressor refuses despite the demand of the invaded state to take all 
possible measures to deprive the armed bands of aid and protection52. 
Nevertheless, the above provisions, were included in the 
Conventions for the Definition of Aggression concluded between the 
Soviet Union and other states in 193353 
. 
The attempts to define aggression continued for a lengthy period of 
time during the period of the United Nations. The present author does, 
not propose to discuss the desirability of ac efinition of aggression. This 
writer only referred to the attempts made during the period of the League 
towards the achievement of a definition of aggression as all illustration of 
the importance attached to the factual aspect of self-defence with the view 
to restrict the application of the said right. 
2 (i) Some particular issues related to the right of self-defence 
. 
2. (i). a. The British reservation to the Pact of Paris 
. 
On May 19th, 1928 the British Government in its notification of 
participation to the Pact of Paris addressed to the U. S. Government, 
submitted the following reservation: 
52 The Politis Report modified the original Soviet proposals. See Brownlie op. Cit. supra n. 
16, p. 353 n. 5; Stone, Aggression and World Order, 1958, pp. 34-5; Giraud loc. cit. supra n. 
11, p. 771 et seq.; Waldock, 81 H. R. C. 455(1952 11), pp. 482-4. 
53 See Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 16, p. 359, Appendix to Ch. XIX. 
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"There are certain regions in the world the welfare of which constitutes a special and 
vital interest for our peace and safety.... Their protection against attack is to the British 
Empire a measure of self-defence" 
Furthermore, and despite the phrase "protection against attack" the 
reservation spoke of "interference" in cerain regions that could not be 
suffered. The wording of the reservation was quite vague and the 
situations of action contemplated thereby seemed to have been rather 
broad and subject to the ultimate determination of Great Britain54 
. 
The 
reservation was interpreted as referring to Egypt 
- 
and more particularly to 
the Suez Canal 
- 
only, or as being justified by the special situation of 
Britain as a state due to the existence of the British Empire55 
. 
By contrast, 
it was regarded as a violation of Article I of the Pact since it seemed to 
contemplate war as an instrument of national policy5E' 
. 
It has also been 
argued that the British reservation could be valid only insofar its scope 
was not larger than that of self-defence and that it did not intend to do 
more than to reserve the right of collective self-defences' 
. 
The 
reservation was expressly rebutted by the Soviet Union, Persia and Turkey. 
The problei-iis raised by the British reservation to the Pact of Paris are of 
theoretical value only due to the fact that it was never relied upon by 
Great Britain 
- 
not even in the intervention in Suez, in 1956 
- 
and the fact 
is that as long as Britain accepted to be bound by the Pact it would be 
inconceivable that her reservation was inconsistent with the object and 
purpose thereof because otherwise the rest cif the signatories would never 
have consented to it. This is, moreover, supported by the attitude of the 
signatorie' of the Pact of Paris, including Great Britain, in rejecting the 
Japanese plea-, of special interests in China and by the principles stated by 
the I. C. J. in its Advisory Opinion in the Reservations to the Genocide 
Convention 58 
. 
2. W. b. The Monroe Doctrine 
During the debate over the Pact cif Paris in the U. S. Senate and 
subsequently in the interpretative report submitted by Senator Borah it 
54 Brierly, 10 B. Y. I. L. 208 (1929), p. 209; Giraud loc. Cit. supra n. 11, p. 742. 
55 Shotwell op. cit. supra n. 34, p. 196; Descamps, 37 H. R. C. 399 (7930 1), pp. 483-4. 
56 Hunter-Miller, The Peace Pact of Pari., 192'8, p. 40 but cf 
. 
pp. 117-8. 
57 Waldock, 81 H. F. C. 455 (1952 I1), p. 477; cf 
. 
Bowett op. cit. supra n. 5, pp. 205-7,212 5 
The concept of coll. self-defence if being dealt with infra Ch. 10. 
58 I. C. J. Rep. 1951, p. 21, at pp. 23-5. 
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was asserted that under the right of self-defence allowed by the treaty, the 
Monroe doctrine had to be maintained in view of the fact that it was part 
of the U. S. system of National defence. However, the U. S. Government 
did not submit any special reservation or declaration with regard to the 
Monroe doctrine; as for the validity of the Borah report with regard to the 
other signatories of the Pact Prof. Borchard in his letter to Sen. Bingham 
made it clear that the said report would be binding only if it was 
communicated to the other parties59 
. 
Finally, the political character and 
the scope of the doctrine rendered it incompatible with the provisions of 
the Pact 60 
. 
59 See Mandelstam, 40 R. G. D. I. P. 537 (1933), pp.. 569,581. 
60Brownlie p. 2.46 Gira, u. d p. 741. The Monroe Doctrine (formulated in 1823 by U. S. President 
Monroe) was directed against any attempt by the European Powers to obtain territory in the 
Americas, either by way of conquest or by restoring the Spanish colonial Empire. The 
interpretation of the Doctrine rested solely with the Government of the U. S. and later in 
the 19th century as well as at the turn of this century the Doctrine was invoked to justify 
the U. S. expansion to the West and a series of interventions in Latin America. It is worth 
mentioning that the Monroe Doctrine was expressly reserved in Article 21 of the Covenant 
of the League. The U. S. A. eventually did not become a Member of the League and the 
importance of this provision was greatly diminished. For a critique of Article 21 and the 
Doctrine itself see Spencer, 30 A. I. 1. L. 400 (1936) 
. 
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CHAPTER 9 
THE RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL DEFENSIVE ACTION. 
First Title: THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE AGAINST AN "ARMED 
ATTACK". 
1. Introduction 
In its Judgment on the Merits of the Nicaragua Case I the 
International Court of justice has pointed that: 
The general rule prohibiting force allows for certain exceptions. In view of the 
arguments advanced by the United States to justify the acts of which it is accused by 
Nicaragua, the Court must express a view on the content of the right of self-defence, and 
more particularly the right of collective self-defence... 
Moreover, in the Addendum to the Eighth Report on State 
Responsibility2 
, 
Special Rapporteur Ago submitted that "... at the present 
time it is proper to regard self-defence as the form 
- 
or better, the only form 
- 
of armed self-protection that is still conceded to a State by the 
international law now in force 
... 
"3. Although Ago's submission may be 
regarded as extremely restricted (in view of the Court's dichotomy between 
self-defence against an armed attack and counter-measures against uses of 
force short of an armed at'tack4, the controve1sial issue of protection of 
nationals abroad and the problems arising from the use of force by the 
consent of the incumbent Government of a State), it is safe to submit that 
the overwhelming majority of cases of unilateral resort to force in the 
post-Charter era have been justified as an exercise of the right of self- 
defence. The U. S. A. invoked the plea of self-defence, as the Court noted, in 
the proceedings of the Nicaragua Case 5. States that have unilaterally 
resorted to force against other States have consistently offered the 
justification of self-defence during debates at the United Nations organs 
and in statements outside the organisation. For example, Israel, Portugal, 
Rhodesia, and S. Africa that have frequently resorted to force beyond their 
1 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, at p. 102, para 193. 2 Doc. A/CN. 4/318/ADD. 5-7, I. L. C. Ybk. 1980, Vol. II, Part One, p. 13. 3 Ibid. p. 53, para 87. 
4 See Second Title, infra 
5 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, at p. 87, para 165. 
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national boundaries have, without failure, always justified their action as 
an exercise of self-defence. 
It can, therefore, be submitted that the right of self-defence constitutes in 
contemporary customary international law the only universally 
admissible instance of unilateral resort to force by States. There has been 
no objection either in the practice of States or in the writings of publicists 
in relation to the existence as such of the right of self-defence in 
international law. Rather, objections and controversy arise with regard to 
the existence and the scope of the conditions for the exercise of the right in 
specific cases where unilateral use of force has been justified as an exercise 
of self-defence. Lauterpacht has rightly pointed with respect to self-defence 
that "... no law can disregard it". It is, therefore, not surprising that the 
concept of self-defence has been entrenched in the practice of States long 
before the establishment of the United Nations. It has been understood to 
constitute an exception to the regulation of "resort to war" in the 
Covenant of the League of Nations and to the prohibition of resort to war 
"as an instrument of national policy" in the Pact of Paris, though neither 
of the above instruments included a specific provision on self-defencehbiti 
It is not so with the United Nations Charter. Article 51 thereof provides: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the 
Security. Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security. Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right shall be immediately 
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and 
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such 
action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. 
The above provision appears to constitute the point of focus as a 
term of reference in the practice of States, namely, in the form of mutual 
security treaty-making7 and in statements of Governments. Thus, Article 
51 has been referred to by the representatives of Israel during the U. N. 
debates on the Suez Campaign of 19568 
, 
the Six Day War of 19679, the Yo iii 
t' H. Lauterpacht, The Fritrrihi'Orr of Lrnv in the International Community, 7933, p. 180. 
6bis See supra Ch. 8 and Part One, Ch. 1. 
Thus Article 3(1) of the inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (1947) stipulates 
the undertaking by all American States of assisting an American. State that has been the 
victim of a. armed at k "... in the exercise of the inherei)t right of individual or collective 
seif-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations... " ; text in 43 
A. J. 1. r 
_ 
53 (1949) p. 54. Also see Art. 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (1949), Art. 4 of the 
Warsaw Pact (1955). 
8 G. A. O. R. ES-1, Plennary Meetings and Annexes, 562nd pl. mtg. para 145. 
u S. C. O. R. 22nd yr. 1347th mtg. para 32; G. A. O. R. ES-5, Plennary Meetings, Verbatim 
Records of Meetings 17 June-1S Sept. 1967,1526th pl. mtg. para 134. 
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Kippur War of 197310 and the air raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor 
(O. S. I. R. A. K. ) in 198111. Both France and Tunisia invoked Article 51 with 
regard to the Remada incident of 18 May 195812 
. 
The U. S. A. invoked Art. 
51 in the operation to rescue the crew of the S. S. Mayaguez 13 and in 
justification of the military action in Panama on 20 December 198914. The 
U. K. initiated and conducted the military campaign to expel the Argentine 
occupation forces from the Falkland Islands, entirely on the basis of Art. 51 
of the Charterl5. 
Furthermore, both the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations [ G. A. 
Res. 2625 (XXV)] and the 1974 Definition of Aggression, Art. 6, [G. A. Res. 
3314 (XXIX)] leave the provision of Art. 51 intact by providing that nothing 
in their respective texts "... shall be construed as enlarging or diminishing 
in any way the scope of the provisions of the Charter concerning cases in 
which the use of force is lawful" 16 
. 
There is agreement in the jurisprudence of the Court, the practice of 
States and among jurists on the following aspects of self-defence. First, that 
the right of self-defence, especially as embodied in Art. 51 of the Charter, 
constitutes the exception to the rule of the prohibition of the threat or use 
of force. Secondly, that it is exercised in response to and for protection 
against an unlawful use of force17 
. 
Thirdly, that it is subject to the 
responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international 
peace and securityl s. Fourthly, that the requirements for the exercise of 
the right are "'immediate", necessity of self-defence and proportionality] 9. 
All consensus, however, seems to disappear when the relation 
between Art. 51 and customary law is dealt with. Thus, it becomes a matter 
9 S. C. O. R. 22nd yr. 1347th mtg. para 32; G. A. O. R. ES-5, Plennary Meetings, Verbatim 
Records of Meetings 17 June-18 Sept. 1967,1526th pl. mtg. para 134. 
10 S. C. O. R. 28th yr. 1733rd mtg. para 75. 
11 S. C. O. R. 36th yr. 2280th mtg. para 97. 
12 S. C. O. R. 13th yr. 819th mtg. paras 11(Tunisia), 87 (France). 
13 Letter dated 14 May 1975 from the representative of the United States of America to the 
President of the Security Council, Doc. S/ 11689, S. C. O. R. Suppl. for April-June 1975, pp. 24- 
25. 
14 U. N. Chronicle vol. XXVI1 no 1 March 1990, p. 67. 15 See Documents S/ 14988, S/ 15002, S/ 15006, SJ15025, S/ 15031, S. C. O. R 37th yr. suppl. for 
April-June 1982, pp. 34-5,45,47,59,62. 16 I. C. J. Rep. '1986, p. 14 at p. 103, para 193. 
17 See for instance D. W. Bowett, Self-Defence in International Lau?, 1958, pp. 6,109 seq. 18 See the controversy that arose during the Falkland and Kuwait crises with regard to 
whether the Security Council had taken measures to restore international peace and 
security, which would require action in self-defence to be discontinued. See infra. 
19 See The Caroline, Moore Digest, vol. ii, p. 409 seq. and vol. vii, p. 919 seq, ; I. C. J. Rep. 
1986, p. 14, at p. 103, para 194. 
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of controversy whether Art. 51 embodies pre-existing customary law (the 
Article safeguards, according to its wording, the "inherent" right of self- 
defence) or whether it constitutes a progressive development of the law. It 
is also debated whether the necessity for its exercise arises only "if an 
armed attack occurs" or, rather, if any use of armed force occurs, or even in 
anticipation of a use of armed force. In addition, the requirement of 
proportionality does not feature in the text of Art. 51 and it also constitutes 
the subject of debate as to its precise content. Lastly, the exact limitation of 
the exercise of self-defence in relation to the collective security function of 
the Security Council is yet another point of dispute. 
The subsequent parts of this section shall deal with the above issues. 
2. Self-defence as an "Inherent Right". 
2. (i). Self-defence as a "'Right". 
Special Rapporteur Ago has submitted that "... self-defence connotes 
a situation or de facto condition, not a subjective right. The State finds 
itself in a condition of self-defence when it is confronted by an armed 
attack against it in breach of international law 
... 
-20. 
This appears to be at variance with the language of Article 51 and State 
practice in both of which self-defence is referred to as the exercise of a 
"right"; at the same time, it is submitted, that Ago seems to have simply 
stated the obvious. The occurrence of an "arrjed attack" signifies both a 
factual and a legal situation21 
. 
The actual use of force against a State 
constitutes both a fact and a breach of the rule of the prohibition of the use 
of force. The forcible reaction by the victim of the unlawful use of force for 
its own protection apart from being itself a factual situation clearly 
warrants a necessity of being accommodated in the context of the law that 
prohibits, as a rule, the unilateral resort to force. International law has 
recognised this necessity by exonerating the defending State for its recourse 
to force and, thus, by investing its action. with admissibility in law. This 
contingency can be explained by the fact that the law would have been 
indifferent to the concept of self-defence in the absence of the rule 
according to which its subjects would be under the obligation to refrain 
20 Supra n. 2, p. 53, para 87. 21 Cf. Mendelson, The Nicaragua Case and Customary International Law, in Butler (ed. ), 
The Non-Use of Force in International Law, 1990, p. 85 at p. 88; Kunz, Individual and 
Collective Self-Defence in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, 41 A. J. I. L. 872 (7 947), p. 878. 
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from the use of force, which is reserved for the organs of the organised 
community. No system of law, whatever the degree of its organisation and 
centralisation, is able to guarantee the immediate mobilisation of its 
enforcement mechanism for the protection of its subjects against 
violations of the above rule. At the same time, no system of law has been 
expected to put to the test its credibility by withholding its sanctioning 
from the exceptional situation that compels an individual subject to 
exercise unilaterally what is, as a rule, reserved for the organs of the 
community. Such unilateral action, in the exceptional circumstances of an 
actual and immediate danger to the individual subject of the law, has the 
position of an exception that reinforces rather than being detrimental to 
the law; as such it is of provisional character and its exercise is regulated by 
the law. 22 
. 
Consequently, it is submitted, that there is no reason to deny 
the exercise of self-defence the character of a de jure right. 23 
On the other hand, self-defence is not a duty. This means that the 
victim of an armed attack is under no legal obligation to resist at all or 
effectively the aggressor; the armed forces of Kuwait offered only a token 
resistance to the Iraqi invasion of 2 August 199024 without any third State 
censuring Kuwait for its conduct. 
2. (ii). Self-defence as "inherent" right. 
The characterisation in Article 51 of the right of self-defence as 
"inherent" ( droit naturel in the French text) 
'has been criticised on 
grounds of terminology as introducing an element of natural law in the 
22 See Lauterpacht op. cit. supra n. 6, pp. 180,393-4; Kunz, loc. cit. supra n. 21, p. 875; 
Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, 81 
H. R. C. 455 (1952 11), p. 495; McDougal & Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order, 
1961, pp. 126-7,222; Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, 1963, p. 
252; id. The Use of Force in Self-Defence, 37 B. Y. I. L. 183 (1961), 219; Kelsen, Collective 
Security and Collective Self-Defence under the United Nations Charter, 42 A. J. I. L. 783 
(1948), p. 795; Farer, Law and War, ißt Black & Falk (eds), The Future of the International 
Legal Order vol. iii, 1971, p. 28; Dinstein, War, Aggression, Self-Defence, 1988, pp. 167-8; 
Combacau, The Exception of Self-Defence in the United Nations Practice, in Cassese (ed. ), 
The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force, 1986, p. 9; Pompe, Aggressive War: An 
International Crime, 1949, p. 110; Cot & Pellet, La Charte des Nations Urries, 1985, pp, 769- 
770; Rifaat, International Aggression, 1979, p. 123; Greenwood, Self-Defence and the 
Conduct of International Armed Conflict, in Dinstein (ed. ), International Law at a Time of 
Perplexity, 1989, p. 273. Cf. Bowett, op. cit. supra n. 17, pp. 8-9; Schwarzenberger, The 
Fundamental Principles of International Law, 87 H. R. C. 195 (1955 1), pp. 331,332,338; 
Kolesnik, The Development of the Right to Self-Defence, in Butler (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 21, 
p 154. 
23 Dinstein op. Cit. supra n. 22, p. 168. 
24 Keesing's 1990, p. 37632 et seq. ; Dinstein op. cit. supra n. 22, p. 169; Brownlie op. cit. 
supra n. 22, pp. 375-376; id. 37 B. M. L. 183 (1961), p. 262. 
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Charter, namely, that the right exists irrespective of the provision of the 
law, as an attribute of the mere existence of States or entities that have the 
characteristics of statehood but lack express recognition25. 
Furthermore, it has also been rightly suggested that the term "inherent" 
does not signify that self-defence is, as a matter of law, part of the concept 
of State sovereignty26 
. 
This is apparent for the following reasons: First, 
self-defence as a right is attributable to entities having the characteristics of 
statehood irrespective of recognition27 
. 
The Arab-Israeli conflict may be 
cited as an illustration. Israel has not been recognised, with the exception 
of Egypt by any of the other Arab States. This lack of formal recognition, 
however, did not prevent the Syrian Government from stating that Israel 
had the right to defend herself against the Scud missile attack launched by 
Iraq on 17 January 199128. 
Secondly, in cases of recognised States, self-defence is not exercised because 
of sovereignty but rather as a result of it, for the reason that States as 
subjects of international law are entitled to all rights thereunder29. Lastly, 
the concept of State sovereignty is a legal concept and its precise content 
may vary according to the "... state of development of international law at 
any given moment 
... 
"30 
. 
The best view, according to overwhelming authoritative opinion, is 
rather that the term "inherent" refers to the existence of the right of self- 
defence in customary law and the desirability of the drafters of the Charter 
to preserve it in Article 51'31 0 
25 Bowett op. cit. supra n. 17, pp. 6,8-9; Kunz loc. cit. supra n. 21; Dinstein op. cit. supra 
n. 22, p. 170; cf. Zourek, L' Interdiction de I' Emploi de la Force en Droit International, 1974, 
p 102. 
20 Schwarzenberger loc. cit. supra n. 22, pp. 339-340; Dinstein op. cit. supra n. 25. 
27 McDougal & Feliciano op. cit. supra n. 22, p. 221. 
28 Keesing's 1991, p. 37939. 
29 Schwarzenberger loc. cit. supra n. 26. 
30 Dinstein op. cit. supra n. 25. 
31 Wehberg, L' Interdiction du Recours ä la Force: Le Principe et les Problemes qui se posent, 
78 N. R. C. 70951 1), pp. 81-82; Waldock 81 H. R. C. 455 (1952 II), p. 495; Bowett op. cit. supra 
n. 17, p. 187; Schwarzenberger 87 H. R. C. 195 (1955 1), pp. 339-341; McDougal & Feliciano op. 
cit. supra n. 22, p. 126; Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 22, pp. 271-272; id. 37 B. Y. I. L. 183 (1961), p. 
239; Dinstein op. cit. cnnprn n. 22, p. 171; Fawcett, Intervention in International Law, A Study 
of some Recent Cases, 703 H. R. C. 347 (1961 II), pp. 360-361; Goodrich-Hambro-Simons, The 
Charter of the United Nations, Commientary and Docinnents, 3rd ed., 1969, p. 344; Schachter, 
The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 Mich. L. R. 1620 (1984), p. 1634; E. Jimenez de 
Arechaga, International Law in the Past Third of the Century, 159 H. R. C. 9 (1978 1), p. 96; 
J. N. Moore, The Secret War in Central America and the Future of World Order, 80 A. J. I. L. 
43 (1986), pp. 82-83; McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defence, 57 A. J. I. L. 
597 (1963), pp. 598-599; G. B. Roberts, Self-Help in Combating State-Sponsored Terrorism: 
Self-Defence and Peacetime Reprisals, 19 Case W. Res. J. I. L. 243 (1987), pp. 274-277; 
Linnan, Iran Air Flight 655 and Beyond: Free Passage, Mistaken Self-Defence and State 
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The Court in the Nicaragua Case has expressly taken the above 
view, with regard to the right of collective self-defence, by ruling that: 
... 
First with regard to the existence of this right it notes that in the language of 
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the inherent right (or "droit nature]") which any 
State possesses in the event of an armed attack, covers both collective and individual self- 
defence. 
Thus, the Charter itself testifies to the existence of the right of collective self-defence in 
customary law... 32 
Moreover, the practice of States also provides evidence that the 
term "inherent right" points at the existence of the right of self-defence in 
customary law. The Annotated Supplement to the Commander's 
Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations of the United States Navy, 
provides that "... [T]he "inherent" right of self-defence refers to the right of 
self-defence as it existed in customary law when the United Nations 
Charter was written 
... 
"33 
. 
In a letter dated 30 April 1982, from the representative of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the President of the 
Security Council during the Falklands crisis it was stated that the right of 
self-defence "... is expressly recognized by Article 51 of the Charter, which 
makes it clear that the right of self-defence is "inherent" and that nothing 
in the Charter is intended to impair it.. 1134 
This prima facie consensus with respect to self-defence as a right of 
customary law breaks down when one proceeds to examine the content of 
this customary law of self defence. 
In his dissenting opinion in the Nicaragua Case Judge Schwebel 
disagreed with the view that 
... 
the terms or intent of Article 51 eliminate the right of self-defence under 
customary law, or confine its entire scope to the express terms of Article 51... 35 
Responsibility, 16 Yale J. I. L. 245 (1991), p. 310; Greenwood, 89 W. Va. L. R. 933 (1987), p. 938; 
Levenfeld, Israel's Counter-Fedayeen Tactics in Lebanon: Self-Defence and Reprisal under 
Modern International Law, 21 Col. J. Trans. L. 1 (1982), pp. 26-27. Cf. Stone, Legal Controls 
of International Conflict, 1954, pp. 243,245; Kunz 41 A. J. I. L. 872 (1947), pp. 875,879; Wright, 
United States Intervention in the Lebanon, 531., 4.1.11.112 (1959), p. 116; A. Shapira, The 
Six-Day War and the Right of Self-Defence, 6 Israel L. R. 65 (1971), p. 71; D. W. Greig, Self- 
Defence and the Security Council: What Does Article 51 Require?, 40 I. C. L. Q. 366 (1991), 
p368. Contra. Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 1951, p. 914. 32 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, at p. 102, para 193. 33 N. W. P. 9 (Rev. A)/FMFM 1-10, WASHINGTON D. C. 1989,4.3.2., (4-9), n. 21. 34 Doc. S/ 15016, S. C. O. R. 37th yr. Suppl. for April-June 1982, p. 54 at p. 55. 35 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, at pp. 347-348, para 173. 
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This approach reflects the view of eminent authority36 that the 
customary law right of self-defence safeguarded in Article 51 is stated and 
is identical with the famous Webster formula in the diplomatic 
correspondence between the United States Department of State and the 
British Foreign Office in the aftermath of the Caroline incident of 183737 
. 
It may be recalled that the United States Secretary of State Webster stated 
that for the destruction of The Caroline by the British armed forces to be 
lawful, there had to exist "... a necessity of self-defence, instant, 
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for 
deliberation... " and that ".... the local authorities in Canada.... did nothing 
unreasonable or excessive; since the act, justified by the necessity of self- 
defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it... "38 
. 
Moreover, the same authority point at the absence of any provision with 
regard to self-defence in the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Pact of 
Paris and the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals that formed the basis for the text 
of the Charter of the United Nations. Instead, it is argued, the preparatory 
works of the Charter at the San Francisco Conference, reveal that the only 
purpose for the creation of Article 51 and its insertion in the text of the 
Charter was to accommodate the pre-existing Inter-American arrangement 
for mutual assistance in the event of an armed attack against any 
American State- notably the Act of Chapultepec of 194539. Consequently, it 
is concluded, that as long as (1) the provision of Article 51 is virtually 
redundant with regard to'the existence of the right of self-defence and (2) 
as long as the latter would be ipso facto reserved under the Charter (in the 
same way as with the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Pact of 
Paris), its scope and content should be judged by reference to the 
prohibition of force in Article 2(4) rather than Article 5140 
. 
36 Waldock, 81 H. R. C. 455 (1952 II), p. 496; Bowett op. cit. supra n. 17, pp. 187-189; 
Schwarzenberger, 87 H. R. C. 195 (1955 1), p. 332; Schachter, 82 Mich. L. R. 1620 (1984), p. 
1634; Stone, Conflict Through Consensus, 1977, p. 48; McDougal, 57 A. J. I. L. 597 (1963), pp. 
599-600. 
37 Moore International Law Digest, vol. ii, p. 409 et seq. ; id. vol. vii, p. 919 et seq. Also see 
Kuhn, Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defence, 6 S. A. Y. I. L. 42 (1980), p. 46; Rostow, 
Nicaragua and the Law of Self-Defence Revisited, 11 Yale I. I. L. 437 (1985-86), p. 451; 
J. N. Moore, 80 A. J. LL. 43 (1986), pp. 82-83; Levenfeld, 21 Col. J. Trans. L. 1 (1982), pp. 26-27; 
Roberts, 19 Case W. Res. J. I. L. 243 (1987), pp. 274-275. 
38 Moore Digest. 
, 
vol. ii, supra n. 37, p. 412. 
39 Text in 39 A. J. I. L. Suppl. 108 (1945); See U. N. C. I. O. Documents vol. 6, p. 459, vol. 12, p. 
680 et seq.; references supra n. 36; McCormack, Anticipatory Self-Defence in the Legislative 
History of the United Nations Charter, 25 Israel L. R. 1 (1991). 
40 Bowett op. cit. supra n. 17, pp. 185-186; Stone op. cit. supra n. 36, p. 48; McCormack, 25 
Israel L. R. 1 (1991), pp. 20-24; B. Asrat, Prohibition of Force Under the U. N. Charter. A 
Study of Article 2(4), 1991, p. 204; Cf 
. 
Combacau loc. cit. in Cassese(ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 22, 
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The present author doe-, not share the above view and 
proposes to submit the following pointy. 
First, if self-defence is to be a right in law that is exercised in 
circumstances of exceptional necessity and within a legal systellm that 
precludes its, subjects from resorting to force unilaterally, then the 
reference to The Caroline incident, as the comprehensive statement of the 
customaryy, law on self-defence, is a very curious proposition. The Caroline 
incident and the subsequent correspondence related to it took place in the 
19th century at a time when unilateral resort to armed force, far from 
being prohibited, was considered a privilege of State sovereignty. Self- 
defence, therefore, as a justification in the context of the legal 
environment of the 19th century is nothing more than an attempt at 
investing with moral or political plausibility conduct which would in any 
case be admissible in law. What Webster laid out to be the law of self- 
defence in the middle of the 19th century cannot be appreciated as such in 
view of the total lack of a jrrti ad belbim in the period under discussion411 
Secondly, the argument that Tlie Caroline represents the customary 
law on self-defence at the time of the conclusion of the United Nations 
Charter constitutes an unjustified proposition. It means in effect that State 
practice has remained "static" its the period 1837-1945 and this is according 
to authority not the case42 
. 
The argument for the static nature of 
customary law seems to rest on the twofold assumption that the 
requirement of an "armed attack" in Article 51 is too restrictive of the 
exercise of self-defence which is permitted for the protection of a State 
against any° violation of the prohibition of the rule of non-use of force. 
T lie Webster formula of necessity of self-defence and proportionate 
response in self-defence, has survived as the basis of the content of the 
right of self-defence and it owes its survival to the fact that it is broad 
p. 11; Reisman, Allocating Competences to Use Coercion in the Post-Cold War World: 
Practices, Conditions, and Prospects, in L. F. Damrasch & D. J. Scheffer (eds. ), Lazo and Force 
in the ' eu.. w htternati ,, ui Order, 7997, p. 30. 41 Addendum to the Eighth Report on State Responsibility by Special Rapporteur Ago, loc. 
cit. supra n. 2, pp. 52,61,65, paras 83,106,113; Brownaie op. cit. supra n. 22, pp. 216-21;, 231 
et seq. ; id. ;, 7 B. Y. I. L. 183 (1961), p. 201; id. The Principle of the Non-Use of Force in 
Contemporary International Law, in Butler (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 21, p. 23; Müllerson, The 
Principle of Non-Threat and Non-Use of Force in the Modern World, in Butler (ed. ) op. cit. 
sripra n. 21, p. 32; Skubiszewski, Use of Force by States, Collective Security, Law of War and 
Neutrality, in Sorensen (ed. ), Manual of Public International Law, 1968, p. 739, at pp. 766- 
767; Jimenez de Arechaga, 159 H. R. C. 9 (1978 1), pp. 96-97; Zourek op. cit. supra n. 25, pp. 
98-103. 
42 Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 22, pp. 216-250; id. 3' B. Y. I. L. 183 (1961), pp. 195 et seq. ; id. loc. 
cit. in Butler (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 21, p. 23. 
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enough to accommodate the evolution of the law as evidenced in State 
practice43 
. 
While a necessity of self-defence is of no legal significance in 
the 19th century legal context, it acquires fundamental importance in the 
light of a rule prohibiting resort to force. It is, therefore, one thing to speak 
genera 11v of a "tnecessity" of self-defence and it is quite another to specify 
the exact circumstances in which the use of force in self-defence is 
admissible. The latter clearly depends on the development of the state of 
the law with regard to the use of force by States. In the period 1919-1945 the 
establishment of the League of Nations, the conclusion of the Pact of Paris, 
the attempt to define Aggression and the conclusion of a number of 
bilateral non-aggression treaties, signifies an evolution in the law in that 
while force had hitherto been admissible in the practice of States resort to 
it, at least in the form of "war" was regulated under the Covenant of the 
League and prohibited under the Pact of Paris. It was in such legal climate 
that an exception for the protection of a State could be admitted in the 
form of the right of self-defence against certain uses of force``. The 
assertion that The C ri)/inc principles represent in their general 
formulation the law on self-defence, not only ignores any development of 
the law its the intervening period until the adoption of the United 
\ations Charter, but it effectively negates the rule of the prohibition of the 
use of force by suggesting the continuing validity of the all-permisive 
character of the law o i) resort to force its the 19th century. According to 
Special Rapporteur Ago this would amount to the rather untenable 
situation that "... at the Same moment in history and in consequence of 
the same historic events, nearly all Governments should have been able 
to , ioii a treaty instrument binding them reciprocally on the basis of a 
specific notion and that, at the same time, they should have beeil able to 
retain in their legal thinking the conviction of being reciprocally bound on 
the basis of a different notion 
... 
"45 
. 
It is thus cogent to submit that the 
customary law safeguarded in Article 51 is the customary law as it existed 
in 1945 
. 
The suggestion, moreover, propounded by Bowett4' that the 
prohibition of Article 2(4) is not inconsistent with the right of self-defence 
introduces the continency that self-defence as a concept is independent a 
43 Brownlie loc cit. in Butler (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 21, p. 25; contra McDougal ä: Feliciano 
op. cit. supra n. 22, p. 217. 
td References to Brownlie supra n. 42; Skubiszewski loc. cit. in Sorensen (ed. ) op. cit. supra 
n. 41; Jimenez de Arechaga loc. cit. supra n. 41. 
45 Loc. cit. supra n. 2, p. 63, para 108. 
`4'6 Brownlic op. cit. supra n. 22, pp. 272-275; id. 37 B. Y. I. L. 183 (1961), pp. 246-247- 
4,1' Supra n. 40. 
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to its operation from any rule regulating or prohibiting the unilateral 
resort to force and it exists beyond and despite such rule. This effectively 
amounts to subjecting the rule to its purported exception, without which 
the latter cannot as a matter of law exist. According to Brownlie if this 
view is accepted "... Article 51 ceases to be the exception and becomes a 
permission that overrides the general principle set forth in Article 
2(4).... "48 
. 
Reference to the preparatory work of the United Nations 
Charter reveals that Article 51 was understood with regard to the concept 
of collective self-defence as accommodating the "... necessity of preserving 
regional systems like the Inter-American one... "49 
. 
There is not the 
slightest indication, however, that the purpose of Article 51 was wholly 
and solely to bring in line the existing collective self-defence arrangements 
with the collective security provisions of the new organisation. After all, 
Article 51 speaks of individual self-defence and, if this is the basis for the 
exercise of collective self-defence in customary law, then Article 51 seems 
to constitute more than a mere technicality. In addition, the fact should 
not be overlooked that Article 51 constitutes part of an instrument the 
purpose of which is to abolish, as a rule, unilateral resort to force by 
individual States and substitute in its place a quasi monopoly of the use of 
force by the Organisation it establishes5° 
. 
The provision of Article 51 
merely introduces an exception to the above by recognising and 
sanctioning the contingency that has been firmly entrenched in the 
practice of States that a use of force (and as it will be seen infra a use of 
force of considerable gravity) may create an immediate necessity to be 
repelled "there and then" and which the collective security machinery of 
the organisation cannot deal with at once. Moreover, Article 51 expressly 
provides that the right to resort to force in self-defence is admissible "... 
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security 
... 
". This passage understates the 
temporary and exceptional character of self-defence and effectively 
breaches any link with the 19th century doctrine of self-preservation and 
its unlimited licence to unilateral resort to force by subjecting the 
observance of the law to the preservation of the State57 
. 
During the Suez 
48 Loc. cit. in Butler (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 21, p. 23; Farer loc. cit. in Black & Falk (eds. ) op. 
cit. supra n. 22, p. 32. 
49 U. N. C. I. O. Documents vol. 12, p. 680. 50 Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 22, pp. 269-275; id. 37 B. Y. I. L. 183 (1961), p. 237; contra Asrat 
of. cit. supra n. 40, p. 199 et seq. 
51 Schwarzenberger, 87 H. R. C. 195 (1955 1), pp. 344-345; Bowett op. cit. supra n. 17, p. 10; 
Henkin, Force, Intervention and Neutrality in Contemporary International Law, A. S. I. L. 
225 
crisis of 1956 the Egyptian Government invoked the right of self-defence 
against the Israel military action in the Sinai and the joint Anglo-French 
ultimatum, until the Security Council or the General Assembly had taken 
the necessary measures to restore peace and security in the area52. 
The restrictions on the Israel-bound shipping through the Suez 
canal that were introduced by Egypt in the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli 
war of 1948, were justified on the basis of the right of self-preservation53. 
To this the U. K. representative replied that 
"... This right at any rate to my delegation seems to be a very vague conception. 
Obviously states have a right to preserve themselves, if by that is meant to defend 
themselves in the face of unprovoked. This right is clearly acknowledged in Article 51 of 
the Charter, which lays down that it can only be exercised until the Security Council has 
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security...... 54 
A third point to be made is that in the forty-five years since the 
conclusion of the United Nations Charter, Article 51 has had considerable 
influence on Mate practice. The overwhelming majority of unilateral 
resort to force has been justified on the basis of Article 51 of the Charter. 
Moreover, the requirement of an armed attack in Article 51 has been ruled 
by the Court in the Nicaragua Case to constitute part of customary 
international laXV55 
3. Necessity of Self-'Defence and the Concept of Armed Attack. 
3. (i). The Meaning of Necessity of Self-Defence. 
The term "necessity of self-defence" is held by authority to connote 
the situation where the occurrence of an act of armed force in violation of 
Article 2(4) of the Charter by a State gives rise to the undertaking of 
protective action on the part of the State against which armed force is 
Proceedings 147 (1963), pp. 148-149; id. General Course on Public International Law, 216 
H. R. C. 19 (1989 IV), p. 155. 
52 G. A. O. 
. 
(ES-1) First Special Emergency Session, Plennary Meetings and Annexes, 561st 
Alen. mtg, para 4,2. 
3 See S. C. O. R. 6th yr. 550th mtg, Para 33 et seq. 54 Ibid. para 93. 55 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, at p. 103, para 195. Although there is evidence that armed attack 
is considered as the primary, albeit not the only, event giving rise to the necessity of 
defensive action, its reference in Article 51 as the only type of use of force giving rise to the 
right of individual or collective self-defence has certainly influenced the practice of 
States. See infra section 3 and Second Title on Proportionate Counter-Measures. 
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directed56 
. 
Beyond the need of a prior use of armed force the controversial 
question arises of what kind of unlawful armed force gives rise to 
defensive necessity. Brownlie57 has pointed that "... [T]he Webster formula 
defines necessity only in terms of itself which is like saying that a piece of 
string must be long without specifying the length... ". 
Article 51 of the Charter provides that the right of individual or 
collective self-defence is admissible "... if an armed attack occurs... ", while 
the French text of the same provision stipulates that self-defence is 
legitimately exercised "... dans le cas oü un Membre des Nations Unies est 
1' object d' une agression armee... ". The issue of whether "armed attack" 
and "aggression" are identical concepts has generated much controversy, 
and, it is submitted that they are not58 
. 
"Aggression" seems, rather, to signify an illegal use of force in the 
sense of a violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter59 
, 
and, although prior to 
the adoption of the United Nations Charter it was believed to be identical 
56 Kunz, 41 A. J. 1. L. 872 (1947), pp. 877-878; Waldock, 81 H. R. C. 455 (7952 11), pp. 484,497; 
Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 22, p. 239 et seq.; id. 37 B. Y. I. L. 183 (1961), pp. 222 n. 4,223; Kelsen, 
42 783 (1948), 791; Dinstein op. cit. supra n. 22, p. 173; Skubiszewski loc. cit. in 
Sorensen (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 41, p. 767; Pompe op. cit. supra n. 22, p. 60; Cot & Pellet op. cit. 
supra n. 22, p. 772; Schachter, Self-Defence and the Rule of Law, 83 A. J. I. L. 259 (1989), p. 
272-273; Jimenez de Arechaga, 159 H. R. C. 9 (1978 I), p. 95; Henkin, 216 H. R. C. 19 (1989 It"), 
p. 156; F. M. Higginbotham, International Law, the Use of Force in Self-Defence and the 
Southern African Conflict, 25 Col. J. Trans. L. 529 (1987), pp. 550-551; P. Kahn, From 
Nuremberg to the Hague: The United States Position in Nicaragua v. United States and the 
Development of Internationa) Law, 12 Yale J. J. L. I (1987), p. 18; Akehurst, Nicaragua v. 
United States of America, 2^ I. I. I. L. 357 (1987), p. 370; P. Lamberti Zanardi, Indirect 
Military Aggression, in Cassese (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 22, p. 112; O'Connell, The Influence of 
Lazo on Sea Power, 1975, p. 80; Rifaat op. cit. supra n. 22, p. 124; R. Higgins, The Legal 
Limits To the Use of Force by Sovereign States; United Nations Practice, 37 B. Y. I. L. 269 
(1961), p. 303. Cf. Bowett op. cit. supra n. 17, pp. 109-114; Schwarzenberger, 87 H. R. C. 195 
(1955 1), p. 332. Contra. McDougal & Feliciano op. cit. supra n. 22, pp. 198,200-201,217,230; 
McDougal, 57 A. I. I. L. 597 (1963), p. 601; Feinstein, Self-Defence and Israel in International 
Law, 11 Israel L. R. 516 (1976), pp. 522-524; Rostow, 11 Yale J. I. L. 437 (1985-86), pp. 451-453; 
Roberts, 19 Case W. Res. J. I. L. 243 (1987), p. 277; Levenfeld, 21 Col. f. Trans. L. 1 (1982), 
p20-21. 
7 Loc. cit. in Butler (ed_) op. cit. supra n.. 21, p. 25. 58 See to this effect Combacau loc. cit. in Cassese (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 22, p. 22; Müllerson 
loc. cit. in Butler (ed. ) op. cit. n. 21, p. 33; Kolesnik loc. cit. in ibid., p. 154; Dinstein op. cit. 
supra n. 22, p. 173; Pompe op. cit. supra n. 22, p. 64; T. D. Gill, The Law of Armed Attack in 
the Context of the Nicaragua Case, 1 Hague Y11_. 30 (1988), p. 36; Higginbotham, 25 Col. J. 
Trans. L. 529 (1987), p. 548; D. Wallace Jr. 
, 
International Law and the Use of Force: 
Reflections on the Need for Reform, 19 Intern. Lawyer 259 (1985), p. 262; Lamberti Zanardi 
loc. cit. supra n. 56, p. 111. Cf. Skubiszewski loc. cit. supra n. 56, p. 777; Rifaat op. cit. supra 
n. 22, pp. 124-125. Contra. Nicaragua Case (per Judge Schwebel), 1. C. J. 1986, p. 14, at pp. 
349-350, paras 176-177; ibid. (per Judge Jennings), pp. 543-544; Broms, The Definition of 
Aggression, 154 H. R. C. 305 (1977 1), p. 370; Macdonald, xxiv Can. Y. I. L. 127 (1986), p. 148; 
Akehurst, 27 I. J. I. L. 357 (1987), p. 370. 
59 Pompe op. cit. supra n. 22, p. 60; cf. Kunz, 41 A. I. I. L. 872 (1947), p. 878. 
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with "armed attack"60 
, 
it has come to be considered in State practice as a 
wider concept. 
In the early stages of the United Nations deliberations on the 
Definition of Aggression the tendency appeared towards drawing the 
distinction between "aggression" in general and "armed attack" in 
particular. In 1956 the Report of the Special Committee on the Question of 
Defining Aggression6' referred to the U. S. S. R. draft definition62 which 
drew the distinction between "... enumerated acts of force constituting 
aggression and frontier incidents... " which were not; this distinction was 
purported to indicate that on the basis of their "... quantity and quality... 
[N]ot every use of armed force, only a specific use of armed force, may be 
considered as an act of aggression 
... 
"63 
. 
While the Soviet Government 
seemed to have considered the concepts of "aggression" and "armed 
attack" as identical64, other delegations did not share the same view. The 
representative of the Netherlands suggested that if a definition of 
aggression would serve to facilitate the circumstances in which a State or a 
group of States could resort in individual or collective self-defence, then it 
should be appropriate that the definition be one of "armed attack", which, 
he added, was "... a specific case of armed aggression 
... 
"65 
. 
Moreover, the 
representative of Syria proposed that the definition included two parts, 
one "... dealing with armed attack within the meaning of Article 51... " and 
the second "... with other forms of aggression 
... 
"66 
. 
The point of 
distinction was identified 'on the basis of the quality and intensity of the 
acts of armed force, without, however, further elaboration. There were 
only two general points that were raised. First, that the fact that Article 51 
was part of Chapter VII of the Charter indicated that self-defence was to be 
exercised only with regard to grave breaches of peace and not in case of "... 
small-scale hostilities connected with border incidents... [that] fell outside 
the scope of that Article 
... 
"67 
. 
With regard to border incidents it was 
60 Brow&ie op. cit. supra n. 22, p. 255; id. 37 B. Y. I. L. 183 (1961), p. 222. 
61 Doc. A/ 3574, GA. O.. k 12th session, Suppl. No 16. 
62 Doc. AJC. 6/ L. 3321 Rev. 1. 
63 Loc. cit. srcpni n. 61, p. 10, para 78. 
64 Ibid. p. 25, para 215; a similar position was adopted by the Government of 
Czechoslovakia, ibid. para 216. 
65 Ibid. pp. 13,15,16,24, paras 108,125,128,204; approvingly by the representatives of 
Norway and Iraq, ibid. p. 15, para 126. 
66 Ibid. p. 16, para 126. 
67 Ibid. p. 16, para 128 (Iraq), p. 24, para 205 (The Netherlands). Cf. Waldock, 81 H. R. C. 
455 (7952 11), p. 497. 
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argued that although they might warrant limited defensive action68 "... 
such protective action was not based on the provision of Article 51 but 
followed from the function of the State to maintain law and order on its 
territory...... 69 
. 
Secondly, it was claimed that action in self-defence as it was stipulated in 
Article 51 would be undertaken "... in circumstances that the victim State 
had no means other than military to preserve its territorial integrity or 
political independence... "70. 
During the later stages of the preparatory work of the Definition of 
Aggression the question of whether self-defence could be exercised against 
any use of force was debated in a more elaborate fashion with regard to the 
assistance rendered by a State to armed bands operating against another 
State. According to western States every form of material assistance was 
deemed to give rise to the right of self-defence, while the representatives 
of developing States argued that only the "sending" of armed bands 
constituted a ground for resort to force in self-defence against the assisting 
State71 
. 
The Court in the Nicaragua Case has maintained the distinction 
between unlawful use of force siinpliciter and unlawful use of force that 
amounts to an armed attack; the Court ruled that in respect of the 
principle of the prohibition of the use of force it was "... necessary to 
distinguish the most grave forms of the use of force ( those constituting an 
armed attack) from others less grave forms 
... 
"72 
. 
The Court went further 
and ruled in respect of the exercise of individual and collective self- 
defence: 
... 
In the case of individual self-defence, the exercise of this right is subject to the 
State concerned having been the victim of an armed attack. Reliance on collective self- 
defence of course does not remove the need for this. There appears now to be general 
agreement on the nature of the acts which can be treated as constituting armed attacks. In 
particular, it may be considered to be agreed that an armed attack must be understood as 
including not merely action by regular armed forces across an international border, but also 
"the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands....... which carry out acts of armed 
force against another State of such gravity as to amount to" ( (titer alias ) an actual armed 
attack conducted by regular armed forces, "or its substantial involvement therein". This 
description contained in Article 3, paragraph (g), of the Definition of Aggression annexed to 
General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX ), may be taken to reflect customary international 
law. The Court sees no reason to deny that in customary iaw, the prohibition of armed 
68 Ibid. p. 16, para 128 (U. K. 
, 
The Netherlands) 
69 Ibid. ( The Netherlands) 
70 Ibid. p. 24, para 205 ( The Netherlands) 
71 See infra Second Title. 
72 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, at p. 101, para 191. 
229 
attacks may apply to the sending by a State of armed bands to the territory of another 
State, if such an operation, because of its scale and effects, would have been classified as an 
armed attack rather than a mere frontier incident had it been carried out by regular armed 
forces. But the Court does not believe that the concept of "armed attack" includes not only 
acts by armed bands where such acts occur on a significant scale but also assistance to rebels 
in the form of the provision of weapons or logistical or other support. Such assistance may 
be regarded as a threat or use of force, or amount to intervention in the internal or external 
affairs of other States... 73 
It, moreover, went on to say that in the case of use of force that does 
not amount to an armed attack the victim State alone has the right to take 
proportionate counter-measures, without, however, specifying against 
whom they could be exercised or whether they could involve the use of 
armed force74 
It is submitted that the term "necessity of self-defence" represents an 
over-simplified generalisation which would be more accurately put as 
"necessity of defensive action". State practice reveals that not every use of 
force warrants armed action in self-defence75 
. 
It is rather a case of 
ascertaining whether the "necessity of protective action" is a necessity to 
protect the State as a whole, namely, as an existing political, territorial and 
economic unit or, whether there arises a necessity to protect the authority 
of the State with regard to a use of force that occurs and is limited to a 
specific locals over which such authority extends. Thus, frontier incidents, 
uses of force against individual vessels, material assistance to an 
indigenous insurgency within another State do not call for resort to force 
in self-defence but rather or resort to protective action which the Court 
called counter-measures. An illustration of the above submission is found 
in the Annotated Supplement To The Commander's Handbook on the 
Law of Naval Operations of the United States Navy where the distinction 
is drawn between self-defence in relation to a unit of United States naval 
forces, namely, defending an individual warship only that refers to 
73 Ibid. pp. 103-104, pars 195. Contra. Ibid. (per judge Schinebel ) pp. 349-350, paras 176- 
177; (per Judge Jennings ), p. 543-544; Bowett op. cit. sepia n. 17, pp. 192,256-258; 
Schwarzenberger, 87 H. R. C. 795 (1455 ]J,, p. 332; McDougal & Feliciano op. cit. supra n. 22, 
pp. 240-241; Stone, Aggressioi and i,, Vorld Order, 1958, pp. 43-44; Schachter, 53 Univ. Chic. 
L. R. 113 (1986), p. 133 but cf. id. 83A. ). 11.2 59 (1989), p. 273; Rostohr, a1 Yale J. I. L. 437 (1985- 
86), p. 453; J. N. Moore, 80 A. I. I. L. 43 (1986), p. 86; Akehurst, 27 I. I. I. L. 357 (1987), p. 370; 
Reisman, Allocating Competences to Use Coercion in the Post-Cold War World: Practices, 
Conditions, and Prospects, in L. F. Damrosch & D. J. Scheffer (eds. ), Law and Force in the 
New International Order, 1991, p. 36 et seq. 
74 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, at pp. 110,127, paras 210-211,249. See infra Second Title. 
75 See infra Second Title. 
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localized low-level situations, and self-defence in relation to the United 
States as a nation, that is, the United States territory and armed forcesTh 
Both the resort to force in self-defence against an armed attack, and 
in counter-measures are defensive in nature. The question then arises of 
whether it is, proper to discuss defensive action under two headings 
instead of one 
- 
self-defence. Moreover, such doubt as to the dichotomy of 
self-defence and counter-measures seem-, to be reinforced by reference to 
the principle of proportionality, according to which, if it is strictly 
observed, every unlawful force could be repelled without any need of the 
above-mentioned distinction? 
. 
It is submitted that the distinction 
between self-defence and counter-measures is one that is pertinent to the 
kiiid of the necessity of protective action that is given rise upon the 
occurrence of an unlawful act of furce78. The requirement of "scale and 
effects" of a particular use of force in order to constitute an armed attack in 
conjunction with the fact that the author of the use of force is a State, 
connotes an armed action of considerable magnitude, with regard to its 
execution and the gravity of its objective. If the object of the unlawful 
armed force is the territorial integrity, political independence, economic 
and security infrastructure of the target State as a whole, then the 
protective counter-action is to be expected to accommodate to such 
corntingency. At the same time armed action which is of no such 
consequentiality like frontier incidents clashes over territory in dispute, 
attacks against individual vessels, creates a necessity to be repelled but it 
does not seem by the nature of the circumstances to constitute protection 
of the State as a «. vhuie'9 
. 
The consequentiality of an act of force is a very 
important factor in respect of the protective force to be exercised, but, and 
this is essential, it must ascertained on the basis of the actual purport of 
II Loc. cit. supra n. 33,4.3.2.2/4-13/ notes 30-31. Also see infra Second Title in relation to 
the laying of submarine mines. Cf 
. 
D. L. Peace, Major Maritime Events in the Persian Gulf 
Between 1984 and 1991: A Juridical Analysis, 37 taJ. I. L_ 545 (7997), pp. 563-4. 
7- Dinstein op. cit. supra n. 22, p. 182; N. D. White, The Legality of Intervention Following 
the Nicaragua Case, ix Intern. Rel. 535 (7989), p. 541 n. 28. 
78 Kalun, 12 Yak' J. 1. L_. I t' 987, pp. 21-22. 
'9 This, however, majy not be the case as far as the participants themselves are concerned 
in the case of territorial disputes where the area in dispute over which fighting may break 
out, may be regarded by either of them as an integral part of his territory. State practice 
with regard to border clashes reveals that in principle the parties to the conflict refrain 
from invoking claims of individual or collective self-defence at least in the early stages of 
the fighting; at the same time, however, the danger of escalation is very high and it is at 
that point that claims of self-defence against an armed attack are made. See infra Second 
Title 
. 
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the use of force on the ground and not merely by the expectations that any 
unlawful force gives rise to for the target State80. 
Of course both defensive operations are to be limited within 
boundaries set by the extremely important requirement of proportionality, 
but at the same time the latter is itself adapted in the requirement of the 
specific necessity. 
If State A is invaded by the armed forces of State B along the full 
length of the common frontier of the two States and a large portion of the 
territory of the former is occupied, then it is a case of an armed attack by 
State B against State A. In this situation State A may invoke the right of 
self-defence and resort to force along the full length of the deployed armed 
forces of State B and may even invade the territory of State B with the 
view of encircling the armed forces of the latter occupying its territory and 
ultimately expel or destroy them. It may also bombard airfields, naval 
stations and supply routes of State B. But it cannot, by application of the 
principle of proportionality, overthrow the Government or destroy the 
entire infrastructure of State B. 
If, on the other hand, a war vessel of State A comes under fire by a 
naval helicopter of State B, while the warship may take defensive action 
against the helicopter, it is not a case of use of force that poses a danger to 
the entirety of State A in the sense that is directed against its security 
infrastructure as it would be the case if the entire or large sections of the 
fleet of State A came under aerial bombardment. 
It is, therefore, the quality and quantity of the unlawful use of force 
that determine the kind of necessity for protective action to be taken. The 
practical significance of this is that it upholds the exceptional character of 
defensive action which must not be allowed to disrupt international peace 
and security at large. For if every use of force in violation of the rule of 
non-use of force were treated as creating a general necessity of self-defence, 
then it would be possible to assert a necessity of collective self-defence 
which in practice would involve the use of force by a third or more States 
80 Pompe op. cit. supra n. 22, p. 103 et seq. ; Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 22, pp. 366-368; id. 37 
B. " A 
. 
L. 183 (1961), p. 257; Jimenez de Arechaga, 159 H. R. C. 9 (1978 I), p. 95; Wengler, 7 Rey;. 
Beige D. I. 401 (1977), p. 406; Lamberi Zanardi loc. cit, supra n. 56, p. 112; Müllerson loc. cit. 
supra n. 58, p. 35; id. Self-Defence in the Contemporary World, in L. F. Damrosch & D. J. 
Scheffer (eds. ), Law and Force in the New International Order, 1991, pp. 16-18. Cf. Kelsen, 
42 A. J. I. L. 783 (1948) ; Rifaat op. cit. supra n. 22, p. 125. Contra. McDougal & Feliciano op. 
cit. supra n. 22, pp. 175-177,180-182,198,200-201,217-218,228,230. 
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apart from the original warring parties, an escalation of the conflict and a 
major breach of the peace8l. 
lt is submitted that resort to force in the exercise of the right of self- 
defence as it is understood in contemporary customary international law 
constitutes part of a broader necessity for protective action that arises 
because of a use of force in violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter. This use 
of force must amount to an armed attack, a special type of unlawful armed 
force which entails a high degree of gravity posing a danger to the 
existence of the target State as a whole and which would restrict the 
unilateral resort to force against the source of the attack and at the same 
time would minimize the possibility of grave breaches of the peace82. 
3. (ii). Immediacy of Necessity, of Self-Defence. 
The necessity of action in self-defence must be "immediate", 
namely, that as long as use of force is the only means to counter the 
danger that threatens the State53 then it must be resorted to within 
reasonable time from when the necessity arose. Such necessity can be 
safely said to arise only when there is open violence in progress and 
everything is a matter of ascertaining the issue of when an armed attack or 
a mere use of force has started. An undue time-lag may be prejudicial for 
claiming defensive necessitvs4 
. 
The Falklands crisis, where the U. K. 
resorted to defensive force against the Argentine occupation forces almost 
one month after the invasion of the islands illustrates that what really 
matters is the immediate invocation of the right and the immediate 
mounting of measures to implement it as opposed to immediate actions. 
Mrs M. Thatcher, the Prime Minister of the U. K. 
, 
in a speech in the House 
of Commons Emergency Debate on 3 April 1982 announced the dispatch of 
an Expeditionary Force to the South Atlantic to expel the Argentine 
occupation forcessh. This is understandable for practical reasons. Action in 
self-defence involves the commitment of the armed forces of a State and 
all the logistical requirements that such a contingency entails with regard 
to mobilisation and dispatch of troops to a certain area that may be 
81 See I'n r-a Second Title 
82 T. D. Gill, I Hague Y. I. L. 30 (1988), p. 50. 
83 Greenwood, International Law and the Air Operation against Libya, 89 W. Va. L. R. 933 
(1987), p. 945. 
84 Cot & Pellet op. cit. supra n. 22, p. 773; Dinstein op. cit. supra n. 22, p. 191. 
85 Dinstein op. cit. supra n. 22, pp. 220-221. 
86 Hansard Parliamentarti' Debates, H. C. 
, 
No 1239,2nd-Sth April 1982, p. 337 col. 637. 
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geographically remote. Moreover, the victim of the aggression may pursue 
a peaceful reversal of the effects of the aggression. The U. K. requested an 
emergency meeting of the Security Council upon the occurrence of the 
Argentine invasion and provoked the adoption of Security Council 
resolution 502 (1982) of 3 April 1982 calling on Argentina to withdraw her 
forces from the islands 87. An invocation of a necessity of self-defence is 
essential to be followed by measures revealing a high degree of expectancy 
and probability to put into effect; otherwise the right to resort to defensive 
force is thought to wane 88. To hold otherwise would mean that legitimate 
unilateral resort to force would lose its exceptional character and would 
appear as a form of enforcement (i. e. reprisal) exercised at will at any 
remote instance of time 
-a possibility that is not pertinent to the right of 
self-defence in any system of law and that would be destructive of the law. 
It is, furthermore, essential to have knowledge of an actual use of 
force that precedes and creates the defensive necessity, in order to avoid 
the general and, in this writer's view, extremely dangerous proposition 
that self-defence is admissible if all other peaceful alternatives are 
exhausted, whether it be through recourse to the Security Council or other 
peaceful means s9 
. 
While commentators taking the above view 
presuppose a prior occurrence of unlawful force they seem to imply that 
there is a duty of attempting to settle the dispute by peaceful means first 
and reserve action in self-defence as the last resort. This is very 
reminiscent of the theory'of armed reprisals and the rules for their 
exercise set by the Naulilaa Award 
. 
It is submitted that a necessity of self-defence is not and should not 
be part of the concept of pacific settlement of disputes. The latter 
constitutes an obligation ( rather than a prerequisite of using force ) that 
87 Letter dated 2 April 1982 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland to the president of the Security Council, Doc. S/ 14946, 
S. C. O. R. 37th yr. Suppl. for April-June 1982, p. 3; also see Doc. S/14947, ibid. p. 4. Such an 
attempt, if it involves recourse to the Security Council unavoidably entails the issue of 
whether the Council. has adopted "measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security" which involves according to Article 51 the obligation to cease action in self- 
defence. See infra 
. 88 C'Coru ell, The Ir /Thence of Law on Sea Power, 1975, p. 81; Macdonald, xxiv Can. Y. I. L. 
727 (1986), p. 152; cf. Schwarzenberger, 87 H. R. C. 195 (19551), p. 333. 
89 Co, ctra. Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict, 1954, p. 246; id. Aggression and 
World Order, 1958, p. 44; Dinstein op. cit. supra n. 22, p. 191; Roberts, 19 Case W. Res. J. I. L. 
243 (1987), p. 277; Intoccia, American Bombing of Libya: An International Legal Analysis, 19 
Case W. Res. J. I. L. 17/7 (1987), p. 201; Levenfeld, 21 Col. J. Trans. L. 1 (1982), pp. 20-21,34; 
Rostow, 11 Yale J. I. L. 437 (1985-86), p. 455. Cf. Nicaragua Case (per Judge Sclnoebel ) I. C. J 
Rep. 1986, p. 14, at pp. 363-365, paras 201-205; Skubiszewski loc. cit. in Sorensen (ed. ) op. 
cit. supra n. 41, pp. 774-775; McCredie, 19 Case W. Res. I. I. L. 215 (1987), p. 227. 
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aims at the elimination of the very eventuality 
- 
namely, the use of force 
to settle disputes 
- 
that itself gives rise to the exceptional necessity of self- 
defence go 
. 
To hold otherwise would amount in effect to a situation 
similar to the one under the Covenant of the League of Nations that is 
simply not the case under the United Nations Charter: The latter prohibits 
in unequivocal terms, and does not merely regulate the circumstances of, 
resort to force for the settlement of international disputes. 
Even when the right of self-defence was invoked when the 
necessity arose, force was used and then both the action and the 
invocation of the right ceased, either upon unilateral appraisal of the 
situation or by adherence to a Security Council call for a cease-fire ( after 
which the consideration of the situation came under its deliberation ), 
necessity of self-defence cannot be invoked with regard to the initial 
occurrence of force but only if the armed attack is renewed. What is 
required is a new resort to force that creates a "new" necessity of self- 
defence. In The Eilat incident that involved the sinking of an Israeli 
destroyer by U. A. R. missile batteries in the vicinity of Port Said in the 
aftermath of the Security Council sponsored cease-fire in the Six-Day War 
great significance was laid on whether The Eilat had penetrated inside 
U. A. R. territorial waters that would justify defensive action by the latter. 
According to the Indian representative in the Security Council "... 
[D]etermination of this fact has great importance in the context of Security 
Council resolution 236 (1967) which specifically prohibited any forward 
military 
-movements subsequent to the cease-fire... "91 
. 
In the so-called Yom Kippur War of 6 October 1973 Egypt and Syria 
attacked the Israel armed forces in occupation of the Sinai peninsula and 
the Golan Heights that constituted Egyptian and Syrian territories that 
were lost to Israel in the Six-Day War of 1967. The Egyptian and Syrian 
actions were justified as an exercise of the right of self-defence, not against 
the initial occupation of these territories in 1967, but against an alleged 
Israel attack upon the Egyptian and Syrian Army positions on the West 
bank of the Suez canal and the Golan Heights, respectively 92. 
90 While such eventuality was envisaged under Article 12 of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations it was not deemed as an exercise of the right of self-defence, and in any case, it is 
not admitted by the Charter of the United Nations, unless it is collective action by virtue of 
Chapter VII thereof 
- 
namely, sanctioned by the Security Council. See, for instance, S. C. 
Res. 678 (1990) of 30 October 1990. 
91 S. C. O. R. 22nd yr. 1369th mtg, para 92. 92 Letters dated 6 October 1973 from the representatives of Egypt ( Doc. S/ 11011 ) Syria 
Doc. S/ 11009 and Corr. 1) to the President of the Security Council, S. C. O. R. 28th yr. Suppl. 
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lt constitutes an abuse of the exceptional character of the right of 
self-defence and its usurpation as a right, if it is invoked to justify armed 
action that aims at returning to a territorial status quo ante that has been 
altered by a process of negotiation and conclusion of a treaty by 
subsequently denouncing the treaty. Any demand for reinstating the 
denouncing party into the position that it held before the repudiation of 
the treaty involves matters that arise out of the general issue of 
termination of treaties and the terms of the specific treaty itself 
,- 
both 
matters that are directly amenable to peaceful settlement and utterly 
foreign to any kind of urgency posed by a use of armed force. An 
illustration of such disingenuous invocation of self-defence is the 
outbreak of the eight-year long conflict between Iran and Iraq on 21 
September 1980. The underlying issue of the conflict was the question of 
sovereignty over the Shatt Al-Arab waterway= which is situated between 
the two States. By virtue of the Algiers Treaty of 1975 the common border 
between Iran and Iraq along the disputed waterway was the median line of 
the waterway's deepest channel rather than the previously accepted line 
running along the eastern ( Iranian ) bank of the Shatt Al-Arab. On 17 
September 1980 the Iraqi Government unilaterally abrogated the Algiers 
Treaty and announced that Iraq "... understood that the pre- 1975 position 
had been reinstated, thus rendering void the legal relationship governing 
the Iran 
- 
Iraq boundaries including Iraq's recovery of full control and 
sovereignty over the Shakt Al-Arab... " and the subsequent military action 
by Iraq on 21 September 1980 was justified as self-defence of Iraq's 
territorial integrity and reassertion of her right-, against Iran Qý 
. 
Mr 
\ lcfenry : speaking in the Security Council on behalf of the United States 
Government took the view that Iran and Iraq should immediately cease 
hostilities and adhere to the principle of non-acquisition of territory by 
force 94 
. 
adopted Resolution : 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973 calling for an immediate cease-fire and 
the majority of its Members felt that the dispute should be settled by peaceful means. 
9' Letter dated 24 September 1980 from the representative of Iraq to the President of the 
Security Council transmitting the letter dated 24 September 1980 from the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the President of the Security Council, Doc. S/ 14192, 
S. C. O. R. 35th yr. Suppl. for July-Sept. 1980, pp. 114-115; Letter dated 26 September 1980 
from the Secretary General to the President of the Security Council transmitting a letter 
dated 26 September 1980 from the President of Iraq to the Secretary General, Doc. S/ 14199, 
Ibid. 
, 
p. 119. 
94 U. N. Chronicle, vol. XVII, No 10 December 1980, p. 9. 
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3. (iii). The Characteristics of an Armed Attack. 
An armed attack that gives rise to the necessity of individual and 
collective self-defence consists of (i) a use of armed force against a State in 
violation of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter and the customary 
law principle of non-use of force, (ii) the author of which is a State and (iii) 
which is of such scale and effects as to constitute a threat to the target State 
in its entirety as a territorial, political and economic entity. 
3. (iii). a. The Use of Armed Force in violation of Article 2(4) 
. 
Elie necessity of forcible defensive action 
- 
whether in self-defence 
or proportionate counter-measures 
- 
arises against another actual use of 
force by another State which itself is not defensive. Self-defence is not 
permissible against seif-defence. 
State practice does not admit resort to force in self-defence in the 
absence of a prior unlawful use of forcea5. Thus, unfavourable economic 
policy on the part of a State that affects the economy of another or the 
existence of a certain political regime in a State which is different from 
that of another State or a group of States in a certain geographical region, 
do not warrant resort to armed force in self-defence. Article 5(1) of the 1974 
Definition of Aggression stipulates that "... [N]o consideration of whatever 
nature, whether political, economic, military or otherwise, may serve as a 
justification for aggression... ". 
11'itli regard to economic coercion it may be recalled that, on the 
one hand, it is not prohibited by Article 2(4) of the Charter, and on the 
other, it must be first established that a certain economic policy constitute 
a means of coercion against another State, rather than an exercise of the 
freedom to have economic relations with whatever State one wishes, 
\vhereupon it may constitute either unlawful intervention96 or a threat to 
international peace amenable to the consideration of the Security 
Council97. 
That State practice does not accept economic considerations as a 
legitimate ground of resort to force in self-defence can be illustrated by the 
9,5 The concept of anticipatory self-defence is discussed iriji-a in section 5. 
In this case, such eventuality may warrant proportionate and, certainly, non-forcible 
counter-measures. 
`'' See sepia Part One Chapter 5; also see Bowett op. cit. supra n. 17, pp. 113,114; Higgins, 
37 B. Y.!.!. ? ý, ý) (11)(, 1), p.. 301. 
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invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on 2 August 1990. In a Press release by the Press 
Office of the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in London dated 12 September 
1990, Kuwait has been accused of being the spearhead of an international 
conspiracy against Iraq aiming at waging "... economic war by flooding the 
International oil market with excessive oil production and without 
adherence to OPEC quotas. Their policy resulted in the sharp reduction of 
oil prices and consequently deprived Iraq of an important and desperate 
part of its resources in the aftermath of a very costly war and under the 
burden of heavy debts... "; furthermore, Kuwait was also accused of "... 
stealing oil from the Rimela South Field... " which extends across the Iraq- 
Kuwait border9" 
. 
The justification for the Iraqi action was not based on the 
right of self-defence but rather on the invitation by a so-called 
Revolutionary Government of Kuwait99. Even so, the economic grievance 
of Iraq seems to have such a prominent position in the crisis that erupted 
on 2 August 1990 that it appears to be central in the Iraqi Government case 
with regard to resorting to armed force ( under any justification) and may 
be held to be covered by the universal condemnation of the invasion100. 
A similar situation was invoked by the Indian representative in the 
Security Council with regard to the large numbers of Benghali refugees 
that fled to India from East Pakistan due to the operations conducted by 
the Pakistan Army, during the debate on the Indian military intervention 
in East Pakistan in December 1971. Mr. Sen, the representative of India 
argued: 
"... Now, was that not a kind of aggression? If aggression against another foreign 
country means that it strains its social structure, that it ruins its finances, that it has to give 
up its territory for sheltering the refugees......., what is the difference between that kind of 
aggression and the other type, the more classical type, when someone declares war or 
something of that sort? 
...... 
101 
However, later in the debate Mr. Sen presented the refugee issue as 
a case of humanitarian assistance in the face of the Pakistan Government 
allegations that the Indian Government was engaged in fomenting the 
secession of East Pakistan and in rendering material support to the 
98 Text in Lauterpacht & others (eds. ), The Kuwait Crisis 
- 
Basic Documents (1991), pp. 73, 
74; Memorandum dated 15 July 1990 from the Foreign Minister of Iraq, Mr. Tariq Aziz, to 
Secretary General of the Arab League, Keesing's 1990, p. 37631. 
99 S/ PV. 2932, text in Lauterpacht & others (eds. ) loc. cit. supra n. 98, p. 100. 
100 S. C. Res. 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990. Also See Greenwood, New World Order or Old? 
The Invasion of Kuwait and the Rule of Law, 55 Modern L. R. 153 (1992), p. 155. 
101 S. C. O. R. 26th yr. 1606th mtg 
, 
para 161. 
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insurgents102. Most delegates of the other Members of the Council did not 
deal with the refugee problem at all. Still the representative of Saudi 
Arabia stated that: 
".,. Although the refugees on Indian soil are a burden on India there is no excuse for 
championing a separatist movement inside the State of Pakistan 
... 
"103 
Political considerations that have given rise to the use of force 
purportedly in self-defence have arisen in the context of power-politics 
antagonism of the U. S. A. and the U. S. S. R. during the period of the so- 
called "Cold War" in the form of the so-called "doctrines" on foreign 
policy. 
In the case of the U. S. S. R. such policy is epitomised in the so-called 
Brezhnev Doctrine that "... the weakening of any link in the world 
socialist system has a direct effect on all the socialist countries, which 
cannot be indifferent to this... " 104. This particular foreign policy 
prerogative was first asserted as a form of self-defence in the military 
intervention of Czechoslovakia of 20-21 August 1968 by the combined 
armed forces of the U. S. S. R. 
, 
Poland, Hungary, East Germany and 
Bulgaria. Though the justification offered by the Soviet Government was 
in a considerable part rested on a prior request of assistance by the 
Czechoslovak Government, this was linked with the right of self-defence 
and the "... protection of the achievements of socialism... "; Mr. Malik, the 
Soviet representative in the Security Council stated: 
"... The decision of the socialist countries on rendering assistance to the 
Czechoslovak people is entirety in accordance with the right of States to individual and 
collective self-defence.... 
... 
The Warsaw Treaty steadfastly protects the achievements of socialism, the 
sovereignty and the independence of the fraternal socialist States... "105 
To this the representative of Senegal retorted: 
"... My Government regrets and condemns this intervention which despite the 
existence of the Warsaw Treaty, constitutes an interference in the internal affairs of 
Czechoslovakia, which was not threatened by any aggression from outside... "l06 
102 Ibid. 1607th mit 
, 
Para 173. 
103 Ibid. 1608th mtg, para 226. 
104 Tunkin, Theory of internahional Law, translation by Butler, 1974, pp. 435-436. This 
foreign policy doctrine has been abandoned in 1989 when the Soviet Union relinquished its 
political influence over the former Socialist States of Eastern Europe. See Keesing's 1989, 
pp. 36982,37105. 
105 S. C. O. R. 23rd yr. 1441st mtg 
, 
paras 3,90,92. 
106 Ibid. 1443rd mtg, para 19. 
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The U. S. A. position was formulated on a twofold basis. First, 
through statements of policy by certain Administrations according to 
which the creation of communist regimes ( that were invariably held to 
represent an extension of Soviet power ) was to be resisted, and, secondly, 
through the concept, that has been formulated during the 1980s, of the 
admissibility of the so-called pro-democratic intervention, namely, the use 
of military force to promote or restore democracy. Thus, President 
Truman introduced a policy of military and financial aid to countries the 
U. S. deemed they were threatened by communism 
- 
e. g. Greece and 
Turkey during the late 1940s and 1950s107. President Johnson said in the 
aftermath of the U. S. intervention in the Dominican Republic that his 
Government had resisted an attempt at creating a communist regime in 
the Western Hemisphere108. Furthermore, President Reagan asserted that 
the U. S. would oppose, if necessary by force, the direct or indirect 
expansion of Soviet power in certain, predesignated, geographical 
regions109 
. 
The above-mentioned statement was coupled on 1 March 1985 
with an assertion to intervene in order to restore democracy in Central 
America and the Caribbean> 10 
. 
Such policies, however, whenever they resulted in the use of armed 
force on the part of the U. S. 
, 
were always justified on the basis of the law 
on the use of force. Thus, the Dominican Republic and the Grenada 
actions were justified on the basis of prior request for assistance by the 
local Governments and of the protection of the lives of U. S. nationals. 
Self-defence was invoked with regard to the assistance provided to the 
Nicaraguan contras and in respect of the military operation in Panama on 
20 December 1989 that resulted in the overthrow of the country's ruler, 
General M. A. Noriega. In the case of the material assistance to the contra 
guerrillas, the U. S. Government argued that it constituted action in 
collective self-defence to assist the Government of EI-Salvador which was 
faced with a leftist insurgency allegedly assisted by the Government of 
Nicaragua. The issue was considered by the International 
107 P. Calvocoressi, World Poi'rticý since 1945,6th ed. 
, 
1991, p. 9 
108 52 Dept. State Bill. (1965), p. 822. 
109 M. Reisman, Old Wine in New Bottles: The Reagan and Brezhnev Doctrines in 
Contemporary International Law and Practice, 13 Yale J. I. L. 171 (1988), p. 172; also see id. 
loc. cit. in Damrosch & Scheffer (eds. ) op. cit. supra n. 73, pp. 29-36. 
110 This was apparently a reference to the U. S. intervention in Grenada in 1983 and the 
U. S. involvement in the civil strife in Nicaragua during the 1980's. Reisman loc. cit. supra 
n. 109, p. 180. 
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Court of Justice in the Nicaragua Case and it was ruled that on the basis of 
evidence the Nicaraguan Government was not guilty of providing 
material assistance to the Salvadorean guerrillas ( at least after 1981 ) and 
that even if it were that would not amount to an armed attack against El- 
Salvador; therefore, while only the latter would have to resort to 
proportionate counter-measures there was no basis for collective action in 
self-defence11 I. 
The Panama operation of 20 December 1989, on the other hand, was 
justified on the basis of Article 51 of the Charter as action for the 
protection of U. S. nationals and the Panama canal112 
. 
President Bush 
asserted an additional ground by stating that the U. S. operation aimed at 
the restoration of democracy in Panama and the bringing of the 
Panamanian ruler to justice for drug traffieking113 
. 
The Panamanian 
operation was deplored714 and it must be pointed that there had been no 
prior use of force against either the entirety of U. S. citizens or the canal's 15 
. 
lt is submitted that the so-called foreign policy "doctrines" are what 
their name indicates : statements of policy and not a "special type of 
international law" 111 
. 
The Court in the Nicaragua Case pointed that: 
... 
The United States authorities have on some occasions clearly stated their 
grounds for intervening in the affairs of a foreign State for reasons connected with, for 
example, the domestic policies of that country, its ideology, the level of its armaments, or 
the direction of its foreign policy. But these were statements of international policy and not 
an assertion of rules of existing international law... 117 
In 
-, o far as they purport to constitute instances of State practice they 
are either justified on the basis of existing rules of international law or on 
the basis of new ones. It appears that the former situation has prevailed for 
both the U. S. A. and the U. S. S. R. have attempted to justify their actions on 
the basis of exceptions to the general rule of the prohibition of the use of 
force, with the right of self-defence having been allocated a prominent 
111 I. C. J. Rep. 19`86, p. 14, at pp. 119,120,12: 7, paras 230,232-233,249. 
112 L. N. Chronicle, vol. xxvii, No 1 March 1990, p-. 67. 
113 Keesing's 1989, p. 37112. 
114 G. A. Res. 44/ 240 of 29 December 1989 (75: 20: 40 ); O. A. S. Res. of 22 December 1989 (20 : 
1: 6), Keesing's i9S9, p. 37113. 
11 r' (ý one L; 
-S. citizen was reported to 
have been killed as a result of the hostile policy 
of the Panamanian Government towards the U. S. See generally, Notes by Nanda, Farer, 
D'Annato in Agora: Li S. Forces in Panama: Defenders, Aggressors or Human Rights 
Activists? 
, 
84 A. J. I. L. 494-524 (1990) ; Quigley, The Legality of the United States Invasion 
of Panama, 15 Yale J. I. L. 276 (1990) ; Henkin, The Invasion of Panama Under International 
Law: A Gross Violation, 29 Col. J. Trans. L. 293 (1991), 
116 Conit-a. Reisman loc. cit. sopra n. 109, p. 183. 
117 1. C. 1. Rep. 1986, p. 14, at p. 109, Para 207. 
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position. Thus, the Court in the Nicaragua Cace ruled in relation to the 
assistance to the contras 
... 
the United States has not claimed that its intervention which it justified in this 
way on the political level, was also justified on the legal level, alleging the existence of a 
new right of of intervention regarded by the United States as existing in such 
circumstances.... the United States has on the legal plane, justified its intervention 
expressly and solely by reference to the "classic" rules involved, namely, collective self- 
defence against an armed attack... 118 
While both the Soviet and the U. S. "doctrines" presuppose a claim 
for at least non-forcible interventionary policy, and are in this respect 
identical in nature, they have encountered substantial opposition by third 
States and by each of their proponents against the actions of the other. It is 
submitted that this can be considered both as a case of persistent objection 
and as a case of inconsistency of practice that are prejudicial to the 
formation of a new rule of international law119 
. 
As to the legitimacy of pro-democratic intervention it is submitted 
that its admission as an exception to the rule of nori-use of force would 
undermine international peace, because it implies that a not 
uncontroversial concept like "democracy" would serve as the basis for 
armed intervention against another State giving States the licence to 
overthrow Governments simply on a unilateral assessment and according 
to very subjective standards of what a democratic Government is. This 
would virtually annul the rule of Article 2(4) of the Charter and the 
necessity of any exception to itl20 
A necessity of self-defence is also absent where State activity is 
exercised as part of its jurisdiction over persons and property. The problem 
has arisen with regard to suggestions 
118 ibid. p. 109, para 208. 
119 Wright, 53 A. J. I. L. 112 (1959), p. 117; Henkin, 216 H. R. C. 19 (1989 IV), pp. 152-153; cf. 
Reisman loc. cit. supra n. 109, pp. 184,197. 
120 Nicaragua Case, I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, at p. 124, para 241; Schachter, The Legality of 
Pro-Democratic Invasion, 78 A. J. I. L. 645 (1984), pp. 647-648; Henkin, 216 H. R. C. 79 (7989 
1 V), p. 153; D'Amato, Nicaragua and International Law: The Academic and the Real, 79 
ý. J. I. L. 657 (7985), p. 658; Henkin, The Invasion of Panama Under International Law: A 
Gross Violation, 29 Cal. J. Tmf(S. L. 293 (1991), pp. 297-300 ; Nanda, Commentary on 
International Intervention to Promote the Legitimacy of Regimes, in Damrosch & Scheffer 
(eds. ) op. cit. supra n. 73, pp. 181,183; Franck, Intervention against Illegitimate Regimes, 
in Damrosch & Scheffer (eds. ) op. cit. supra n. 73, pp. 159-170; Contra. Reisman, Coercion 
and Self-Determination: Construing Charter Art. 2(4), 78 A. J. I. L. 642 (1984); J. Kirkpatrick, 
The Use of Force in the Law of Nations ( Review Essav ), 16 Yale J. I. L. 583 (1991), p. 594; 
A. D. Sofaer, The Legality of the United States Action in Panama, 29 Col. J. Trans. L. 281 
(1991), pp. 288-290. 
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of a general right of self-defence on the high seas121 
. 
In so far as the right 
is exercised for repelling a use of force against an individual vessel then it 
is generally considered as an admissible use of force122, which, it must be 
stressed, does not represent self-defence of the State as a whole and should 
be characterised as proportionate counter-measure. When, however, self- 
defence is asserted independently of any immediate necessity arising from 
a use of force then it comes very close to the exercise of State jurisdiction, 
which is strictly prescribed in law in relation to the high seas ( viz. Art. 22 
of 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas and Art. 110(1) of the 1982 
Law of the Sea Convention) and it is to be discharged only with regard to 
the specific instances laid out in the above provisions. Invocation of the 
right of self-defence, on the other hand, has the result of absolving the 
State acting under its cover from responsibility for an otherwise unlawful 
act and only with regard to an immediate necessity that usually arises due 
to the use of force. To apply this function of self-defence in the context of 
jurisdiction on the high seas would render any need for specific grounds 
for its exercise nugatory and would promote abuse and conflict in an area 
of great significance for the majority of States. State practice does not 
support such an assertion of self-defence. In 1956 during the Algerian War 
of Independence the French Government by virtue of the Algeria State of 
Emergency Decree of 17 March 1956 asserted the right of visit and search of 
other States' shipping on the high seas. The French justification was 
inconsistent and was based either on the doctrine of contiguous zone or 
on the right of self-defence; on the other hand the French action was met 
by universal opposition and it must be held not to have contributed to the 
creation of a rule of customary law123. 
3. (iii). b. Use of Armed Force by a State against another State. 
It is submitted that only a use of armed force by a State against 
another State constitutes an armed attack and hence a ground for the 
exercise of self-defence. Consequently, the use of force by the Government 
of a State against a group of individuals that have risen in revolt against it 
121 Bowett op. cit. supra n. 17, pp. 66-86. 
122 O'Connell, International Law of the Sea, vol. ii, ed. by I. A. Shearer, Oxford, 1984, p. 
804; Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 22, p. 305; A. V. Lowe, Self-Defence at Sea, in Butler (ed. ) op. 
cit. supra n. 21, pp. 188-189. 
123 O'Connell, The Influence of Lain on Sea Power, 1975, p. 123. 
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does not constitute a case of self-defence for it is not, in any case, a 
violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter. 
Forcible response against an insurgency that is assisted by another 
State or it is based on the territory of another State, and is itself the author 
of the use of force in the sense that it is not under the complete control of 
the assisting Government and that it resorted to armed force on its own 
devices constitutes the basis for forcible response by way of proportionate 
counter-measures. The same is true for the use of force to protect the 
armed force-, of an administering power from attack by units of a national 
liberation movement124 
It is Only where a State is the author of the use of force that force 
can be used against it in self-defence125 
. 
This is in accordance with Article 
2(4) that prohibits the use of force by States only and of Article 51 that 
speaks of an armed attack against a Member of the United Nation., 
namely a Statel26 
. 
Conversely, groups that have not constituted 
themselves into statehood in an area under the administration of another 
State, do not have the right of self-defence because they are not in the first 
place prohibited from using force127. When, however, the foreign 
administration has been relinquished and effective control has been 
established by the indigenous group then the rule-, of the prohibition of 
force and the exception of self-defence are thought to apply 
- 
e. g. S. Korea, 
South Viet- Nam, Israei1'`` 
3. (iii). c. "Scale and Effects. " of a Use of Axmed Force that constitutes 
an Armed Attack. 
The "scale" of a use of armed force may be held to imply the 
material intensity and the geographical extension of this use of force. So 
far as its perpetrator is concerned, the material intensity of a use of armed 
force depends on considerations of logistics and teclulology. Therefore, 
124 See supra Part One, Ch.. 6. 
125 Brownlie op. cit. suprz n. 22, p. 375. 
126 Linnan, 7 hh Vale J. J. L. 245 (7991), p. 309. Ci 
. 
A. K. Fletcher, Pirates and Smugglers: An 
Analysis of the Use of Abductions to Bring Drug Traffickers to Trial, 32 Va J. I. L. 
. 
233 (1991), 
p 259-261. 
1' Supra n. 124 
12? Article 1, Explanatory Note (a) of the 1974 Definition of Aggression; Memorandum of 
the U. S. State Dept., Legality of the United States Participation in the Defence of Viet- 
Nam, 4 March 1964, in R. Falk (ed. ), The Viet- Nara War and International Laww, vol. 1, 
1968, p. 583, at pp. 587-8; McDougal & Feliciano op. cit. supra n. 22, p. 221. 
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with regard to the land, naval and air forces of a State, whether a specific 
use of force amounts to an armed attack would depend on either the 
numerical strength of the forces involved or the amount of fire power 
unleashed or both. Thus, the 
penetration of a platoon of the armed forces of a State inside another 
State's territory at one point of their common border, or the sinking of a 
coast guard patrol boat by a destroyer of another State, or the strafing by a 
jet fighter of a frontier post of another State, would not in this writer's 
view constitute a case of an armed attack. By contrast, the 
penetration of an army division or divisions along the full or considerable 
length of the common border between two States, or the sinking of a 
number of units of a State's navy, or the aerial bombardment by a large 
number of aircraft of the cities, industrial and military installations of a 
State are generally taken to constitute classical cases of armed attack. 
However, technological advances in the manufacturing of weapons that 
aim at enhancing their destructive power may be held to identify the use 
of certain weapons as an armed attack. Consequently, resort to force by way 
of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons seems to fall within this 
category. Moreover, the launching of long-range missiles against the 
territory of another State 
- 
such as the Iraqi missile attack on Israel of 17 
January 1991 
-, 
the drop of fuel or cluster bombs, may be held to constitute 
cases of armed attack. 
The likelihood of widespread destruction brings discussion to the 
requirement of "effects" of a use of force so as to constitute an armed 
attack. The term refers to the consequences of the use of force with regard 
to the State against which it is used. It is submitted that for a use of force to 
constitute an armed attack it must be directed against another State as such 
and must be prejudicial to the existence of the State as a whole. Thus, a use 
of force that is aimed at the territorial integrity of a State (in the sense of 
mere occupation of territory or acquisition of territory ), its political 
independence ( viz. the forcible overthrow of the Government of a State ), 
the destruction of its security or economic infrastructure ( namely, the use 
of force against the armed forces of a State, industrial and resources 
production cites ) merits to be considered an armed attack because its 
natural outcome is in all probability to impair the locus stand[ of a State as 
a sovereign territorial and political unit. 
Again, the above submission must ultimately undergo an 
examination in a "case by case" manner. Thus, factual considerations 
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pertaining to the size of the territory of a State, the size of its armed forces, 
the main industry that provides a substantial part of the income of a State, 
the number of the installations of a particular industry, must be taken into 
account. Therefore, the incursion of an army regiment in the territory of 
the People's Republic of China cannot be considered an armed attack while 
it is the opposite case with regard to the principality of Monaco. 
Furthermore, the destruction of an oil refinery in Saudi Arabia may not be 
an armed attack while the destruction of the Beira oil facilities in 
Mozambique by Rhodesian commandos on 23 March 1979 and the 
attempted destruction by the South African army of the Gulf Oil storage 
installation in the Cabinda province of North Eastern Angola on 21 May 
1985 ( had it been successful) would merit to be treated as such due to 
their importance to the economies of these countries and the fact that they 
constituted the only facilities of such industry. 
There is no general agreement in authority about the existence of 
the "scale and effects" factor and this rather seems to be due to either a 
reluctance to accept armed attack as the only factor giving rise to the 
necessity of individual and collective self-defence or exclusive reliance on 
the requirement of proportionality l2° 
. 
The "scale and effects" factor has beeil adopted b. -,, - the Court in the 
Nicaragua Calf, in dealing with the concept of armed attack in the context 
of the activities of armed bands and State involvement therein130 
. 
The 
Court relied on the 1974 Definition of Aggression and more specifically 
on Article 3(g) thereof that is pertinent to the activities of armed bands 
against a State. The reference to the Definition of Aggression does not 
seem to constitute an identification of aggression with the concept of 
armed attack. While the Court stressed that according to Art. 3(g) an armed 
attack could be waged by indirect means the relevant passage of its 
Judgment does not indicate that Article 3(g), or, rather, Art. 3 of the 
129 Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 22, pp. 367-368; id. 37 B. Y. I. L. 783 (7961), p. 258; Dinstein op. 
cit. supra n. 22, p. 182; N. D. White, ix Intern. Rel. 535 (1989), p. 541, n. 28. However, support 
for the "scale and effects" factor may be inferred by some authority. See Pompe op. cit. 
supra n. 22, pp. l03-104; Rifaat op. cit. supra n. 22, p. 125;; Laanberti Zanardi loc. cit. in 
Cassese (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 56, p. 112; Falk, 75 `vale L. J. 7722 (7%6), p. 1123 n. 7; id. 76 
Yale L. J. 1095 (1967), pp. 1102 1104, cf ibid. pp. 1124-5,1140-2; Farer, 67 Col. L. R. 266 
(7967), p. 276; id. 81 A. I. I. L. 772 (1987), p. 113-114; Kolesnik loc. cit. in Butler (ed. ) op. cit. 
supra n. 21, pp. 154-155; Skubiszewski loc. cit. in Sorensen (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 22, p. 777; 
Broms, 154 Ii. R. C. 305 (1977 1), p. 346; Shapira, 6 Israel L. R. 65 (19,71), p. 72; Gill, 1 Hague 
Y. I. L. 30 (1988), p. 50, but cf. p. 51; Rowles, 80 A. J. I. L. 568 (1986), pp. 579-580; 
Higginbotham, 25 Col. J. Trans. L. 529 (1987), pp. 548,555-6. 
130 Supra n. 73. 
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Definition as a whole constitutes a statement of instances of armed attacks. 
It is submitted that it is, rather, a statement of the modality that an armed 
attack may take provided that the specific manner of its execution ( 
namely, as to its scale and effects ) is present. This is supported by Art. 2 of 
the Definition which provides that a first use of armed force by a State may 
not be determined as "aggression" by the Security Council because of the 
circumstances of its occurrence "... including the fact that the acts 
concerned or their consequences are not of sufficient gravity... " 
The said passage seems to imply that the notions of armed attack 
and aggression are identicall31 
. 
However, it must not be overlooked that 
Art. 2 of the Definition refers to determination by the Security Council 
under Chapter VII of the Charter on whether collective action should be 
undertaken by the Organisation against the State that perpetrated a use of 
armed force. Article 39 of the Charter gives the Council a wide discretion 
to decide on collective measures if there is deemed to exist a threat to the 
peace, a breach of peace or an act of aggression. If action by the Security 
Council is all that matters and if such action is to be set in train because of 
the existence of any of the above contingencies the specific nature of an 
actual use of force on the ground seems to be immaterial as far as the 
Security Council is concerned. Indeed, the Council may conceivably take 
into account factors such as the policies of the Government or the military 
planning of the armed forces of the State that resorted to force in a fashion 
similar to the Military Tribunal for the Far East with regard to the Lake 
Khassan (1938) and Nomohan (1939) incidents between the armed forces 
of Japan and the U. S. S. R. ; although both events were considered as 
frontier incidents at the time of their occurrence, the Tribunal ruled that 
they constituted aggressive war on the part of Japan 32 
. 
At the same time, 
however, a claim of use of force in self-defence is made unilaterally by a 
State with regard to a use of armed force against it. According to Art. 1 of 
the Definition of Aggression, "aggression" is a use of armed force and 
whether the latter amounts to an "armed attack" or not, is a matter which 
is in the first instance beyond the powers of the Security Council under 
Article 39 of the Charter. It is a question of the existence of the objective 
131 Broms loc. cit. supra n. 129. 
132 Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 22, pp. 210-211; It must not be overlooked that the Definition 
of Aggression is purported to be used by the Security Council as guidance for the discharge of 
its functions under Chapter VII of the Charter. See Preambular para 4 of G. A. Res. 3314 
(XXIX) and Preambular para 2 of the main text of the Definition of Aggression annexed to 
G. A. Res. 3314 (XXIX). 
247 
criteria of "scale and effects" of the use of force that will determine the 
existence of a necessity of self-defence, the propriety of collective self- 
defence and will assist the Security Council to judge whether claims of 
self-defence are really cogent and do not serve as a guise for aggression133. 
In view of the fact that when a breach of peace happens it is often 
justified as self-defence on the part of both participants, then the 
requirement of the scale and effects of a resort to force acquires great 
importance for both the claim of defensive necessity and the subsequent 
examination of such a claim by the Security Council. It is submitted that if 
the above passage of Art. 2 of the Definition of Aggression is viewed in 
this light then its importance goes beyond the area of the powers of the 
Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter and may well be 
considered as a statement of customary international 1aw134. 
The requirement that the effects of a use of force that amounts to an 
armed attack must be an actual danger to the existence of a State as a whole 
inevitably leads to the conclusion that the State author of the armed attack 
intends to deliver a devastating blow to the target State. However, it is 
submitted that such intent should not be identified with an ani in us 
aggression is analogous to the concept of inens rea of criminal law. This is 
a notion that is virtually impossible to establish with regard to a State and 
its Government at the time when force is unleashed and when claims of 
self-defence are asserted. It implies reliance on the stated position of the 
party that resorts to force) that inevitably becomes the judge and advocate 
of its own intentiünl35 
. 
Rather, the intent of the use of force should be 
inferred by the purport of the act itself, when it actually takes place, and 
claims of lack of animus aggressionis ( pertinent with regard to the legally 
dubious concept of anticipatory self-defence ) are best dealt with by third 
party examination such as the Security Council or adjudication] 36. 
Furthermore, the scale and effects of a use of force as a requirement of its 
characterisation as an armed attack has the merit of being a factor that can 
be objectively ascertained by third States and the Security Council. This 
133 Article 51 stipulates that measures of self-defence should be brought to the attention of 
the Security Council which eventually will adopt measures for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. See infra sub-section 3. C. (vi) and section VI. 
134 Nicaragua Case (Merits) 
, 
ICJ. Rep. 1986, p. 14, at pp. 99,103, paras 188,195. 
135 Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 22, pp. 377-378. 
136 Pompe op. cit. supra n. 22, pp. 103-104; Broms, 154 H. R. C. 305 (1977 1), p. 346. Contra. 
Stone, Conflict Through Consenisus, 1977, pp. 43,44-45; Schwebel, Aggression, Intervention 
and Self-Defence in Modern International Law, 136 H. R. C. 419 (1972 1II), pp. 469-470; Cf 
. 
McDougal & Feliciano op. cit. supra n. 22, pp. 175-176. 
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entails the advantage that claims by the victim State that is the victim of 
an armed attack may be objectively weighed against the background of the 
actual event of armed force against it and may influence the attitude of its 
allies with regard to invoking the right of collective self-defence. 
3. (iii). d. The Commencement of an Armed Attack. 
The question of when an armed attack has started is essential for the 
invocation of a necessity of self-defence and for dispensing with claims of 
anticipatory self-defence. According to Brownlie "... [T]he question which 
should be posed is not when is anticipatory action justified but when has 
an armed attack occurred ?.... "137. Similarly, Dinstein has submitted that 
"... since self-defence is linked to an armed attack, it is important to 
pinpoint the exact moment at which an armed attack beging to take 
place... "138 
The question is relevant to the so-called "priority principle", 
namely, that the State that resorts to force first is to be deemed the 
perpetrator of aggression. Although the priority principle seems to be 
inherent in the context of armed attack and self-defence it poses certain 
problems if it is strictly applied. 
First, when a conflict breaks out between two States it is not always 
clear which State resorted to force first. At the outbreak of the Six-Day war 
both Egypt and Israel asserted that they had been attacked by the other 
country firsts 3y 
. 
Secondly, because of the fact that the priority principle seems to 
apply to any use of force, it does not take into account the scale and effects 
of a use of force as requirement of an armed attack and this may be held to 
be of little contribution to the question of what constitutes an armed 
attack. Inuring the work of the Special Committee on the Question of 
Defining Aggression in 1956 the Soviet Union proposed a draft definition 
of Aggression according to which the priority principle would be the sole 
ground for identifying the aggressor; at the same time frontier incidents 
I- Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 22, p. 367; id 37 B. Y. I. L. 183 (7061), p. 258. 
136 Dinstein op. cit. supra n. 22, p. 176. 
139 Stone, Conflict Through Consensus, 7977, p. 45; Schwebet loc. cit. supra n. 136, pp. 464- 
465; Dinstein op. cit. supra n. 22, pp. 176-177. 
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were excluded as justifications for defensive force, without, however, 
specifying what constituted a frontier incident140. 
Thirdly, the priority principle in its srictest form, namely, the actual 
use of fire power on the ground does not seem to take into consideration 
either situations of violations of a State's territory which are 
unaccompanied by the firing of weapons141 or the tremendous advance in 
technology of weapons production, such as missiles. O'Connell has 
pointed out in relation to naval operational planning that: 
... 
weapon systems are so instantaneously activated and homing or guidance systems 
are, in theory at least, so accurate and their terminal impact so destructive, and design of 
modern warships affords so little possibility for damage control, that the victim may well 
be deprived of the capacity for self-defence and the assailant of the capacity of graduated 
force.... 142 
Lastly, the 1974 Definition of Aggression has not adopted the rigid 
formulation of the priority principle and has linked it with the effects of 
the act of force on the ground. Article 2 of the Definition provides that "... 
The first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall 
constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression 
... 
"743 
. 
It is submitted that the point of commencement of an armed attack 
is dependent upon the means by which it is carried out, provided that the 
requirement of "scale and effects" is manifest during its execution. This 
means that a train of events is set in motion that leads to the forcible 
trespass of another State'sv territorial integrity, political independence, 
economic and security infrastructure. This train of events has in the 
majority of cases of State practice ended with the use of open violence. The 
question that arises is at which precise point of this series of events, and 
prior to the outbreak of armed violence, should the starting point of an 
armed attack be placed. Dinstein suggests that the embarking "... on an 
irreversible course of action... " is the crucial point of the commencement 
of an armed attack and that the issue is reduced to "... not whether war 
would materialise but when... "144 
. 
He places great importance, by 
reference to the air attack on the U. S. fleet in Pearl Harbour in 1941 and the 
events preceding the Six-Day wýý ar of 1967, on remote events that, in the 
140 See criticism by the representative of the Netherlands, Report of the Special 
Committee, Doc. A/ 3574, G. A. O. R. 12th sess. Suppl. No 16, p. 19, para 151. 
141 Dinstein op. cit. supra n. 22, p. 178. 
142 O'Connell, The Influence of Law on Sea Power, 1975, p. 70; Jimenez de Arechaga, 159 
H. R. C. 9 (1978 1), p. 97; Linnan, 16 Yale J. I. L. 245 (1991), p. 338. 
143 Italics original. 
144 Op. cit. supra n. 22, pp. 179-181. 
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former case, did precede the air strike] 45, and in the latter, constituted the 
totality of the Egyptian Government policy in late May 1967146, as 
conclusively establishing that both Japan and Egypt had committed 
themselves "... to an attack in an ostensibly irrevocable way... "147 
. 
Action 
against Japan would have been and against Egypt was lawful in what he 
calls "Interceptive Self-Defence" which, unlike anticipatory self-defence or 
pre-emptive strike, is resorted to not against a "foreseeable" attack but 
against an attack "... which is imminent and practically unavoidable 
... 
11148 
Dinstein concedes that "... [T]he invocation of the right of self-defence 
must be weighed on the basis of the information available at the moment 
of action without the benefit of post factuum wisdom 
... 
11149 
. 
Dinstein's thesis warrants certain observations. First, to say that 
action in self-defence is legitimately resorted to before the actual outbreak 
of violence on the part of the purported aggressor against an armed attack 
which is already in progress merely begs the question of which specific 
prior event is to be taken as the point where an armed attack starts. With 
regard to the Japanese attack in Pearl Harbour Dinstein is right to assert 
that had the U. S. attacked the Japanese carrier group first it Would have 
been "... a miraculously early use of counter force 
... 
"150 
, 
because what 
seems very logical to suggest in the safety of an ex post facto assessment 
half a century later, would require the U. S. A. to exhibit such powerful 
speculation that would reach the point of divine inspiration. State practice 
is pertinent to what States really do or do not do, and in the case of Pearl 
Harbour the U. S. A. did nothing; what she could have done or would have 
done is simply immaterial. 
Secondly, the notion of Interceptive self-defence seems to 
constitute a brave attempt at admitting the legality of anticipatory self- 
defence which also requires an "imminent" armed attack, by simply 
devising a new term. As for the Six-Day war it is treated by commentators 
as the classical case of anticipatory self-defence in the post-Charter era. 
Suffice it to mention at this stage that Israel did not invoke the right of 
145 Namely, the departure of the Japanese air carrier task force. 
14" Viz. the inflammatory statements by President Nasser as to the destruction of the 
State of Israel, the request for the withdrawal of U. N. E. F. from the Sinai and the closure 
of the Straits of Tiran. 
147 Op. cit. supra n. 22, p. 180. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Ibid. 
, 
p. 181. 
150 Ibid. 
, 
p. 180. 
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anticipatory self-defence in June 1967, but claimed that she had been 
subject to open violence on the part of Egyptl51 
. 
It is submitted that the starting point of an armed attack is 
dependent on the means by which it is carried out and consists of either 
the moment when open violence erupts or the event which though does 
not in itself constitute a case of open armed force, it can only be objectively 
followed, because of its nature, by armed violence. Thus, the departure of a 
naval task force from its station is not the beginning of an armed attack, 
while the launch of a missile or the crossing of the frontier of a State by 
the armed units of another is. 
3. (iii). e. Consideration of Specific Instances of Use of Force that may 
amount to an Armed Attack. 
Instances of use of force in State practice that may amount, because 
of their scale and effects, to an armed attack, may be found in the 
illustrative Article 3 of the 1974 Definition of Aggression which provides 
that: 
Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, subject to and in 
accordance with the provision of Article 2, qualify as an act of aggression: 
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another 
State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or 
attack, or am- annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part 
thereof; 
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another 
State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State; 
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another 
State; 
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land sea or air forces, or marine 
and air fleets of another State; 
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the the territory of 
another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions 
provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the 
termination of the agreement; 
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the 
disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of 
aggression against a third State; 
(g) The sending by, or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or 
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to 
amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein. 152 
151 See statement by Mr. Rafael, the representative of Israel in the Security Council, 
before the Council on 5 June 1967, S. C. O. R. 22nd yr. 1347th mtg, para 30. See infra section on 
Anticipatory Self-Defence. 
152 See also Article 4 of the Definition which stipulates that: 
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It can be submitted that Article 3 reflects customary international 
law. 'l he Court in the Nicara; uffl Case has so ruled with regard to 
paragraph (g) that is pertaining to the consideration of the case before it] 53 
if this is- the case with regard to use of force perpetrated by armed groups 
then the brief comparison that the Court drew between action by armed 
bands and that by regular armed forces of a State ( that constitutes the 
classical case of use of force ) militates for considering paragraphs (a-f) as 
also reflecting customary law. The subsequent part of this section shall 
deal with a number of such instances of use of force which are mainly 
cited in Article 3 of the Definition of Aggression. 
1. Declaration of war; the existence of a State of war; initiation of an armed 
conflict. 
In classical international law a declaration of war was thought to 
bring about a state of war in the legal 
Article 2(4) of the Charter and the Definition of Aggression lay 
emphasis, rather on the actual use of material force against a State. 
It is, therefore, submitted that a declaration of war xvhich is 
unaccompanied by actual resort to force should be treated as a threat to 
peace or threat of force or breach of peace and it should be brought to the 
consideration of the Security, Council, rather than being considered as an 
armed attackl. sa 
On the other hand a declaration of war that in unequivocal terms, 
states an intention to attack, if accompanied by acts that reveal that an 
153 I. C. ]. Rep. 1986, p. 14, at p. 103, para 195. 
153bß- Supf- a Part Orte 
, 
Ch. 1. 
154 Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, Doc. A/8019, 
G. A. O. R. 25th sess. Suppl. No 19, pp. 38 (para 103), 39 (paras 104-107), 40; Broms, The 
Definition of Aggression, ? 54 H. R. C. 305 (79/77 1), p. 347. Prior to the U. S. invasion of 
Panama, the Panamanian National Assembly declared, on 15 December 1989, war on the 
U. S. A. because of the economic sanctions of the latter against Panama. President Bush 
relied on that fact in justif)"ing the U. S. action of 20 December 1989 as exercise of the right 
of self-defence. I iowever, there was no indication that Panama took subsequent measures of 
armed force in carrying out its declaration of war against the U. S. A. See Keesing's 1989, p. 
37112; Quigley, 15 Yale I. I. L. 276 (1990), pp. 282,286-7; Henkin, The Invasion of Panama 
Under International Law :A Gross Violation, 29 Col. 1. Trans. L. 293 (1991), pp. 301-2. 
Contra 
. 
A. D. Sofaer, The Legality of the United States Action in Panama, 29 Col. J. Trans. 
L. 281 (1991), pp. 284-5. 
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attack is being mounted, may be held to justify resort to force in self- 
defence. 
The starting point of the armed attack in this case is not the 
declaration of war itself but rather the acts that purport to put the intent 
formulated therein into effect. Thus, the event that would have as its 
immediate next step a use of armed force on the part of the State that 
declared war, such as the approaching of naval units or aircraft to the 
territory of the target State, or the occurrence of fighting along the land 
mass of the target Statel55. 
The existence of a state of war, that under the pre-Charter law was 
brought about by a declaration of of war or a statement to that effect, and 
it-, maintenance for a long period of time may be indicative of hostile 
tension between two State-, 
- 
see, for instance, the state of war that existed 
between Albania and Greece from 1949 
- 
1985. So far as there are no acts of 
force, then it should be treated as a threat to peace or breach of peace and 
this would depend in its turn on the precise level of tension at a certain 
point of time during the state of war period. Equivocal acts on the part of 
either of the parties to the state of war situation could be treated as the 
starting point of an armed attack only if their next immediate stage would 
lead to open violence and only if such acts are expressly rationalised by 
reference to the existence of a state of war. 
On 7 June 1981 the Israel Air Force launched an air strike and 
destroyed C)SIR-\K, the Iraqi nuclear reactor, situated in the suburbs of the 
Iraqi capital Baghdad. One of the grounds justifying the action that were 
offerred by the Israel Government was the existence of a -state of Nvar 
between Israel and Iraq since 1948156 
. 
Israel, however, referred to the 
existence of a state of wear in conjunction with the right of so-called 
"anticipatory self-defence" that seemed to be considered directly pertinent 
to the act of force itself 15-/, 
. 
Moreover, the Israel action was dealt with by 
the representatives of the other Members of the Council strictly by 
reference to the admissibility of anticipatory --, elf-defence rather than the 
admissibility of armed action against Iraq because of the existence of a state 
of war r98 
. 
155 Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 22, pp. 367368. 
156 S. C. O. R. 36th yr. 2280th mtg, paras 63-67; Dinstein op. cit. supra n. 22, p. 176. 
15' Ibid. paras 97-100; 2288th mtg, paras 81-85 but cf. para 86 in which Ambassador 
Blum, the Israel representative in the Security Council, linked the Israel action with the 
general background of the Arab 
- 
Israel conflict. 
158 Cf. Greenwood, The Concept of War in Modern International Law, 36 I. C. L. Q. 283 
p. 303. 
254 
It is submitted that, by virtue of Articles 2(4) and 51 of the Charter, 
what really matters, in case of a declaration of war or the existence of s 
state of war, is not the existence alone of those contingencies that gives an 
unlimited licence to resort to force as exercise of belligerent rights but 
rather the existence of factors admitting recourse to force in self-defence. 
This how the Israeli air strike on OSIRAK was both presented by Israel and 
treated by other States. 
The same position seems to exist in case of claims of belligerency in 
the aftermath of the cessation of hostilities by the conclusion of an 
armistice agreement. By virtue of Security Council resolution 95 (1951) of 1 
September 1951 that was adopted pursuant to a complaint by Israel with 
regard to the restrictions imposed by Egypt to all Israel bound shipping 
passing through the Suez canal. The 6th preambular paragraph of the 
resolution provides that 
".... since the armistice regime, which has been in existence for nearly two and a 
half years, is of permanent character, neither party can reasonably assert that it is 
actively a belligerent or requires to exercise the right of visit, search and seizure for any 
legitimate purpose of self-defence... " 
Egypt justified her interference with shipping through the Suez 
canal on the basis of the existence of a state of war with Israel and the 
necessity of self-defence159 
. 
During the debate at the Security Council, Sir 
Gladti,, 
-yn Jebb, the representative of the U. K. stated that 
"... If Egypt were involved in actual hostilities, it would no doubt be justified in 
taking measures for its own defence. This not, however, the situation at present time. 
Hostilities are not in progress and have not been in progress for two and a half 
years. It cannot even be maintained that Egypt is under any imminent threat of attack from 
Israel. We must therefore conclude that the claim to exercise belligerent rights for the 
defence of Egypt cannot be now sustained... " 160 
While considerations of jus ad belluin and the right of self-defence 
can be said to represent the present state of the lave with regard to 
initiation. of hostilities under a state of war or in the aftermath of an 
armistice, this does not seem to be the case with regard to the conduct of 
active hostilities once force has been resorted to in self-defence. In other 
words it does not appear that the conduct of hostilities is to conform to the 
requirements of self-defence rather than the rules of the jus in bello 
. 
159 S. C. O. R. 6th yr. 550th mtg, paras 23-32,33 et seq. 
, 
42-43. 
16O Ibid. paras 93-94. 
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While there is agreement in theory and practice with regard to land 
warfare, controversy has arisen in respect of armed conflict at sea and the 
exercise of belligerent rights against neutral shipping. It is argued that 
because of the incompatibility of a "state of war" with the Charter, a state 
of war cannot be proclaimed 161 
, 
and that the Hague Conventions of 1907 
on Naval Warfare cannot be applied in the post-Charter era because they 
are deemed to be applied in cases of a state of war 162 
. 
State practice is 
characterised by paucity and the sole instance of such practice in relying on 
the right of self-defence can be found in the Falklands conflict of 1982. On 2 
April 1982 the Argentine armed forces invaded and occupied the 
Falkaland Islands over which the U. K. had exercised sovereignty since 
1830. The U. K. conducted the campaign for the expulsion of the Argentine 
occupation forces on the basis of the right of self-defence and relied on this 
right for every operational measure it took after the jus ad bellurn 
requirement of self-defence had been satisfied. 
On 7 April 1982, Mr. Nott, the Secretary of Defence, announced in a 
speech in the House of Commons the establishment of a Maritime 
Exclusion Zone over a 200-mile radius around the islands, within which 
any Argentine warships and naval auxiliaries would be "... treated as 
hostile and they would be liable to attack... " 163. 
The repossession of the South Georgia Island on 25 April 1982 was 
again justified as an exercise of the right of self-defence 164. 
Moreover, the establishment of a Total Exclusion Zone was justified 
as a measure of self-defence "... without prejudice to the right to take 
additional measures of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter... " 165. 
161 E. Lauterpacht, The Legal Irrelevance of a State of War, A. S. 1. L. Proceedings 58 (1968); 
Contra Greenwood, 36 I. C. L. Q. 283 (1987) ; L. Doswald-Beck, The International Law of 
Naval Armed Conflicts: A Need for Reform, 7 I. Y. I. L. 251 (1986-87), pp. 258-9. 
162 N. Ronzitti, The Right of Self-Defence and the Law of Naval Warfare, 14 Syracuse 
J. I. L. and Commerce 571 (1988). 
163 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, H. C. 
, 
No 1239. p. 541, col. 1045; also see, Letter dated 
9 April 1982 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland to the President of the Security Council, Doc. S/14963, S. C. O. R. 37th yr. Suppl. for 
April-June 1982, p. 16. 
104 Letter dated 26 April 1982 from the representative of the United Kingdom.... to the 
President of the Security Council, Doc. S/ 15002, Ibid. p. 45. 
165 Letter dated 28 April 1982 from the representative of the United Kingdom... to the 
President of the Security Council, Doc. S/ 15006, Ibid. p. 47. 
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On 2 May 1982 a U. K. submarine torpedoed and sank the Argentine 
battle cruiser General Belgrano ; this act was again justified as the exercise 
of the right of self-defencel66 
. 
Such practice that purports to supplant the traditional rules of the 
jus in bello with the right of self-defence has attracted considerable 
criticism. First, it is thought to beg the question of whether only one or 
both belligerents would have the right of self-defence while the conflict is 
in progress 167 
. 
Secondly, as long as the application of self-defence is to be 
effected in a case by case manner, the controversial issues with regard to 
the content of self-defence will inevitably arise 168 
. 
Thirdly, if action 
against neutral shipping is justified as self-defence it amounts to a non- 
sequitur 
, 
because the neutral States are not parties to the dispute and the 
only justification for such action outside the traditional laws of armed 
conflict would seem to be the legally dubious doctrine of "necessity" 169 
. 
Finally, it is submitted that, if every instance in an armed conflict is judged 
as a separate event according to the right of self-defence then the 
possibility of the exercise of collective self-defence would entail a 
dangerous escalation of a conflict which might prejudice international 
peace and security. 
For all the above reasons, it is submitted that a doctrine that would 
purport to replace the laws of naval warfare with the right of self-defence 
as far as the conduct of hostilities is concerned, does not constitute part of 
the law. State practice is insufficient and inconsistent. While in the 
Falklands crisis such a doctrine could find a solid basis, it is somehow 
contradicted by the Iran-Iraq conflict in which numerous attacks by both 
belligerents against neutral shipping were treated as inadmissible and 
hostile, hence the dispatch of escort warships by the U. K. 
, 
U. S. A. and 
France 170. Lastly, the Court in the Nicaragua Case has expressly admitted 
the applicability of the Hague Convention VIII of 1907 relevant to the 
laying of mines in considering the laying of mines without notification in 
166 Letter dated 3 May 1982 from the representative of the United Kingdom.... to the 
President of the Security Council, Doc. S/ 15031, Ibid. p. 62. 
167 Remarks by Frits Kalshoven, 14 Syracuse 1.11. and Commerce 571 (1988), pp. 582-583. 
168 A. V. Lowe, The Laws of War at Sea and the 1958 and 1982 Conventions, 12 Marine 
Polin) 286 (1988), p. 287; Remarks by H. B. Robertson in loc. cit. supra n. 167, at p. 586. 
169 Commentary of the I. L. C. on the Draft Articles on State Responsibility; Report of the 
I. L. C. on the work of its thirty-second session (5 May-25 July 1980 ), Doc. A/35/10, I. L. C. 
Ybk. 1980 Volume 11, Part Two, p. 26, at pp. 43-45, paras 22-24; Remarks by T. Halkiopoulos 
in loc. cit. supra n. 167, p. 583. 
170 Lowe loc. cit. supra n. 168, p. 286. 
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Nicaragua's territorial and internal waters as opposed to an application of 
the right of self-defence 171 
. 
2. Invasion, Occupation, Annexation by the armed forces of a State of the 
Territory of another State. 
Invasion and occupation or annexation of the whole or part of the 
territory of a State constitutes the classical case of an armed attack 172. The 
above acts are proximate in time to each other with invasion preceding 
occupation. Annexation is normally proclaimed after occupation is 
established and it formalises on the part of the aggressor the intent to 
acquire the territory under occupation. Proximity in time is merely the 
characteristic of acts that are closely connected in nature by a relation of 
cause and effect. While the effect of an invasion may not be occupation of 
territory the latter is always the result of an invasion, and it may be 
considered as the continuation of the latter 173 
. 
Be that as it may, the fact 
that an invasion constitutes an act of force renders the same forcible 
nature to its effects, namely, to the resulting occupation or annexation. 
The Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands of 2 April 1982 resulted in 
the occupation of the territory. Security Council resolution 502 (1982) of 3 
April 1982 demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Argentine forces. 
This illustrates the fact that a militant' occupation as a result of prior 
invasion constitutes itself an act of force that must be reversed. On 21 
September 1980 the armed forces of Iraq launched an offensive across the 
frontier with Iran. This illustrates an act of invasion which was not 
followed by an unopposed military occupation in the sense that the 
territorial sovereign withdrew his forces and desisted from fighting. 
Operative paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 479 (1980) of 28 
September 1980 called upon both Iran and Iraq to "... refrain immediately 
from any further use of force... ". With regard to Iraq this could be 
interpreted as a call for the cessation of her invasion. 
The sequence of invasion, occupation and annexation is illustrated 
by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990. The invasion and 
occupation of the entire territory of the Emirate of Kuwait took place on 2 
August 1990 while on 8 August 1990 the "merger" of Iraq with Kuwait was 
171 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, at p. 112, para 215. 
172 Broms, 154 H. R. C. 305 (1977 1), p. 348. 
173 Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, Doc. A/ 8019, 
G. A. O. R. 25th sess. Suppl. No 19, p. 41, para 113; cf. ibid. p. 43, para 116. 
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proclaimed 174 
. 
By virtue of Security Council resolution 660 (1990) of 2 
August 1990 the Council condemned the Iraqi invasion and demanded the 
immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Iraqi forces from Kuwait. 
When the "merger" was proclaimed, the Council adopted S. C. Res 662 
(1990) of 9 August 1990 deciding that the act of annexation was null and 
void and demanding "once again" the withdrawal of the Iraq forces. 
It appears from the above illustrations that the invasion of the 
territory of a State constitutes the starting point of the illegality that 
ultimately extends over the occupation and annexation of the invaded 
territory. When invasion is in progress, and that seems to be the case 
when the armed forces of the invaded State are resisting the invader's 
advance, the illegality of force is limited to the act of invasion; when 
occupation is established then illegality is mainly focused on it, while 
condemnation of an annexation is thought to constitute a statement of 
this illegality that is usually manifested in policies of non-recognition of 
acquisition of territory by force. 
An invasion constitutes an armed attack because of its scale, 
namely, the involvement of substantial number of troops and depending, 
of course on the size of the territory that is invaded, and its effects. Thus, 
the invasion of a small State like Kuwait was effected at its initial stages by 
a force smaller than the one massed along the Kuwait 
- 
Iraq border 175. 
The effects of an invasion in order to constitute an armed attack 
must be a violation of the territory of the State of considerable proportion, 
a trespass, which constitutes a forcible rebuttal of the territorial sovereign 
176 
. 
If the invasion is followed by occupation then its effects would 
amount to a permanent severance of exercise of sovereignty over the 
occupied territory, while annexation would imply loss of territory. Such 
acts, therefore, may be directed against the existence of a State both as 
territorial and political unit. Thus, it is of no importance that the invaded 
territory may not be contiguous with the administrative centre of the 
State. During the Falklands crisis the Argentine Government argued that 
the U. K. did not have the right of self-defence with regard to "islands 
situated 8,000 miles from British territory" 177. The assertion was rejected 
174 Keesing's 1990, p. 37632 et seq. 
175 Ibid. 
176 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, at p. 111, para 212. 
177 Letter dated 28 April 1982 from the representative of Argentina to the President of the 
Security Council, Doc. S/ 15009, S. C. O. R. 37th yr. Suppl. for April-June 1982, p. 51. 
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in the most unequivocal terms by the Government of the L. K. on the 
basis of Articles 73 and 2(3,4) of the Charter 17h 
. 
It is submitted that the commencement of an invasion takes place 
upon the crossing of a State's land boundaries or the outer limits of its 
territorial sea and air space. Thus during the Security Council debate on 
the Suez crisis of 1956, the Egyptian representative stated that: 
"... Egypt has been the victim of aggression; its territory has been invaded; and.... it 
has been obliged to take the necessary measures and to use force to repel the aggressors 
invading its territory. But it did not resort to force until Israel troops had actually entered 
Egyptian territory in large numbers, equipped with tanks and aircraft... "179 
Similarly, the use of force in self-defence at sea has in the majority 
of cases been treated as a response to a trespass on the territorial waters of a 
State. The sinking of the Israel destroyer Eilat by Egyptian missile batteries 
on 21 October 1967 was justified by the Egyptian Government as an act of 
self-defence because of The Eilat 's "... violation of the territorial waters of 
the U. A. R. and its attempt to carry out aggression against the city of Port 
Said... " i 8o 
. 
It is significant that the Israel representative disputed the 
Egyptian justification on the basis of the assertion that The Eilat was 
sailing on the high seas when it was sunk by the missiles 181 
. 
The same 
emphasis on the fact that the position of warships inside the territorial sea 
of a State may constitute an act of force giving the right of defensive 
response is illustrated by the Security Council debate on the Gulf of 
Tonkin incident of 4 August 1964. N1r. A. Stevenson, the U. S. 
representative, stressed the fact that the U. S. warships were on the high 
seas when they were attacked by N. Viet-Namese torpedo boatsl h2 
, 
while 
the representative of the U. S. S. R. advocated the N. Viet-Namese view that 
the U. S. vessels were inside the territorial waters of N. Viet-Nam1s3 
. 
Occupation of territory is established with respect to the land mass 
of a State. Action in self-defence would be directed towards terminating it, 
but in this case the requirement of "immediacy" of the necessity of self- 
defence should be observed 184. 
178 Letter dated 30 April 1982 from the representative of the U. K..... to the President of 
the Security Council, Doc. 5115016, ibid. pp. 54-55. 
179 S. C. O. R. 11th yr. 750th mtg. para 44. 
18() S. C. O. R. 22nd yr. 1369th mtg, Para 17; also see ibid. para 91 (Pakistan). 
181 Ibid. para 27. 
182 S. C. O. R. 19th yr. 1140th mtg, para 46. 
183 Ibid. para 59; see also O'Connell, The Influence of Law on Sea Pother, 1975, pp. 125-129. 
184 See supra 
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An interesting situation arises in cases of invasion and subsequent 
occupation as a result of a resort to force in self-defence. It is conceivable 
that should a necessity of self-defence permits it and provided that the 
requirement of proportionality is strictly observed, action may be taken 
within the territory of the aggressor and the defending State may find itself 
in occupation of parts thereof. According to the Government of Israel the 
resort to force on 5 June 1967 was justified as an exercise of the right of self- 
defence. As' a result of this action Israel found herself in occupation of 
hitherto Arab held territories ( namely, the Golan Heights, the West Bank 
of the Jordan River, the Gaza strip and the Sinai Peninsula ). On 20 July 
1973, during a debate at the Security Council on the Palestine Question and 
while the Israel occupation was still in place, Mr. Tekoah, the Israel 
representative submitted the following: 
"... Article 51 of the Charter declares unequivocally : 'Nothing in the present 
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an 
armed attack occurs... ' 
. 
Israel's recourse to arms in self-defence has been in accordance with 
the Charter and not in contravention of it. Furthermore, no principle and no provision of the 
Charter precludes border changes, especially following the use of force in self-defence and 
especially' where no secure and recognized international boundaries had existed between 
the victim of the aggression and the States that had been waging war against it for two and 
a half decades in violation of the Charter... " 185 
The above statement appears to advocate not only the legitimacy of 
military occupation as a result of force in self-defence, but the legitimacy of 
the acquisition of territory by the defending State 186 
. 
It is submitted 
, 
that, although occupation of the territory of the aggressor 
may ensue as a result of action in self-defence, it must cease after the 
necessity of self-defence ( namely, an actually in progress armed attack ) 
has disappeared. Furthermore, self-defence may not serve as a ground for 
acquisition of territory by force, for it is incompatible with the essence of 
self-defence which is the protection of the territory of the defending State 
187 
. 
Moreover, the occupation of territory as a measure of self-defence 
185 S. C. O. R. 28th yr. 1733rd mtg, para 75. 
186 See also Stone, Conflict Through Consensus, 1977, pp. 58-59,62-63; Higgins, The Place of 
International Law in the Settlement of Disputes by the Security Council, 64 4. J. 1. L. 1 
(1370), pp. 7-8; Schwebel, What Weight to Conquest?, 64 A. I. I. L. 344 (1970), pp. 345-347; 
Blum, The Beirut Raid and the International Double Standard, 64 A. J. I. L. 73 (1970), pp. 94- 
98. 
187 Greenwood loc. cit. in Dinstein (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 22, pp. 282-283; Jennings, The 
Acquisition of Territory in International Lath, 1963, p. 55; Cot & Pellet op. cit. supra n. 22, p. 
773; Greig, Self-Defence and the Security Council: What Does Article 51 Require?, 40 
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would not survive the test of proportionality; indeed, it is only under the 
legally dubious doctrine of anticipatory self-defence that such occupation 
of territory could be maintained 
- 
viz. the Israel security zone in Southern 
Lebanon is. 
3. Bombardment or the use of any weapons by the armed forces of a State 
against the territory of another State. 
The situation envisaged by the above rubric is the use of force by the 
launching of long or short-range explosive projectiles, namely land or 
naval artillery bombardment, attack by way of missiles, the drop of bombs 
from aircraft. Such use of force must be directed against the territory of a 
State, namely, its cities and population, military and economic 
installations. The factor of the scale of the use of force depends on the 
intensity of the bombardment ( the number of batteries, warships and 
aircraft used ) and/or the destruction potential of the bombs used ( 
namely, cluster or fuel bombs, nuclear bombs, bombs equipped with 
chemical or biological warheads ). As for the effects of the bombardment it 
must be aimed at destroying population centres, military and economic 
installations. 
The start of the attack must depend on the kind of weapons used 
and the manner in which the bombardment is carried out. It is submitted 
that artillery and naval bombardment starts with the actual firing of 
weapons. An aerial bombardment appears to start at the moment the 
aircraft formations enter the airspace of the target State. With regard to 
aircraft it is a matter of technological advance; given the speed, the capacity 
for high altitude flight and the radar evasion techniques, it is a matter of 
achieving as a early a detection as possible, of approaching hostile aircraft 
189 This does not constitute an impossibility and offers a cogent 
alternative to claims of anticipatory self-defence. 
Attack by way of missiles is slightly more problematic in view of the 
technology involved in conjunction with the time span of reacting after 
I. C. L. Q. 366 (1991), pp. 394,396. Cf. Feinberg, 15 Israel L. R. 160 (1980), pp. 172-175; 
Schachter, 82 Mich. L. R. 162() (1984), p. 1637. 
188 Brownlie loc. cit. in Butler (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 21, p. 25. 
189 Kinley, The Law of Self-Defence, Contemporary Naval Operations and the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, in E. D. Brown 
- 
R. R. Churchill (eds. ), Tile 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Impact and Implementation; 
Proceedings, L1711 of the Sea Institute, Nineteenth Anneal Conference, 1987, p. 23. 
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the launch of the missile 190. Everything depends on the kind of missile 
that is launched. It is believed that long-range missiles are easier subject to 
radar detection after their launch (. which constitutes the start of the attack 
) and thus the prospective victim is given sufficient time to react i9i. The 
majority of the Scud long-range missiles launched by Iraq against Israel on 
17 January 1991 were detected and destroyed by the Israel anti-missile 
batteries soon after their launch. Short-range missiles are more 
problematic due to the lack of time for defensive reaction after their 
launch; it has been suggested that, rather than introducing a general 
acceptance of anticipatory self-defence, it is preferable to expand the 
starting point of armed attack before the actual launch to the moment of 
the "lock-on" of the missiles' radar guidance system onto the target 192. 
4. Blockade of the ports or coasts of a State. 
Oppenheim defines blockade as: 
"... the blocking by men-of-war of the approach to the enemy coast, or part of it, for 
the purpose of preventing ingress and egress of vessels or aircraft of all nations,.. " 193 
Moreover the same author submits that a blockade has to be made 
effective "... by the presence of a blockading squadron of sufficient strength 
to prevent egreýý and ingress of vessels... "194 
. 
The preparatory work of the Definition of Aggression reveal that 
the term "blockade" in Article 3(c) thereof should be understood as \vider 
than the traditional concept of blockade so as to include the cutting-off of 
access, to sea of land locked States. Indeed, in its final Report on the 
Definition of Aggression the Sixth Committee of the United Nations 
General Assembly included the following passage: 
"... The Sixth Committee agreed that nothing in the definition and in particular 
Art. 3(c) shall be construed as a justification for a State to block, contrary to international 
law, the routes of free access of a land locked country to and from the sea... "195 
190 O`Connell op. cit. supra n. 183, pp. 70 et seq. 
191 Ibid. 
192 ibid. p. 82. 
193 Oppenheim, International Law, vol. ii, 71h ed. by Luderpacht, 1952, p. 768; also see 
O'Connell, 1nterºwtioººal Law of the Sea, vol. ii, ed. by Shearer, 7984, p. 1150. 
N4 Oppenheim op. cit. supra n. 193, pp. 778,782. 
195 Quoted in Broms, 154 H. R. C. 305 (1917 1), p. 349. 
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The problem with the above passage is its reference to prohibition 
of passage "contrary to international law" that suggests that such 
prohibition may be in certain circumstances lawful; moreover, the 
question of access to sea by land locked States is one that it is pertinent as 
to its regulation by the Law of the Sea, and finally, the prohibition as such 
of access to sea does not necessarily amount to a resort to force 196 
. 
In so far as the use of armed force is concerned, a blockade could be 
effected by the use of surface war vessels, submarines, aircraft and the 
laying of submarine contact mines 197. To consider a blockade as an 
instance of armed attack, its intensity in conjunction with the number and 
importance of the blockaded ports must be such as to amount to the 
economic srangulation of the victim State. Moreover, it is submitted that 
measures taken by a State that affect the shipping of another State and that 
can be justified on the basis of the rules of the Law of the Sea, are to be 
considered as creating a dispute with regard to rights and duties under the 
Law of the Sea, rather than a case of use of force, let alone an armed attack. 
On 22 May 1967 the Egyptian Government announced the closure of the 
straits of Tiran ( that connect the Gulf of Aqaba with the Red Sea ) to Israel 
shipping and other vessels carrying certain cargoes to Israel. Israel 
considered the Egyptian action as blockade and an act of aggression giving 
rise to the right of self-defence; thus, Mr. Eban, the Foreign Minister of 
Israel stated in his address to the 5th Special Emergency Session of the 
General Assembly: 
"... From the moment the blockade was imposed, active hostilities had commenced 
and Israel owed Egypt nothing of her Charter rights... "198 
This view, however, "was objected to by other delegates. The issue 
appears to have been whether the Gulf of Aqaba was an international 
waterway or, as Egypt contended, a maritime area divided into the 
territorial seas of several States that had the right to regulate passage of 
third States` ships through their territorial waters. Irrespective of what 
each State thought to be the status of the Gulf of Aqaba, resort to force 
19h Broms loc. cit. supra n. 195, pp. 349-350; Wengler, 7 Revue Belge D. I. 401 (1971), pp. 409- 
410. 
197 Cf. Oppenheim op. cit. supra n. 193, p. 781. 
198 G. A. ES-5, G. A. O. R. Fifth Special Emergency Session, Plennary Meetings, Verbatim 
Records of Meetings, 17 June 
- 
18 September 1967,1526th plen. mtg, para 133; also see paras 
132,134. in addition see S. C. O. R. 22nd yr. 1343rd mtg para 170; 1348th mtg para 175; 1351st 
mtg para 83. 
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against Egypt for the measures taken seems to have been considered 
inadmissible. Before hostilities broke out on 5 June 1967, the U. S. 
representative in the Security Council stated that in his Governments 
view the Gulf of Aqaba was an international waterway, but at the same 
time he pointed out that the issue of innocent passage through the Strait 
of Tiran could be solved "... by peaceful measures in the sense of Article 33 
of the Charter... "1 99 
. 
Lastly, during the 5th Special Emergency Session of 
the General Assembly the representative of Cyprus stated that the 
international status of the Gulf of Aqaba was a matter open to controversy 
and that the legal merits of the case would seem to be a proper subject for 
adjudication or arbitration 200. 
5. Attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces or 
marine and air fleets of another State. 
Such use of force as contemplated by the above rubric constitutes an 
armed attack if used with great fire power and amounts to the destruction 
of the military security infrastructure of a State, by destroying substantial 
sections of its armed forces. The destruction of the U. S. Pacific fleet and Air 
Force at Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941 constitutes the classical 
example. 
The phrase "marine and air fleets" which is included in Article 3(d) 
of the Definition of Aggression raises two observations. First, it does not 
specifically refer to the war marine or air fleets of a State. Indeed, in this 
respect it could be considered as redundant. Thus, the destruction of a 
State's of commercial or fishing marine fleet whose economy is largely 
based on marine commerce or fisheries, may amount to an armed attack, 
for the use of force is directed against the economy of the State 201 
. 
Secondly, it implies that for the purposes of the exercise of self-defence 
against an armed attack a use of force against individual vessels would not 
suffice; although the attacked ship could take protective proportionate 
199 S. C. O. R. 22nd yr. 1343rd mtg, paras 29-33. 
200 ES-5,1541st plen. mtg, para 73. 
201 See the statement made by the Japanese delegate at the adoption by consensus of the 
Definition of Aggression, according to which an attack on the Japanese fishing and 
commercial fleets would be equivalent to a blockade of the Japanese coast; Report of the 
Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, Doc. A/9619, G. A. O. R. 29th 
sess. Suppl. No 19, Annex I, p. 16. 
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counter-measures to repel the use of force against it, it is not a case of self- 
defence of the State as a whole 202 
. 
6. Armed Forces of a State that are within the territory of another State by 
virtue of an Agreement between the two States. 
Article 3(e) of the Definition of Aggression stipulates that a use of 
force against the host State exists if these forces are either used in 
. 
contravention of the terms of the agreement or their presence in the 
territory of the host State continues after the termination of this 
agreement 203. Roth situations are illustrated by the Remada incident of 
1958 and the Pizerta crisis of 1961, between Tunisia and France with regard 
to the presence of armed forces of the latter on Tunisian territory. 
On 9 February 1958, a day after the French air strike on the Tunisian 
town of Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef, the Tunisian Government demanded the 
evacuation of the French forces from Tunisia and prohibited French troop 
movements by also demanding that French troops should be confined to 
barracks 204. In accordance with this decision the 15,000 French troops, 
stationed in Tunisia were confined to their barracks, road blocks, were 
erected in order to prevent troop movements, telephone communications 
from the camps were cut off and food supplies and services by local 
authorities ceased 205. The Tunisian Government justified these 
measures can the basis of the right of self-defence under Article 51 of the 
Charter as a response to the French military action against the town of 
Sakiet 2Oh 
. 
On 18 May 1958 a serious clash occurred between the French and 
Tunisian force-, in the Remada area in southern Tunisia when a 
detachment of French troops attempted a sortie from their barrack-, and 
tried to force their way through the road block guarded by Tunisian troops 
20 7. The French representative in the Security Council disputed the plea 
of self-defence invoked by the Tuitisiatn Government by asserting that 
202 Statement by the Syrian delegate, loc. cit. supra n. 201, p. 20; Skubiszewski loc. cit. in 
Sorensen (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 22, p. 773; Annotated Supplement to the Commander's 
Handbook of the U. S. Navy supra n. 76. 
Broms, 154 H. R. C. 305 (197 71), p. 351; Brown lie, 3i B. Y. I. L. 183 (1961), p. 262; 
Skubiszewski, loc. cit. in Sorensen (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 22, pp. 774-775. 
204 Keesing's 1957-1958, p. 16203. 
205 [bid. p. 16204. 
20(' S. C. O. R. 13th yr. 819th mtg, paras 10,11,55,58; 821st mtg, para 12. 
207 Keesing's 1957-1958, p. 16328. 
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there had been no armed attack against Tunisia, that the Tunisian forces 
opened fire first and that the Saharan units of the French army stationed 
in the southern region of the country were exempt from the restrictions 
208 
. 
The representative of Iraq made the following statement: 
"... France is not entitled to station any forces on Tunisian territory- against the will 
of the Government and the people of Tunisia... 
By their acts of repeated aggression especially since the bombing of Sakiet, the French 
forces have forfeited any right to hospital 209 
The Bizerta crisis of 19-20 July 1961 arose with regard to the French 
naval base there which had been established in 1891. In the aftermath of 
the Sakiet incident the Tunisian Government first demanded the 
evacuation of the base, but on 17 June 1958 it was agreed by an exchange of 
letters between the French and Tunisian Governments that negotiations 
for a provisional agreement on the status of the base should begin no later 
than 1 October 1958. These negotiations never took place and the Tunisian 
Government consistently raised the question of the evacuation of the base 
during the ensuing period of time 210. At the end of June 1961 the French 
military authorities of the base undertook works for the extension of the 
runway of the base NvIthout prior notification of the Tunisian 
Government 211. On 17 July 1961 President Bourguiba announced that the 
hi7erta base would be blockaded from 19 July 1961 and that no French 
aircraft or warships would be allowed to enter Tunisian airspace or 
territorial waters. On 19 July heavy fighting broke out between French and 
'l unisian forces in the town of Bizerta 212 Tunisia invoked the right of 
pelf-defence but only after French troops inside the base had started to be 
reinforced and French aircraft penetrated Tunisian airspace without prior 
authorisation 213. France invoked the same right against the Tunisian 
measures of 19 July 1961 214. To this the Tunisian delegate stated that: 
208 S. C. O. R. 13th yr. 819th mtg, para 87; 820th mtg, paras 16,45-46. 
209 Ibid. 820th mtg, Para 71. 
21(1 Keesing's 1961-1962, p. 18341. 
211 See, Formal Protest of 6 July 1961 by President Bourguiba of Tunisia to the French 
Government transmitted to the Security Council in the letter dated 21 July 1961 from the 
representative of Tunisia to the President of the Security Council, Doc. S/4871, S. C. O. R. 
16th yr. Suppl. for July-Sept. 1961, pp. 17-20. 
-' 
12 Keesing's 1961-1962, pp. 18342-18343. 213 S. C. O. R. 16th yr. 961st mtg, paras 31-49,52,56,59; 
214 Ibid. paras 80-81. 
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"... It would have been understandable for French troops on the ground, believing 
themselves to be threatened by one danger or other, to have retaliated against Tunisian 
troops or Tunisian civilians demonstrating peacefully in the streets, but to use the 
expression self-defence to describe shooting by aircraft coming from the "Arromanches" as it 
lay in the vicinity of Tunisian territorial waters and by aircraft coming from Algeria for 
the purpose of dropping paratroops on Tunisian soil in defiance of the Tunisian 
Government's ban on flights 
- 
that is really beyond my understand ing... "215 
At the request of 55 States the General Assembly convened in 
Special Session on 21 August 1961. During the debate there was unanimity 
on upholding Tunisia's sovereignty over its territory but at the same time 
it was argued that any procedure for the withdrawal of the French forces 
would consist of peaceful means so as to avoid an escalation of tension 
and deterioration of the situation 216 
. 
It has been suggested that Article 
3(e) of the Definition of Aggression seems somewhat rigidly formulated 
because it appears to give extreme emphasis to the concept of sanctity of 
territorial sovereignty and would establish the occurrence of the use of 
armed force on the basis of simply not meeting a withdrawal schedule laid 
out by the territorial sovereign alone 217. State practice reveals that the 
presence of foreign troops on the territory of another State is realised only 
by the consent of the territorial sovereign. Moreover, the termination or 
continuation of such presence is generally thought to be achieved through 
a process of negotiations : this was certainly the intention of the Tunisian 
Government and it is furthermore illustrated in the recent negotiations 
between the Philippines and U. S. Governments with regard to the Subic 
Bay naval base of the U. S. forces. It is submitted that an unlawful use of 
force by the foreign troops against the host State should be held to exist 
when these troops resort to force against the host State itself, or against 
targets, other than the host State, within the territory of the latter and 
without its consent, or when an agreed schedule for their withdrawal has 
lapsed and they forcibly resist any attempt of the host State to remove 
them 219. Whether such force constitutes an armed attack would depend 
on its scale and effects. 
A statement of the wish for the evacuation of foreign troops may be 
held to constitute an exercise of sovereignty. The question arises whether 
the intransigence of the State whose troops are stationed on the territory of 
215 Ibid. para 185; see also 963rd mtg paras 15 (Ceylon), 39,42 (U. A. R. ), 55 (Chile). 21h G. A. O. R. S-3, Third Special Session, 21-25 August 1961, Plennarv Meetings, 998th plen. 
mtý, paras 34-36,38 (Argentina), 95-98 (U. S. A. ) 
21 B. B. Ferencz, Defining International Aggression, vol. ii, 1975, p. 37. 218 Broms, loc. cit. 
, 
Brownlie loc. cit. supra n. 203. 
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the host State to enter negotiations for the evacuation of its forces would 
constitute a use of force. It is submitted that this question must be 
answered in the negative. However, such intransigence if it is manifest 
may be interpreted as a violation of sovereignty and depending on the 
level of tension that it might cause, it may be referred to the Security 
Council as a threat to the peace 219 
, 
or provoke non-forcible counter- 
measures on the part of the territorial sovereign. Such were the measures 
adopted by the Tunisian Government in 1958 ( when restrictions were 
imposed on the movement of French troops ) and in 1961 when the 
Bizerta base was sealed off. It is submitted that a use of force occurs only in 
the case where the foreign forces react forcibly against these measures. It is 
significant that the French delegate in the Security Council stated with 
regard to the Remada incident that the French troops were fired on first 
and that the Saharan contingents were exempted from the Tunisian 
restrictions; this seems to suggest that the Tunisian measures had not, in 
principle, been met with the objection of the French Government 220. 
7. Allowing the territory of a State to be used for forcible acts by another 
State against a third State. 
This contingency contemplates a situation in which a State consents 
that its territory be used by the armed forces of another State in order to 
launch an attack against a third State. The consent given by the territorial 
sovereign to the aggressor renders the former a co-author of the use of 
force in so far as the source of the use of force against the target State is 
located in its territory. This, depending on the scale and effects of the use 
of force, would give rise to the defensive necessity to repeal this force and 
the complicity of the "host" of the aggressor would entitle the victim State 
to resort to force in self-defence against the source of the armed attack on 
the territory of the host State 221. 
However, one point must be clarified. A use of force from the 
territory of the host State must be launched and this is a question 
pertinent to the issue of the commencement of an armed attack. Thus, the 
U. K. would be considered as the aggressor for the L. S. air strike against 
Libya in 1986, should the latter be considered an act of reprisal, for the U. K. 
219 See statement of the Argentine representative during the Third Special Session of the 
G. A. 
, 
G. A. O. R. S-3,998th plen. mtg, Para 38. 
220 Cf. Higgins, 37 B. Y. I. L. 269 (1961), p. 298. 
221 Greenwood, loc. cit. in Dinstein (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 22, pp. 277-278. 
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allowed the U. S. Air Force to launch the raid from its bases in the territory 
of the U. K. 222. 
The U-2 incident of 1960 provoked, on 9 May 1960, a statement by 
the Soviet Premier Khrushchev according to which "... [T]hose countries 
that have bases on their territories should note most carefully the 
following: if they allow others to fly from their bases to our territory we 
shall hit at those bases... " 223 
. 
On 14-15 May 1975 the U. S. forces launched an operation in the Gulf 
of Thailand for the rescue of the crew of the S. S. Mayaguez which had 
been arrested by the Cambodian authorities. The operation was justified as 
an exercise of the right of self-defence 224 
. 
The U. S. operation was 
mounted from the U. S. base at Utapao in Thailand territory. On 13 May 
1975 the Thai Prime Minister informed the U. S. Charge d' Affaires in 
Bangok that the Thai Government would not permit the territory of 
Thailand to be used by the U. S. A. for any action against Cambodia 225. The 
Thai Government expressed its concern about the mounting of the U. S. 
operation in terms of it becoming the target of Cambodian action 226. 
The consent of the territorial sovereign must be firmly established 
upon evidence. The introduction of foreign troops in the territory of 
another State without any resistance or protest by its Government or 
under a prior agreement, may be held to establish consent. Thus, on 7 
August 1990 the Israel Defence Minister, Mr. M. Arens in a statement to 
the Knesset said that Israel would take action if Iraq ( that had invaded and 
occupied Kuwait on 2 August 1990 ) introduced troops in Jordan 227. This 
statement involves questions of anticipatory self-defence and Israeli action 
would have been legitimate only if the consent of Jordan had been firmly 
established and the Iraqi troops had undertaken forcible action against 
Israel. 
8. Activities of Armed Bands. 
222 Greenwood, 89 t. 'c'st Vx. L. R. 933 (19871, p. 938. 223 Whitenuuu Digest of 1nternatioºtal Law, vol. 5, p. 714. As it is considered in Second Title 
infra, the U-2 cannot be held to constitute an unlawful use of force and such statements, 
while appropriate in cases of actual use of force, would rather appear to constitute a threat 
of force in violation of Art. 2(4) of the Charter. 
224 Keesing's 1975, p. 27239; Letter dated 14 May 1975 from the representative of the 
United States of America to the President of the Security Council, Doc. S/ 11689. 225 Keesing's supra n. 224. 
22c, Ibid. 
227 Keesing's 1990, p. 37638. 
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The Court in the Nicaragua Case has expressly recognised the 
possibility of an armed attack being launched by indirect means, namely, 
by using the activities of bands of guerrillas 228 
. 
In order to characterise a use of force waged by armed bands as an 
armed attack it must be established that, although the source of force on 
the ground is the guerrillas, the author of the use of force is a State. In 
other words there has to be not only complicity of a State in the activities 
of the insurgents (by way of material support ) but there has to be total 
control over the armed bands in the sense that they constitute a "weapon" 
or a "means" of the assisting State to use force against another State: The 
use of force by the armed bands constitutes a longa inanu force by the 
assisting State 229 
. 
It is submitted that the above contingency is brought about in the 
following cases. 
(i). First, when the guerrilla movement is founded, recruited and 
sent to the territory of another State by the assisting State. 
This is the case with regard to activities by bands of mercenaries. On 
16 January 1977 a mercenary force attacked the capital of the African State 
of Benin. The invaders were successfully repelled by the Benin Army. By 
virtue of Security Council resolution 404 (1977) of 8 February 1977, the 
Council decided to dispatch an investigatory mission to Benin with the 
mandate to report on the events of 16 January 1977. In its report on 8 
March 1977 the Special Mission found that Benin had been subjected to an 
armed attack 2.3v. The sending of 
insurgents that had been recruited by another State is illustrated by the 
Indonesian organised infiltration of Malaysia in 1963-65 231 
. 
Although 
Indonesia escaped condemnation by the Council due to the negative vote 
of the U. S. S. R. 
, 
the majority of delegates condemned her action. Thus the 
representative of Brazil stated that: 
228 I. C. J. Rep. 1936, p. T1, at p. 103, Para 195. 
229 Ibid. pp. 61-62, paras 1O8-109; contra per fudge Schinebel pp. 343-344, paras 166-167, 
170; cf. prr fudge Jennings, p. 543. Also see Lamberti Zanardi loc. cit. in Cassese (ed. ) op. cit. 
supra n. 22, pp. ] 12-115. Cf. Gil], 1 Hague Y. I. L. 30 (1988), pp. 51-52; Müllerson loc. cit. in 
Butler (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 21, pp. 33-35. 
230 Doc. S/ 12294/ Rev. I of 8 March 1977, S. C. O. R. 32nd yr. Special Suppl. No 3, p. 39, para 
141. The Special Mission, however, did not attribute the authorship of the attack to a 
particular State. 
231 The Indonesian Government openly admitted its involvement before the Security 
Council; S. C. O. R. 19th yr. 1144th mtg, para 103. 
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"... All the evidence indicates that the attack would not have been the act of 
individuals but was the result of a planned action supported by the military authorities of 
Indonesia... " 232 
A similar case occurred on 25 May 1977 when the Ethiopian 
province of Ogaden was invaded by a force of 3,000-6,000 heavily armed 
guerrillas that purportedly belonged to the hitherto unknown Western 
Somalia Liberation Front (W. S. L. F. ), which according to the Ethiopian 
Government was alleged to be an "artificial liberation movement" * used by 
Somalia to "expand its territory" 233 
. 
On 21 February 1978 the Somali 
Government formally admitted that the Somali armed forces were 
fighting alongside the guerrillas 234. 
(ii). This contingency brings discussion to the second case where 
assistance to armed bands constitutes an instance of armed attack, namely, 
the active participation of the armed forces of the assisting State on the 
side of the guerrillas. 
Apart from the participation of the Somali Army in the fighting 
against the Ethiopian armed forces on the side of the so-called W. S. L. F. 
, 
Tanzania and S. Africa have demonstrated similar conduct. 
In April 1979 the Tanzanian Army actively assisted Ugandan 
dissident exiles to overthrow the tyrannical regime of President Idi Amin. 
Due to the unpopularity of the latter the Tanzanian action did not attract 
substantial criticism. It is interesting, however, that at the 16th Annual 
Summit of the O. A. U. held in the Liberian capital, Monrovia, on 17 July 
1979, President Obasanjo of Nigeria warned that the Tanzanian 
intervention in Uganda constituted an extremely dangerous precedent, for 
it seemed to blur the fundamental distinction between the overthrow of a 
tyrant from within the country and an attack from outside 235. 
In October 1987 the Angolan armed forces launched a major 
offensive against the positions of the rebel organisation U. N. I. T. A. that 
had been waging armed insurgency against the Angolan Government 
since 1975 236 
. 
The operation was repelled by the forces of U. N. I. T. A. with 
the active support of the S. African Army, which was formally admitted by 
the S. African Chief-of-Staff, Gen. Johan Geldenhuys on 11 November 1987 
232 S. C. O. R. 19th yr. 1148th mtg, para 32; also see 1144th mtg, para 127 (U. K. ), 1145th mtg, 
paras 17,23 (U. S. A. ). 233 Keesing's 1977, p. 28634. 
234 Keesing's 1978, p. 28760. 
235 Keesing's 1979, p. 29840. 
23h The civil war in Angola was terminated by a Peace accord signed in Lisbon between the 
two factions in 1991. 
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237. S. Africa was unanimously condemned by the Security Council by 
Security Council resolution 602 (1987) of 25 November 1987, for aggression 
against Angola. 
(iii) A third case of assistance to insurgents that amounts to an 
armed attack is the arming of a hitherto unarmed opposition to a 
Government of another State for the sole purpose of resorting to guerrilla 
warfare aiming at the overthrow the latter23mi, 
. 
This is the case with 
regard to the invasion of Cuba by dissident exiles on 17 April 1961. On 18 
April 1961 the President of the U. S. S. R. 
, 
Mr. Khrushchev in a message to 
the President of the U. S. A. J. F. Kennendy stated that "... [A]n armed 
aggression has begun against Cuba. It is not a secret to anyone that the 
armed bands which invaded that country have been trained, equipped and 
armed in the United States... "238. 
It can be inferred, therefore, from the three cases submitted above 
that material assistance by a State to a guerrilla movement that has 
emerged as the outcome of an indigenous rebellion against the 
Government of another State, does not constitute an armed attack by the 
assisting State against the victim State because in this case the author of 
the use of force as well as its source on the ground, is the guerrillas 
themselves 3. 
This category includes (a) the so-called national liberation 
movements that waged guerrilla warfare against the former colonial 
Powers ( namely, the Algerian F. L. N. 
, 
P. O. U. S. A. R. I. O. in Western Sahara, 
P. A. I. G. C. in Guinea-Bissau, M. P. L. LA. in Angola, S. W. A. P. O. in Namibia, 
F. R. E. L. I. M. O. in Mozambique, A. N. C. in S. Africa ); (b) guerrilla 
organisations that advocate the aspirations of the population of a territory 
under military occupation, namely, the P. L. O. in the territories occupied by 
Israel ; (c) guerrilla movements that represent indigenous political 
opposition to the Government of a State (namely, the Nicaraguan contras 
, 
the Salvadorean F. M. L. N. 
, 
the Angolan U. N. I. T. A., the Afghan 
guerrillas, the Eritrean E. P. L. F. ). 
Still, the "independence" of an initially indigenous guerrilla 
movement may become "dependence" on another State in the sense of 
237 Keesing's 1987, p. 35552. 
237bis Cf. I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, pp. 103-104, para 195. 
238 Keesing's 1961-1962, pp. 18151-18152. 
239 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, at p. 104, para 195. Also see Lamberti Zanardi loc. cit. in Cassese 
(ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 22, p. 113; P. S. Reichler & D. Wippman, The United States Armed 
Intervention in Nicaragua: A Rejoinder, 11 Yale 1.11 462 (1985-86), p. 471. 
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the guerrillas becoming quasi Government "agents" of the assisting State. 
This is, however, a contingency that has to be proved on the basis of 
evidence and that is not discernible at the outset of an initially indigenous 
armed insurgency 240 
. 
It is a very delicate task and it must involve 
meticulous research and great deal of evidence in order to prove that an 
indigenous movement has come to constitute an "agent" of the assisting 
State. The practice of States does not offer any assistance for the 
formulation of a general rule with regard to the kind of control that is 
required for a guerrilla movement to lose its autonomy. It is significant, 
however, that an organisation like the Nicaraguan contras that from a 
small, ill-equipped force evolved in a short time, largely due to the U. S. 
material support, into a sophisticatedly armed force of thousand of 
fighters, was not considered by the Court as being completely subordinate 
to the U. S. Government so as to constitute an "agent" of the latter 241 
. 
3. (iii). f. Cessation of the Necessity of Self-Defence. 
The significance of determining when a necessity of self-defence 
ceases to exist lies in the fact that armed action under this justification will 
have to be terminated. It is submitted that the cessation of self-defence 
arises in two situations: (1) when the aggression is reversed by the 
defending State or the aggressor himself, and (2) when the Security 
Council takes "measures for the maintenance of international peace and 
security". 
1. Reversal of the Aggression. 
Action in self-defence is held to stop if the defending State 
successfully repels the armed attack against it or if the aggressor after being 
repelled desists from further acts of force 242. Continuation of armed 
action in this context on the part of the defending State incurs the risk of 
being characterised as an act of aggression 243. It, moreover, involves 
240 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, at pp. 61-62, paras 108-109. 241 Supra n. 240; Cf. Ibid. per fudge Jennings supra n. 229; also cf. Müllerson loc. cit. and 
Gill loc. cit. supra n. 229. 
242 Cf. Wengler, 7 Revue Belge D. 1.401 (1971), p. 413. 243 Rifaat op. cit. supra n. 22, p. 127. 
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claims of anticipatory self-defence, namely, that despite his withdrawal the 
aggressor is very likely to resume an armed attack 244. Thus, if the 
aggressor stops the armed attack and withdraws from the territory of the 
victim State, then action in self-defence is no longer justified. If, on the 
other hand, the aggressor halts his advance, but remains in occupation of 
the victim State's territory, the latter may continue to use force in self- 
defence in order to expel him, provided that the Security Council has not 
taken any measures for the maintenance of international peace and 
security and that the requirement of the "immediacy" of the necessity of 
self-defence is observed. 
The successful resistance of the victim of the aggression that leads to 
the expulsion of the invading or occupant forces ( or the cessation of other 
use of force against its territory or armed forces ) must be held to indicate 
termination of the defensive action. Although the aggressor may renew 
the armed attack, this should not militate for continuation of the use of 
force by the defending State under the justification of self-defence 245 
. 
The 
maintenance of the defending State's armed forces in a high state of alert 
would be justified, but any further action on its part would rather depend 
on actual renewal of the armed attack by the aggressor. This is illustrated 
by the Israel response to the launch against her of long-range Scud missiles 
by Iraq on 17 January 1991 and subsequent days. After countering the 
initial strike, Israel forces did not pursue further action against the missile 
launchers on Iraqi territory but they would resist every subsequent attack 
as it was perpetrated by the Iraqi Aru-iy 2.4f, 
. 
Moreover, when the Ethiopian Army succeeded in repelling the Somali 
attack in Ogaden by expelling the W. S. L. F. and the regular Somali armed 
forces back into Somalia, the Ethiopian Government suspended all 
operations and refrained from ordering the Army to pursue action inside 
Somalia; President Mengistu of Ethiopia stated that "... [W]e will not 
interfere in the internal affairs of other people. The defensive war we are 
waging goes as far as our frontier... " 247 
. 
Finally, the Court in the Nicaragua Case ruled as unnecessary for 
the purposes of self-defence the U. S. measures against Nicaragua that were 
purportedly taken in collective self-defence of El Salvador in 1981, because 
244 Wengler loc. cit. supra n. 242. 
245 See infra section 5. 
244 Keesing's 1991, p. 37936-37937. 
247 Keesing's 1978, p. 28989. Cf 
. 
Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, 1988, pp. 216- 
219. 
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they were adopted after the "... major offensive of the armed opposition 
against the Government of El Salvador had been completely repulsed 
(January 1981), and the actions of the opposition completely reduced in 
consequence. Thus, it was possible to eliminate the main danger to the 
Salvadorean Government without the United States embarking on 
activities in and against Nicaragua. Accordingly, it cannot be held that 
these activities were undertaken in the light of necessity... " of self-defence 
248 
. 
2. Adoption by the Security Council of measures for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. 
Article 51 of the Charter expressly stipulates that the "inherent" 
right of self-defence is to be exercised "... until the Security Council has 
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security... " 
The importance of this proviso is cogently expressed in Bowett: 
"... This clause illustrates the essentially provisional nature of action in self- 
defence under a centralized system; such a system presupposes that the right is inevitable 
as an interim measure of protection, but that it should cease when the machinery of the 
centralized system itself operates as an effective protection of the individual member's 
rights. Accordingly under the Charter, such action by the individual State, or even by a 
number of States acting under the 'collective' right, is envisaged as temporary measure and 
in no way a substitute for the collective action by the organisation. 
This view is supported by the fact that all members have conferred primary 
responsibilih- for the maintenance of international peace and security on the Security 
Council... °249 
It is, moreover suggested, that in the case of paralysis of the Security 
Council due to the cast of a- negative vote by one of the Permanent 
Members, it is the General Assembly that assumes responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security by virtue of General 
248 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, at p. 122, para 237; contra. id. per Judge Schwebet 
, 
p. 365, paras 
207-208- 
249 B wett, Self Defence fn International Law, 1958, p. 195 but cf 
. 
n. 1; Wehberg, 78 H. R. C. 
7 (1951 1), p. 83; \0`aldock, 81 H. R. C. 455 (1952 11), pp. 495-496; Wright, 53 A. J. I. L. 112 
(1959), pp. 117-118; Higgins, 37 B. Y. I. L. 269 (1961), pp. 303-304; Kelsen, 42 A. J. I. L. 783 
(1948), pp. 793,796; Dinstein, War, Aggression, Self-Defence, 1988, p. 195 et seq. ; Fawcett, 
103 H. R. C. 347 (1961 11), pp. 365-366; Greig, 40 I. C. L. Q. 366 (1991), pp. 389-392; Greenwood, 
How legitimate is force against Iraq?, The Times 
, 
August 10,1990, p. 10, cols. 5-8. Cf 
Goodrich, Hambro, Simons op. cit. supra n. 31, p. 352; Feinberg, 15 Israel L. R. 160 (1980), p. 
172. 
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Assembly resolution 377 (V) "Uniting for Peace" 250, and the measures 
adopted thereunder warrant the cessation of action in self-defence 251 
Considerations that the General Assembly is not a substitute for the 
Security Council have led some jurists to take an opposite view 252. 
However, what seems to matter is the taking of measures for the 
maintenance of peace and security and not which organ takes them. The 
United Nations Organisation purports to hold the monopoly of the use of 
force and this is a function which is primarily but not exclusively 
entrusted to the Security Council 253. 
State practice evinces concern for the consequences that outbreaks of 
violence may have for international peace and security as a whole 
irrespective of their justification. During the eight-year long Iran-Iraq 
conflict the Security Council adopted no less than seven resolutions 
stating grave concern for the danger of the escalation of the conflict and 
calling on both belligerents to cease hostilities 254. When the Iran-Iraq 
conflict broke out, the President of the Security Council issued a statement 
on 23 September 1980 saying that "... [T]he Members of the Council are 
deeply concerned that this conflict can prove increasingly serious and 
could pose a grave threat to international peace and security... " 255. 
Individual Members that have invoked the right of self-defence have 
done so by expressly stating adherence to the exclusive competence of the 
United Nations, whether the Security Council or the General Assembly, to 
maintain international peace and security. Thus, during the First Special 
Emergency Session of the General Assembly on the Suez crisis of 1956 the 
representative of Egypt stated: 
"... until such time as the necessary measures are taken by the Council or the 
General Assembly, the Egyptian Government has no other choice but to defend itself and to 
protect its rights against this armed and unprovoked attack... " 256 
25() 5 U. N. G. A. O. R. Resolutions 10 (1950). 
251 Wehberg loc. cit. supra n. 249; Waldock loc. cit. supra n. 249, p. 496; Wright loc. cit. 
supra n. 249, p. 118; Schachter, 83 A. f_P. L. 259 (1989), p. 264. 
252 Kelsen loc. Cit. supra n. 249, p. 796; Fawcett loc. cit. supra n. 249, p. 366. 
253 Viz. Article 24(1) of the Charter. 
2,54 S. C. Resolutions, 479 (1980) of 28 Sept. 1980,514 (1982) of 12 July 1982,522 (1982) of 4 
Oct. 1982,540 (1983) of 31 Oct. 1983,582 (1986) of 24 Feb. 1986,588 (1986) of 8 Oct. 1986,598 
(1987) of 20 July 1987. The latter resolution was adopted under Ch. VII of the Charter. 255 Doc. S/ 14190, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1980, p. 23. 
256 G. A. O. R. ES-1, Plennarv Meetings and Annexes, 561st plen. mtg, para 47; also see 563rd 
plen. mtg 
, 
para 254 ( El Salvador ). 
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The same deference, though in the context of whether "effective" 
measures had been adopted by the Security Council, was shown by the 
U. K. during the Falklands conflict of 1982 257 
. 
The significance of this lies 
in the fact that State practice appears to have evolved into accepting a 
limitation of the exercise of a right that exists in customary law by a rule 
that is stipulated in treaty law 
- 
the Charter of the United Nations. Both 
customary law and treaty law are considered to "retain a separate 
. 
existence" which means that they neither subsume nor exist in complete 
insulation from each other25m s. It is submitted that in this respect Article 
51 of the Charter has influenced the practice of States, not into abandoning 
the right of self-defence, but into ceasing its exercise when community 
action is undertaken through the United Nations257* 
. 
Two interrelated issues arise in the present context of discussion. 
First, the question of who is competent to decide that necessary measures 
have been taken for the maintenance of international peace and security, 
and, secondly, the question of what kind of measures are deemed 
necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security. It is 
submitted that the question must be dealt under two contingencies. 
First, the primary task for such decision lies with the Security 
Council (or the Assembly ), while at the same time the defending State is 
legitimised to reach its own decision, although this would happen at the 
risk that its action may be considered as a threat to international peace or 
an act of aggression under Article 39 of the Charter 258 
. 
It is submitted that 
this is the case in which the Security Council (or the Assembly) issue a 
recommendation or a decision the execution of which calls for action 
exclusively by the aggressor State. This is the case with regard to calls or 
demands of withdrawal of the invading forces from the victim State's 
territory 
- 
see, for instance, Security Council resolution 502 (1982) of 3 
April 1982 on the Falklands crisis, and Security Council resolution 660 
(1990) of 2 August 1990 on the Kuwait crisis. In this case "necessary 
measures" means "effective" measures the result of which would be the 
reversal of the aggression but which should depend for their realisation 
257 Letter dated 30 April 1982 from the representative of the U. K.... to the President of the 
Security Council, Doc. S/ 15017, S. C. O. R. 37th yr. Suppl. for April-June 1982, p. 55. 
257b's See I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, p. 95, paras 177-178. 
257* Cf. H. H. Almond Jr., An Assessment of Economic Warfare: Developments from the 
Persian Gulf, 31 Va I. I. L. 645 (1991), p. 665. 
258 Cf. Bowett op. cit. supra n. 249, p. 196; Dinstein op. cit. supra n. 249, p. 197; Kelsen loc. 
cit. supra n. 249, p. 793. Contra. Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict, 1954, p. 244 
n. 9; Higgins loc. cit. srupra n. 249, p. 304. 
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on positive action on the part of the aggressor. It appears that in this case 
the scope and result of action in self-defence ( the expulsion of the 
aggressor from one's territory ) is exactly the same with the demand to the 
aggressor. Consequently, in the event of intransigence on the part of the 
latter to comply with the demand of the Security Council, and if self- 
defence had been invoked and measures taken for its implementation, 
action under the plea of defensive necessity may proceed without a 
violation of Article 51 of the Charter. The fact that it is the aggressor that, 
under the decision of the Council, has to act positively and reverse the 
outcome of its act and that it is the defending State that may do the same 
by acting unilaterally against the aggressor simply constitutes a twofold 
approach to the same outcome. It is submitted that the exercise of self- 
defence in such circumstances of Security Council deliberations has the 
function of upholding rather than going against the rule of law 259. This is 
illustrated by the action resorted to on the part of the U. K. against the 
Argentine forces occupying the Falklands subsequent to the adoption of 
Security Council resolution 502 (1982) of 3 April 1982 which demanded the 
immediate withdrawal of the latter. When the U. K. resorted to force the 
Argentine Government in a letter dated 29 April 1982 from the 
representative of Argentina to the President of the Security Council, 
contended that "... these illicit actions by the U. K. are claimed to be 
justified by a so-called right of self-defence. Among other reasons, that 
right cannot be invoked when the Security Council has adopted measures 
for the maintenance of international peace and security... " 260. To this the 
Government of the U. K. countered that: 
"... The fact that Argentina has not withdrawn its armed forces from the Falkland 
Islands, contrary to the demand in paragraph 2 of resolution 502 (1982), is sufficient to 
indicate that the decision of the Council has not, in fact, been effective to restore 
international peace and security because of Argentina's refusal to comply..... in the face of 
Argentina's flagrant and open violation of resolution 502 (1982), the U. K. is exercising its 
inherent right of self-defence... " 261 
It is a totally different situation when the Security Council 
undertakes positive action itself by adopting, in the sense of deciding or 
ordering, measures that are to be carried out by the entire Membership of 
259 Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community, 1933, p. 393. 
260 Doc. S/ 15014, S. C. O. R. 37th yr. Suppl. for April-June 1982, pp. 53-54; also see Letter 
dated 14 April 1982 from the representative of Panama to the President of the Security 
Council, Doc. S/ 14978, ibid. p. 22, at p. 25. 
261 Supra n. 257, at pp. 55-56. 
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the Organisation, except the aggressor State, or by the parties to the dispute, 
including the aggressor. In this case the latter constitutes the target of these 
measures, as opposed to their sole executor, or positive action is required 
by all parties that are involved in a conflict. It is submitted that measures 
necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security are a 
priori deemed to constitute decisions or calls adopted under Chapter VII 
of the Charter ( Security Council resolution 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990 
imposing comprehensive economic sanctions on Iraq for her invasion of 
Kuwait ); decisions or calls that threaten the imposition of such measures 
Security Council resolution 50 (1948) of 29 May 1948, paragraph 11 ); 
decisions or calls that aspire to the comprehensive settlement of a 
situation of long-standing dispute ( Security Council resolution 242 (1967) 
of 22 November 1967 ). The question of whether these measures are 
"effective" in their implementation against the aggressor or the question 
of the means by which they can be rendered "effective", is a matter for the 
Security Council alone to decide, because the Council is, in the above 
contingencies, discharging ad hoc powers of settlement of disputes and 
the primary duty for the maintenance of international peace and security 
expressly invested upon it by the Charter. In other words such measures 
are adopted without allowing in principle any discretion or initiative on 
the part of the aggressor. Thus, the representative of Israel in the Security 
Council, 
-Mr. A. Eban, observed with regard to the Egyptian plea of self- 
defence in justification for the restrictions imposed on Israel-bound 
shipping through the Suez canal, that: 
"... Article 51 of the Charter allows a nation to undertake action in self-defence 
only on two conditions, both of which are absent here. One of them is that that country 
should be the victim of armed attack, and not even the Egyptian representative himself 
has invoked any such prospect. The second is that the Security Council has not yet assumed 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in that area. The 
Security Council has undertaken its responsibilities in that area by underwriting the 
General Armistice Agreements and calling upon the parties to ensure their continued 
fulfilment... " 262 
Following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on 2 August 1990 the 
Security Council adopted Res. 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990 that imposed 
comprehensive economic sanctions on Iraq. Interestingly enough, the 6th 
preambular paragraph thereof affirms "... the inherent right of individual 
262 S. C. O. R. 6th yr. 551st mtg 
, 
para 36; ibid. 550th mtg 
, 
para 93 (U. K. ); S. C. Res. 95 (1951) 
of 1 Sept. 1951. 
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or collective self-defence, in response to the armed attack by Iraq against 
Kuwait, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter... ". 
The above passage seems to be somewhat contradictory, for, if the 
right of self-defence is to be affirmed in accordance with the terms of 
Article 51, then it should be superseded by the terms of Res. 661 (1990) 
imposing sanctions against Iraq under Chapter VII of the Charter262bis 
. 
The above preambular paragraph has been asserted in justification for the 
dispatch of U. S. and other troops to Saudi Arabia 263 
, 
and to institute a so- 
called naval "interdiction" to enforce the economic sanctions imposed by 
resolution 661 (1990) on Iraq-bound shipping suspected of breaching the 
terms of the resolution 264 
. 
With regard to the dispatch of U. S. and other troops to Saudi 
Arabia, this was effected at the request of the Saudi Government and was 
justified as a preparatory defensive measure against imminent threat of 
invasion of the Saudi Kingdom by Iraq 265 
. 
The above measures in so far 
as they concerned Saudi Arabia herself should rather be considered as 
distinct from the occupation of Kuwait and Res. 661 (1990) that aimed at 
ending the Iraqi aggression; indeed, the wording of the 6th preambular 
paragraph of the resolution appears to be rather awkward in seeking to 
link the right of self-defence of Kuwait against Iraq with that of Saudi 
Arabia against Iraq which is a totally different situation. Moreover the U. S. 
and other troops were dispatched to Saudi Arabia in defence of the latter 
and not of Kuwait. Thus, the right of self-defence could be invoked in case 
of renewed aggression by Iraq against Saudi Arabia. This, however, would 
not constitute a renewal of the right that Kuwait had when the invasion 
of 2 August 1990 happened but a new situation in which self-defence 
becomes operative with regard to Saudi Arabia and her allies only265bk, 
. 
Thus, in the hypothetical situation that force would have had to be used 
for the defence of Saudi Arabia, it could not in principle extend to the 
liberation of Kuwait, unless the requirement of proportionality rendered 
the latter contingency a de facto outcome of the defensive action in 
262bis Contra. Greenwood, 55 Modern L. R. 153 (1992), pp. 164-5; R. N. Gardner, Commentary 
on the Law of Self-Defence, in Damrosch & Scheffer (eds. ) op. cit. supra n. 73, p. 50; D. B. 
Rivkin Jr., Commentary on Aggression and Self-Defence, in Damrosch & Sceffer (eds. ) op. 
cit. supra n. 73, pp. 57-58. 
263 Statement by Mr. The. Pickering (U. S. A. ) at the 2934th mtg of the S. C. of 9 August 1990, 
in Lauterpacht & others (eds. ) op. cit. supra n. 98, p. 105. 264 Keesing's 1990, pp. 37639-37640. 
265 Keesing's 1990, pp. 37636-37639; supra n. 263. 
265h" A. Chayes, The Use of Force in the Persian Gulf, in Damrosch & Scheffer (eds. ) op. 
cit. supra n. 73, pp. 5-6; Contra. Greenwood loc. cit. supra n. 262bis. 
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support of Saudi Arabia. This is, furthermore, illustrated by the fact that 
when Israel became the victim of the Iraqi missile attack on 17 January 
1991 she resorted to force in self-defence in order to repel the attack against 
her, but did not resort to further force against the massive concentration of 
Iraqi armed forces in and around Kuwait; the latter were being subject to 
action endorsed by the Security Council. It can be argued that Israel did 
have the right to attack and destroy the Iraqi missile launchers on the 
territory of Iraq, but she refrained from doing so on the basis of 
considerations of policy 266 
. 
With regard to the claim of using naval force for the 
implementation of Res. 661 (1990) as an exercise of the right of self- 
defence, it is submitted that it has contradicted previous practice that 
requires the Security Council itself to decide upon further measures to 
implement the ones already imposed by its own resolution 
- 
viz. Security 
Council resolution 221 (1966) of 9 April 1966, paragraph 5 of which 
empowered the U. K. "... to prevent, by the use of force if necessary, the 
arrival at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined 
for Southern Rhodesia... ". The above resolution appears to authorise 
measures to render "effective" the measures adopted by the Council 
against the minority regime in Rhodesia by virtue of operative paragraph 
8 of Security Council resolution 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965. The U. S. 
proposal of a naval "interdiction" was met with considerable scepticism 
on the part of the French and Soviet Governments 267, and outright 
opposition by certain members of the Security Council. Mr. Alacron de 
Quesada of Cuba stressed that according to Article 51, self-defence stopped 
until the Security Council had taken measures necessary for to maintain 
international peace and security and concluded: 
"... I think that what is most important about the Article and resolution from 
which he [the U. S. representative] has quoted from is that both assert this Council's 
authority to handle the crisis... " 268 
26' Keesing's 1991, p. 37939. 
267 Keesing's 1990, p. 37640. 268 S/PV 2937,18 August 1990, in Lauterpacht & others (eds. ) op. cit. supra n. 98, p. 112; 
also ibid. pp. 109 ( Yemen ), 115 ( Iraq ). See N. D. White & H. McCoubrey, x Int. Rel. 34, - 
(1991), pp. 350-1,353-4 ; Mullerson, Self-Defence in the Contemporary World, in Damrosch 
& Sheffer (eds. ) op. cit. supra n. 73, p. 22 but cf. p. 23; cf. Greenwood, 55 Modern L. R. 153 
(1992), pp. 162-2. 
282 
That this is the case is illustrated by the ultimate decision of the U. S. 
and the U. K. to refer the matter to the Security Council that called upon 
the States that were cooperating with the Government of Kuwait and that 
maintained naval forces in the region "... to use such measures 
commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary under the 
authority of the Security Council to halt all inward and outward marine 
shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and 
to ensure strict implementation of the provisions related to such shipping 
laid out in resolution 661 (1990)... " 269. 
The suggestion was, furthermore, propounded by Mrs. M. Thatcher, 
the Prime Minister of the U. K., that: 
"... We hope that economic sanctions will prove to be sufficient. That is why they 
must be strictly enforced. But we are not precluded by reason of any of the Security Council 
resolutions from exercising the inherent right of collective self-defence in accordance with 
the rules of international law. 
To undertake now to use no military force without the further authority of the 
Security Council would be to deprive ourselves of a right in international law expressly 
affirmed by Security Council Resolution 661;... " 270 
This view strongly suggests that in case economic sanctions were 
not proved to be effective, the U. K. Government took the view that the 
right of collective self-defence could be legitimately invoked to liberate 
Kuwait. Again such assertion was ultimately not made for the use of force 
to expel the Iraqi forces from Kuwait was authorised by virtue of Security 
Council resolution 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990. The representative of 
Malaysia in explaining the vote of his delegation stated that: 
" 
... 
Malaysia would like to make it clear that our support for Resolution 678 (1990) 
is not without reservations. The authorization of force 
... 
can only be taken under the terms 
of the Charter of the United Nations. We have not agreed to any attempt unilaterally to 
apply Article 51 of the Charter once the Security Council is seized of the matter. In this 
regard we have always insisted on the centrality of the United Nations role in the 
maintenance of international peace and security. Any proposed use of force must be brought 
before the Council for its prior approval, in accordance with specific provisions of Chapter 
VII of the Charter. We regret that this point is not clearly reflected in this resolution, a 
precedent that may not bode well for the future 
... 
"270bis 
269 S. C. Res. 665 (1990) of 25 August 1990, operative para 1. 270 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, H. C., No 1533,6 September 1990, p. 383, col. 737. 270bi,, See S. C. O. R. 45th yr. S/PV. 2963rd mtg. (29 November 1990), in Lauterpacht & 
others (eds. ), The Kuwait Crisis-Basic Documents, 1991, p. 170. Also see B. H. Weston, 
Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision Making: Precarious Legitimacy, 
85 
, 
4. J. 1. L. 516 (1991), pp. 520-1; N. D. White & H. McCoubrey, x Int. Rel. 347 (1991), p. 354- 
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4. The Rule of Proportionality 
. 
Proportionality of self-defence is the second requirement, apart 
from the necessity of self-defence, for the exercise of the right in 
international law 271 
. 
Its meaning consists in that the force resorted to in self-defence 
must be limited to repelling the armed attack that gave rise to the necessity 
of self-defence and be kept within this necessity. Consequently, it is 
submitted that proportionality connotes a requirement of performance of 
armed action in self-defence 272. 
Thus, the Annotated Supplement to the Commander's Handbook 
on the Laz' of Naval Operations of the U. S. Navy defines proportionality 
as 
"... The requirement that the use of force be in all circumstances limited in intensity, 
duration and scope to that which is reasonably required to counter the attack or threat of 
attack... " 273 
The application of proportionality in practice may be difficult due to 
the specific factual situation on the ground between two States. It may be 
that two armies facing each other for a long period of time could react 
more forcefully should a violent incident occur 274. 
It is submitted that the requirement of proportionality of action in 
self-defence entails a limiting effect on the action of the defending State 
with regard to (A) the means it will use against the aggressor; (B) the locus 
of the military operations, and (C) their target. The starting point for the 
6; Greenwood, 55 Modern L. R. 153 (1992), pp. 167-9; Mullerson loc. cit. supra D. 268; T. M. 
Franck & F. Patel, U. N. Police Action in Lieu of War. The Old Order Changeth, 85 A. I. I. L. 
63 (1991), p. 66. Cf, 
. 
Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 A. J. I. L. 452 
(1991), pp. 460-1; Rostow, Until What? Enforcement Action or Collective Self-Defence, 85 
A. J. I. L. 506 (1991), pp. 508-514; Chayes loc. cit. supra n. 265bis, p. 10. 
271 Nicaragua Case (Merits), LC. J! 
_ 
Rep. 1986, p. 14, at p. 103, para 194. 272 Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, Doc. Al 7620, 
G. A. G. R_ 24th session, Suppl. No 20, p. 29, para 73; Doc. A/8019, G. A. O. R. 25th session, 
Suppl. No 19, pp. 47-48, paras 131-132; Wright, 53 A. J. I. L. 112 (1959), p. 117; Fawcett, 103 
H. R. C. 347 (7961 11), p. 365; Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 22, pp. 261-264; Schachter, 82 Mich. 
L. R. 1620 (1984), p. 1637, but cf. p. 1638; id. 53 Univ. Chic. L. R. 113 (1986), pp. 132,143; 
Jimenez de Arechaga, 159 H. R. C. 9 (1978 1), p. 97; Greenwood, 89 W. Va. L. R. 933 (1987), p. 
946. 
273 Loc. cit. supra n. 33 at 4.3.2/4-9. Cf. Dinstein op. cit. supra n. 22, pp. 216-217. 274 Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 22, p. 264; id. loc. cit. in Butler (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 21, p. 25; 
cf. Schwarzenberger, 87 H. R. C. 195 (1955 1), pp. 333-334. 
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application of proportionality is the moment of the occurrence of the 
armed attack, namely, the point in time where the necessity of self-defence 
has arisen. The fulfilment of proportionality would depend on a 
consideration of the means, locus 
, 
and target of the military operations of 
the defending State. 
4. (i). The Means of Response to an Armed Attack. 
The use of which weapons by the defending State depends on the 
means used by the aggressor. It is submitted that exact identity in kind 
between the defensive response and the attack within the same broad 
category of weapons is not required 275 
. 
Thus, an attack by conventional 
weapons is to be met with defensive response with any other 
conventional weapons. Consequently, an attack by way of artillery 
bombardment may be countered with action by way of helicopter gunships 
against the artillery batteries; action, however, would be disproportionate 
if it entailed the aerial bombardment of the capital of the aggressor State. 
Similarly, an attack by nuclear or chemical weapons could be be countered 
by similar means. This writer believes that nuclear weapons should never 
be used in the first instance to counter an attack by conventional weapons 
because of the immensely destructive potential of the former and their 
long-term effects on the natural environment of their target. Their use, 
however, may envisaged only when the defending State's conventional 
defence structure is subject to such devastating use of armed force that its 
use only, is not sufficient for repelling the aggressor 276 
. 
By contrast, an 
attack launched by way of chemical or biological weapons may be held to 
be proportionately countered by battlefield (as opposed to strategic) nuclear 
275 Greenwood loc. cit. in Dinstein (ed. ) op. cit. sup a n. 22, pp. 279-281; Lachs, 169 H. R. C. 
1(1(1980 1), p. At". 
27h Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 22, pp. 262-264; N. Singh, Nuclear Weapons and 
International Law, 1959, pp. 132-136; cf. Greenwood loc. cit. in Dinstein (ed. ) op. cit. supra 
n. 22, p. 281. The general issue of the legality of the use of nuclear weapons constitutes an 
autonomous area that has generated prolific academic research. It is not the purpose of this 
study to deal with it in its merits. See generally, Schwarzenberger, Legality of Nuclear 
Weapons, 1958 ; H. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, 1957 ; H. Nash, 
Nuclear Weapon and International Behaviour, 1975 ; H. Fujita, International Regulation 
of Nuclear Weapons, 1988 ; N. Singh & E. McWhinney, Nuclear Weapons and 
Contemporary International Law, 2nd rev. ed. 1989 ; Pogany (ed. ), Nuclear Weapons and 
International Lain, 1987 ; A. S. Miller & M. Feinrider, Nuclear Weapons and Law, 1984 ; E. L. 
Meyrowitz, Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, 1990 ; V. Harle & P. Sivonen (eds. ), Nuclear 
Weapons in a Changing Europe, 1991 
. 
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weapons, if it is of such intensity as to result in widespread destruction of 
the population and other living resources of the defending State. Still, 
however, the permanent character of the effects of a nuclear attack should 
be very scrupulously judged against the effects, beyond the short-term 
ones, of chemical and biological weapons. It can be said that while the 
effects of the former can be reasonably successfully countered at least with 
regard to the population of the State by the use of certain protective 
measures ( namely, the distribution of chemical gas masks, the 
construction of special home-made bunkers ); biological weapons, on the 
other hand, do have more lasting effect by affecting the entire living 
resources of the State. 
An interesting question arises with regard to whether covert 
counter-insurgency operations, namely, assistance given to guerrillas 
operating against the Government of a State, is a proportionate measure of 
self-defence against assistance given by the former to guerrillas operating 
against the Government of the defending State or one of its allies. This 
was the justification that was invoked by the U. S. A. in the proceedings of 
the Nicar'agiua Case The U. S. justified her material assistance to the 
Nicaraguan contras as collective self-defence on behalf of the 
Government of El Salvador against the assistance allegedly provided by 
the Nicaraguan Government to the Salvadorean insurgents. The Court 
did not rule whether the U. S. assistance was proportionate, because it 
found that the alleged Nicaraguan involvement did not amount to an 
armed attack and therefore the U. S. did not have the right of self-defence 
277 
. 
Judge Schwebel has dealt with the matter at some length and 
maintained that defensive measures couid be covert and that the test of 
proportionality did not imply "perfect proportionality" 278 
. 
The advantage 
of covert actions according to Judge Schwebel lies in that they can be "... 
more modest and more readily terminated... " and that they entail less loss 
of life 279 
. 
It is submitted that the thesis propounded in the dissenting opinion 
of Judge Schwebel should be regarded at least with some suspicion 280. It 
277 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, at p. 122, para 237. 
278 Ibid. per Judge Sc)noebel, pp. 269-270,367-369, paras 9,210-213; Rostow, 11 Yale I. I. L. 
437 (1985-86), p. 454; Moore, 80 A. I. I. L. 43 (1986), p. 107; cf. Macdonald, xxiv Can. Y. U. 127 (1986), p. 153. 
279 Supra n. 278, at p. 367, para 210. 
2800 Higginbotham, 25 Col. J. Timis. L. 529 (1987), p. 559 notes 137,138, but cf. p. 560; 
Reichler & ýV'ippman, 11 Yale I. I. L. 462 (1985-86), pp. 469,471; Kahn, 12 Yale J. I. L. 1 (1987), 
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amounts to the following situation: Both Governments of States A and B 
are faced with armed insurgency aiming at overthrowing each one of 
them. If State A assists the armed opposition in State B, then State B has 
the right of self-defence by assisting the armed opposition in State A. 
Moreover, the same right of collective self-defence belongs to 13's ally, State 
C. This implies in effect that the only tangible means of defence would be 
the overthrow of the Government of the assisting State, a contingency 
which is not supported by the practice of States 281. The authorities that 
argue for the legitimacy of such contingency point at the overthrow of the 
Axis Governments as one of the aims of a war of self-defence of the Allied 
Powers against these countries 282. It is submitted that such a conclusion is 
somewhat arbitrary because the declaration of intent to overthrow these 
Governments has taken place in a situation of total global war and it was 
subscribed to, not by one or a few States acting individually, but as a policy 
of collective sanction ?. Such action would nowadays be undertaken 
only under the authority of the United Nations Security Council 283hk 
and if one is to draw a conclusion from the attitude towards the B'aath 
Government in Iraq of the Organisation and the U. S. 
- 
led coalition that 
forcibly implemented Security Council resolution 660 (1990) against Iraq 
for its invasion of Kuwait, the overthro-tv of a Government, even as a 
matter of collective security, is not a contingency which is readily to be 
implemeinted. 
Moreover, if the cessation of the assistance to the guerrillas 
operating against the defending State can only be achieved by offering the 
same situation to the assisting State ( amounting even to the point of 
overthrowing its Government ), this creates a situation that partakes a 
great deal of vindwciic. eness, as opposed to concern for one's oxvil 
protection, and merits to be characterised as repnsai l 284. Indeed, instead of 
defending itself ( namely, adopting measures of defence against its own 
guerrillas and intercepting the assistance supplied to them) the 
defending State 
281 Reichler && Wippman, 77 Yale ]. IL. 4b2 (1985-86), p. pp. 469-470; D'Amato, 79 
A. J. l L. 657 (1985), p. 658. Contra Rostow loc. cit. supra n. 278, p. 453; Moore loc. cit. supra 
n. 278, p. 114. 
282 I. C. J. Rep. 1986 ( per Judge Sclrwebel ), p. 270, para 9; Rostow supra n. 281; Moore supra 
n. 281. )s 1- See The Declaration by the United Nations of 1 January 1942, text in 36 191 
(1942) ; Brownlie op. Cit. srrln"a n. 22, pp. 109,332; Farer, 84 A. J. I. L. 503 (1990), p.. 508. 
283bis Cf. Dinstein supra n. 247. 
284 Joyner & Grimaldi, 25 Va. /. I. L. 621 (1985), p. 647. 
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remains entangled in the misery of its own civil war, it contributes to 
perpetuating of a civil war in another State and if a request for assistance 
in collective self-defence is answered, then there is real danger of creating 
a major conflict. 
Finally, the overthrow of a Government, especially by way of 
assisting guerrillas, is a task that it is rather difficult to achieve. The fact 
that it is of no real purpose for the protection of the beleaguered 
Government against a domestic insurgency militates against the 
characterisation of covert action as "modest and easily terminated". On the 
contrary, it reveals, its real nature, namely, an attempt at preserving 
"public deniability" 287 of one's own defensive action that is itself in 
contradiction with the requirement of reporting action in self-defence to 
the Security Council. In fact, it constitutes a curious proposition that a 
State that has the genuine belief that it acts in self-defence should be 
fearful of openly pursuing its protective action 286. 
4. (ii). The Iocrr5 of the defensive action 
. 
One of the results of the requirement of proportionality of self- 
defence is that the military operations of the defending State are limited 
locally to the geographical area where the attack takes place. As a result the 
distinction draNvn in classical international law between the "region of 
war", namely, "... that part of the surface of the earth in which the 
belligerents nati prepare and execute hostilities against each other... ", and 
the "theatre of war", the locality where hostilities actually take place 25 
seems- to have been overturned in favour of the latter 285 
Thus, the action in self-defence resorted to by Ethiopia against the W. S. L. F. 
and the Somali Army was onfined to the territory of Ogaden. Similarly, 
the resort to force in self-defence by the U. K. against the Argentine forces 
occupying the Falklands was, also confined to the islands under occupation 
and a 200 miles zone around them. Moreover, State practice in naval 
xvarfare demonstrates a consistent tendency to confine naval operation, 
very close to the belligerents' coast, namely, either in the territorial sea or 
the contiguous zone 2819 
. 
It is conceivable that action may be taken on the 
285 Kahn loc. cit. supra n. 280, p. 29. 
286 See in fia section 6. 
287 Oppenheim, International Law, vol. ii, 7th ed. by Lauterpacht, 79.52, p. 2.37. 
288 Greenwood loc. cit. in Dinstein op. cit. supra n. 22, p. 277. 289 O'Connell, The Influence of Law on Sea Power, 79'7, pp. 122-129. 
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territory of the aggressor State provided that, first, the source of material 
force on the ground is situated therein ( namely, airfields from which air 
strikes are launched, missiles or artillery batteries in action against the 
victim State ) and, secondly, the undertaking of military action in the 
territory of the aggressor is closely connected with either dislodging his 
forces from the territory of the defending State ( the conduct of an 
encirclement manoeuvre through the territory of the aggressor ), or 
disrupting the logistical and supply network between his. command centre 
and his forces on the ground 290 
. 
It is submitted that action on the 
territory of the aggressor is a contingency that depends on the actual 
situation on the ground in the aftermath of the occurrence of the armed 
attack and it should not be licensed a priori as a general rule. 
Judge Schwebel took the opposite view in his dissenting opinion in 
the Nicaragua Case 
. 
By reference to instances of the practice of the United 
Nations ( Korea ), Israel, France ( the Sakiet incident ), U. K. (Harib Fort 
incident ), U. S. 
, 
China, Viet-Nam, Iraq, U. S. S. R., Afghanistan and 
Nicaragua, he concluded: 
lt is by no means suggested that all of these actions are of the same legal value; 
some were clearly lawful, others clearly not. But what is significant is that these actions, 
whose legality has been affirmed by those carrying them out, provide ample and 
significant State practice indicating that what is proposed as a limitation upon self- 
defence and counter-intervention is not today applied as a rule of international law. It is not 
generally accepted State practice.... 291 
He, then, proceeded by arguing that refraining from action on the 
territory of the aggressor should even not be accepted as a rule of 
international law for in Judge Schwebel's view this "... would encourage 
rather than deter aggression... " 292. 
The present author does not share the above view. To argue that a 
rule of customary law emerges on the basis of State practice and opinio 
juris without taking into account the possibility of persistent objection to 
that practice constitutes a very narrow conception of the creation of 
customary law 293. Moreover, the statement on the undesirability of the 
opposite contingency is alarmingly disturbing because it effectively 
advocates that an a ressor should "suffer" for its delict, not by virtue of 
290 Wengler, 7 Revue Belge D. I. 41)1 (1971), pp. 412-413. 
291 I. C. J. Rep. 1986 (per Judge Schzoebel ), p. 372, para 219. 
292 Ibid. para 220; also see Moore, 80 A. I. I. L. 43 (1986), pp. 58,88-89. 293 See infra Second Title. 
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collective security or judicial action, but by unilateral action in self-defence 
! It is not clear by what logic, other than that of self-help or self- 
preservation, self-defence, an action which is clearly protective, should 
partake the character of inflicting suffering on the aggressor. Indeed, 
should the above thesis supported by Judge Schwebel be accepted any 
distinction between self-defence and reprisals will be rendered totally 
nugatory. 
4. (iii). The Target of defensive action. 
It is submitted that the target of defensive force should be the actual 
source of armed force on the ground and not the aggressor State 
considered as a whole. The same is the case with regard to counter- 
measures against uses of force short of an armed attack 294. Thus, the use 
of defensive force against targets that are totally unconnected with the 
action that has given rise to the necessity of self-defence, is 
disproportionate and, therefore, unlawful. The mining of the Nicaraguan 
ports and the attacks on oil installations were considered by the Court in 
the Nicaragua Case as totally unconnected with what had given rise to the 
necessity of self-defence of El Salvador, namely, the alleged material 
assistance by Nicaragua to the Salvadorean insurgents 295 
. 
Indeed, it is 
strongly implicit in the Judgment that only action against the network as 
such of rendering material assistance to the Salvadorean guerrillas would 
have been lawful 296 
. 
It appears from the Judgment that this "network" 
would not include the ports of Nicaragua, where the material supplies for 
the guerrillas might have arrived, and which would have significance for 
the economy of Nicaragua as a whole. It seems that it is rather the final 
stage of the dispatch of the materiel to the Salvadorean insurgents that 
would legitimately be the target of defensive force, namely, the routes of 
supply close to the area where the guerrillas actually used force against the 
Government of El Salvador. To stretch the principle of proportionality to 
cover targets that are not strictly connected or not connected at all with the 
source of armed force on the ground would amount to a sharp escalation 
of force 297 
. 
294 Ibid. 
295 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, at p. 122, para 237. 
2% Ibid. p. 124, para 241. 
297 Rowles, 80 A. J. I. L. 568 (1986), p. 580. 
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In the general context of activities of armed bands the victim State's 
armed response is to be directed against the guerrillas themselves, because 
they constitute the source of force on the ground, and with regard to every 
specific instance of force by the guerrillas 298. The totality of the past 
guerrilla acts, the so-called "accumulation of events" theory is not accepted 
in the practice of State-, and its main practical result is to by-pass the 
requirement of proportionality with regard to the use of force that 
immediately precedes the armed response of the victim State 299. Thus, 
massive sweeping operation-, against guerrillas on the territory of another 
State derive their attractiveness from the fact that they purport to eradicate 
the activities of the armed bands once and for all at one blow 
- 
see for 
instance, the operation "Peace for Galilee" that was launched by Israel 
against the P. L. O. in Lebanon in June 1982. Such operations are, on the 
basis of precedent in the practice of States that resorted to them, 
disproportionate for they entail a massive use of force over a sizeable 
geographical area, and are waged indiscriminately with regard to the local 
population of the host State of the guerrilla-, resulting in heavy casualties 
and large-scale destruction of property. It appears that it is the purpose of 
the operation ( namely, the destruction of the guerrilla organisation as a 
whole ) that is taken into account at the expense of the rule of 
proportionality it hick is sought to be accordingly extended 300. 
It is submitted that to give prominence to the purpose of otne's 
military response as defined by the interest of the defending State and 
sacrifice the requirement of proportionality thereunder, may, first, render 
the exceptional defensive use of force an exercise of national policy and 
quite possibly aggression, and, secondly, it may escalate a conflict to 
dangerous levels 301 
. 
5. Tice Poctrine of Anticipatory Seif Defence 
. 
In \tafdock the folloiAing passage occurs: 
29 Higgins, 3; B. Y. LL. 269 (1961), p. 303; In Second Title. 
299 See supra Part One, Ch. 3 and infra Second Title. 
Adendum to the Eighth Report on State Responsibility by Rapporteur 
. 
ago supra n. 2, 
pp. 69-70, para 121; approvingly in I. C. J. Rep. 1986 ( per Judge Schwebel ), pp. 367-369, 
gras 212-213; Feinstein 71 Israel L. R. 576 (7971)), p. 537 et seq. 3001 
Greenwood loc. cit. in Dinstein (ed. ) op. cit. pp, 278-279. 
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"... Does Article 51 cut down the customary right by restricting forcible self-defence 
to cases where the attack provoking it has actually been launched ? The question is 
whether the words "if an armed attack occurs" introduce into the law of self-defence the 
principle of the second blow 
- 
the riposte to a stroke already delivered 
- 
as a rigid test of 
legitimate self-defence. If so, an imminent threat is no longer sufficient to create an 
immediate right to resort to self-defence.... That goes beyond the necessary meaning of the 
words.... Nor does it seem that at San Francisco there was an intention to cut down the right 
of self-defence beyond the already narrow doctrine of the Caroline Incident. 
That doctrine allows and only allows a right of defence in the face of imminent threat of 
attack 
- 
in face of an armed attack already impending over the defending State. Where 
there is convincing evidence not merely of threats and potential danger but of an attack 
being actually mounted, then an armed attack may be said to have begun to occur, though it 
has not passed the frontier.... If... the attack becomes manifestly imminent, then it would 
be a travesty of the purposes of the Charter to compel a defending State to allow its 
assailant to deliver the first and perhaps fatal blow... " 302 
The Court in the Nicaragua Case refrained from passing judgment 
on the legality of anticipatory self-defence by stating that: 
... 
ln view of the circumstances in which the dispute has arisen, reliance is placed 
by the Parties only on the right of self-defence in the case of an armed attack which has 
already occurred, and the issue of the lawfulness of a response to the imminent threat of 
302 Waldock, 81 H. R. C. 455 (1952 11), pp. 497-498. Also see, Bowett op. cit. supra n. 17, pp. 
188-189,191,192; Wright, 53 A. J. 1. L. 112 (1959), p. 117; id. The Strengthening of 
International Law, 98 H. R. C. 5 (1959 III), pp. 167-168; but cf. id. The Cuban Quarantine, 57 
A. J. 1. L. 546 (1963), pp. 560-561; McDougal & Feliciano op. cit. supra n. 22, pp. 231-240; 
Higgins, 37 B. Y. I. L. 269 (1961), pp. 301-302; Fawcett, 103 H. R. C. 419 (1961 II), pp. 361-363; 
Schwebel, 136 H. R. C. 419 (1972 II), pp. 480-481; Feinstein, 11 Israel L. R. 516 (1976), pp. 529- 
537; Greig, 40 I. C. L. Q. 366 (1991Y, p. 397; Shapira, 6 Israel L. R. 65 (1971), pp. 74-75; Rifaat 
op. cit. supra n. 22, pp. 126-127; Schachter, 82 Mich. L. R. 1620 (1984), p. 1634; id. 53 Univ. 
Chic. L. R. 113 (1986), pp. 134,136; id. 83 A. J. I. L. 259 (1989), p. 267; Kuhn, 6 S. A. Y. I. L. 42 
(1980), p. 47; W. T. Mallison & S. V. Mallison, The Israeli Air Attack of June 7,1981, upon 
the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor: Aggression or Self-Defence ?, 15 Vand. J. Trans. L. 417 (1982), 
420-424; Rostow, 11 Yale J. I. L. 437 (1985-86), p. 452 n. 59; Joyner & Grimaldi, 25 Va. J. I. L. 621 
. 
(1985), p. 659 but cf. p. 660; Stone, Conflict Through Consensus, 1977, pp. 47-50; McDougal, 57 
A. J. I. L. 597 (1963), pp. 598,600-601; Phillips, 10 Hoffis. J. I. L. 275 (1988), pp. 287,291-292; 
McCredie, 19 Case W. Res. J. I. L. 215 (1987), pp. 230-231; Blum loc. cit. in Netanyahu (ed. ) 
op. cit., pp. 136-137; Sullivan, 10 ASILS. I. L. J. 169 (1986), pp. 177 et. seq. ; Intoccia, 19 Case 
W. Res. J. I. L. 177 (1987), pp. 203-205; C. J. Botha, 11 S. A. Y. I. L. 138 (1985-86), pp. 148-149, but 
cf. p. 150; Gross, 13 Cal. West. I. L. J. 458 (1983), pp. 479-486; J. E. Brinberg, The Sun Sets on 
Tamuz 1: The Israeli Raid on Iraq's Nuclear Reactor, 13 Cal. West. I. L. J. 86 (1983), pp. 104- 
105; Wengler, 7 Revue Belge D. J. 401 (1971), p. 405 n. 12, but cf. p. 404; Linnan, 16 Yale I. I. L. 
245 (1991), p. 339; W. T. Mallison, Aggression or Self-Defence in Lebanon in 1982, A. S. I. L. 
Proceedings 174 (1983), p. 177; Greenwood, 89 W. Va. L. R. 933 (1987), pp. 942-944; 
Levenfeld, 21 Col. J. Trans. L. 1 (1982), pp. 29-30; McCormack, 25 Israel L. R. 1 (1991), pp. 35- 
42; Chayes, The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1974, p. 65. 
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armed attack has not been raised. Accordingly, the Court expresses no view in that issue... 
303 
Judge Schwebel, however, appears very close to endorsing the 
legality of anticipatory self-defence in his dissenting opinion, although it 
seems that his main concern focuses on whether self-defence may be 
exercised against uses of force that do not amount to an armed attack. He 
expressed the view: 
"... The Court rightly observes that the issue of the lawfulness of a response to the 
imminent threat of armed attack has not been raised in this case, and that the Court 
accordingly expresses no view on that issue. Nevertheless, its Judgment may be open to the 
interpretation of inferring that a State may react in self-defence, and that supportive 
States may react in self-defence, only if an armed attack occurs... 
I wish, ex abudanti cautela 
, 
to make clear that, for my part, I do not agree with a 
construction of the United Nations Charter which would read Article 51 as if it were 
worded: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if, and only if, an armed attack occurs... " 304 
The Annotated Supplement to the Commander's Handbook on the 
Law of Naval Operations of the U. S. Navy expressly argues for the 
admissibility of anticipatory self-defence by reference to the Caroline 
incident 305 
. 
Moreover, during the Security Council debate on the Israel air strike 
on Iraq's nuclear reactor on 7 June 1981, Mr. Blum, the Israel 
representative in the Security Council, defended his country's right of 
anticipatory self-defence by referring to authoritative literature in support 
of anticipatory action Soh 
. 
There is evidence that prior to the adoption of the United Charter, 
the doctrine of anticipatory self-defence was considered admissible in law. 
The Military Tribunal at Nuremberg rejected the German pleas of 
anticipatory self-defence for the attacks by Germany on Norway and the 
Soviet Union, not on the basis of illegality of the doctrine but on the fact 
that there was no imminent threat of attack against Germany in either of 
303 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14 at p. 103, para 194. Cf. Macdonald, xxizv Can. Y. I. L. 127 (1986), pp. 
147,154. 
304 Ibid. ( per Judge Schinebel ), p. 347, paras 172-173. 
305 Loc. cit. supra n. 33,4.3.2.1 /4-12,4-13, n. 29. 
306 Reference was made, inter alia, to works by Waldock, Bowett, Schwebel and McDougal (supra n. 302); S. C. O. R. 36th yr. 2280th mtg, paras 98-100; 2288th mtg, paras 81-84. 
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the above instances 307 
. 
Furthermore, the International Military Tribunal 
for the Far East expressly upheld the Netherlands anticipatory declaration 
of war against Japan of 8 December 1941 before the Japanese forces 
launched any armed action against the Netherlands East Indies 308. 
It is submitted that such evidence must be treated with caution 
because, first, apart from the Netherlands action, State practice in the 
period prior to the Charter is characterised by paucity of instances of 
invocation of anticipatory self-defence. The Italian action against Ethiopia 
in 1935, which was justified as anticipatory self-defence, was ultimately 
treated by the League of Nations as aggression. Secondly, the ruling of the 
Military Tribunal for the Far East seems to refer primarily to the conduct 
of Japan rather than that of the Netherlands; therefore, whatever the 
legality of the latter's action, Japan would have been condemned as the 
aggressor 309 
. 
It is submitted that the doctrine of anticipatory self-defence is 
unlawful and inadmissible under present international law for a number 
of reasons 310. 
First, in so far as the right to anticipatory self-defence is based on the 
survival of the Caroline doctrine under Article 51 of the Charter, it is 
argued that in the context of the 19th century law there was no ]us ad 
bellum and force could be resorted to freely by States and, therefore, there 
307 The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Proceedings of the International Military 
Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg, Germany, part 22, H. M. S. O. 1950, p. 411, pp. 435,437,441; 
also 41 A. J. 1. L. 172 (1947), pp. 205,206-207,213. 
3()8 Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 22, p. 258 n. 5. 
309 Ibid. 
310 See Oppenheim, International Law, vol. ii, 7th ed. by Lautetpacht, 1952, p. 156; Jessup, 
A Modern Lain of Nations; An Introduction, 1947, p. 165 et seq. ; Kelsen, The Lain of the 
United Nations, 1950, pp. 269,797 et seq. ; id. 42 A. J. I. L. 783 (1948), p. 791; Wehberg, 78 
H. R. C. 7 (1951 1), pp. 81-82; Kunz, 41 A. J. I. L. 872 (1947), p. 875; Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 22, 
p. 272 et seq. ; id. 37 B. Y. I. L. 183 (1961), pp. 227-228,242-243; id. loc. cit. in Butler (ed. ) op. 
cit. supra n. 21, pp. 24-25; Kolesnik loc. cit. in Butler (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 21, pp 154-155; 
Farer loc. cit. in Brown & Falk (eds. ) op. cit. supra n. 22, pp. 36-41; Ornstein op. cit. supra 
n. 22, pp. ] 74-176 but cf. pp. 179-180 where the author discusses the concept of "interceptive" 
self-defence; Skubiszewski loc. cit. in Sorensen (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 22, pp. 767,778; Broms, 
154 H. R. C. 305 (1977 1), pp. 342,344-345; Henkin, A. S. I. L. Proceedings 147 (1963), pp. 150- 
152; id. 216 H. R. C. 19 (1989 IV), p. 156; O'Connell, International Law and Contemporary 
Naval Operations, 44 B. Y. I. L. 19 (1970), p. 61 et seq. ; id. The Influeuce of Law on Sea 
Power, 1975, pp. 82-84; Combacau loc. cit. in Cassese (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 22, p. 24; Cot & 
Pellet op. cit. supra n. 22, p. 778 and notes 28-34; Macdonald, xxiv Can. Y. 1. L. 127 (1986), pp. 
147,154; Paust, Responding Lawfully To International Terrorism: The Use of Force Abroad, 8 
Whittier L. R. 711 (1986), p. 719; Wallace, 19 International Lawyer 259 (1985), p. 263; 
Lamberti Zanardi, La Legitinta Difesa nel Diritto Internazionale, Milano 1972, p. 231; id. 
loc. cit. in Cassese (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 22, pp. 111-112; G. Fischer, Le Bombardement par 
Israel d' un Reacteur Nucleaire Irakien, 27 A. F. D. I. 147 (1981), pp. 164-165; Zourek op. cit. 
supra n. 22, pp. 105-106. 
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was no real purpose for an exception of self-defence to a non-existent rule 
of the prohibition of unilateral armed force by States. Instead the Wider 
concept of self-preservation was invoked which is clearly inadmissible 
under the United Nations Charter 311. Moreover, the ordinary meaning of 
the text of Article 51 precludes a priori any interpretation permitting 
anticipatory action 312. 
Secondly, the provision of Article 51 as to the prior occurrence of an 
armed attack before resorting to force in self-defence has had a marked 
impact on the practice of States subsequent to the introduction of the 
United Nations Charter: 
(i) Claims of "accumulation of events" in the context of the 
activities of armed bands, though inadmissible as a matter of law, are 
based on the totality of past acts of force on which the probability of future 
attacks is based. Thus the past occurrence of an act of force is even to the 
adherents of this theory of certain importance. 
(ii) The "classical" illustration offerred by adherents of anticipatory 
is the Six-Day war of 5 June 1967, when Israel resorted to anticipatory 
armed action simultaneously against Egypt, Jordan and Syria 313 
. 
Israel, 
however, did not invoke any right of anticipatory self-defence in 
justification of her action. The Israel representative in the Security 
Council justified his country's resort to force in the following terms: 
"... It is evident from the preliminary reports received that in the early hours of 
this morning Egyptian armoured columns moved in an offensive thrust against Israel's 
borders. At the same time Egyptian planes took off from airfields in Sinai and struck out 
towards Israel... Egyptian artillery in the Gaza strip shelled a number of Israeli 
villages... "314 
It becomes clear that Israel justified its action as defensive on the 
basis of prior Egyptian acts of force that indicated the commencement of an 
armed attack, rather than a general right of anticipatory defence. 
(iii) In a letter dated 7 October 1973 from the representative of Israel 
to the President of the Security Council 315 on the day after the outbreak of 
the Yong Kippur war which was initiated by Egypt and Syria, it was stated 
311 See statement of the U. K. representative in the S. C. 
, 
S. C. O. R. 6th yr. 550th mtg, Para 
93, supra p. 11; also Zourek op. cit. supra n. 310, p. 105. 
312 Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 22, p. 275; Kunz loc. cit. supra n. 310; Kelsen op. cit. and loc. cit. 
supra n. 310; Henkin, A. S. I. L. Proceedings 147 (1963), pp. 148,151. 
313 Greenwood, 89 W. Va. L. R. 933 (1987), p. 943. 
314 S. C. O. R. 22nd yr. 1347th mtg, para 30. 
315 Doc. S/ 11011, S. C. O. R. 28th yr. Suppl. for Oct. 
-Dec. 1973. 
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that although Israel had become aware that such an attack had been 
imminent she made it clear that she would not herself initiate military 
action. 
(iv) States that have had information or very compelling fear that 
they would be the target of an attack by another State, have decided to 
expose the intention of the alleged aggressor by referring the matter to the 
Security Council rather than launching an attack against the alleged 
aggressor. 
Thus, the Government of the Republic of Guinea ( which had been 
the victim of a mercenary attack sponsored by Portugal in November 1970 
) requested an emergency meeting of the Security Council to consider "... 
an imminent military aggression by Portugal against the Republic of 
Guinea... " which was alleged on the basis of intercepted radio 
transmissions from the headquarters of the Portuguese Colonial Army in 
Guinea-Bissau 316 
. 
The Council adopted Security Council resolution 295 
(1971) of 3 August 1971 by virtue of which a Special Mission was 
dispatched to Guinea to investigate and report on the situation on the 
spot. In its report the Mission appreciated the concern of the Guinean 
Government for possible armed action against Guinea, especially in view 
of the prior mercenary attack 317. 
A similar resort to the Security Council was had by the Viet- 
Namese Government alleging an imminent attack by China when the 
border clashes between the two countries occurred in 1979 318. 
Lastly, in a letter dated 1 April 1982 from the representative of the 
U. K. to the President of the Security Council, it was stated that the U. K. 
had good reason to believe that the armed forces of Argentina were about 
to attempt to invade the Falkland Islands, and an urgent meeting of the 
Security Council was requested 319. 
Although reference to the Security Council of a State's concern that 
an attack upon it is imminent does not constitute a panacea with regard to 
preventing an aggression, the fact that the situation becomes publicised 
316 Letter dated 3 August 1971 from the representative of Guinea to the President of the 
Security Council, Doc_ S/ 10280, S. C. O. R. 26th yr. Suppl. for July-Sept. 1971, p. 41. 
317 Doc. S/10309 and Rev. 1 of 15 September 1971, S. C. O. R. 26th yr. Special Suppl. No 4. In 
a statement of the President of the S. C. on behalf of all its Members the report was 
endorsed and it was affirmed that "... the territorial integrity and political independence 
of the Republic of Guinea must be respected... "; issued at the 1603rd mtg of 30 November 
1971, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1971, S. C. O. R. 26th yr. 
, 
p. 5. 318 Letter dated 10 February 1979 from the Foreign Minister of Viet-Nam to the President 
of the Security Council, Doc. S/ 13077, S. C. O. R. 34th yr. Suppl. for Jan. 
-March 1979, p. 55. 319 Doc. S/ 14942, S. C. O. R. 37th yyr. Suppl. for April-June 1082, p. 2. 
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might be sufficient to dissuade the putative aggressor from carrying out 
his plans. Mr. Camara, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Guinea, stated to the Special Mission that investigated the alleged 
imminent attack by Portugal against his country: 
"... At the same time our enemies knew that the Security Council had been informed 
of the matter and that the time had proved to be unsuitable. That is why they had to put 
off the attack to a later date... "320 
(v) Apart from reference to the Security Council a country that 
believes itself to be under the threat of attack is entitled to take all 
necessary measures for the preparation of its defence 321. Such contingency 
may help deprive the alleged aggressor from the benefit of surprise and is 
very likely to disrupt his plans. During the meetings of the Security 
Council Special Mission with members of the Guinean Government, one 
of the members of the Mission, 'Mr. Tomeh of Syria enquired why, 
although it had been alleged imminent, there was no aggression; to this 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs replied: 
"... That can be explained by the fact that at the same time as we informed the 
Security Council we also ordered the general mobilisation of the people and we sent 
messages to alert all defensive positions on the border and inside the country, so the 
aggressor knew that we were ready for him and would have to change the date planned for 
the attack... "322 
Furthermore, the prospective victim may request military 
assistance on the part of his allies as part of preparing his defence against 
the allegedly impending attack. Thus in the aftermath of the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia fearing 
an imminent threat of invasion of his country by Iraq, requested on 7 
August 1990 the dispatch of U. S. and other troops to the territory of the 
Kingdom 323. 
2=) Doc. S/ 10309 and Rev. 1, S. C. O. R. 26th yr. Spec. Suppl. No 4, p. 26. 321 This contingency, as the Italo-Ethiopian conflict of 1935 illustrates, may itself serve as 
a ground for anticipatory action on the part of the putative aggressor 
, 
and it might be held 
to constitute an illustration of the paranoic consequences of admitting the legality of the 
doctrine of anticipatory self-defence in contemporary international law. 
322 Supra n. 320. 
323 Keesing's 1990, pp. 37636,37638; S/ P. V. 2934,9 August 1990, statement by Mr. Pickering 
( U. S. A. ), in Lauterpacht & others (eds. ) loc. cit. supra n. 98, p. 105. 
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It is, therefore, evident from the above that the the requirement of 
"instant and overwhelming necessity" of self-defence is simply absent in 
cases of alleged imminent attack. 
Thirdly, the leading proponents of anticipatory self-defence point 
out at the existence of an "imminent" 
, 
in the sense of "impending" attack 
324 
. 
It is submitted that if an attack is characterised as "impending", 
namely, as about to start in the sense that the the next act of the 
prospective aggressor would be an act of armed force, then discussion 
must turn to the question of whether the armed attack has indeed 
commenced. Indeed, this appears to be a preferable solution to an a priori 
adherence toi the concept of anticipatory self-defence because it is 
compatible with the terms of Article 51 of the Charter and avoids the 
eventuality of a grave breach of peace based on the highly speculative 
character of anticipatory action. Hence, attempts to justify anticipatory 
defence on the basis of State practice formulated in terms of " if Nazi 
Germany had been attacked before 1 September 1939 there would not have 
been a Second World \\Tar" or "if the Japanese fleet had been bombed 
while it had been -, ailing in the North Pacific there would not have been 
any Pearl Harbour", simply constitute intellectual exercise. -, in futility 2 
Such a method purports to rely on certain instances of State practice that 
have the position of consummated facts, and by restructuring them by way, 
of hypothesis, to arrive to the conclusion of the desirability of anticipator),, 
self-defence 
-a line of argument that this author finds quite untenable. 
\1oreover, claims, of "imminence" of an attack entail the extremely 
difficult determination of the precise content of the intention of a 
Government 32 
. 
'c'hat the Japanese Government had drawn plans for 
attack against the Netherlands East Indies was supported by evidence that 
was revealed after the end of the Second World War and was submitted 
before the the Military Tribunal for the Far East. It was thus only 
retrnautively established that the Netherlands had in fact resorted to 
324 See supra n. 302, Waldock loc. cit. p. 498; Bowett op. cit. p. 189; Wright, 98 H. R. C. 5 
(1959 III), p. 167; McDougal & Feliciano op. cit. p. 231; Fawcett loc. cit. pp. 361-3; Shapira, 
6 Israel L. R. 65 (/fl), p. 74; Schachter, rig khCh. L. R. 7620 (1984), p. 1634; id. 53 Univ. Chic. 
L. R. 113 (1986), p. 136; id. 83 A. J. I. L. 259 (1989), p. 267; W. T. Mallison-S. V. Mallison, 15 
L'aiid. 1. Trans. L. 417 (1982), 429; Joyner && Grimaldi, 25 Va. ). I. L. 627 (7985), p. 659; 
McDougal, 5,7 A. I. I. L. 59i (1963), p. 598; W. T. Mallison, A. S. I. L. Procecdiii s 174 (1983), p. 
177; McCredie, 79 Case IV. Res. J. 1. L. 275 (7967), p. 232; Sullivan, 7U 
. 
ý57LS. I. L. J. 7h9 
'5 Dinstein op. cit. sri/va n. 22, p. 180; Feinstein, 71 Israel L. R. 576 (79Th), p. 530. 
32t Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 22, p. 259. 
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defensive action 327 
. 
In fact, State practice reveals that the determination 
of the "imminence" of the attack, in the sense mentioned supra 
, 
can 
never be safely established in advance (a situation that constitutes the 
most essential feature of anticipatory self-defence ) but always ex post facto 
. 
In reality what seems to be the position is that the "impending" nature of 
an attack lies entirely with the would be aggressor, who may modify his 
plans at will, often according to the degree of preparedness of the 
prospective victim. Thus Mr. Ismael Toure, Minister of Financial Affairs 
of Guinea, explained to the S. C. Special Mission that his Government 
thought that an attack was "imminent" because of information about 
troops positioned along the frontier with Guinea-Bissau and ready to 
launch the assault. When, however, he was asked, why, if the attack had 
been imminent, it had not taken place so far, he conceded that there must 
have been "... changes according to the conditions on the aggressor's side 
and also according to conditions in Guinea... "328 It is worth mentioning 
that in the view of Mr. Tomeh of Syria, "imminent" meant "... that 
something is to happen very shortly, perhaps in a day or two... "; Mr. 
Toure, however, was not very precise when he said that "... when we refer 
to the period of gestation or imminence of the attack we mean at any time, 
even tomorrow, the attack could take place... According to all the 
information we have received, the attack must necessarily take place 
before the end of this year, or by November 1971 at the latest... " 329. 
Fourthly, the Israel air strike on OSIRAK has signaled a new and 
extremely dangerous trend towards a theory of "pre-emptive strike". Such 
theory, on the one hand, effectively abolishes the requirement of 
"imminence" of an armed attack, and, on the other, the fact that the 
traditional concept of anticipatory self-defence constitutes the archetypal 
theoretical basis, may serve as an illustration of the degeneration and 
abuse of the doctrine of anticipatory defence as formulated by Waldock. In 
fact, traces of a "pre-emptive strike" theory are discernible even in the 
works of jurists that adhere, in principle, to the requirement of 
"imminent" attack when the issue of nuclear arms proliferation is 
discussed 3-30 
. 
The raison d' etre of the concept of "pre-emptive strike" is 
327 Mc Dougal & Feliciano op. cit. supra n. 22, pp. 231-232. 
328 Supra n. 320, pp. 24-25. 
329 [bid. 
330 Waldock loc. cit. supra n. 302, p. 498; Bowett op. cit. supra n. 17, pp. 191-192; McDougal 
& Feliciano op. cit. supra n. 22, p. 238 et seq. ; Fawcett loc. cit. supra n. 302, p. 362; 
McDougal, 57 A. J. I. L. 597 (1963); Phillips, 10 Hous. J. I. L. 275 (1988), pp. 291-292; Intoccia, 
19 Case W. Res. J. I. L. 177 (1987), pp. 203-205. 
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that force can be legitimately used against a State that constitutes a 
potential author of an armed attack, however distant in the future this 
possibility might be; the advance in nuclear armaments serves just as the 
pretext to argue for the admissibility of such resort to force. 
Israel launched an air strike and destroyed OSIRAK, Iraq's nuclear 
reactor, on 7 June 1981, because "... A threat of nuclear obliteration was 
being developed against Israel by Iraq... We were obliged to remove that 
mortal danger... "331 
. 
Moreover, according to the Israel Government The 
Caroline incident, that is traditionally cited in support of anticipatory self- 
defence, cannot sufficiently accommodate present day realities; thus: 
To try and apply it to a nuclear situation in the post-Hiroshima era makes clear 
the absurdity of the position of those who base themselves upon it. To assert the 
application of the Caroline principles to a State confronted with the threat of nuclear 
destruction would be an emasculation of that State's inherent and natural right of self- 
defence... 
... 
Indeed, the concept of a State's right to self-defence has not changed throughout 
recorded history. Its scope has, however, broadened with the advance of man's ability to 
wreak havoc on his enemies. Consequently, the concept took on new and and far wider 
application with the advent of the nuclear era. Anyone who thinks otherwise has simply 
not faced up to the horrific realities of the world we live in today, and that is particularly 
true for small States whose vulnerability is vast and whose capacity to survive a nuclear 
strike is very limited... " 332 
Some authors have gone so far as to advocate a permissibility of 
"pre-emptive" force for reasons such as the possession of weapons of mass 
destruction by smaller States that tend to change the regional balance of 
power 333 
, 
or, even, the development of defensive military systems that 
reduce another State's offensive military capability ! 334 Furthermore, it is 
argued that victory is better achieved by way of "pre-emptive strike" 335. 
To this very disturbing trend certain points must be raised. 
331 Statement by the Israel representative before the Security Council, S. C. O. R. 36th yr. 
2280th mtg 
, 
para 59. 
332 Ibid. 2288th mtg,. paras 80,85; also cf. D'Amato, Israel's Air Strike Upon the Iraqi 
Nuclear Reactor; 77 A_(.!.. L. 584 (1983), p. 588; Intoccia, 19 Case W. Res. J. I. L. 177 (1987), pp. 
203-205. 
333 M. Silverberg, International Law and the Use of Force: May the United States Attack 
the Chemical Weapons Plant at Rabta ?, 13 Boston Coll. I. C. L. R. 53 (1990), pp. 57,86 et seq. 
R. Zedalis, Preliminary Thoughts on Some Unresolved Questions Involving the Law of 
Anticipatory Self-Defence, 19 Case W. Res. I. I. L. 129 (1987), pp. 149 et seq. ; Phillips, 10 
Hons. I. I. L. 275 (1988), pp. 291-292. 
334 Zedalis loc. cit. supra n. 333, p. 162. 
335 Silverberg loc. cit. supra n. 333, p. 58. 
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(a) The concept of "pre-emptive strike" has as a result that any 
plausibility of the serviceability of anticipatory self-defence disappears. If 
any State has the right to identify potential threats to its security, as it itself 
perceives it, and resort to force in order to preserve this security 
- 
not 
when it is actually threatened by an attack in progress 
- 
in order to achieve 
"victory" ( which is also an aspiration of the aggressor), or in order to 
safeguard its offensive capability (rather than protect itself against an 
actual attack ), then it is submitted that one would deal with outright 
aggression and that the world would be a less safe place even by the 19th 
century standards 336. 
(b) Secondly, and with reference to nuclear weapons, it has always 
been asserted by the traditional possessors of nuclear armaments that they 
constituted a "deterrent", namely, that a first strike against them would 
provoke a nuclear response. This, in turn, implies, first, that if anticipatory 
self-defence or "pre-emptive strike" are to acquire any meaning their 
invocation should be confined as among the exclusive group of nuclear 
powers, and, secondly, that a second strike capability is possible 337. It is 
ludicrous to believe that a State that possesses nuclear weapons would 
invoke anticipatory self-defence against a State that does not have any 
nuclear weapons at all. The reverse possibility, namely, the resort to 
anticipatory action against a State that possesses nuclear capability by one 
that does not, would probably be suicidal for the latter. As for pre-emptive 
action in order to forestall a nuclear capability programme in progress, like 
the Israel destruction of OSIRAK, it is merely futile, because it offers no 
guarantee that the same venture will not resume after a brief delay. 
Despite the Iraqi Government assurances that OSIRAK was not intended 
for the manufacturing of nuclear weapons 338, it became clear in the 
aftermath of the expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait in February-March 1991, 
336 The concept of "pre-emptive strike has been rejected by jurists that accept the doctrine 
of anticipatory self-defence against an "imminent" attack. See Wright, 53 A. J. I. L. 112 
(1959), p. 117; id. 98 H. R. C. 5 (1959 111), pp. 167-168; Schachter, 82 Mich. L. R. 1620 (1984), p. 
1634; id. 83 A. j. LL. 259 (1989), p. 267; cf. id. 53 Univ. Chic. L. R. 113 (1986), p. 134; Mallison 
& Mallison, 15 Vaud. J. Trans. L. 417 (1982), p. 429; Joyner & Grimaldi, 25 Va. J. 1. L. 621 
(1985), p. 659; Mcc redie, 19 Gase W. Res_ J. I. L. 215 (1987), p. 232; Sullivan, 10 ASILS. I. L. J. 
169 (1986), p. 182; Mallison, A. S. 11. Pnxeedings 174 /1983), p. 180; O ayes op. cit. supra 
n. 302, p. 65. 
337 Farer loc. cit. in Black & Falk (eds. ) op. cit. supra n. 22, p. 38; Wright, 57 A. J. I. L. 546 (1963), p. 561. 
338 During the S. C. debate the Iraqi Government strongly emphasised that Iraq had been 
party to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and that had 
agreed to the imposition of I. A. E. A. safeguards on all Iraqi nuclear activities; S. C. O. R. 
36th yr. 2280th mtg 
, 
para 37. 
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that Iraq had developed an advanced research programme which would 
enable her to produce nuclear weapons. This indicates that the Israel strike 
was far from from rendering the Middle East "a safer place" 339 ; instead, it 
would not surprising if the Israel action intensified Iraqi hostility and 
galvanised Iraq towards producing nuclear weapons 340 
. 
A fifth objection with regard to the right of anticipatory self-defence 
is that it is impossible to apply the rule of proportionality in view of the 
absence of any positive action on the part of the putative aggressor'341 
. 
The massing of troops and the conduct of military preparations offer no 
indication of the actual amount of force that will be eventually employed. 
Instead the result of action in anticipatory self-defence is to effectively 
render the rule of the prohibition of the use of force nugatory 342 
.A 
practical result of admitting anticipatory self-defence would be to dispense 
with the distinction between self-defence and reprisals; indeed this seems 
to be the reasoning behind the "accumulation of events" theory 343 
. 
Furthermore, in so far as the admissibility of anticipatory action is 
purported to be based on the terms of Article 51, namely, in terms of an 
exception to the rule of Article 2(4), it entails the contradictory result of a 
permanent suspension of the rule of Article 2(4) which is imposed 
unilaterally. This is manifested in the practice of continuing military 
occupation or the establishment of the so-called "security zones" on the 
territory of other States 
- 
see the practice of Israel with regard to the I'Vest 
Bank of the Jordan River, the Gaza Strip and Southern Lebanon 344. In 
addition, it is submitted that as along as anticipatory defence could be 
exercised collectively 345 
, 
then it is necessary to ascertain that the 
"impending" use of force really constitutes an armed attack. It must be 
born in mind that the Court in the Nicaragua Case ruled that collective 
self-defence can be exercised only if an armed attack occurs, while any use 
of force short of an armed attack can be repelled by taking proportionate 
counter-measures on the part of the victim State alone. While anticipatory 
action in case of individual self-defence and counter-measures may be 
339 Supra n. 331. 
340 Farer loc. cit. supra n. 337, p. 41. 
341 Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 22, pp. 259,261-262; cf. Higgins, 37 B. Y. I. L. 269 (1961), p. 301. 
342 Wehberg, 78 H. R. C. 7 (1951 1), pp. 81-82; Brownlie, 37 B. Y. I. L. 183 (1961), p. 227; 
Zourek op. cit. supra n. 22, pp. 105-106. 
343 Botha, 11 S. A. Y. I. L. 138 (1985-86), p. 150. 
344 Brownlie loc. cit. in Butler (ed. ) op. cit. p. 25; cf. Greig, 40 I. C. L. Q. 366 (1991), p. 397. 
345 This is theoretically feasible and no-one of the authorities supporting the doctrine has 
e\pressly ruled out such possibility. 
302 
treated in the same fashion, the exercise of anticipatory collective self- 
defence must be preceded by the finding that what is about to be launched 
will really be an armed attack. It is submitted that it is impossible to 
predict that the allegedly imminent use of force shall be, when unleashed, 
of scale and effects that would amount to an armed attack. This is 
something which cannot be fully appreciated in the face of anything else 
but open use of force. It may also be added that the scale of the preparation 
of the armed forces of the putative aggressor could offer credible ground 
for arguing that an armed attack is being mounted; still, however, this 
entails a great deal of speculation that does not involve the element of 
certainty that is inherent in open violence for a unilateral breach of peace 
to be excused. 
Finally, claims of anticipatory self-defence or "pre-emptive strike" 
have been persistently objected to by third States and for this reason it is 
submitted that they do not contribute towards the creation of customary 
international law. The Six-Day war was justified by Israel as action in self- 
defence after an armed attack had occurred; it later transpired that Israel 
had in fact resorted to force first and the Israel Government did nothing to 
dispel such claim. A number of representatives in the Security Council 
and the General Assembly expressly condemned the concept of 
"preventive war" and pointed at its incompatibility with the United 
Nations Charter 346 
. 
The Israel strike on OSIRAK was met with 
unequivocal and universal condemnation by the Security Council 347, the 
General Assembly 34s and individual States 349. 
34-' G. A. ES-5 (17 June-5 July 1967) G. A. O. R. Fifth Special Emergency Session, Plennary 
Meetings, Verbatim Records, 1530th plen. mtg 
, 
paras 58 (Sudan), 153 (India); 1539th plen. 
mtg, paras 83 (Spain), 71-72 (Cyprus). S. C. O. R. 22nd yr. 1351st mtg, para 97 (Bulgaria); 
1360th mtg 
, 
para 54 (Pakistan). The Israel action of 5 Jane 1967 may also be held to be an 
illustration of inconsistency of practice that precludes the formation of customary law. In 
justifying the resort to force the Israel Government relied heavily on inflamatory 
proclamations and threats uttered by the Egyptian and Syrian Governments against the 
existence of the State of Israel prior to the outbreak of hostilities; see statement by Mr. 
Eban, the Foreign Minister of Israel, before the S. C. 
, 
S. C. O. R. 22nd yr. 1348th mtg 
, 
paras 
142-154. It is noteworthy, however, that similar threats by the Israel Government against 
Syria in the early May of 1967, that prompted the latter to activate the 1966 Mutual 
Defence Pact with Egypt, were not considered by the former as serious enough to provoke 
such response; see Ch. Yost, The Arab-Israeli War: How it Began, in Moore (ed. ) The Arab- 
Israeli Conflict, Vol. ii, 1974, p. 5 at pp. 8-10. In any case it does not appear to be accepted 
that verbal threats uttered in a period of tension between two States give rise to necessity 
of self-defence; see statement by Mr. Rossides, the representative of Cyprus, G. A. ES-5, 
G. A. O. R. Fifth Special Emergency Session, 1541st plen. mtg, para 72. 
347 S. C. Res. 487 (1981) of 19 June 1981. 
348 G. A. Res. 36/ 27 ( 109: 2: 34) of 13 November 1981. 
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In addition practice reveals that the overwhelming majority of 
States seem to refrain from invoking the ploas of anticipatory defence and 
"pre-emptive strike". Thus, the U. S. Government specifically refrained 
from relying on the said doctrine in order to justify the so-called 
"quarantine" during the Cuban missile crisis 350. 
6. The Reporting of Measures of Self-Defence to the Security 
Council 
Article 51 of the Charter provides that "... [M]easures taken by 
members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately 
reported to the Security Council... ". It is submitted that the above 
constitutes a requirement that has the position of treaty obligation; the 
wording "shall be immediately reported" seems to support this 
contingency 351 
. 
The issue that arises with regard to the content of this 
obligation is whether non-compliance would invalidate a claim of self- 
defence. The Court in the Nicaragua Case treated the question in the 
context of customary law and treaty law separately and ruled that: 
... 
At this point, the Court may consider whether in customary international law 
there is any requirement corresponding to that found in the treaty law, of the United 
Nations Charter, by which a State claiming to use the right of individual or collective 
self-defence must report to an international body, empowered to determine the conformity 
with international law of the measures which the State is seeking to justify on that basis. 
Thus Article 51 of the United Nations Charter requires that measures taken by States in 
exercise of of this right of self-defence must be "immediately reported" to the Security 
Council. As the Court has observed 
... ,a principle enshrined in a treaty, if reflected in 
customary international law, may well be so unencumbered with the conditions and 
modalities surrounding it in the treaty. Whatever influence the Charter may have had on 
customary international law in these matters, it is clear that in customary international 
law it is not a condition for the lawfulness of the use of force in self-defence that a 
procedure so closely dependent on the content of a treaty commitment and of the institutions 
established by it, should have been followed. On the other hand, if self-defence is 
advanced as a justification for measures which would otherwise be in breach both of the 
principle of customary international law and of that contained in the Charter, it is to be 
expected that the conditions of the Charter should be respected. Thus for the purpose of 
enquiry into the customary law position, the absence of a report may be one of the factors 
349 S. C. O. R. 2280th mtg 
, 
paras 31 (India), 39 (Brazil), 70 (Pakistan); 2286th mtg 
, 
paras 
15-16 (Guyana), 49 (Turkey); 2288th mtg, paras 115 (Mexico), 141 (Uganda). 
350 Chayes op. cit. supra n. 302, pp. 63-64. 
351 Bowett op. cit. supra n. 17, pp. 197-198; Tünnermann Bernheim, 11 Yale J. I. L. 104 (1985- 
83), pp. 135,136 n. 183. Contra Greig, 40 I. C. L. Q. 366 (1991), p. 385 et seq. 
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indicating whether the State in question was itself convinced that it was acting in self- 
defence. 
... 
352 
Judge Schwebel, on the other hand, took the view that: 
.. 
All this said, there remains under the Charter of the United Nations, a literal 
violation of one of its terms. The term in question is a procedural term; of itself it does not, 
and by the terms of Article 51, cannot, impair the substantive, inherent right of self- 
defence, individual or collective. The measures of the United States in assisting El 
Salvador by, among other means, applying force against Nicaragua, are not transformed 
from defensive into aggressive measures by the failure to report those measures to the 
Security Council. But there is nevertheless a violation of an important provision which is 
designed to permit the Security Council to exert its supervening authority in a timely way. 
.... 
the international community at large, as represented by the Security Council, has an 
interest in the maintenance of international peace and security which should not be pre- 
empted by the failure of a State to report its defensive measures to the Security Council.... " 
353 
It is submitted that despite the fact that the pronouncement of the 
majority of the Court seems quite obscure, there is more room for 
agreement rather than dissent between the Judgment and Judge 
Schwebel's opinion. 
It may be that there is no obligation in customary international law 
to report measures of self-defence to the Security Council, but what is in 
strict terms only a treaty obligation, its function and its aim is to realise a 
requirement that is part of both customary law and the Charter, namely, 
that no State is the sole and final judge of its action in self-defence 354. 
With regard to Article 51 of the Charter authority seems to be in 
agreement that the importance of reporting measures of self-defence to the 
352 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, at p. 105, para 200. 
353 Ibid. per Judge Schwebel 
, 
p. 376, para 227. 
354 Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community, 1933, pp. 177-180; 
Judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, part 22, H. M. S. O. 1950, p. 
436; I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, at pp. 27-28, paras 34-35; id. per Judge Lachs, pp. 502-504; id. per 
Judge Schwebel, pp. 285-287, paras 46-50, but cf. pp_ 287-296, paras 51-77; Schachter, 83 
A. J. I. L. 259 (1989), p. 260 et seq. ; Dicstein op. cit. supra n. 22, pp. 193-194; Kahn, 12 Yale 
J. I. L. 1 (1987) 
. 
Contra 
. 
I. C. J. Rep. 1986, per Judge Oda, pp. 555-558. It must be noted, 
however, that the inadmissibility of exclusive judgment on the part of a State that resorts 
to force in self-defence is realised through the reporting requirement to the Council only 
with regard to its political dimensions. In other words, irrespective of the merits in law of 
an action allegedly in self-defence, resort to force under this justification entails a breach of 
international peace. As such it must be addressed by the Security Council and measures, 
such as a call for a cease-fire, may be adopted. But this does not imply, nor has it ever been 
the case in practice, that the Council has itself exclusive competence at adjudicating each 
party's legal rights in respect of resort to force in self-defence, rather than an international 
tribunal. See supra Ch. 8, p. 207 n. 38. Also see E. Lauterpacht, Aspects of the 
Adminititration of international Justice, 1991, pp. 37-48,112-114. 
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Council fulfils exactly the above contingency and a fortiori reinforces the 
fact that the right of self-defence is only an exceptional right and the 
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security lies with the United Nations Security Council ass 
. 
The implication in the Court's Judgment that failure to report 
measures of self-defence may affect the lawfulness of resort to self-defence 
must be treated with some scepticism. Indeed, the subsequent passage in 
the Judgment suggests that, although not required by customary law, the 
report of action in self-defence to the Security Council could have 
evidential value in respect of the genuine nature of a State's belief that it is 
acting in self-defence 356 
. 
Thus, if the reporting obligation under Article 51 
is treated as a sine qua non for the lawfulness of resort to force in self- 
defence and at the same time is given a subsidiary position in customary 
law, despite the fact that it can be altogether disregarded, this amounts to 
saying that a right whose genesis and requirement of performance are 
identical in customary and treaty law may be legally invalidated by the 
non-observance of a requirement of a treaty but not of customary law. The 
validity of a claim of self-defence is really based on the examination of 
whether there exists a necessity of self-defence and whether resort to force 
took place in a proportionate fashion. This examination may be carried 
out by the Council, by way of adjudication, and by the members of the 
international community individually. With regard to the Council it is set 
in train by the report of measures of self-defence. An obligation to report is 
therefore an obligation of procedure and not of substance as to the 
lawfulness of action in self-defence 357 
. 
Still, it is an important obligation 
the violation of which, although it does not affect the substance of claims 
of self-defence, may incur scepticism as to the genuineness of a claim of 
self-defence. Scepticism, however, does not imply either acceptance or 
rejection of such claims. Furthermore, State practice shows that, though 
States do not usually report in detail individual measures taken during 
armed action allegedly in self-defence, they consistently report resort to 
force in self-defence. The ideal position in accordance with Article 51 is 
illustrated by the scrupulous communication by the U. K. to the Council of 
355 Wehberg, 78 H. R. C. 7 (1951 1), p. 83; Waldock, 81 H. R. C. 455 (1952 11), pp. 495-496; 
McDougal & Feliciano op. cit. supra n. 22, p. 220; Higgins, 37 B. Y. I. L. 269 (1961), p. 304; 
Schachter loc. cit. supra n. 354, pp. 263-265; Reichler && Wippman, 11 Yale Q. I. L. 462 
(1985-86), p. 471; Rowles, 80 A. J. I. L. 568 (1986), p. 577. 
356 Higgins, 37 B. Y. I. L. 269 (1961), p. 306 n. 1. 
357 Dinstein op. cit. supra n. 22, pp. 198-199; Grieg, 40 I. C. L. Q. 366 (1990), p. 384 et seq. 
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the measures adopted against Argentina in the Falklands. The 
identification of the particular measures allegedly taken in self-defence, in 
case the defending State does not furnish them ( and this constitutes the 
rule ), may be provided by the target State, or fact finding missions ( see, 
for instance, the statements made before the Council by the various Chiefs 
of Staff of U. N. T. S. O. in Palestine ), or mass media, or third States. 
It can therefore be concluded that the lack of any report to the 
Security Council of action which is purported to be defensive, or of the 
precise measures taken in the pursuit of such action does not affect the 
final judgment on the legality or not of action in self-defence. This, 
however, does not warrant any claims of justifying such failure to report 
on the basis of the nature of the allegedly defensive measures. Thus, Judge 
Schwebel took the view that the U. S. had the right not to report to the 
Council its assistance to the contras because it was covert 358 
. 
It may be 
argued in reply to this assertion that in so far as covert action is concerned, 
it is by its nature non ascertainable and it appears to constitute an attempt 
at defeating the aim of the reporting requirement, namely, that no State is 
the sole judge of its action in self-defence and consequently it may 
constitute a repudiation of self-defence as an exceptional instance of use of 
force 359 
. 
358 I. Q. Rep. 1986 ( per Judge Schinebel ), pp. 373-374, paras 221-224. 
359 Dinstein op. cit. supra n. 22, p. 198; Kahn loc. cit. supra n. 354, pp. 28-29; Rowles loc. cit. 
supra n. 355. 
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Second Title: PROPORTIONATE COUNTER-MEASURES AGAINST 
INSTANCES. OF USE OF FORCE SHORT OF AN ARMED ATTACK'. 
In the Judgment on the Merits of the Nicaragua Case 1 the following 
passages occur: 
... 
As regards certain particular aspects of the principle in question, it will be 
necessary to distinguish the most grave forms of the use of force(those constituting an armed 
attack) from other less grave forms..... 2 
... 
When dealing with the rule of the prohibition of the use of force, the Court 
considered the exception to it constituted by the exercise of the right of collective self- 
defence in the event of armed attack. Similarly, it must now consider the following 
question: if one State acts towards another State in breach of the principle of non- 
intervention, may a third State lawfully take such action by way of counter-measures 
against the first State as would otherwise constitute an intervention in its internal affairs ? 
A right to act in this way in the case of intervention would be analogous to the right of 
collective self-defence in the case of an armed attack, but both the act which gives rise to 
the reaction, and that reaction itself, would in principle be less grave..... 3 
... 
The Court has recalled above (paragraphs 193 to 195) that for one State to use 
force against another, on the ground that that State has committed a wrongful act of force 
against a third State, is regarded as lawful, by way of exception, only when the wrongful 
act provoking the response was an armed attack. Thus the lawfulness of the use of force by a 
State in response to a wrongful act of which it has not itself been the victim is not admitted 
when the wrongful act is not an armed attack. In the view of the Court, under international 
law in force today 
- 
whether customary international law or that of the United Nations 
system 
- 
States do not have a right of "collective" armed response to acts which do not 
constitute an "armed attack"..... 4 
... 
While an armed attack would give rise to an entitlement to collective self- 
defence, a use of force of a lesser degree of gravity cannot, as the Court has already observed 
( paragraph 211 above), produce any entitlement to take collective counter-measures 
involving the use of force. The acts of which Nicaragua is accused, even assuming them to 
have been established and imputable to that State, could only have justified proportionate 
counter-measures on the part of the State which had been the victim of these acts, namely 
El Salvador, Honduras or Costa Rica. They could not justify counter-measures taken by a 
third State, the United States, and particularly could not justify intervention involving the 
use of force.. 
.5 
1. The concept of "Counter-Measures" in International Law 
. 
1 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14. 
2 Ibid. p. 101, para 191. 
3 Ibid. p. 110, para 210. 
4 Ibid. p. 110, para 211. 
5 Ibid. p. 127, para 249. 
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The reference in the Court's Judgment to "counter-measures" 
against a use of force that does not amount to an "armed attack" renders 
necessary a discussion of the content of the term. 
The terns "counter-measures" is relatively novel in the literature 
and theory of international law. Prior to the Nicaragua Cate the term hay 
been used, mainly, in the context of non-forcible punitive retaliatory 
action. 6 This, however, does not seem to indicate that "counter-measures" 
has evolved into a term of art indicative of the concept of reprisal. The 
literature emerging on the subject suggests that counter-measures may 
constitute a generic term xvhich describes State responses against a 
wrongful act committed by another State, the purpose of which varies 
considerably. Thus, "punishment" in the sense of an act of reprisal is not 
but one of the aims of counter-measures the others being self-protection, 
reciprocity, suspension or termination of a treaty, inducement to settling a 
dispute. 7 
lt is submitted that counter-measures serve to describe, as a matter 
of terminology, a general category of acts that preclude the international 
responsibility of the State that resorts to them in a variety of factual 
situations, and such acts, are each one of them individually subject to 
regulation, with regard to its legitimacy and requirements of performance, 
by the law in force. In its Commentary on Art. 30 of Part 1 of the Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility the I. L. C. stated that: 
It is only, and this should he emphasized, when the countermeasure in question 
can be described as legitimate 
- 
permissible under international law and taken in 
accordance with the conditions laid down in international law 
- 
that it can be valid as a 
Case Concerning the Air Services Agreement of 27 March 1946, United States of America 
V. France, 54 I. L. R. 303; Case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in 
Tehran, United States of America v. Iran, I. C. J. Rep. 7,98(1 p. 3 at p. 27, para 53; I. L. C. 
Coinnientarv on the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, I. L. C. Ybk 1979 vol. II, Part 
Two, p. 115 at p. 116, Para 3; Fourth Report on the content, forms and degrees of 
international responsibility (part 2 of the draft Articles) by Mr. W. Riphagen, Special 
Rapporteur, Doc. A/CN. 366 and Add. 1, T. L. C. Ybk 1983 vol TI, Part One, pp. 3-25, at p. 17; 
Malannczuk, Coauaterm_ ures and Self-Defence as Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness in 
the International Lai, 
- 
Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 43 
Z. a. o. R. \ 
. 
705 (1983 ), pp. 715-723, cf. pp. 724-735; Elagab, The Legalihi of Non-Forcible 
Counter-A-ieasurres in International Law, Oxford 1988, p. 4; Alland, International 
Responsibility and Sanctions: Self-Defence and Countermeasures in the I. L. C. Codification 
of Rules Governing International Responsibility, in Al. Spinedi and B. Sinrmu (eds. ). United 
Nations Codification of State Responsibility, 1987, p. 143 at p. 146; cf 
. 
Zoller, Peacetime 
Unilateral Remedies: An Analysis of Countermeasures, 1984, pp. 62-3,75. 
Elagab op. cit. supra n. 6, pp. 3-5,44-7; Zoller op. cit. supra n. 6 pp. 4-44,46, but cf. id. at 
pp. 62-3,75; Fourth Report by Riphagen loc. cit. supra n. 6 at pp. 17-18. 
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circumstance precluding the wrongfulness of conduct of of the State not in conformity with 
what, under other conditions, would be required of it by an international obligation... 8 
Consequently, the concept of exceptio non adimpleti contractus, 
namely, the unilateral suspension or termination of a treaty in case of 
breach of obligation under the treaty by another party thereto, is legitimate 
and regulated by Article 60 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties9 
. 
Similarly, the concept of economic reprisals is legitimate 
because economic coercion is not prohibited by Article 2(4) of the Charter 
or the customary law prohibition of the use of force, and their application 
is regulated by international arbitration precedents such as the Naulilaa 
and the U. S. A. aa. France Awards lo 
. 
Unfortunately, the Commission went on to ultimately identify 
counter-measures with acts whose ".... object is to inflict punishment or to 
secure performance... " 11 
. 
This established a regrettable deviation from the 
general thesis of "legitimacy" cited supra that had as a result that the focus 
of its work fell exclusively on the notion of "reprisals" as legitimate 
counter-measures 12 
. 
Still, however, it is not conclusive that the Commission envisaged 
counter-measures exclusively as unilateral acts of reprisal, for it expressly 
included sanctions undertaken in pursuance of decisions of international 
organisations in the concept of reprisals under Art. 30 of the Drafts 3. 
Moreover, Special Rapporteur Riphagen, though himself inclined to 
consider the concept of counter-measures in the context of reprisals, 
strongly suggests in his Fourth Report on Part 2 of the Draft Articles on 
State Responsibility that counter-measures is a wider concept than that of 
punitive retaliation. It is stated that "... [U]nder the terms of Article 30 of 
part 1 of the draft articles on State responsibility, the reprisal is a legitimate 
counter-measure which precludes the wrongfulness of the act... "14. 
8 I. L. C. Ybk 1979 vol. 11, Part Two, pp. 115-116, para 2. 
' Malanczuk loc. cit. supra n_6 ßp. 721; cf. Fourth Report by Riphagen loc. cit. supra n. 6 p. 17 
Faras 92-93. 
Eighth Report by Special Rapporteur Ago, I. L. C. Ybk 1979 vol. 11, Part One p. 39, para 81. 
I. L. C. Commentary, supra n. 8 paras 3-4. 
12 Eighth Report by Ago, supra n. 10 p. 39 para 79; I. L. C. Commentary, supra n. 8, p. 116; 
Fourth Report by Riphagen supra n. 6, p. 17; Alland loc. cit. p. 147; Malanczuk loc. cit. p. 717. 
13 I. L. C. Commentary, supra n. 8, p. 119 paras 13-14. 
14 Supra n. 6, p. 17 paras 92-95. The same Rapporteur in his preliminary Report (I. L. C. Ybk 
1980 vol. 11 Part One, p. 107, Doc. A/ CN. 4/330) drew up a "catalogue" of likely 
relationships due to a State's wrongful act that included "... the duty to make reparation in 
its various forms, non-recognition, exceptio non adimpleti contractus, and other counter- 
measures... ", ibid p. 5 para 9; cf. Alland supra n. 12. 
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2. The Concept of Counter-Measures in the Context of the Law on the Use 
of Force. 
The Judgment of the International Court in the Nicaragua Case 
appears to reinforce the submission that counter-measures are not and 
should not be considered a term of art. The notion was considered in the 
context of the use of armed force by States, and more specifically, in the 
context of the right self-defence as an exception to the rule of the 
prohibition of the use of force. The Court dealt with the invocation by the 
United States of the right of collective self-defence in support of the 
Government of El Salvador against the alleged material support rendered 
by Nicaragua to the Salvadorean guerrillas. The United States offered the 
plea of collective self-defence in justification for its provision of material 
support to the contra insurgents fighting against the Government of 
Nicaragua. The Court rejected the United States plea of collective self- 
defence by, first, drawing a distinction between uses of force that amount 
to an "armed attack" and uses of force that do not15. It then proceeded to 
rule that the right of individual and collective self-defence was to be 
exercised only in the event of an "armed attack", while in any other 
instance of use of force the victim. State has a right to take proportionate 
counter-measures against the author of the use of force16 
. 
According to 
the Judgment, an "armed attack" constitutes the use of armed force by the 
regular armed forces of a State or by armed bands if such action "... because 
of its scale and effects, would have been classified as an armed attack rather 
than as a mere frontier incident... "] 7. It has been subsequently held that 
assistance to insurgents in the form of provision of weapons, training and 
logistical support constitutes a use of force short of an armed attack, while 
the provision of financial assistance constitutes mere intervention in the 
internal affairs of the victim State18 
. 
Furthermore, the laying of mines in 
the territorial and internal waters of Nicaragua was ruled to constitute a 
violation of the principle of the use of force- again short of an armed 
attack19 
-What becomes clear from the Judgment of the Court is, that in 
15 Supra n. 2. 
16 Supra notes 4,5. 
17 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 103, para 195. 
18 Ibid. p. 119, para 228; cf. ibid. (per Judge Jennings)p. 543; contra ibid. (per Judge Schwebe! )
Fý344-5,347-8, paras 167-8,172-3. 
Ibid. p. 128, para 251. 
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cases of use of force which does not amount to an armed attack the victim 
State has a right to resort to proportionate counter-measures on the 
international plane individually only, and not collectively with the 
assistance of another State20 
. 
This can be, moreover, inferred from the fact 
that the Court appears to admit, at least in situations of insurgency, the 
right of the victim State to receive outside military assistance from 
another State within its own territory21 
. 
It can also be inferred from the 
Judgment that counter-measures against mere uses of force could entail 
the use of armed force22. It is submitted that this is based on the character 
of proportionate counter-measures as defensive measures. The concept 
was treated as "analogous" to self-defence when the Court dealt with the 
United States plea of collective self-defence in support of the Government 
of El Salvador23 
. 
This plea was subsequently rejected24. It was ultimately 
held, however, that El Salvador 
- 
as well as Honduras and Costa Rica 
- 
had 
the right to exercise proportionate counter-measures individually only25 
If the inadmissible necessity for collective action in counter-measures is 
established in the context of defensive action, then the necessity for 
individual action by the victim State, which indeed purportedly serves as 
the basis for the collective one and is lawful, is a fortiori of the same 
defensive character. Furthermore, if the fact that the I. L. C. had previously 
dealt with reprisals as a form of counter-measures and expressly rejected 
the notion of forcible punitive retaliation'-6 is considered in conjunction 
with the appearance of the term in its generic form and unqualified as to 
its precise nature, in a Judgment of the International Court pertinent to 
the use of armed force, it is very likely that a flawed impression of an 
express sanctioning of lawfulness of armed reprisals might be created. 
Such a contingency has been expressly addressed by Judge Nagendra Singh 
in his Separate Opinion in the Nicaragua Case; he stated that: 
20 Akehurst, Nicaragua v. U. S. A. 
, 
27 I. J. I. L. 357 (1987) p. 372; Farer, Drawing the Right 
Line, 81 A. J. 1. L. 112 (1987) p. 113. 
21 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 126, para 246; Akehurst loc. cit. supra n. 20, p. 373. 
22 LC. j. Rep. 1986, p. 124, para 241; ibid. (per judge Schinebel) pp. 348-350, paras 174-175, 
177; J. F. Murphy, Stute Support of international Terrorism, Legal, Political and Economic 
Dimensions, 1989, pp. 103-4; Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, 1988, p. 183; N. D. 
White, The Legality of Intervention Following the Nicaragua Case, 9 Intent. Rel. 535 
(1989) p. 543; j. L. Hargrove, The Nicaragua Judgment and the Future of the Law of Force and 
Self-Defense, 81 A. I. I. L. 135 (1987) p. 138; Akehurst, 27 I. J. I. L. 357 (1987) p. 371; Farer, 81 
A. J. I. L. 112 (1987) p. 113. 
23 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 110, para 210. 
24 Ibid. para 211. 
25 Ibid. p. 127, para 249. 
26 I. L. C. Ybk 1979 vol. il, Part Two, p. 118, paras 10-11. 
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... 
The logic behind this extension of the principle of non-use of force to reprisals has been that if use of force was made permissible not as a lone restricted measure of self- defence, but also for other minor provocations demanding counter-measures, the day would 
soon dawn when the world would have to face the major catastrophe of a third World 
War 
... 
27 
In addition, the fact that counter-measures must be legitimate on 
the basis of already existing international law, as to their admissibility and 
requirements of performance, and that unilateral resort to force is 
legitimate only in the exercise of the right of self-defence both indicate that 
counter-measures may entail the use of armed force so long as they are 
resorted to in conformity with the conditions of the exercise of self- 
defence; namely, that there is a necessity giving rise to to the exercise of 
protective action and that the latter must be proportionate to the danger 
that must be repelled. It must be pointed that, although the exercise of the 
right of self-defence may be pursued by non-forcible means25, any use of 
force in circumstances other than of defensive necessity creates a 
presumption of illegality. This is implicit in the U.. S. 
- 
France Award that 
stated: 
... 
If a situation arises which, in one State's view, results in the violation of an 
international obligation by another State, the first State is entitled, within the limits set 
by the general rules of international law pertaining to the use of armed force, to affirm its 
rights through countermeasures.. 
It is. therefore, submitted that the distinction between resort to force 
in individual or collective self-defence against an "armed attack", and 
resort to force in proportionate counter-measures against uses of force 
short of an armed attack, is not a one concerning genre for both actions are 
defensive in nature. It is not even a distinction concerning proportionality 
for this is merely a requirement of performance in 
27 I. C. (. Rep. 1986, p. 151. 
2s Bowett, The Interrelation of Theories of Intervention and Self-Defence, in J. N. Moore(ed. ) 
Law and Civil War in the Modern World, 1974, p. 38 at p. 40; id. 13 Va. J. 1. L. 1 (1972) at pp. 
7-8. 
29 54 I. L. R. 303 at p. 33., Para 91; Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law, 1958, p. 258; 
Brotivnlie, hiternatio; ial Lm' ajed the t. 1>c of For-Le by Sfaies, 1963, pp. 279,366,372-5; 
M. Sorensen, Principes de Droit International Public, 101 H. R. C. 5 (1960 III) p. 240; 
E. S. Fawcett, General Course on Public International Law, 132 H. R. C. 362 (1971 1) pp. 500- 
1; T. Franck, Some Observations on the I. C. J. 's Procedural and Substantive Innovations, 81 
A. J. I. L. 116 (1987) p. 120; R. St. ). Macdonald, The Nicaragua Case: New Answers to Old 
Questions?, xxiv Gin. Y. 1. L. 127 (1986) p. 145; T. A. Phillips, Exchanging Excuses for Uses of 
Force- 1 he "lug of War in the Persian Gulf, 101-Hous. l. 1, L. 275 (1988) p. 292. 
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exercising force after a defensive necessity has arisen30. It is, rather, a 
distinction as to the precise kind of necessity to defend oneself as dictated 
by the kind of use of force that faces the victim State; more specifically, it 
concerns the precise nature of the danger that faces the victim State 
- 
both 
qualitatively and quantitatively 
- 
and the precise nature of its object31 
. 
On 
the other hand, it must be stressed that in the above instances of legitimate 
uses of defensive force the object that needs to be protected is always a 
State (as a territorial and political unit); as for the perpetrator of the use of 
force that warrants protective action it is either a State or a group of 
private individuals. It is indicated by the the wording of Art. 2(4) of the 
Charter, the principle of non-use of force in General Assembly resolution 
2625 (XXV) and of Art. 1 of the Definition of Aggression, G. A. 3314 (XXIX), 
that the rule of the prohibition of the use of force is addressed to States 
only; again the objects of the prohibition are States (as territorial and 
political units) or the destruction (not the promotion) of the purposes of 
the United Nations. As for the latter it seems that only the exercise of the 
right of self-determination of peoples under colonial or alien domination 
is covered by the prohibition- viz. General Assembly resolution 2625 
(XXV). It is not force against the above peoples as such that is prohibited; it 
is force which is intended to or results in the deprivation of the said 
peoples' right of self-determination. That various colonial peoples have in 
the past resorted to armed struggle against their administering powers 
simply because of the 
30 Cf. Dinstein op. cit. supra n. 22, pp. 181-3; N. D. White loc. cit. supra n. 22, p. 541 n. 28. 
31 Farer 81 A. J. I. L. 112 (1987), pp. 113-4; Macdonald xxiv Can. Y. 1. L. 127 (1986) p. 148 but cf. 
ibid. at p. 145; Rifaat, international Aggression, 1979, p. 125; Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 29 
pp. 327,366; R. A. Falk, International Law and the United States Role in the Viet- Nam 
War, 75 Yale L. J. 1122 (1966) pp. 1123 n. 7,1157-8; F. M. Higginbotham, International Law, 
the Use of Force in Self-Defence, and the Southern African Conflict, 25 Col. J. Trans. L. 529 
(1987) pp. 548,555-6; Falk, International Law and the U. S. Role in Viet- Nam: A Response 
to Professor Moore, 76 Yale L. J. 1095 (1967) pp. 1102-4 but cf. ibid. at 1124-5,1140-2; J. P. 
Rowles, "Secret Wars", Self-Defense and the Charter 
-A Reply To Professor Moore, 80 
A. J. I. L. 568 (1986) pp. 579-80; Farer, Intervent on in Civil Wars: A Modest Proposal, 67 
Col. L. R. 266 (1967) p. 276; McDougal & Feliciano, Laar-, and Minimum World Public Order, 
1961, pp. 196-202 and id. Legal Regulation of Resort to International Coercion: Aggression 
and Self-Defense in Policy Perspective, 68 Yale L. J. 1057 (1958-59) pp. 1115-9. Cf. Ch. C. 
Joyner& M. A. & Grimaldi, The United States and Nicaragua: Reflections on the 
Lawfulness of Contemporary Intervention, 2-5 Va. J. LL. 621 (1985) pp. 662-3,665; T. D. Gill, 
The Law of Armed Attack in the Context of the Nicaragua Case, I Hague Y. I. L. 30 (1988) 
pp. 50-1. 
Contra: Bowett op. cit. supra n. 29 pp-256-8 and loc. cit. in Moore (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 28 p. 
40; Dinstein op. cit. supra n. 22 p. 182; J. N. Moore, International Law and the United States 
Role in Viet- Nam: A Reply, 76 Yale L. J. 1051 (1967) pp. 1055,1075 but cf. pp. 1067,1076; id. 
The Secret War in Central America and the Future of World Order, 80 43 (1986) pp. 
87 n. 183,88-9,105-7,114. 
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latters' disinclination to relinquish their rule cannot be characterised as 
defensive action by way of exception to the rule of the prohibition of force. 
An exception to a rule pertinent to States only, implies that it aims at the 
benefit of States only. State practice seems to support the above argument 
in that attempts by the developing and socialist States made during the 
drafting of G. A. Resolution-, 2625 and 3314 to justify the armed struggles of 
various colonial peoples as exercises of the right of self-defence were met 
with persistent objection on the part of Western and Latin American 
States and cannot be held to represent customary lawww32. 
3. S, ititations Creating tue \'ecf°5city of Proportionate Counter-Aleatiurýe, 
Force can be used by the regular armed forces of a State or private 
individuals. There is not the slightest difficulty in characterising the 
former as a violation of Art. 2(4) and customary law; for the latter to fall 
under the same prohibition State involvement must exist in the forcible 
activities of private inndividuak_ The precise degree of a violation of the 
rule of the prohibition of the use of force, namely, whether it amounts to 
an armed attack or mere use of force is the starting point for deternminin 
whether the victim State shall resort to force in self-defence or 
proportionate counter-measures. Moreover, the degree of the violation of 
the said rule that establishes the defensive necessity to resort to force 
seems to be a matter of the quality and quantity of the unlawful use of 
force as well as of its precise oblect_ 
The Judgment of the Court in the T\'icaragwi Case has given 
prominence in the above by ruling that it is the "scale and effects" of an 
instance of use of armed force that elevates it to the point of being an 
armed attack33. Furthermore, it is always the event of a use of armed 
force that is an armed attack as indicated by the Court's exclusive reliance 
on the United Nations Definition of Aggression [ G. A. Res. 3314 (XXIX) ] 
that expressly stipulates in Art. 1 that "... [Ajggression is the use of armed 
force hý- a State against another State... "34. In addition it is always a case of 
purely State use of force, namely, that both the author and the actual 
32 H. Wilson, International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements, 
Oxford 1988. Supra Part One 
, 
Ch. 6. 
33 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 103, para 195. Cf. Dinstein op. cit. and N. D. White loc. cit. supra n. 30. 
34 N. D. White, 9 Irrt. Relal. 535 (1989) p. 538. 
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source of armed force on the ground is a State35. An armed attack is 
understood to constitute a use of armed force or the initiation of a series of 
acts of force proximate in time with each other, of considerable magnitude, 
the object of which is the destruction of the political, or territorial, or 
economic infrastructure of the target State as such36 
. 
It is submitted that it 
is this event that creates the necessity to protect the State as a whole and 
that gives rise to the exercise of proportionate use of force in individual or 
collective self-defence. 
An armed attack, as any use of armed force, may be perpetrated 
either directly by the armed forces of the aggressor State or indirectly by 
way of armed bands. Again the Nicaragua Judgment points exclusively at 
the Definition of Aggression which in Art. 3(a-g) provides a list of possible 
uses of armed force by States, which though not exhaustive 
- 
viz. Art. 2 of 
the Definition 
- 
may be held to represent the most classical and frequent 
instances of inter-State use of force. A large-scale invasion of the territory 
of a State by the armed forces of another State, resulting in the occupation 
of part or of the entirety of the territory of the victim State constitutes a 
case of armed attack. The invasion and subsequent occupation of Kuwait 
by the armed forces of Iraq on 2 August 1990 is an illustration of the above 
contingency; Security Council Res. 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990 reaffirmed 
in its sixth preambular paragraph "... the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence, in response to the armed attack by Iraq against 
Kuwait 
... 
"37 
. 
The activities of armed bands constitute an armed attack by a 
State against another State only when the former 
- 
the aggressor State 
- 
is 
both the author and the source of the use of force38 
. 
This in its turn 
indicates that the armed bands are merely an instrument qua weapon in 
the hands of the aggressor State and such a situation exists in the 
"sending" of guerrillas to invade the territory of another State 
- 
e. g.. the 
sending by Somalia of the Western Somalia Liberation Front (W. S. L. F. ) 
that invaded the Ethiopian province of Ogaden in 197739; or the 
"substantial involvement" of the aggressor State in the activities of armed 
35 Cf. 0. Schachter, The Extra-Territorial Use of Force Against Terrorist Bases, 11 
Hous. J. 1. L. 309 (1989) p. 311- 
31 Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 29 pp. 278-9,366; McDougal and Feliciano supra n. 31. 
37 Text in E. Lauterpacht, C. ). Greenwood, M. Weller, D. Bethlehem (eds. ) The Kuwait 
Crisis: Basic Documents vol. 1, Cambridge International Documents Series, 1991, pp. 88-9. 
38 Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 29 pp. 372-5 and id. International Law and the Activities of 
Armed Bands, 7 I. C. L. Q. 712 (1958) pp. 730-2; Higginbotham 25 Col. J. Trans. L. 529 (1987) p. 
548; Gill 1 Hague Y. I. L. 30 (1988) p. 36 seq. 
39 Keesing's 1977 p. 28634; id. 1978 pp. 28760,28989-91; I. C. J. Rep. 1986 p. 103 para 195; N. D. 
White supra n. 34. 
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bands, either by exercising total control over them reducing the guerrilla 
organisation to a quasi Government agent40 or by enabling a hitherto 
unarmed political opposition-in-exile to become a potent fighting force 
that invades and uses force against the victim State 
- 
e. g. the invasions of 
Guatemala in 195441 and Cuba in 196142 by dissident exiles. Finally, the 
active participation of a State's regular armed forces on the side of the 
guerrillas fighting against the Government of another State 
- 
viz. the 
participation of Tanzanian troops on the side of Ugandan exiles fighting 
against the Government of President Amin43 and the active assistance 
offerred by the South African army to the rebel group U. N. I. T. A. against 
the Angolan Government troops in 198744. 
State practice, however, acknowledges the occurrence of certain 
State activities that take place in circumstances in which no actual danger 
is posed to the security of the victim State as a Nvhole45 
. 
Such eventualities 
create the necessity of being repelled by the use of armed force or simply 
countered by non-forcible means, that in both instances are protective in 
character. Whether it is a case of one or the other contingency it depends 
on whether such activities themselves entail or not the use of armed 
force. 
3. (i). I'an-Forcible State Acti-,? Itie 
. 
It is submitted that there are two situations in which certain 
activities do not entail the use of armed force and, therefore, do not create 
a necessity to resort to protective forcible action against another State. 
3. (i). a. Unauthorised Aerial Intrusions. 
The first situation contemplated under this rubric constitutes of the 
unauthorised entry of aircraft into another State's air space. 
Intrusions by civilian aircraft are generally considered not to give 
rise to a defensive necessity for the use of armed force and the legitimacy 
of any measures to terminate the intrusion should be judged by reference 
40 T. C. J. Rep. 1986, pp. 62-3, paras 109-112; N. D. White supra n. 34 p. 541 n. 29. 
41 Keesing's 1952-1954 pp. 13667,13679. 
42 Id. 1961-1962 pp. 18151-5. 
43 Id. 1979 p. 29671. Cf. infra Part Three 
, 
Ch. 11, Second Title. 
44 Id. 1987 pp. 354SS, 15552; S. C. Res. 602(1987) of 25 November 1987. 
45 Farer, 81 A. I. I. L. 112 (1987) pp. 113-4; Falk, 75 Yth' L. J. 1122 (1966) p. 1123 n. 7 
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to existing rules of of international law on civil aviation, and more 
specifically, to the 1944 Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation46 and 
the1971 Montreal I. C. A. O. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation47 Indeed, the forcible 
termination of an unauthorised intrusion by civilian aircraft is viewed as 
a violation of the provisions of the above treaties. In the Aerial Incident of 
27 July 1955 Case ( Israel v. Bulgaria, U. K. v. Bulgaria, U. S. A. v. Bulgaria) 
the Government of Israel submitted that any violations of Articles 6( 
infringement of airspace due to intrusion of international scheduled air 
services) and 9( intrusion into a prohibited area) of the 1944 Chicago 
Convention could be remedied "... without causing an undue degree of 
physical danger to the aircraft and its occupants... "48. On 4 June 1973 Israel 
was condemned as having acted in breach of the 1944 Chicago Convention 
for the shooting down of a Libyan passenger aircraft over the Sinai 
peninsula- then occupied by Israel- on 21 February 197149. In the Security 
Council debate on the shooting down by Soviet aircraft of the Korean 
Airlines flight 007 on 31 August- 1 September 1983 the Soviet action was 
deemed as a violation of the Chicago Convention50. On 17 May 1989 Iran 
instituted proceedings against the U. S. A. 
, 
for the shooting down of the 
Iranian Airways flight 655 by a U. S. warship over the Persian Gulf on 3 
July 1988, for violation of the 1944 Chicago and 1971 Montreal 
Conventions51 
Furthermore, the use of armed force against civilian aircraft has 
been considered inadmissible as unnecessary. In the Aerial Incident of 27 
July 1955 Case the Government of the United Kingdom submitted the 
following: 
... 
there can be no justification in international law for the destruction, by a State 
using armed force, of a foreign civil aircraft, clearly identifiable as such, which is on a 
scheduled passenger flight, even if that aircraft enters without previous authorisation the 
airspace above the territory of that State... 52 
46 U. N. T. S. vol. 15 pp. 296-363. 
47 10 1. L. M. 1151 (1971). 
48 I. C. J. Pleadings 1959, p. 87, para 66. 
49 12 1. L. A1.7180 (1973) 
5() See statements by the Japanese and Australian delegates, 22 I. L. M. 1114 (1983) 
, 
pp. 
1116,1118. 
51 Application Instituting Proceedings, filed on 17 May 1989, Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988, 
Iran 77. U. S. A. 
, 
28 I. L. M. 843 (1989), pp. 845-6.; S. C Res. 616 (1988) of 20 July 1988. 52 I. C. J. Pleadings 1959, p. 358, para 66; statement of the Japanese representative supra 
n. 50; Resolution of the I. C. A. O. Council of 16 September 1983 on the KAL-007 incident, 22 
I. L. A1.1114 (1983), pp. 1150-1; cf. U. S. A. Memorial, I. C. J. Pleadings 1959, p. 242 where it 
appears to be suggested that force may be used if there is sufficient and essential evidence 
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It must be pointed out that the aerial incident of 3 July 1988, though 
not involving intrusion of another State's air space, took place during the 
Iran- Iraq conflict at a time when U. S. warships had been subject to uses of 
armed force by Iranian gunboats, and illustrates a situation of error as to 
the identity of an alleged source of force, which may become more or less 
justifiable according to the facts of every particular case53. 
Cases of intrusion of Government or military aircraft into the air 
space of another State offer a rather plausible argument of defensive 
necessity. Still, however, the treatment of such action as an armed attack 
or simple use of force must depend on the specific incident. The U-2 
incident, namely, the shooting down by the Soviet authorities of a U. S. 
high flying reconnaissance aircraft on 1 May 1960 was treated and referred 
to the Security Council by the U. S. S. R. as a case of "aggression"54 
. 
The 
majority of the Security Council Members took the view that the flight 
had been greatly exaggerated by the Soviet Government55; in fact, the 
above incident does not appear to give rise to any necessity for defensive 
armed action due to the lack of an actual use of force by the unarmed U-2 
aircraft56 
. 
Finally, in the Nicaragua Case the Court held that unauthorised 
overflights of the territory of a State by "... aircraft belonging to or under 
the control of the government of another State. 
... 
" constitute in every case 
a violation of the territorial sovereignty of a State57 
. 
3. (i). b. Financial Assistance to Insurgents. 
The second contingency in which the State activity involved does 
not constitute use of armed force and consequently gives rise to no 
defensive necessity by way of armed force, arises in cases of assistance to 
armed bands in the form of provision of financial support. This kind of 
that the security of the State whose air space has been infringed is threatened; 
approvingly i. n G. M. McCarthy, Limitations on the Right to Use Force against Civil Aerial 
Intruders: The Destruelion of KAL flight 007 in Community Perspective, 6 N. Y. L. S. J. 1. C. L. 
I T7 (1984) P. 201. 
53 Report of I. C. A. O. fact-finding Investigation of the Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988, 
November 1988,28 I. L. M. 900 (1989) at 909 seq. The U. K. Government demonstrated strong 
support for the U. S. by emphasising the right of forces engaged in such hostilities to defend 
themselves, Keesing's 1988 p. 36170. See also D. L. Peace, 31 Va J. I. L. 545 (1991), pp. 564-5. 
54 Doc. S/4314, S/4315, U. N. Repertory of Practice, Suppl. no 3, vol. 1, p. 140; Q. Wright, 
Legal Aspects of the U-2 Incident, 54 A. J. I. L. 836 (1960). 
55 Wright loc. cit. supra n. 54, pp. 840,842. 
56 Ibid. pp. 846,849. 
57 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 128, para 251. 
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assistance has been characterised in the Nicaragua Case as "... an act of 
intervention... " which "... does not in itself amount to a use of force 
... 
"58 
The financing of a guerrilla movement fighting against the 
Government of a State does not seem to have the position of a conditio 
sine qua non with regard to the actual capacity of the guerrillas to wage 
armed struggle or the improvement of such capacity. Indeed, it can by no 
means be ascertained that by receiving a certain amount of capital 
, 
the 
guerrillas will inevitably spend it in order to improve their fighting 
ability. The management of such funds is solely dependent on the 
guerrillas themselves rather than the providing State. Moreover, if the 
actual source and authors of the use of force against the victim State on 
the ground are the guerrillas themselves then their assistance by another 
State through the provision of funds constitutes coercive interference in 
the internal affairs of the victim State irrespective of the fact that the aim 
of such policy may not be identical with the objective of the guerrilla 
activities, provided of course that the assisting State is aware of that 
objective59. The Eritrean E. P. L. F. has waged armed struggle against the 
Government of Ethiopia is a leftist guerrilla movement. It has, however, 
been financially assisted by the Government of Kuwait despite the lack of 
political allegiance of the latter with the E. P. L. F. 60. It appears that 
assistance to the Eritrean insurgents was motivated by allegiance on the 
basis of religion ( Islam is the predominant religion in Eritrea); other than 
that it is not evident that the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia 
- 
the 
objective of the E. P. L. F. struggle 
- 
has been a matter of Kuwaiti policy. It is 
very unlikely, however, that the Government of Kuwait is unaware of 
this contingency and by its provision of funds to the rebels has brought 
itself to the position of interfering in the internal strife in Ethiopia, in the 
sense of establishing a link between itself and the guerrillas against the 
Ethiopian Government. 
3. (ii). Forcible State Activities. 
The next set of State activities is one that entails the use of armed 
force and calls for aamed action on the part of the victim State which is 
directed against the source of force, is defensive in nature and aims at 
58 Ibid. p. 119, para 228. 
59 Ibid. p. 124, para 241. 
60 Keesing's 1975, p. 27032; id. 1977, p. 28635. 
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protecting the specific object of the use of force. The latter, it may be 
stressed, does not as a form of State activity appear to be prejudicial to the 
entirety of the territorial integrity, political independence, economic or 
security infrastructure of the victim Statehl 
. 
State practice evinces such incidents of use of force that do not 
amount to armed attack in (a) two forms of action by a State's own armed 
forces, namely, (1) frontier incidents and (2) laying of submarine mines in 
the internal or territorial waters of another State; and (b) in the form of 
assistance to armed bands- in the sense of an indigenous armed opposition 
to the Government of the victim State initially being formed as such 
without the complicity of the assisting State 
- 
by providing to them arms, 
training and logistical support. 
3. (ii). a. 1. Frontier Incidents 
. 
Frontier incidents are localised incidents of use of armed force that 
may arise purely by accident or be the product of tension created by long- 
standing disputes with regard to the demarcation of frontiers (viz. the 
Himalayan fighting between India and China in 1962), or to territory on 
either side of the frontier (viz. the Sino-Soviet border clashes in the Far 
East of 1969, the Sino- Viet Namese border fighting in 1979), or to territory 
as a whole which is divided between the disputants by way of cease-fire or 
armistice lines ( viz. the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir)62 
. 
The accidental 
outbreak of force such as might be the case of the killing of a sentry from 
across the frontier or the trespassing by a small group of military 
personnel of another State's, territory is generally held to be settled by way 
of investigation, request of punishment of the culprits and compensation. 
This has been the attitude of both the Soviet and Chinese Governments 
61 cf. L. Henkin, General Course on Public lnternationa) Law, 216 H. R. C. 13 (1989 IV) pp. 
158-9. 
62 See generally: E. Giraud, Theorie de la Legitime Defense, 49 H. R. C. 691 (1934 111) ; J. 
Kunz, Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the Charter of the United 
Nations, 41 A. J. I. L. 872 (1947) p. 878; G. Fitzmaurice, The Definition of Aggression, 
I I. C. L. Q. 137 (1952); Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law, 1958, pp. 256-8; and id. 
The Interrelation of Theories of Intervention and Self-Defence, in J. N. Moore (ed. ), Law and 
Civil War in the Modern World, 1974, p. 38 at p. 40; M. Sorensen, Principes de Droit 
International Public, 101 H. R. C. 5 (1960 111) p. 240; Brownlie, International Lazy and the 
Use of Force by States, 1963, pp. 210-211,278-279,366; Rifaat, International Aggression, 
1979, p. 125; Macdonald, xxiv Can. Y. I. L. 127(1986) pp. 145,148; Dinstein, 
War, Aggression and Self-Defence, 1988, p. 182. 
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when clashes occurred on the Damansky / Chenpao island on the border 
between China and the U. S. S. R. in the Far East on 2 March 1969, and 
before it became clear on the 15th March that the 2nd March clashes had 
been in reality an assertion of Chinese territorial claims on the island 
currently considered part of Soviet territory63. 
It is, however, the second category of border fighting that is deemed 
the most dangerous for international peace and security at large. Border 
clashes over non-demarcated or disputed territory or across cease-fire lines 
dividing the armies of two claimants over territory in dispute, are not 
immediately treated by the disputing States 
- 
which each consider itself as 
the territorial sovereign 
- 
as "aggression" or "armed attack" or even the 
prelude of an armed attack that ultimately gives rise to the right of 
individual or collective self-defence. It is only after the force used reaches a 
high level of material intensity that claims of "aggression" and self- 
defence are put forward. 
The Chinese offensive in the Himalayan Border region with India 
on 20 October 1962, came after a series of border skirmishes involving the 
armed forces of both countries and was finally justified as self-defence in 
the face of "... large scale frenzied attacks by aggressive Indian forces 
... 
"64 
. 
Similar claims of self-defence were offered by both the Chinese and 
Soviet Governments with respect to the border incidents in the Far East 
and Sinkiang in south west China on 2 March and 13 August 1969 
respectively. With regard to the former incident on the 
Damansky / Chenpao island, the matter was initially deemed as calling for 
investigation and compensation65 ; it was only after a Chinese attack in 
regimental force on 15 March that the Soviet Government spoke of 
defending the territory. As for the latter incident at Sinkiang it was an 
allegation by the Chinese Government of a Soviet military incursion 2km 
inside China that prompted the invocation of self-defence66 
. 
From September 1978 to February 1979 a series of border clashes 
took place on the Sino-Viet Namese frontier. In a letter dated 10 February 
1979 to the President of the Security Council the Government of Viet- 
Nam expressed concern for the mass deployment of Chinese troops along 
the common border of the two countries; it is significant that the " daily 
armed activities" by the Chinese forces were presented as constituting a "... 
63 Keesing's 1969-1970 pp. 23313-4. 
64 Ibid. 1961-1962, pp. 19122,19124. 
65 Supra n. 63. 
66 Ibid. p. 23641. 
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threat to peace and security in the area... " rather than an armed attack67 
. 
It 
was only after the invasion of of Viet- Nam by the Chinese forces on 17 
February 1979 that the Viet- Namese Government spoke of "aggression" 
and asserted the right of self-defence. The Chinese Government also 
justified their action as "... limited counter-attack in self-defence... " due to 
the Viet- Namese border provocations68 
. 
From 5-11 March 1964 armed clashes between the armies of India 
and Pakistan occurred on the Kashmir- West Pakistan border. At a press 
conference on 18 March 1964 Mr. Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, in 
reply to a question on whether the Indian army would take unilateral 
action in protecting the cease-fire line, stated: "... we are not prepared to go 
across the cease-fire line and take the territory under the occupation of 
Pakistan.... Obviously if it becomes necessary in defence of our territory to 
cross the cease-fire line they ( the Indian armed forces) will cross it 
- 
but 
that is not a policy... "69 
. 
The disputed area of Rann of Kutch became the location of border 
fighting between the Indian and Pakistani armed forces in the period 9 
April- 29 June 1965. On 28 April 1965 the Prime Minister of India, Mr. 
Shastri, stated during a debate at the Indian Parliament that the matter 
should be settled by peaceful means beyond reaching "... a point of no 
return... " and he rejected calls by Members of Parliament for retaliatory 
action at other points of the Indo-Pakistani border70 
. 
The practice of States indicates, furthermore, that even if fighting 
escalates to considerable proportions and claims of armed attack and self- 
defence are made, although they are not as such repudiated by third States, 
a conflict may be considered highly localised and of intensity that does not 
warrant the exercise of collective self-defence. Whether fighting is of such 
scale as to constitute an armed attack seems to be a question which 
depends on the circumstances and the motivation surrounding the border 
incident (especially when it involves transgression into another State's 
territory), as evidence of any intention to launch a large-scale operation; 
moreover, the fact that the target State of the use of force considers itself 
67 Doc. S/ 13077, S. C. O. R. 34th yr. Suppl. Jan. 
-March 1979, p. 55. 68 S. C. O. R. 34th yr. 2114th mtg. para 103; id. 2129th mtg. paras 76-80. 
69 Keesing's 1965-1966 p. 21065. 
7() Ibid. pp. 20927-20928. 
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the victim of an armed attack as well as the individual assessment of the 
allies of the target State are pertinent7l 
. 
During the border clashes between China and the U. S. S. R. in 1969, 
Romania and Czechoslovakia opposed and defeated a Soviet proposal at 
the meeting of the Political. Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact 
in Budapest on 17 March 1969, to expand the Alliance by admitting 
Mongolia so as to deploy Warsaw Pact troops on the Sino-Mongolian 
frontier72 
In the aftermath of the Chinese attack across the border with Viet- 
Nam on 17 February 1979 and after Viet- Nam had characterised the 
Chinese action as "aggression" the U. S. S. R. dispatched military supplies to 
Viet- Nam but left no doubt that it did not intend to actively assist it in 
collective self-defence because the hostilities were of limited scale73. 
Certainly, this illustration presents a situation of frontier incidents being 
escalated into an invasion of territory by using a formidable striking force. 
This, it is submitted is in principle a case of armed attack according to 
the Nicaragua Case 74 
. 
Still, all factual considerations must be taken into 
account. China defended its action as self-defence, there was a territorial 
dispute in the area that obscured the issue of whose territory had been 
invaded, and Viet- Nam managed to localise the conflict in the border 
area. Although the latter is no legal obstacle to invoke the right of 
collective self-defence it may be of significance by serving as a justification 
of declining to assist a State if fighting in its actual form is not of the 
effects, or the scale locally, to pose a threat to the security of a State as a 
whole. 
Moreover, concern is often expressed that frontier fighting may 
escalate to a point of being prejudicial to international peace and security. 
On 1 September 1965 fighting broke out in Kashmir between the 
Indian and Pakistani armies when the latter crossed the cease-fire line. On 
the same day, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U 
-Thant, sent 
identical letters to the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of 
India stating that "... [W]ithout any attempt to apportion blame, it may be 
said that such actions now come from both sides of the line.... An outright 
71 I. Q. Rep. 1986, pp. 119-121, paras 231-234; Brownlie, op. cit. supra n. 62 pp. 210-211,366; 
Rifaat op. cit. supra n. 62; Macdonald loc. cit. supra n. 62 p. 148; Cf. Fitzmaurice loc. cit. 
supra n. 62 p. 139; Bowett loc. cit. in Moore (ed. ) op. cit. supra at n. 62; Dinstein op. cit. 
supra id. ; Kunz, loc. cit. supra n. 62. 
72 Keesing's 1969-1970 p. 23 644. 
73 Ibid. 1979 p. 29872. 
74 Supra n. 39. 
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military confrontation between the armed forces of India and Pakistan is 
threatened and may be imminent which can have only the gravest 
implications for the peace of the world 
... 
"75 
. 
During the Security Council consideration of the Sino-Viet Namese 
border clashes in 1979, the representative of the United Kingdom stated: 
"... Wars can come in two ways: deliberate aggression or drift... Perhaps the 
Security Council cannot stop the extension of war by the deliberate act of a Government bent 
on national aggrandizement. But it can help to avoid a limited conflict from drifting into 
catastrophe... "7 
A similarly dangerous escalation was created in July 1977 when 
border clashes between Egypt and Libya degenerated into a full-fledged 
conflict involving the invasion of Libyan territory by the Egyptian armed 
forces7hbk 
Finally, the outbreak of border fighting in a number of cases took 
place while attempts at peaceful settlement of the dispute that created the 
tension were pursued either between the parties themselves or by way of 
mediation. The continuing effort at peaceful settlement, despite the 
occurrence of frontier incidents, may be taken to reflect the conviction of 
the parties that the territorial dispute must be solved by peaceful means, 
and that armed force may be prejudicial to their respective interests. 
Prior to and during the Himala`van fighting between India and 
China no less than 400 notes pertinent to the subject-matter of the dispute 
were exchanged between the two countries77. 
Notes were exchanged between the Chinese and Soviet 
Governments during the border clashes of 1969 and the fighting stopped 
on 10 September 1969 after The Chinese Government agreed on a five- 
point negotiations plan presented by the Soviet Prime Minister78 
. 
The border fighting between Peru and Ecuador of 28-31 January 1981 
was terminated after the joint mediation by Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 
the U. S. A. 
, 
the guarantor powers under the 1942 Rio Protocol between 
Peru and Ecuador by virtue of which the territory in dispute where the 
fighting took place had bn allocated to Pe u79 
. 
5 Doc. S/6647, S. C. O. R. 20th yr. Suppl. for July-Sept. 1965. 
76 S. C. O. R. 34th yr. 2115th mtg. para 21. loh" Keesing's 1977, pp. 28710-28711. 
77 Keesing's 1961-1962 p. 19121. 
78 Ibid. 1969 
-1970 p. 23645- 79 Ibid. 1981 p. 30763. 
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3. (ii). a. 2. The Laying of Submarine Mines. 
The laying of mines in time of peace, as opposed to a situation of 
armed conflict, and the failure to give any warning or notification with 
regard to their location at a peril for the safety of international shipping, 
constitutes a violation of "... certain general and well recognized 
principles, namely: elementary, considerations of humanity, even more 
exacting in peace than in war... ", regardless of the status of the waters 
where they are laid80 
. 
The laying of mines in the territorial or internal waters of a State 
constitutes a fortiori a violation of its territorial sovereignty and a threat 
81 or use of force against that State 
The submarine mine is as, a source of force, static for the target 
must establish contact with the mine. It is clandestine and indiscriminate 
for it is not overtly noticeable and the perpetrator of the mine-laying may 
keep his identity concealed for a considerable period of time. Its effects, 
however, for the coastal State may be potentially devastating. According to 
one commentator submarine mines are "... capable of altering 
geographical circumstances by making certain areas impassable to 
ships... "82, and consequently have effects in its economy, constitute a 
violation of its territory and may be prejudicial to its naval forces. 
Moreover, if the numerical and geographical scale of mine-laying 
amounts to effectively blockading the ports and ship-traffic lanes within 
the territorial sea of the coastal State, then it may constitute a full-fledged 
blockade according to Art. 3(c) of the Definition of Aggression, General 
Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX), and possibly an armed attack. As a 
source of force, regardless of its being an armed attack, it is submitted that 
mine-laying in the territorial or internal waters of a State creates the 
defensive necessity for its repelling by way of mine-sweeping and by taking 
proportionate action against the vessel or aircraft laying the mines. 
On the other hand it must be in principle doubtful that the laying of 
mines on the high seas or in international straits composed of the 
80 The Corfu Channel Case, I. C. J. Rep. 1949, p. 22; Nicaragua Case, I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 112, 
Para 215. 
8ý I. C. J. Rep. 1986 p. 14, p. 128, para 251. 
82 Patterson, Mining: A Naval Strategy, 23 Naval War College Review 53 (1971) p. 63; 
approvingly by Phillips, 10 Hous. ). I. L. 275 (1988) p. 289. 
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territorial sea of two or more States constitutes, in general, a threat or use 
of force, so long as it is prima facie impossible to establish the precise 
vessels of the precise State that constitute the target of the mines83 
. 
It is 
submitted that the forcible removal of the source of force that submarine 
mines pose to international shipping on the high seas should not extend 
beyond an operation of mine-sweeping, in the sense of destroying vessels, 
aircraft or permanent artificial installations of a specific State. This is 
illustrated by the mine-sweeping operation that was undertaken by the 
Navies of the U. K., the U. S. A., the U. S. S. R., Italy, France, Saudi Arabia, 
Egypt and Yemen in July 1984 that removed unidentified submarine 
mines from the Red Sea83' 
.A fortiori any forcible removal of a 
minefield from the territorial waters of a State that form part of 
international straits cannot be by virtue of the Corfu Channel Case a 
defensive counter-measure84 
. 
However, if the laying of mines is attributed to a certain State on the basis 
of evidence and at the same time constitutes integral part of systematically 
using force by the above State 
- 
by more overt means 
- 
against the 
merchant vessels or warships of another State, then it is submitted that 
defensive counter-measures can lawfully be taken against the source of 
such force. 
On 14 April 1988, during the Iran-Iraq conflict, the United States frigate 
U. S. S. Samuel B. Roberts, was damaged by mine explosion east of Bahrain; 
United States warships had been the target of Iranian gunboat attacks and 
had been established that Iran was responsible for mine-laying in the 
Persian Gulf85. On 18 April 1988 United States naval units bombarded and 
destroyed two Iranian oil platforms used as bases in order to mount mine- 
laying sorties86 
. 
83 It is conceivable that such act, will create international responsibility against the State 
on which the mine-laying is imputed on the basis of evidence for violating the principle of 
the freedom of navigation on the high seas. Contra : Phillips loc. cit. supra n. 82. 
83bis The mines were detected in the Gulf of Suez and the straits of Bab El Mandab at the 
northern and southern ends of the Red Sea respectively. Responsibility for their planting 
was initially attributed to both Iran and Libya. There was not any conclusive evidence, 
however, of involvement of these two States. Suspicion was later focused on Libya, but still 
its involvement was not established beyond any reasonable doubt. See Keesing's 1985, pp. 
33371-33373. 
84 I. C. J. Rep. 1949, p. 33- 
85 Phillips loc. cit. supra n. 82 p. 276. 
86 Keesing's 1988 p. 36169. Cf. D. L. Peace, Major Maritime Events in the Persian Gulf 
Between 1984 and 1991: A Juridical Analysis, 31 Va I. I. L. 545 (1991), pp. 563-564. See supra 
First Title. 
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3. (ii). b. State Support of Armed Bands. 
Activities of armed bands, in the case of their being the outcome of 
a rebellion within the State and irrespective of the support received from 
another State, constitute an autonomous source of force, which always 
creates the necessity of taking measures in order to repel it. The history of 
insurgency in the post-1945 period reveals that guerrilla movements 
fighting against the Government of a State have relied, in one way or 
another, on some kind of support by other States. This assistance may 
range from the very low-level and lawful form of political or 
humanitarian support, by way of foodstuffs and medicine87, to the higher 
level of provision of weapons, training and logistical aid. It is the latter 
form of assistance that establishes a link between the assisting State and 
the guerrillas by bringing the former very close to the actual use of armed 
force, and constitutes a breach of the rules of non-intervention in the 
internal affairs of a State and of the prohibition of the threat or use of 
force88. 
Victim States of activities of armed bands have consistently resorted 
to force in order to counter activities in a twofold fashion: (a) Force has 
been used in the majority of cases within the territory of the State by the 
armed forces of the latter alone or in conjunction with the armed forces of 
another State that have been dispatched at the request of the beleaguered 
Government; (b) secondly, force has been used, by the victim State 
individually, across international boundaries on the territory of another 
State. 
3. (ii). b. 1. Forcible Counter-Measures Within the Territory of the 
Victim State. 
In cases where the Government of the victim State acts alone, the 
use of force in order to suppress internal revolt 
- 
possibly with the 
exception of colonial territories 
- 
does not contravene the rule of the 
prohibition of the use of force for it does not constitute force in the 
"international relations" of the State. Consequently, resort to force by the 
Sinalese Government for the crushing of the Tamil insurgency in Sri 
Lanka from 1987 to-date, by the Sandinista Government of Nicaragua 
87 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, pp. 124-125, paras 242-243; id. (per Judge Schziwebel), p. 351, para 180. 88 Ibid. pp. 104,118-119, paras 195,228; G. A. Resolutions 2131(XX), 2625(XXV), 3314(XXIX). 
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against the contra rebels from 1979-1989, by the Salvadorean Government 
against the F. M. L. N. from 1979 to-date and by the Iraqi Government for 
the suppression of the Kurdish and Shia revolts in February and March 
199189 are not illicit by reference to Art. 2(4) of the Charter". A possibility 
of breach of the latter may arise in the case of a request by the beleaguered 
State for outside military assistance. As will be seen in greater detail in a 
subsequent section the issue in cases of such request is whether the latter 
emanates genuinely from the Government of the requesting State rather 
then from an Opposition group (viz. the Soviet intervention in 
Hungary[1956], the U. A. R. intervention in Yemen[1962], the U. S. 
intervention in Panama [ 1989], the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait[ 1990] ); or from 
an individual whose precise constitutional authority to act as the 
executive Government of the State is lacking ( the U. S. intervention in 
Grenada[19831) or is uncertain (the U. S. intervention in the Dominican 
Republic[ 1965]); or from an entity installed as the Government by the State 
whose assistance was subsequently requested (the Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan[ 1979]). Moreover, in spite of the doctrinal controversy on the 
admissibility at all of intervening in a situation of civil strife, it has 
generally been acknowledged in state practice that an established 
Government is entitled to request and receive assistance from another 
State in crushing an insurgency91; a fortiori 
, 
such assistance appears to be 
admissible in law if the insurgency is assisted by another State92. In the 
Nicaragua Case the Court held that, 
Indeed, it is difficult to see what would remain. of the principle of non- 
intervention in international law if intervention, which is already allowable at the 
request of the government of a State, were also to be allowed at the request of the 
Opposition... 9 
State practice offers a number of illustrations in support of the right 
of a State faced with armed insurgency to receive outside military 
assistance either in the form of military equipment or the dispatch of 
contingents of the assisting State's armed forces. It is also noteworthy that 
89 Cf. S. C. Res. 688(1991) of 5 April 1991. 
90 Bowett loc. cit. in Moore (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 62 p. 39. 
91 Garner, Questions of International Law in the Spanish Civil War, 31 A. J. IL. 66 (1937) 
p. 68; Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 62 pp. 321-327; Farer, 81 A. J. IL. 112 (1987) p. 114; N. D. 
White, ix leit. Relat. 535 (1989) pp. 542-543. 
92 Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 91 p. 327; Q. Wright, United States Intervention in the 
Lebanon, 53 A. I. I. L. 112 (1959) p. 123. 
93 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 126, para 246. 
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in the cases where support to the guerrillas from another State was alleged 
the dispatch of troops was based on consideration of defensive necessity. 
On 11 January 1955 Costa Rica became the victim of land invasion 
and air strikes by a force of dissident exiles that was initiated from the 
territory of Nicaragua and aimed at overthrowing the Government of 
President Figueres; the rebels were repelled by the Costa Rican security 
forces after an eleven-day fighting94 
. 
The Government of Costa Rica 
referred the matter to the Council of the O. A. S. by invoking Art. 6 of the 
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. This provision stipulates 
the following: 
If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political 
independence of any American State should be affected by an aggression which is not an 
armed attack... the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on the 
measures which must be taken in case of aggression to assist the victim of aggression... 
The Council resolved on 16 January 1955 to call upon all the 
American Republics to give prompt consideration to a Costa Rican request 
for aircraft95 
During the second week of May 1958 large-scale disturbances broke 
out throughout Lebanon against the Government of President Chamoun, 
which were instigated by Moslem opponents of the Government's pro- 
Western policies and sympathisers of President Nasser and the U. A. R. 96. 
On 13 May 1958 the Lebanese Government expressly accused the U. A. R. of 
being responsible for the disturbances and of ""massive interference" in the 
internal affairs of Lebanon97; on 22 May 1958 it brought the matter to the 
attention of the Security Council98 
. 
Similar accusations against the U. A. R. 
were made by the Government of Jordan in the aftermath of the violent 
overthrow of the monarchy-in Iraq on 14 July 1958 and the subsequent 
dissolution of the Arab Federation of Iraq and Jordan99. On 15 and 17 July 
1958 respectively the representatives of Lebanonloo and Jordanlol made it 
94 Keesing's 1955-1956 p. 14048. The Government of Nicaragua strongly denied any 
involvement in the action of the armed dissidents, ibid. 
95 On 16 January 1955 the U. S. Government announced that it would supply Costa Rica 
with aircraft; Keesing's 19551956 p. 14048. 
Doc. C-a-i69, Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Applications vol. I 1948- 
1959, General Secretariat O. A. S. Washington D. C., 1973,3rd ed. 
, 
pp. 183-7. 
96 Keesing's 1957-1958 p. 16181. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Doc. S/4007, S. C. O. R. 13th yr. Suppl. for April-June 1958, p. 33. 99 DOC. S/4053, Ibid. Suppl. for July-Sept. 1958, p. 37. 
100 S. C. O. R. 13th yr. 827th mtg. para 84. 
1()I ld. 831st mtg. paras 24-25. 
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known to the Security Council that U. S. and U. K. troops had landed in 
their respective countries at the request of their Governments in 
accordance with the right of individual and collective self-defence under 
Article 51 of the Charter in view of the "massive intervention by the 
U. A. R. in Lebanon" and "... the threat to the integrity and independence of 
Jordan through imminent foreign aggression and an attempt by the 
U. A. R. to create internal disorder and to overthrow the existing regime in 
Jordan... "102. 
It was the Swedish representative who took issue with the justification of 
self-defence by doubting the existence of an armed attack103 ; moreover, 
the United Nations Observers Group in Lebanon (U. N. O. G. I. L. ) had 
reported to the Security Council on 4 July 1958 that "... it has not been 
possible to establish from where arms were acquired. Nor was it possible to 
establish if any of the armed men observed has infiltrated from outside; 
there is no doubt, however, that the vast majority was in any case 
composed of Lebanese... " 104. 
The establishment of the Federation of Malaysia by virtue of the 
London Agreement of 9 July 1963 provoked an extremely vehement 
reaction on the part of the Government of Indonesia which considered the 
London Agreement as a violation of a prior agreement concluded between 
the Foreign Ministers of Malaya and Indonesia at a meeting in Manilla 
whereby the Federation of Malaysia would come into existence before the 
people of Sarawak and Sabbate expressed their wishes in a referendums05 
. 
From 1963-1965 the Indonesian Government embarked upon a policy of 
so-called "confrontation" that involved large-scale infiltration of 
Indonesian "volunteers" and sabotage operations, initially into Sarawak 
102 Id. 828th mtg. paras 54-55(Lebanon); 831st mtg. para 24(Jordan); also see id. 827th mtg. 
paras 34-35,38,40-43,49(U. S. A. ); cf. 831st mtg. para 35. In that instance the U. S. 
representative justified the U. S. action by reference to "... the inherent right of nations to 
call for assistance when threatened... ". S. C. O. R. 13th yr. 831st mtg. paras 27,29(U. K. ); id. 
828th mtg. para 9(France). Moreover the U. S. President, D. Eisenhower in a special message 
to Congress dated 15 July 1958 stated that, "... [l]n response to this appeal from the 
Government of Lebanon the U. S. has dispatched a contingent of U. S. forces to Lebanon.... to 
encourage the Lebanese Government in defense of Lebanese sovereignty and integrity... As 
the U. N. Charter recognizes, there is an inherent right of coil. self-defense... ", Whiteman 
Digest of International Law, vol. 12, p. 137; H. McMillan, the U. K. Prime Minister justified 
the dispatch of U. K. troops to Jordan in a statement to the House of Commons on 17 July 1958 
as action taken in coil. self-defence under Art. 51 of the Charter, Keesing's 1957-1958, p. 
16308. 
103 S. C. O. R. 13th yr. 830th mtg. para 48. Contra : 831st mtg. para 99(China). 104 Doc. S/4040; Keesing's 1957-1958, pp. 16295,16440-1. 
105 The regions of Sarawak and Sabah are situated on the island of Borneo the remainder 
of which constitutes Indonesian territory; Keesing's 1963-1964, pp. 19715-6,19746-7. 
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and Sabah, and subsequently into the Malay peninsula, and culminated in 
the Labis parachute drop of 2 September 1964 that involved a massive air 
borne infiltration of armed individuals very deep into the peninsula. It 
was in the aftermath of the Labis drop that Malaysia referred the matter to 
the Security Councils 06 
. 
During the debate, as well as previously, the 
Indonesian Government made no secret of its connivance in the sending 
of the bands and did not deny the fact that some of the participants in the 
Labis drop had been proved to be members of the Indonesian armed 
forces107 
. 
Although Indonesia avoided formal censure by the Council due 
to the negative vote of the U. S. S. R. 
, 
individual members expressed their 
outright condemnation and considered the Indonesian action as a case of 
"armed attack" requiring action in self-defence108 
. 
Indeed, the Malaysian 
Government took action jointly with the U. K. that dispatched units of the 
Royal Navy and the R. A. F. while Australia and N. Zealand provided 
military aid in the form of equipment109 
. 
The joint British and Malaysian 
action was confined within the territory of Malaysia. 
The Government of Laos was faced with armed insurgency by the 
communist organisation Pathet Lao from 1959-1975; during the 
insurgency the Laotian Government requested and received military 
assistance from Thailand that dispatched ground forces in Laos, and the 
U. S. that made its Air Force availablellO. 
During the Vietkong insurgency in S. Viet- Nam from 1959-1975, 
the S. Viet- Namese Government received military assistance in the form 
of armed contingents that took part in the fighting against the guerrillas 
on the territory of S. Viet- Nam, from the U. S. A. 
, 
Australia, N. Zealand, S. 
Korea and the Philippines111 
. 
By far the largest military commitment in 
assisting the S. Viet- Namese Government was that of the U. S. It is 
significant that the U. S. Government consistently alleged "infiltration" of 
armed individuals from N. Viet- Nam that went back to 1959, rather than 
mere assistance to theVietkong in the form of provision of arms, training 
and logistical support; when this infiltration increased and was proved to 
comprise of elements of the N. Viet- Namese army, in 1965, the U. S. 
106 Doc. S/5930, S. C. O. R. 19th yr. Suppl. for July-September 1964. 
107 Id. 1144th mtg. para 103; Keesing's 1965-1966, p. 20591. 
108 S. C. O. R. 19th yr. 1148th mtg. para 32(Brazil), 1144th mtg. para 127(U. K. ), 1145th mtg. 
Para 25(U. S. A. ). 
iý Keesing's 1963-1964, p. 20184. 
110 Ibid. 1965-1966, p. 21746; 1969-1970 p. 24088. 
111 Ibid. 1961-1962, p. 18615; 1965-1966, p. 20777. 
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resorted to force directly against N. Viet- Nam in collective self-defence 112 
On three occasions the Republic of Congo/ Zaire was invaded by 
mercenaries (5 July 1967) and former Katangese rebels (8 March 1977,11 
May 1978). The Congolese/Zairean Government brought the situation 
arising from the action of mercenaries to the attention of the Security 
Council on 6 Juh 1967113 
. 
During the debate the representative of Brazil, 
Mr. De Carvalho Silos, raised a very significant point with regard to the 
activities of armed bands as a source of use of force in its own right and 
went as far as to suggest that such activities constitute per se a violation of 
the United Nations Charter; he stated: 
"... Even if these persons are not mercenaries, even if they are, for instance, 
volunteers, 
- 
and I mean actual volunteers whose motivations are ideological 
- 
their action 
could constitute a clear violation of the principles of our Charter as an intervention by a 
foreign Power or foreign Powers in the internal affairs of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo... "114 
In all three instances the Government of Congo /Zaire requested 
and received military assistance from third countries. In the case of the 
mercenary attack on Kinsangani ( former Stanleyville) in July 1967, 
Ethiopia dispatched jet-fighters with their crews while the U. S. sent three 
aircraft to provide long-range logistical support115 
. 
In the first invasion of 
the Shaba province ( former Katanga) by Katangese exiles in 1977, the 
Zairean army was assisted by 1,500 Moroccan troops116 
. 
In the second 
invasion of the Shaba in 1978 the mining town of Kolwezi fell in the 
hands of the rebels that resorted to violence against the town's white 
population; French and Belgian troops were dispatched in order to rescue 
their nationals and other Europeans which seemed to be the main 
objective of the mission, although the French Government expressly took 
112 Letter dated 7 February 1965 from the representative of the United States of America to 
the President o( the Security Council, Doc. S/6174, S. C. O. R. 20th yr. Suppl. for Jan. 
-March 
1965, pp. 43-5; Statement by the U. K. Prime Minister in the House of Commons on 9 March 
1965, Hansard no 649 Rh-] I 1h March 1965, p. 238, col. 2; The Legality of the United States 
Participation in the Defense of Viet-Nam, Memorandum of Law, Office of the Legal 
Adviser, Dept. of State, printed in R. A. Falk(ed. ), The Viet-Nam War and International 
Law, vol. 1, Princeton 1968, pp. 583-603; discourse by J. R. Stevenson, United States Military 
Action in Cambodia: Questions of International Law, in The Cambodian Incursion 
... 
Legal 
Issues, Proceedings of the Fifteenth Hammarskjöld Forum, 1971, pp. 24-33; Gill, 1 Hague 
Y. 1. L. 30 (1988) pp. 40-1. 
113 Doc. S/8036, S. C. O. R. 22nd yr. Suppl. for July-Sept. 1967, p. 63. 
114 S. C. O. R. 22nd yr. 1367th mtg. para 107. 
115 Keesing's 1967-1968, p. 22189. 
111 Ibid. 1977 p. 28397. 
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the view that apart from the protection of French nationals the dispatch of 
troops was also in response to the request from the Government of 
Zairel17 
. 
Mozambique has been in a state of civil war since its independence 
in 1975 which has been waged by the Mozambique National Resistance 
Movement (RE. NA. MO. ). The latter consists of mainly Portuguese settlers 
and from 1975-1980 it was armed, trained and financed by the Rhodesian 
Government, while ever since 1980 it has been assisted by the South 
African Governmentlis 
. 
Despite the 1984 Nkomati Accord119 between 
Mozambique and S. Africa whereby both parties undertook not to allow 
their territories be used by armed individuals operating against either of 
them, the RE. NA. MO. activities continued. In 1987 the Mozambique army 
assisted by 10,000 Zimbabwean and 1,000 Tanzanian troops launched a 
major offensive against RE. NA. MO. within the territory of 
Mozambique120. 
On 25 May 1977 the Ethiopian province of Ogaden was invaded by a 
large force of 3,000-6,000 armed individuals claiming to be the Western 
Somalia Liberation Front (1, V. S. L. F. )121. By 21 February 1978 it had been 
established that the W. S. L. F. had been sent into Ogaden by the Somali 
Government and that the Somali regular army was fighting alongside the 
irregulars; the Ethiopian Government invoked the right of self-defence 
and the Ethiopian army was assisted in fighting the W. S. L. F. by large 
contingents of Cuban and S. Yemeni troops1222. The Ethiopian action was 
confined in the territory of Ogaden and on 9 March 1978 the Somali army 
was forced to completely withdraw therefrom. On 14 February 1978 
President Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia stated that "... [W]e will not 
interfere in the internal affairs of other people. The defensive war we are 
waging goes as far as our frontier... " 123. 
Chad is a State where occurrences of insurgency are very frequent. 
In 1968 an insurgency against the Government of President Tombalbaye 
was crushed with the assistance of French troops that were deployed at the 
117 Ibid 1978, pp. 29125-6. 
118 Ibid. 1979, pp. 29760-1; 1980, pp. 30073,30611; 1983, p. 32114. 
119 Ibid. 1984, pp. 328 3 5-6. 
120 Ibid. 1988, p. 35685. The military assistance by Tanzania and Zimbabwe was offerred 
on the basis of Agreements concluded between Mozambique and the above States. 121 Ibid. 1977, p. 28634. 
122 Ibid. 1978, pp. 28760,28989,28991. 
123 Ibid. 1978, p. 28989. 
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request of the President124. In 1983 French troops were re-introduced in 
Chad at the request of the Government of President Hissene Habre that 
was faced with insurgency led by the former President of the country 
Goukouni Oueddei. The rebels were assisted by Libya the army of whom 
occupied the Aozou strip, a belt of territory in dispute between Chad and 
Libya. In the debate at the Security Council of a Chadian complaint against 
Libya, after the Air Force of the latter had launched an air raid on Chadian 
army positions in the disputed territory in the north of Chad during the 
first week of August 1983, the Soviet delegate accused France of 
intervening in the civil war in Chad; on this the representative of the 
Netherlands commented that a distinction had to be maintained between 
military assistance requested by the Government of a country acting in 
pelf-defence and armed intervention in the affairs, of a neighbouring 
State125. The French forces took part in the fighting on the side of the 
Government in 1986 when French fighter bomber-, launched an air raid 
on the main rebel base in Faya LargeaulThe evidence of Libyan 
involvement on the side of the rebels seems to have played a crucial role 
in the French participation in the fighting against the insurgents; by 
contrast the French contingent stationed in Chad declined to assist the 
Government of President H. Habre to crush a rebellion that broke out 
spontaneously and without any evidence of outside assistance in 
December 199t) and resulted in the overthrow of the President's 
Government'127. 
Since 1983 Sri Lanka has been in a state of civil -, 
-%Tar between the 
Government and the Tamil United Liberation Front (T. U. L. F. ) which are 
based in the north of the country and aim at the secession of the north- 
west region. On 29 July 1987 the Governments of India and Sri Lanka 
concluded an Agreement whereby India pledged to ensure that its territory 
would not be used " 
... 
for activities prejudicial to the unity, integrity and 
security of Sri Lanka... "; clause 2.16(c) of the Agreement provided that: 
... 
In the event that the Government of Sri Lanka requests the Government of India 
to afford military assistance to implement these proposals the Government of of India will 
co-operate bT2 giving to the Government of Sri Lanka such military assistance as and when 
requested... $ 
124 Ibid. 1969-1970, p. 23548. 
125 U. N. Chronicle vol. XX no 9 Sept. 1983, p. 13. 
12t' keesing's 1986, p. 34208. 
127 Ibid. 1990, p. 37907. 128 Text of the Agreement in 2; I. I. I. L. 274-278 (7987). 
335 
In pursuance of the above provision 3,000 Indian troops were 
dispatched to Jaffna peninsula in North-West Sri Lanka on 30 July 1987 in 
order to assist the Sri Lankan army with the disarming of the T. U. L. F. (the 
so-called Tamil Tigers) and to undertake general peacekeeping dutiesl29. 
When civil strife resumed in October 1987 the Indian contingent joint the 
Sri Lankan army in fighting against the rebelsl3o. 
On 1 October 1990 the small African State of Rwanda was invaded 
by a force of 10,000 Rwandan dissidents that were servicemen in the 
Ugandan army and belonged to the so-called Rwandan Patriotic Front-131. 
At the request of the Rwandan Government French, Belgian and Zairean 
troops were dispatched to assist the Government in stalling the invasion 
and to help evacuate European, American and Canadian nationals132. 
Only the Zairean contingent actually took part in the fighting against the 
rebels in execution of a mutual defence Agreement between the two 
countries, while the French and Belgian Governments stressed that the 
presence of their troops in Rwanda aimed only at the protection of their 
and other foreign nationals133. 
Apart from resorting to force against guerrilla groups the victim 
State may take on its own territory protective measures short of the use of 
armed force, either individually] 34 
, 
or in conjunction with its 
neighbouring States 
- 
acting on their territories. Such measures may 
consist of, inter alia, border controls, closing of the frontier, erection of 
obstacles, laying of mines, restriction of freedom of movement along the 
frontier, proclamation of security zones. 
Thus, beginning in August 1980, the Moroccan army has 
constructed a complex line of fortifications intended to prevent 
POLISARIO incursions into-certain areas of Western Sahara and notably 
the region where the phosphate mines are situated; the line is more than 
300 miles long and includes, earthworks, minefields, ditches, barbed wire 
fences and observation posts135. 
129 Keesing's 1987, p. 35313. 
130 Ibid. pp. 36283-4. 
131 The Ugandan Government strongly disclaimed any involvement in the invasion; Ibid. 
1990, pp. 37765-6. 
132 Ibid. p. 37766. 
133 Ibid. This may also serve as illustration of declining to committing one's troops in 
assisting a Government against an insurgency in the absence of evidence of another State's 
involvement on the side of the rebels; see supra 
134 Brownlie, International Law and the Activities of Armed Bands, 7 I. C. L. Q. 7120958) 
p 730 
i35 Keesing's 1981, pp. 31003-4. 
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After having dislodged the Khmer Rouges guerrillas from their 
bases on the Thai-Cambodian frontier, the 'Cambodian Government and 
the Viet- Namese forces ( that had been stationed in Cambodia since the 
Viet- Namese intervention of December 1978) consolidated their positions 
by adopting certain preventive measures against guerrilla infiltration, 
which consisted of laying mines and clearing the jungle at border crossing 
points, and of erecting a 75km barbed wire fence along the Thai border136. 
In its attempt to check the activities of the A. N. C. the South African 
Government erected a 12-mile long high voltage electric fence along the 
border with Zimbabwe in March 1985137 
, 
while a similar fence was 
installed along the border with Mozambique in August 1986138. 
During the civil war in Nicaragua A. R. D. E. 
, 
one of the contra 
groups fighting against the Sandinista Government, operated from the 
territory of Costa Rica; despite the deterioration in the relations between 
the two countries, agreement was reached in February 1982 for the 
establishment of joint border patrols, while in June 1982 a bilateral 
Commission was formed the duty of which was "... to analyse and solve 
any border problem which might arise in the future... "139. Moreover, 
following an incursion by A. R. D. E. guerrillas into Nicaragua on 15 May 
1984, the Government of Costa Rica took certain enforcement measures 
against A. R. D. E. that consisted of raiding the organisation's headquarters, 
the closure of its communication centre and the arrest, expulsion or 
imprisonment of its membersl4o. 
The Ethiopian Government has maintained a State of Emergency 
over Eritrea since 1970 by virtue of which a 6-mile strip of land along the 
coast and the border with Sudan was declared a "prohibited zone" from 
which the Government had the power to displace the inhabitants and 
move them into new areas within reasonable reach of police authorities 
and army garrisonsl4l. 
Finally, on 25 October 1989 Zambia and Mozambique signed an 
Agreement for the establishment of a joint Security Commission to 
contain RE. '\TA. MO. incursions and to regulate the movement of 
individuals across the common border between the two countries142. 
136 Ibid. 1985, p. 33732; ibid. 1986, p. 34426. 
137 Ibid. 1985, p. 33639. 
138 Ibid. 1986, p. 34794. 
139 Ibid. 1983, p. 32308. 
140 Ibid. 1984, p. 33275; ibid. 1986, p. 34532; ibid. 1987. pp. 35309-35310. 
141 Ibid. 1971-1972, p. 24507. 
142 Ibid. 1989, p. 37143. 
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3. (ii). b. 2. Extra-Territorial Use of Force Against 
. 
-1nned Bands. 
Controversy arises in cases of extra-territorial use of force by victim 
States against armed band-, that operate from the territory of another State. 
Armed action by the victim State beyond its borders could be justified 
either as an exercise of criminal jurisdiction or of the right of self- 
defence143 
. 
The former requires the express authorisation of the territorial 
sovereign while the latter does not; hence it is of no surprise at all that 
certain States that have on many occasions resorted to force beyond their 
frontiers in order to counter guerrilla activities justified their action as an 
exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence. The latter has 
been generally deemed to be exercised in international law by States 
only143; but defensive action may be conceivably directed against armed 
bands, namely, non-State entities145. Is this latter action to be characterised, 
despite its protective nature, as self-defence under Art. 51 and customary 
late? Article 51 and customary international law require for the exercise of 
self-defence (individual or collective) the existence of an armed attackl4b. 
State practice and the Nicaragua Cace suggest that the source of an armed 
attack against which the victim State resorts to force in self-defence beyond 
its borders must be linked and is directly imputable to another State 147 
. 
For whatever action is to be taken against the source of the armed attack, if 
it is to be exercised outside the territory of the victim State against armed 
bands, it necessarily take-, place on the territory of another State 
- 
and this 
constitutes a prima facie violation of Art. 2(4) of the Charter. 
It is generally accepted that forcible activities of private individuals 
from the territory of a State against another State give rise to international 
14 3 Schachter, The Extra 
-Terri ton al Use of Force Against Terrorist Bases, 17 Hous. J. I. L. 
309 (1989) p. 311. 
144 See supra First Title. 
145 Schachter loc cit_ supra it i43. 
146 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 1113. Para 19-5- 
147 Brownlie, 7 I. C. L. Q. 712 (1958) p. 731, id. op. cit supra it 62 pp. 372-5 and id. System of 
Lund of Nations, State Responsibility, Part 1,7983, pp. 161-2,168-170; M. R Garcia-Mora, 
Intern 1! onal Responsihility for Hostile Acts of Private Per-sons Against Foreign Slates, 
19e)2, pp. 25-35,109-115; Bowett op. cit. supra n. 62 pp. 48-9; Y. Blum, The Beirut Raid and 
the International Double Standard, 64 A. I. I. L. 73 (1970) pp. 79-87 and id. The Legality of 
State Response to Acts of Terrorism, in B. Netanvahu (ed. ) Terrorism, How the t"4v'est Carr 
Win, 1986, pp, 168-170; Levenfeld, Israel's Counter-Fedayeen Tactics in Lebanon: Self- 
Defense and Reprisal under Modern International Law, 21 CoI. J. Trans. L. 1 (1982-83) pp. 5- 
12; Q. Wright, Subversive Intervention, 54 A. J. I. L. 521 (1960), p. 531. Cf. Schachter loc. cit. 
supra n. 143, pp. 311,314. 
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responsibility on the part of the former State if it does not prevent by 
exercising 'due diligence' the said individuals from committing injurious 
acts against the latter148. The fact that such activities amount to the threat 
or use of force establishes their injurious nature. Responsibility of the host 
State requires knowledge of the activities of the armed individuals. It is 
submitted that knowledge of the mere existence of a group of political 
opponents of the Government of another State on the territory of a State is 
not sufficient to create responsibility of the latter. It is the activities 
themselves of private persons that violate international law. According to 
the Corfu Channel Case a State on whose territory an act contrary to 
international law has occurred may be called upon to give an explanation. 
That State cannot evade such a request by claiming ignorance, and it may, 
up to a certain point, be bound to supply particulars of the use made by it 
of the means of information and inquiry at its disposal. But it could not be 
concluded from the mere fact of the control exercised by a State over its 
territory that that State necessarily knew or ought to have known of the 
act or its authors. This fact does not involve in principle the responsibility 
of the State. However, the fact that a State has exclusive control exercised 
within its frontiers may make it impossible to furnish direct proof of facts 
which if correct would involve that State's responsibility in case of 
violation of international law. The State which is the victim must in such 
case be allowed a more liberal recourse to inferences of fact and 
circumstantial evidence so long as the latter do not leave room for 
reasonable doubt] 49 
. 
The practice of States shows that the States from the territory of 
which armed bands operate may deny any knowledge of forcible activities 
of individuals from their territories. Such denial has been manifested 
recently by Uganda for the invasion of Rwanda by dissident exiles in 
October 1990150 f by Angola. for the invasion of the Shaba province of Zaire 
by Katangese rebels in 1977 and 1978151, by Nicaragua for the invasion of 
Costa Rica by dissident exiles152, by France, Senegal, the Ivory Coast, 
148 Oppenheim's Inter»ational Laze, vol. i, 8th ed. by Lauterpacht, 1955, p. 365; Bowett op. 
cit. supra n. 147; Garcia-Mora op. cit. supra n. 147; Blum loci citi supra n. 147; Levenfeld loc. 
cit. supra in. 147. 
149 1. C. ) 
. 
Rep. 1949, p. 18. 
150 See supra n. 131. 
151 Keesing's 1977, p. 28397; id. 1978, p. 29127. 
152 Supn-a n. 94. 
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Morocco and Gabon for the mercenary attack against Benin in 1977153, and 
by South Africa for the mercenary attack against the Seychelles in 1981154. 
Moreover, claims have been raised on the part of States accused of 
harbouring armed bands in their territories that the individuals in 
question are 'refugees' or 'civilians' rather than guerrillas, or that they 
were disarmed the moment they entered the territory of the State. This 
line of argument was put forward by Mozambique with regard to the 
Rhodesian incursion and occupation of the town of Mapai on 30 May 
1977155 and the S. African commando raid on the alleged A. N. C. 
headquarters in the capital Maputo on 30 January 1981156 
. 
Similar 
arguments were asserted by Botswana in respect of a Rhodesian attack on 
an alleged guerrilla camp in the territory of the former on 22 December 
1976. The Hon. Q. K. J. Masire, the Vice-President of Botswana, in a 
statement before the Parliament of Botswana said that: 
"... It has always been the policy of our Government to grant asylum to genuine 
political refugees from neighbouring countries. It has also always been our policy not to 
permit Botswana to be used as a launching pad for attacks against neighbouring 
countries... " 157 
The same plea recurred in the aftermath of a South African 
commando raid on ten alleged A. N. C. centres in Gaboronne, the capital of 
Botswana, on 14 June 1985158. 
On 9 December 1982 S. African commandos launched an operation 
against homes of alleged A. N. C. members in residential areas of Maseru, 
the capital of the Kingdom of Lesotho. At the debate in the Security 
Council, H. M. King Motlotlehi Moshoeshoe II addressing the Council on 
behalf of his country stated that the A. N. C. fighters who had occasionally 
retreated to Lesotho and had been found in possession of arms "... had 
always been dealt with in accordance with Lesotho's laws and 
international obligations... "159. 
1'3 S, C. O. R. 32nd yr. 2000th mtg. paras 142-160(Gabon); 2001st mtg. paras 33-46(Senegal), 
54-67(France), 72-96(Morocco), 108-138(Ivory Coast); 2005th mtg. para 35(Gabon). 
154 Keesing's 1982, p. 31762. 
155 S. C. O. R. 32nd yr. 2014th mtg. paras 18,13-32. 
1 Keesing's 1981, p. 30889. 
157 Doc. S/ 12262. S. C. O. R. 31st yr. Suppl. for Oct. 
-Dec. 1976, pp. 56-7. 158 U. N. Chronicle vol. XXII, no 6, June 1985, p. 23. 
159 U. N. Ybk. 1982, p. 315. 
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The Government of Jordan claimed with regard to the Es-Salt raid 
of 1969, that the Israeli action was directed not against fedayeen bases but 
against civilians160 
. 
Assertion of non-knowledge of the activities of armed bands 
depends to a large extent on the modus operandi of the guerrillas. It is 
submitted that in the case where the guerrillas have their bases on the 
territory of a neighbouring State from where they infiltrate the territory of 
the victim State the existence of such preparation camps, where' training is 
going on, from where operations are mounted, where the guerrilla force 
regroups and where its field command, logistical and communications 
network are situated, it is very hard for the Government of the host State 
to claim that all such activity is unnoticed. Hence, despite denials to the 
contrary claims such as these of the Honduras Government as to the non- 
existence of any contra bases on the territory of the country seem to be of a 
rather fragile credibilityl6l. 
The picture becomes rather less clear in case of genuine 'refugee' 
camps where the individual members of a guerrilla force may have their 
domicile but which do not serve as starting points of concentration for the 
mounting of operations. It is submitted that as long as the latter still 
emanate from the territory of the host State it would be rather difficult for 
the latter to claim total ignorance of the fact. 
Lastly, such claims by the host State could only have a better chance 
of being substantiated with credibility if it is host of the headquarters of the 
guerrilla organisation and not of its fighting force, such as is the case with 
Tunisia where the P. L. O. headquarters are situated while the P. L. O. 
fighters are based mainly in Lebanon. In this case the use of force waged by 
the guerrillas may be decided, planned and co-ordinated from its 
headquarters 
, 
but it is carried out from the territory of another State. 
Again, a point must be made clear. The host State of the headquarters of 
the organisation is definitely aware of the fact that the latter engages in 
guerrilla warfare against another country. What the host State cannot be 
aware of is the circumstances under which an actual use of force is 
launched against the victim State. In 1968 Beirut was the city where the 
P. F. L. P headquarters were situated. The Lebanese Government was 
certainly aware of the activities of the former against Israel. But it is very 
unlikely that the Lebanese Government should have prior knowledge of 
1600 S. C. O. R. 24th yr. 1466th mtg. paras 118-119,121. 
161 Keesing's 1983, p. 32307. 
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specific operations against Israeli targets like the attack on the EL-AL 
airliner at the airport of Athens on 26 December 1968162. The same 
conclusion seems to be warranted with regard to States whose territory 
merely serves as transit passage of the guerrilla force from their bases to 
the territory of the victim State, or as temporary refuge from the battle; 
Laos and Cambodia had respectively been used by the Vietkong in the 
above way during the Viet- Nam conflict163. 
Furthermore, in assessing the question of whether due diligence 
was shown on the part of the host State towards curbing the activities of 
armed bands it is essential to take into account the means that this 
Government possesses to curb such acts, the geographical features of the 
region where the guerrillas operate and the clandestine character of the 
latter's activities164 
. 
During the Security Council debate on the Qibya raid 
the representative of the U. K. pointed that the "... nature and length of the 
border makes it difficult for Jordanian authorities to control the border 
with Israel 
... 
"1t 5. On 22 March 1983 Nicaragua requested an urgent 
meeting of the Security Council to consider "... the great increase in acts of 
aggression... " against it; during the debate the Nicaraguan delegate alleged 
that the contra guerrillas operated from Honduran territory with "... the 
assent and under the direction of important sectors of the Honduran 
Army... "16 
. 
In rejecting the Nicaraguan allegations the representative of 
Honduras countered that it was impossible to control a border of 
thousands of miles4"%. 
Moreover, political pressure on Governments by the population of 
the host State are not to be lightly dismissed. In case of sympathy and 
widespread support for the cause of the guerrilla struggle on the part of the 
population of the host State, the Government of the latter may find itself 
in a very delicate position; while it is prepared to exhibit a minimum 
amount of diligence with regard to the guerrilla activities emanating from 
its territory, it is not, on the other hand, likely to risk inviting immense 
162 Contra: Blum loc. citi supra n. 147; Levenfeld loc. cit. supra n. 147. 
163 Cf. Falk, International Law and Military Operations against Insurgents in Neutral 
Territory, 68 Cof. L. R. 1127 (1968) pp. 1131,1133,1147; however, see id. The Cambodian 
Operation and International Law, in Falk(ed. ), The Viet-Nam War and International Law, 
vol. iii, 1972, p. 33 seq. 
164 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 85, para 157; Brownlie, System of Law of Nations, State 
Responsibilih1, Part 1,1983, p. 165. Contra: Garcia-Mora op. cit. supra n. 147, p. 30; Blum 
supra n. 147. Cf. Bowett, op. cit. supra n. 147, pp. 55-6. 
1655 S. C. O. R. 8th yr. 635th mtg. para 54. 
U. N. Chronicle vol. XX no 3 May 1983, p. 10. 
1 ýý Ibid. p. 12. 
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opposition to it or even its downfall by taking direct action against the 
guerrillas168. Such action by the host State's likely to be taken only when 
the guerrilla organisation acquires political power so as to threaten the 
Government of the host State itself. In September 1970 the Jordanian army 
took military action against and expelled the P. L. O. from Jordan169. Other 
than that, the most that a host State is likely to do against a guerrilla 
organisation is to adopt administrative measures against them by 
expelling or imprisoning officials, or by closing down offices and 
headquarters 
- 
viz. the expulsion of the A. N. C. from Mozambique in the 
aftermath of the 1984 Nkomati Accord170 and the closing down of the 
A. R. D. E. offices in Costa Rica171 
A question that arises is whether the establishment of the 
responsibility of a State for activities of armed bands would entitle the 
victim State to resort to force across its boundaries on the territory of the 
host State. It is submitted that such responsibility, as all State responsibility 
because of acts contrary to obligations under international law, should 
entail liability to pay compensation and should not entitle to resort to 
unilateral military action against the host State of the guerrillas. This 
contingency would depend on the level of connivance of the host State in 
the activities of the armed bands, and more specifically on the precise level 
of involvement in these activitiesl72 
. 
Unilateral extra-territorial military action is a prima facie violation 
of Art. 2(4) of the Charter and requires justification on the basis of an 
exception to the prohibition of the use of force by States. Moreover, 
military action on the territory of another State creates the presumption 
that force is used against this State. If this is to be the case and be justified 
as exercise of the right of self-defence then, in the context of forcible 
activities by armed bands, the connivance of the host State must be of a 
level to be equated with an armed attackl73 
. 
Unless this is established, any 
unilateral action on the territory of the host State is very likely to have the 
character of reprisal and would be unlawful under international law in 
168 See the remarks by 'dir. Baroody, the representative of Saudi Arabia in the Security 
Council, durisig the debate on the Guinean complaint against Portugal of 12 Dec. 1969 ( Doc. 
S/9554, S. C. O. R. 24th yr. Suppl. for Oct. 
-Dec.. 1969, pp. 155-7), S. C. O. R. 24th yr. 1523rd mtg. 
paras 58-59; also viz. remarks by the same representative during the debate on the Es-Salt 
raid, S. C. O. R. 24th yr. 1467th mtg. para 82. 
169 Keesing's 1969-1970, p. 24206. 
170 Ibid. 1986, p. 34088; id. 1988, p. 35687. 
171 Supra n. 140. 
172 Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 164, p. 182. 
173 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 103, para 195. 
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force today1-4. It is submitted that the punitive character of such action on 
the part of the victim State is established by virtue of the fact that the host 
State may not be itself the actual author of the armed force facing the 
victim State. It is the guerrillas themselves that in most cases actually 
constitute the "source" as well as the author of force against the victim 
Statel75, and it is, moreover, this action that warrants the undertaking of 
protective counter-action. The host State simply incurs responsibility for 
allowing its territory to be used for injurious activities against another 
State. However, the host State may bring itself closer to the authorship of 
the use of force against the victim State, by its involvement by way of 
assisting the armed bands in their forcible struggle against the 
Government of the latterl76 
. 
The provision of arms, training and 
logistical support have a direct bearing on the actual on-the-ground ability 
of the guerrillas to pursue their forcible activities and constitutes a 
violation of the customary law rule of the prohibition of the use of force 
by States and of Art. 2(4) of the Charter];; 
. 
The question arises whether the victim State is legitimised to resort 
to defensive use of force against the guerrillas or against the assisting/ host 
State, or against both, should arty form of assistance to the insurgents is 
established. The issue is very controversial and its complexities have been 
highlighted during the preparatory work of the Definition of 
Aggressiow- ý. The Special Committee on the Definition of Aggression 
was faced with two opposing views: The first was propounded by the 
\Vestern States and it called for the right to resort to force in self-defence in 
the face of any form of assistance to armed bands»9 
. 
The 
t' 4 See Part One, Ch. 3; cf. 1. L. C. Ybk. 1984 vol. 11 Part Two, p. 102, paras 361-2. 
175 A State becomes the actual author of the use of force only in case of an armed attack by 
way of armed bands. 
176 In this case the host State becomes also the assisting State of the guerrillas. These 
'capacities', however, do not always coincide on the same State. Guerrillas when operating 
from outside the victim State's territory have always had their bases on the territory of a 
neighbouring State (host State). In certain cases the host State would also provide arms, 
training and logistical support to the guerrillas 
- 
viz. Egypt with regard to the fedatlc eir, 
Syria and Jordan with regard to the AI-Fatah. But in other cases the provision of the above 
kind of aid originates from a non-neighbouring country 
- 
viz. the contras were based in 
Honduras and Costa Rica while they were provided with assistance by the U. S. A. ; the 
Algerian F. L. N. would take refuge in Tunisia but the bulk of its supplies was provided by 
the U. A. R. ; the Afghan guerrillas although based in Pakistan received aid from the 
U. S. A. ; it was the same with regard to the Khmer Rouges that were based in Thailand 
and assisted by the U. S. A. 
177 Slip,,,, 
t',, ' Gill, 1 Hague Y. I. L. 30 (1988), p. 37 
179 See Six Power draft Definition of Aggression, Doc. A/ AC 134/L. 17; Report of the 
Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, G. A. O. R. 24th Session, Suppl. 
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second was advanced by the non-aligned States and suggested a distinction 
between two forms of involvement in the activities of armed bands as 
warranting different kinds of response. In the case of 'sending' by a State of 
armed bands that invade the territory of another State "... in such 
circumstances as to amount to an armed attack... " the right of self-defence 
should be exercised; by contrast, in the case where "... a state is the victim 
in its own territory of subversive or terrorist acts 
.... 
it may take all 
reasonable and adequate measures to safeguard its existence and its 
institutions, without having recourse to the right of individual or 
collective self-defence... " even if the armed bands are supported by another 
Statel8o. 
The same distinction appears to have been relied upon in the 
Nicaragua Case albeit in a somewhat less clear fashionl8l. The non- 
no 20, A/7620; I. C. J. Rep. 1986 (per Judge Schwebel) pp. 344-5,347-8, paras 167-8,172-3; S. 
Schwebet, Aggression, Intervention and Self-Defence, 136 H. R. C. 413 (1972 11) pp. 482-3; 
Schachter, 11 Hous. J. I. L. 309 (1989) ; Reisman, 11 Hous. J. I. L. 317 (1989); Intoccia, 19 Case 
W. Res. J. I. L. 177 (1987) pp. 209,272-3; Blum loc. cit. in Netanyahu(ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 147; 
McCredie, 19 Case W. Res. J. 1. L. 215 (1987) p. 241; Roberts, Self-Help in Combating State 
Sponsored Terrorism: Self-Defense and Peacetime Reprisals, 19 Case W. Res. J. IL. 243 (1981 ) 
pp. 258-9 and cf. 247,265,289-293; Akehurst, 27 I. I. I. L. 357 (1987) p. 370; Bowett, Self- 
Defence in International Law, 1958, pp. 48-9 but cf. pp. 55-6 and id. loc. cit. in Moore(ed. ) op. 
cit. supra n. 28, p. 40; Murphy op. cit. supra n. 22, pp. 105-7; Higginbotham, 25 Col. J. Trans. L. 
529 (1986-87) p. 555; Moore, 76 Yale L. J. 1051 (1967) and id. 80 A. J. 1. L. 43 (1986) pp. 88-9,105- 
6; Macdonald, xxiv Can. Y. l. L. 127 (1986) p. 145. 
180 See Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, Annex 11, 
Report of the Working Group, Appendix A, Doc. A/8719, p. 19, G. A. O. R. 27th Session, 
Suppl. no 19. Also see: G. A. O. R. 24th Session; Thirteen Power draft Definition of 
Aggression, A/AC. 134/L. 16 and Corr. 1; Report of the Special Committee on the Question of 
Defining Aggression, Doc. A/ 7620, Supp(. no 20, paras 28-29,61-65; Report of the Sixth 
Committee, Doc. A/ 7853, G. A. O. R. Annexes, p. 2, paras 13,21-22. 
G. A. O. R. 25th Session; Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining 
Aggression, Doc. A/ 8019, Suppl. no 19, paras 27-29,51-54,126-129; Report of the Sixth 
Committee, Doc. A/8171, G. A. O. R. Annexes, p. 1, paras 18-19. 
G. A. O. R. 26th Session; Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining 
Aggression, Doc. A/8419, Suppl. no 19, paras 26-28; Report of the Sixth Committee, Doc. 
A/8525, G. A. O. R. Annexes, p. 1, paras 24-25. 
G. A. O. R. 27th Session; Report of the Sixth Committee, Doc. A/8929, G. A. O. R. Annexes, p. 
1, Para 22. 
G. A. O. R. 28th Session; Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining 
Aggression, Doc. A/ 9019, Annex 11, Report of the Working Group, Appendix B, Para 22; 
G. A. O. R. Suppl. no 19. Also see: Brownlie, 7 I. C. L. Q. 712 (1958) pp. 730-2 and id. op. cit. 
supra n. 62 pp. 372-5; Sullivan, 10 ASILS. LL. J. 169 (1986) p. 193; Farer, 81 A. J. I. L. 112 (1987) 
and id. 67 Col. L. R. 266 (1967) pp. 276-7; Henkin, 216 H. R. C. 13 (1989 IV) pp. 159-161; Falk, 
75 Yale L. J. 1122 (1966) id. 76 Yale L. J. 1095 (1967) pp_ 1102-3,1124-5,1142 but cf. 1140 and 
id. 68 Col. L. R. 1127 (1968) pp. 1135-8 but cf. pp. 1131-3,1147; Rowles, 81 A. J. I. L. 568 (1986) 
pp. 579-580; Q. Wright, 53 A. J. I. L. 112 (1959) p. 123, id. 60 A. I. I. L. 750 (1966) pp. 766-7, and 
id. 51 A. J. I. L. 257 (1957) p. 271; N. D. White, ix /nt. Rel. 535 (1989); Gross, 13 Cal. West. 
I. L. J. 458 (1983); Garcia-Mora op. cit. supra n. 147 pp. 115-120. 
181 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 103 Para 195; contra id. per Judge Schwebet, pp. 342-3 paras 163-4; cf 
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aligned draft Definition of Aggression seems to suggest a distinction in 
responding to acts of armed bands on the grounds of their territorial basis 
in accumulation with their being or not the primary author of the use of 
force: The 'sending' by a State of armed bands that 'invade' the territory of 
the victim State clearly indicates that the guerrillas may be the source of 
force on the ground but at the same time they have the position of a 
'weapon' in the hands of the State that sends them. By contrast the fact 
that a State may be faced ab initio with insurgency in its own territory 
implies that the guerrillas have been formed spontaneously in the 
territory of the victim State and that they constitute both the source and 
the author of armed forcel82 
. 
Again, in the former case the victim State 
has the right to invoke self-defence, both individual and collective, and 
legitimately resort to force against the assisting State as such. This is 
understood to involve, subject to the requirement of proportionality, the 
likelihood of force used in the territory of the assisting State, while the 
latter situation seems to imply that forcible response should be directed 
only against the armed bands and be restricted on the territory of the 
victim State183. 
In the Nicaragua Case the Court expressly addressed the issue of 
when the involvement in the activities of armed bands constitutes an 
armed attack against the victim State that gives the latter the right to resort 
to force in self-defence. Reliance has been laid on Art. 3(g) of the 
Definition of Aggression and on this basis the Court has elaborated on the 
material dimensions and intensity of the 'sending' of armed bands, 
specifically mentioning the " scale and effects" of the latter's activities, and 
suggested that the "substantial involvement" in the assistance to armed 
bands signified 'agency' on behalf of the assisting State and that the mere 
provision of weapons, training, logistical support amounted to a use of 
force short of an armed attacks 84. It then proceeded to rule that in a 
situation where the victim State is faced with State involvement in 
guerrilla activities that does not amount to an armed attack, it has the 
right to resort to "proportionate counter-measures" that, it is strongly 
suggested, are analogous, to the right of self-defence. It has not been made 
clear, however, whether the exercise of these counter-measures should 
take place on the territory of the victim State only, or whether they could 
182 Gill loc. cit. supra n. 178, pp. 39-40. 
183 Ibid. pp. 41-2. 
184 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, pp. 103-4,61-62, paras 195,108-9. Contra, id. per Judge Schwebel 
, 
pp. 
343-344,346, paras 166-167,170. 
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be exercised extraterritoriality; or whether they should be directed against 
the guerrilla-, only or against the assisting State as well. 
,A passage of the Judgment in the Nicaragua Case may be read as 
implying (albeit vaguely) the possibility of extra-territorial action against 
guerrillas. The Court held that: 
... 
Even if it be accepted, for the sake of argument, that the objective of the United 
States in assisting the contras was solely to interdict the supply of arms to the armed 
opposition in El Salvador, it strains belief to suppose that a body formed in armed 
Opposition to the Government of Nicaragua 
... 
intended only to check Nicaraguan 
interference in El Salvador and did not intend to achieve violent change of Government in 
Nicaragua 
... 
184a 
The implicit admissibility of extraterritorial resort to force may be 
deduced by the fact that the formation of a large guerrilla group would be 
so mmewhat excessive for countering army supplies to the Salvadorean 
insurgents. Indeed, it might be argued that this could be achieved by other 
means, possibly including limited strikes against the supply routes, on 
Nicaraguan territeryisah 
. 
This, however, can only be a tentative 
interpretation in view of the lack of clarity in the Court's Judgment in 
respect of resort to this action. 
Since the Court has dealt with the customary law on the use of force 
by States consideration of State practice is necessary-. 
The overwhelming majeritZt of State-, that have become victims of 
activities of armed bands have resorted to force against the guerrillas 
within their territories only even though it had been alleged or even 
estabiisbed on the basis of evidence that the guerrillas were assisted b 
another Statels. y. Example-, abound. In the period 1946-49 the Greek 
Government resorted to large-scale operations against the communist 
guerrillas only within the territory of Greece notwithstanding the fact that 
a Security Council Special Commission dispatched to the Balkans to 
investigate the 
. 
situation, reported that Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria 
were providing arm-, and logistical support to the guerrillasls6. I oreover, 
the Governments of Chad (1983-87), Mozambique(1975- ), Ethiopia(1961- 
91), Somalia (1988-91) 
, 
Sudan (1983- ), Nicaragua (1979-1989), El Salvador 
(1979-91 ), Malaysia (1963-65), Sri Lanka (1987- ), Cambodia (1979-91 ), 
184a I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 124, para 241. 
164b See N. D. White, ix lilt. Rel. 535 (1989), p. 543. 
185 Gill loc. cit. supra n. 178, p. 41. 
186 Doc. S / 360. 
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Afghanistan (1978-92 ), Yemen (1962-69), Turkey (1979-) and Iraq (1975- ), 
have used force against the guerrilla movements operating against them 
strictly within the territory of the State. 
There is, however, a significant minority of States that have often 
resorted to force beyond the boundaries of their proper territories or 
territories under their administration. The justification offered for such 
extra-territorial action has been in almost all cases the right of self-defence 
to counter the use of force waged by armed bands against their territories, 
their citizens or their interests outside their territoriesls7, always in 
conjunction with the alleged involvement in the guerrilla activities of the 
State on whose territory military force is exercised. Such involvement is 
indiscriminately considered of a nature of giving rise to the right of self- 
defence and includes the supply to the guerrillas of bases or sanctuaries, 
arms, training, political and financial support; even the existence of a 
guerrilla organisation's headquarters or information offices in a country 
have been deemed sufficient grounds for military action on the territory of 
that State188. 
On 8 February 1958 the French Air Force launched an air raid on the 
Tunisian town of Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef that resulted in heavy loss of life. 
Statements by the French Government authorities justified the action as 
an exercise of the legitimate right of self-defence against anti-aircraft 
batteries installed in Tunisian territory, and that Sakiet was a base from 
where the Algerian would launch their operations against the 
French army iii -\Sgeriais9. The responsibility of the Tunisia was 
emphasised in further statements of the French Government; it was 
claimed that Tunisia furnished aid to the Algerian fighters "... enabling 
them to conduct operations from Tunisian territory directed against the 
integrity of French territorY7... "19o; that the insurgents "... aided and abetted 
by the Tunisian authorities had been able to establish a complete 
organisation in Tunisia... "i9i; and, finally, that "... an independent and 
18' Viz. the justifications of the Israeli air strike on the P. L. O. headquarters in Tunis in 
1985, and of the U. S. air raids on Libya in 1986. 
188 Viz. the simultaneous S. African raids on A. N. C. offices in Zambia, Botswana and 
Zimbabwe on 19 May 1986, and the Israeli air strike on the P. L. O. headquarters in Tunis on 
1 October 1985. 
189 Keesing's 1957-1958, p. 15886. 
190 Doc. S/3954, S. C. O. R. 13th yr. Suppl. for Jan. 
-March 1958, p. 15. 191 Repertory of Practice of the U. N. organs, sup]. no 2 vol. 1, p. 105, para 126. 
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sovereign country must not allow people to take cover behind its frontiers 
and attack others even if these others are their enemies... "192 
. 
The armed forces of the white minority regime in Rhodesia 
frequently launched operations against the Z. A. N. U. 
-Z. A. P. U. self- 
determination movements on the territory of neighbouring States of 
Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana. The justification was again the right 
of self-defence 
- 
viz. The Rhodesian incursion in Mozambique followed by 
the occupation of the town of Mapai on 30 May 1977 which was justified as 
"... necessary to achieve the destruction of Z. A. N. U. 
-Z. A. P. U. 
... 
"'193; the 
commando raid against a refugee camp in Zambia on 7 March 1978194. 
Portugal resorted to force under the same justification of self- 
defence in the territories of Zambia, Senegal and Guinea that had a 
common border with the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Guinea 
(Bissau), where Portugal was being faced with armed struggle by the 
indigenous populations that aspired to independence19s. It was stressed by 
the Portuguese Government during the debates in the Security Council 
that the harbouring of guerrillas by the three above States was an outright 
violation of Art. 2(4) of the Charters 9h 
. 
During the Viet- Nam conflict the 1'ietkong would use as a route of 
supply the territories of Laos and Cambodia. Although neither 
Government of these countries was assisting the guerrillas197 
, 
two major 
operations were launched on their territories by the S. Viet- Namese army 
individually in Laos and jointly with U. S. forces in Cambodia. On 1 May 
]92 S. C. O. R. 13th yr. 819th mtg. paras 70-72,74,76-77; id. 820th mtg. para 9. 
193 Keesing's 1977, p. 28550. 
194 Id. 1978, p. 28949. 
195 See S. C. O. R. 24th yr. 1486th mtg. para 72 (Portuguese shelling of the Zambian village 
of Lote, 30 June 1969); id. 1516th mtg. para 102 and 1520th mtg. para 12 (Portuguese shelling 
of the Senegalese village of Samine, 25 Nov. 1969); id. 1522nd mtg. paras 50-52 (shelling of 
two Guinean villages on 2 Dec. 1969). 
196 S. C. O. R. 24th yr. 1486th mtg. para 119 ( the Lote incident); note that the Portuguese 
delegate also stressed that the Portuguese forces had strict instructions "... which are being 
obeyed.. " not to cross into Zambian territory, ibid. 
197 A S. Viet- Namese incursion into Cambodia that the latter brought to the attention of 
the Security Councii (Dn. 5j5697) in 1964 was attributed by S. Viet- Nam to 'error' 
(S. C. O. R. 19th yr. 1118th mtg. paras 19,26,35-36), while the representative of the U. S. A. 
, despite his claim that the Vietkong were using Cambodia as a 'passageway' to infiltrate 
S. Viet Nam, made it clear that the U. S. did not wish to imply that the Cambodian 
Government assisted the guerrillas (S. C. O. R. 19th yr. 1119th mtg. para 97,1122nd mtg. 
paras 14,17,19). Moreover later allegations of Cambodian assistance by allowing traffic- 
in-arms through Cambodian territory were vigorously denied by the Cambodian 
Government 
- 
Keesing's 1969-1970, pp. 24015-6, Doc. S/8149 S. C. O. R. 22nd yr. Suppl. July- 
Sept.. 1967 pp. 288-9. Finally, another S. Viet- Namese incursion inside Cambodia on 18 Jan. 
1968 was again attributed to error 
- 
Keesing's 1969-1970 
, 
p. 24016. 
1970 the S. Viet- Namese and U. S. forces launched an offensive inside 
Cambodian territory justified as action in collective self-defence and 
directed against t'ietkong bases on the territory of Cambodia; the 
operation was, moreover, described as "... restricted in extent, purpose and 
time and confined to the border areas which had been completely occupied 
by N. Viet- Namese and Vietkong forces... " 198 
. 
Furthermore, the 
operation undertaken by the S. Viet- Namese army on the territory of Laos 
on 8 February 1971 was described by the S. Viet- Namese Government as 
"limited" aiming at "... disrupting the supply and infiltration network of 
the Communist North Viet- Namese troops lying in Laotian territory199. 
Moreover the U. S. State Dept. in a statement transmitted to the Security 
Council after stressing the fact that no U. S. troops were participating in the 
operation, it took the view that "... [T]he measures of self-defence being 
taken by the Republic of Viet- Nam are fully consistent with international 
law... "200. 
The U. S. A. justified the air strike against the Libyan cities of Tripoli 
and Bengazi on 19 April 1986 as anticipatory self-defence against 
imminent future terrorist attacks against U. S. targets20l. 
The S. African armed forces have on numerous occasions resorted 
to force on the territories of its neighbouring States of Angola, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe and \ iozambique. All military operations were justified as an 
exercise of the right of self-defence against, and this important, the 
guerrilla movements of S. I '. A. P. O. and A. N. C. as such, rather than the 
States on whose territory the action had taken place; moreover, it has 
always been stressed that S. Africa's neighbouring State-, bore responsibility 
for allowing S. \\ 
. 
A. P. O. and A. N. C. fighters to establish bases and operate 
from their territories. In a letter dated 27 June 1980 from the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and information of South Africa, Mr. R. F. Botha, 
addressed to the President of the Security Council it was stated "... S. Africa 
harbours no aggressive intentions against Angola and its people.... any 
action on the part of S. African security forces is aimed solely at S. W. A. P. O. 
19' Doc. S/9781, S. CO. R 25th yr. Suppl. April-? fay 1970, pp. 176-7; Address of President 
Nixon to the American People of 30 April 1970, Keesiixg`s 1969-1970, p. 24131. 
199 Statement by President Thieu of S. Viet- Nam, Keesing's's 1971-1972 p. 24621; Note 8 
Feb. 1971 by the President of the Security Council transmitting a note verbale from the 
observer of the Republic of Viet- Nam, Doc. S/ 10104, S. C. O. R. 26th yr. Suppl. Jan. -March 
1971, p. 61. 
2( 10 Doc. S/10106, S. C. O. R. 26th yr. Suppl. Jan. 
-March 1971, p. 63. 201 See supra Part One 
, 
Ch. 3. The issue of anticipatory action in self-defence is equally 
applicable with regard to counter-measures and it is dealt with in the context of self- 
defence against an armed attack; supra First Title, section 5. 
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and not at Angola and its people... "202. Furthermore, in another letter to 
the President of the Security Council on 10 April 1980, Mr. R. F. Botha 
Mated that "... S. Africa has no alternative but to take protective action 
against aggression committed from Zambian soil... S. African actions... are 
aimed solely at the elements committing aggression and not against the 
countries concerned or their citizen.... "; he then, however, went on to to 
claim that, ".... Zambia must bear full responsibility for allowing terrorist 
elements to establish sanctuaries in and operate from its territory. It is 
therefore Zambia which is in persistent breach of the provisions both of 
international law and of the Charter of the United Nations to the effect 
that States must refrain from the threat or use of force in their 
international relations... "203. In another communication to the Security 
Council following the so-called operation Protea, a large-scale incursion by 
the S. African army inside Angola on 24 August 1981, ß-1r. Botha again 
stressed the fact that "... [Tin countering S. W. A. P. O. incursions S. Africa has 
been guided by limiting its operational response to S. W. A. P. O. 
targets... "204. 
Between 1953-1992, Israel has frequently resorted to the use of 
armed force in response to the activities of armed organisations based in 
most cases on the territory of its neighbouring Arab States. The 
justification offerred by Israel has consistently been the right of self- 
defence. The assertion of this right by Israel has a unique character in that 
Israel has consistently declined to consider the acts of force by armed 
groups in isolation; instead, it has relied on the 'cumulative effect' of 
previous armed activities against it and the certainty that they will recur 
in the immediate future2o5. Moreover, the Israeli Government has also 
considered the activities of armed bands or groups against Israel as part of 
a concerted Arab policy of hostility and 'aggression' against it, and has held 
its neighbouring Arab States directly responsible for the guerrilla use of 
force directed against it. 
Mr. A. Eban, the representative of Israel in the Security Council, 
justified his country's military action in the Sinai on 29 October 1956 as an 
exercise of the right of self-defence aimed at eliminating the bases of the 
202 Doc. S/ 14028, S. C. O. R. 35th yr. Suppl. April-June 1980, pp. 115-6. 
21)3 Doc. S/ 13886, id. 
, 
p. 14. 
204 Doc. S/ 14652, S. C. O. R. 36th yr. Suppi. July-Sept. 1981, pp. 50-2. 
205 See supra Part One 
, 
Ch. 3. 
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fedayeen which, he stated, constituted "... the spearhead of the unilateral 
belligerency imposed by Egypt on Israel... "zog,. 
The operation Peace for Galilee of 4 June 1982 that involved a deep 
incursion of the Israeli armed forces inside the territory of Lebanon and 
culminated in subjecting the capital Beirut to siege, was justified in the 
Security Council in the following terms: 
"... Israel has been the target of on-going aggression for many years..... 
..... 
Israel has regularly informed the Council over the years of the attempted 
atrocities and the actual atrocities perpetrated by the P. L. O. against Israel, Israelis and 
Jews around the world.... 
... 
It becomes... imperative for the Government of Israel to exercise its legitimate 
right of self-defence to protect the lives of its citizens and to ensure their safety.... 
... 
In the normal course of international affairs, a sovereign State assumes the 
responsibility for the actions not only of its Government but also of its subjects and " guests". 
Lebanon's duty to prevent its territory from being used for terrorist attacks against other 
States is based on general international law.... 
... 
The P. L. O. 
, 
the so-called guest of Lebanon...... is acting with its customary 
brazeness in trespassing against the citizens of a neighbouring State, Israel.... 
... 
Israel must hold Lebanon fully responsible for any atrocity committed against it 
when it is conceived and planned in Lebanon irrespective of whether it is carried out from 
Lebanon or from any other territory 
.... 
"207 
Moreover, since the early 1970s the Israeli Government has placed 
ever increasing emphasis on the fact that the Israeli military operations 
are primarily directed against the guerrillas as such rather than against the 
States on whose territories they are based, while in the 1950s and 1960s the 
host States of the guerrillas were attributed responsibility for allowing 
their territories to be used for injurious acts against Israel, that was 
deemed as rendering them the actual authors of the use of force. Mr. Eban 
stated the following with regard to the Qibya raid of 1953: 
"... Jordan's task.... is to submit the State of Israel,....., to guerrilla warfare with 
the object of inflicting copious bloodshed, and demoralising the national life of Israel at its 
most vulnerable points... "208 
The new trend of regarding the guerrillas as such the source and 
authors of force to be repelled is still accompanied by stressing the 
responsibility of the host State or even making general references to 
206 S. C. O. R. 11th yr. 749th mtg. paras 33,38-48,97; G. A. (E. S. 
-I) 562nd plen. mtg. paras 
105,108-9,111,131-4. 
207 The latter was supported by references to G. A. Resolutions 2131(XX) of 21 Dec. 1965 and 
2625 (XXV) of 24 Oct. 1970. S. C. O. R. 37th yr. 2375th mtg. paras 23,24,39,54,55. 
208 S. C. O. R. 8th yr. 637th mtg. para 43. 
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General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX) and General Assembly resolution 
2625 (XXV) thus implying some form of assistance; this, however, appears 
to be necessary in order to justify armed action against the guerrillas on 
the territory of the host States, rather than to elevate the latter to the actual 
author of the use of force2o9. Thus in justifying his country's military 
incursion in Lebanon on 12 May 1970, Mr. Tekoah, the representative of 
Israel in the Security Council, said that the operation was directed solely 
against concentrations of terrorist organisations in S. E. Lebanonzlo: 
Similarly the Israeli bombing of the P. L. O. headquarters in Tunis on 1 
October 1985 was justified as an act of self-defence " against terrorism" and 
it was emphasised that the air strike was directed against the "terrorist 
killers" and not against Tunisia2l i. 
Apart from the justification of self-defence for extra-territorial use 
of force against armed bands, a right of " hot pursuit" of guerrillas has also 
been asserted in certain cases. 
During the Algerian War of Independence the French Government 
justified the incursion of an infantry company inside Tunisia on 1 
September 1957 as an exercise of the right of "hot pursuit"; President 
Burguiba of Tunisia maintained in a broadcast that this "... right of 
pursuit... " had no basis in international law and claimed that it had been 
used as a pretext for attacks against the sovereignty and integrity of 
Tunisia212. The same right of "pursuit on land" was asserted by the 
Rhodesian Government in justification of a raid on a camp inside 
Mozambique on 8 August 1976 213 and of the occupation of Tapai on 30 
May 1977 
. 
During the Security Council debate on the latter incident the 
representative of Lesotho stated: 
"... It is a right of every State to provide refuge to people who flee their country of 
origin because of oppression or persecution on grounds of their colour religion or race. If these 
people are pursued from the country of origin and they enter the territory of the State of 
refuge, or a third State, such pursuit must cease. Even in the law of the sea the principle of 
hot pursuit forbids the pursuing State to continue the pursuit once the pursued enters the 
territorial waters of its own or a third State..... The principle is very inappropriate to and 
cannot be used in respect of pursuit of fugitives on land. A State which pursues its fugitive 
citizens into the territory of another State, for any crime whatsoever, is guilty of violating 
the sovereignty and the territoria' integrity of that State... "214 
209 A similar position seems to exist with regard to S. Africa; see supra p. 39. 210 S. C. O. R. 25th yr. 1537th mtg. para 35. 211 U. N. Chronicle vol. XII nos 10/ 11 Dec. 1985, p. 4. 
212 Keesing's 1957-1958, p. 15886. 
213 Id. 1976, pp. 27945-6. 
214 S. C. O. R. 32nd yr. 2015th mtg. para 40. 
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Finally, on one occasion, the Israeli Government used the so-called 
right of "hot pursuit" as the basis for the justification of the major Israeli 
operation inside Southern Lebanon on 14 March 1978, by specifically 
referring to the Pershing expedition of Mexican armed bands in 191621!;. 
The Israeli military incursion came as a reaction to the sea landing and 
subsequent commandeering of a bus by eleven P. L. O. fighters along the 
Haifa-Tel Aviv motorway on 11 '-larch 1978 that resulted in the death of 
34 Israelis and 1 L. S. citizen21 
. 
The fact that the P. L. O. operation was 
repelled and that it had been sea-borne (it had not been launched across 
the Israeli-Lebanese frontier) would seem to render the invocation of "hot 
pursuit" somewhat superfluous21 
. 
The so-called right of "hot pursuit" in the sense provided under the 
Law of the Sea does not correspond to any defensive necessity beyond 
repelling the armed bands where and when they use force; if this takes 
place on the territory of the victim State expelling the guerrillas therefrom 
it terminates and defensive necessity for further action (cf. infra ). The 
object of "hot pursuit" as a right to resort to unilateral action seem to be 
the bringing of escaping wrongdoers before the jurisdiction of the 
pursuing State21s. It is, therefore, an enforcement measure rather than an 
exercise dictated by defensive necessity. The persistent objection with 
regard to claims of a right of pursuit on land by third States a well a the 
paucity of the invocation of such right in State practice may militate for 
the submission that the so-called right is not part of general international 
lati; ýý 
. 
The analogy with the Law of the Sea is a rather untenable one; hot 
pursuit in this case is only permitted on the high seas which is under the 
jurisdiction of no State, and must cease when the pursued vessel enter 
the territorial sea of another or its own State22o. It is recognised, however, 
that hot pursuit of insurgents by the victim State on the territory of a 
neighbouring State is admissible only by express consent of the latter in 
215 Id. 33rd yr. 2071 stth mtg. para 55. 
I r. Keesing's 1979, p. 29646. 
21, See criticism by the Libyan representative in the Security Council, S. C. O. R. 33rd vr. 
2071st mtg. para 114. 
=18 N. Poulantzas, The Right of Hof Pursuit in International Law, 7909, p. 2. 
'-Iy Authority seems unanimous. See Bowvett op. cit. supta n. 62 pp. 36-41; Bro,. vnlie 
I. C. L. Q. 7-12 (7956) pp. 733-4 and id. op. cit. supra n. 62; Garcia-Mora op. cit. supra n. 14-, 
pp. 120-4; Poulantzas op. Cit. srupril n. 218, p. 15. 
See 
-articles 23(2) of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas; 111(3) of the 1982 
La%-, 
" of the Sea Convention. 
354 
the form of a treaty221. Such consent was mutually given by the 
Governments of Iraq and Turkey in the Agreement of 20 April 1979 on the 
suppression of Kurdish separatism on the borders between the two 
countries222. That the Agreement contemplated the right to exercise hot 
pursuit on land was inferred from the lack of protest on the part of Iraq 
when the Turkish armed forces pursued Kurdish guerrillas 20km inside 
Iraq on 27 May 1983223. It must be made clear, however, that pursuit may 
form part of defensive action, which has been in progress on the territory 
of the victim State. If, for instance, after their expulsion from the territory 
of the victim State the guerrillas immediately regroup and continue their 
offensive from the territory of another State across the frontier, then a 
limited operation may be envisaged in order to silence the specific source 
of force against the army of the victim State involved in the initial 
operation that has started inside the victim State 
- 
not to destroy the 
guerrilla organisation in general. It is submitted that such action seems to 
be a case of defensive necessity subject to the requirement of 
proportionality and not part of a doctrine of hot pursuit on land 24. 
The States that have been accused of offering refuge or material 
assistance to guerrilla organisations, and on whose territory force has been 
used by the victim State of the guerrillas, have, with the possible 
exceptions of Indonesia and Somalia, either denied any involvement in 
supporting the insurgents or justified such support on the basis of the 
right of individual or collective self-defence 
- 
viz. the U. S. justification for 
assisting the contra insurgency in Nicaragua. Denial of complicity or 
connivance, that aims at casting aside any allegations of State 
responsibility in general and of breach of the rule of the prohibition of the 
use of force in particular, constitutes the primary and most frequently 
invoked ground against allegations to the contrary. This rests on the 
assertion that, although the presence of individuals and organisations 
representing political opposition against the Government of another State 
is admitted, their status is that of political " refugees" escaping oppression 
because of the internal policies of the victim State, and that, due to their 
predicament, they are welcome in the territory of the receiving State. At 
the same time it has been emphasised that such policy of granting political 
asylum would be compromised and degenerate into a violation of 
221 Poulantzas op. cit. supra n. 218, pp. 15-16. 
222 Keesing's 1979, p. 29923. 
223 Id. 1983, p. 32585. 
224 Poulantzas op. Cit. supra n. 218 p. 16. 
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international law if they were allowed to pursue armed action against the 
Government from whose oppression they are fleeing225. Moreover, States 
whose territory has become the terrain of the use of force by the victim 
State against the guerrillas have pointed to the inability of the victim State 
to take sufficient measures of security within its territory against the 
guerrillas while asserting for themselves the right to take any "police" 
measures on their territory. Following the French air strike on the town of 
Sakiet, the Tunisian Government argued that it was not "... the asylum 
granted to Algerians who take refuge on Tunisian territory, or the slight 
traffic in arms that the 40,000 French soldiers guarding our frontiers were 
unable to prevent, which is prolonging the Algerian war.. 
. 
"226. After the 
Qibvva raid of 1953, Jordan contended that "... [T]he Israeli Government 
must be brought to recognize the principle that action to stop the 
infiltration of which they complain must be confined entirely to the 
territory occupied by Israel in accordance with general practices and 
international procedure. 
.. 
"226bi 
. 
During the Security Council on the Israeli 
operation in S. Lebanon on 14-15 March 1978, the representative of 
Lebanon asserted the right of his country to be responsible for the 
maintenance of law and order in the territory of Lebanon notwithstanding 
the civil war therein and the exercise of virtually no control in that part of 
the country22i. 
While the acts of infiltration and sabotage constitute a fact, the issue 
of State involvement therein is a matter to be established on the basis of 
evidence. Political support to the armed opposition within a State as well 
as "humanitarian" aid thereto does not constitute involvement in the 
guerrilla activities228. Yet, it has been used by the State-victims of guerrilla 
activities as a sufficient basis to take action against the armed bands on the 
territory of another State. Israel has consistently considered guerrilla 
infiltration from the neighbouring States of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and 
Egypt (prior to the 1979 Peace Treaty) as being part of the hostile policy of 
these States against it. That these States have pursued such a policy cannot 
225 See supra 
. 222t S. C. O. R. 13th y r. 821st mtg. par-a 4. 
226bi, S. C. O. R. 8th yr. 638th mtg. para 75. 
227 Id. 33rd vr. 2071st mtg. para 16(Lebanon), para 81(Jordan). As for the Israeli action, it 
%ý as pointed out that the landing of the P. L. O. fighters that were responsible for 
commandeering the Israeli bus along the Haifa-Tel Aviv motorway was indicative of the 
failure of the Israeli security forces to prevent infiltration in the territory of Israel. Ibid. 
para 114(Libya). 
228 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, pp. 124-5, para 242; id. per judge Schinebel, p. 351, para 180. 
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be denied. What is doubtful though is whether political hostility towards a 
certain State accompanied by political sympathy towards the armed 
opposition against it amounts to a use of force. As it has been seen there 
must exist a link between a State and the guerrillas that has direct bearing 
on the actual use of force by the latter 
- 
viz. the provision of weapons, the 
training of individuals in combat, the provision of logistical support in 
the form of bases, communication facilities, intelligence. Moreover, the 
involvement of the assisting State must amount to either a sending of the 
armed bands or substantial involvement in their activities so as to 
constitute an armed attack giving rise to the right of individual or 
collective self-defence229. While the "sending" of guerrillas is relatively 
not absolutely) easy to identify, the determination of what constitutes 
"substantial involvement" in their activities is rather complex. The Court 
in the Nicaragua Case seems to have considered the issue as one of agency 
and control, as if the guerrillas constitute part of the armed forces of the 
assisting State23o. It is submitted that the Court's Judgment has introduced 
a distinction of a very essential and practical significance. Whatever the 
complicity of a State in the activities of armed bands is, the latter constitute 
the source of the use of force. The degree of complicity, however, finds its 
importance in that it is essential to determine the question of who the 
actual author of the use of force is. In a case of internal insurgency, and 
this is the case with regard to most guerrilla movements so far, the author 
of the use of force against the victim State is the insurgents themselves. By 
contrast, in a situation of sending armed bands to invade the territory of a 
State 
- 
viz. the mercenary attacks against Benin (1977) and the Seychelles 
(1981); the Indonesian-sponsored infiltration of Malaysia (1963-65); the 
sending of armed bands by Somalia into Ogaden in Ethiopia (1977-78) 
- 
the 
author of the use of force is a State, whereas the armed individuals are 
merely an instrument of that State. The question of the precise level of 
State use of force may be envisaged as a wide range of State involvement 
of such acts which is limited by two extremes: first, no State involvement 
at all, and secondly, the "sending" by a State of armed bands or its 
"substantial involvement" therein. Between these two extremes outside 
involvement may vary considerably. Individual forms of involvement, 
namely, training only or arming the guerrillas only, do not render a State 
the author of the use of force amounting to an armed attack. Multifaceted 
229 Id. p. 103, para 195; Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 62, p. 372; id. 7 I. C. L. Q. ; 12 (1958) p. 731. 
230 Id. pp. 61-62, paras 108-9; contra id. per Judge Schwebel pp. 343-344, paras 166-167,170. 
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assistance, however, seeins to blur the dividing litre between a violation of 
Art. 2(4) of the Charter and a violation that amounts to an armed attack. 
Judge Jennings pointed in his dissenting Opinion in the Nicaragua Cace 
... 
It may be readily agreed that the mere provision of arms cannot be said to 
amount to an armed attack. But the provision of arms may be a very important element in 
what might be thought to amount to armed attack where it is coupled with other kinds of 
involvement. Accordingly, it seems to me that to say that the provision of arms, coupled 
with "logistical or other support" is not armed attack is going much too far... 231 
This author feels bound to disagree. Although such support may 
contribute to the guerrillas becoming a formidable armed unit, it by no 
means implies that the assisting State has become the actual author of the 
activities against the victim State. Thus, the assistance provided by the 
U. S. 
-\. to the contra guerrillas in Nicaragua and the inujliahedin 
guerrillas in Afghanistan may have created a formidable source of force 
against the Governments of these State-, but it did not create these 
movements (both have been indigenous) and it is a matter of evidence to 
determine whether such assistance was coupled by subjecting the 
guerrillas to a quasi command subordination hierarchy of the U. S. 
Government232. In the case of the Afghan guerrillas withdrawal of the 
assistance did not imply withdrawal of the guerrilla force itself. Indeed, 
this would have been the case if the guerrillas were fully subjected to U. S. 
command and constituted part of the strategic deployment of U. S. forces. It 
is submitted that the question of whether a guerrilla movement is 
completely subjugated to the command of the assisting State is a matter of 
evidence, which a the t'icara ua Cate suggests, must not be 
circumstantial, and it should not be deduced simply on the basis of the 
existence of material support233. It is a flawed argument to maintain that, 
for instance, the F. L. N. has been an agent of Tunisia, S. XV. A. P. O. under the 
command of Angola, the P. L. O. an agent of all the Arab States, the 
Salvadorean guerrillas an agent of Nicaragua and the E. P. L. F. subordinate 
to the Kuwaiti Government. In fact, far from being so, certain guerrilla 
organisations seem to have been quite politically influential in the States 
n1 here they were based234. 
2311 Id. per Judge kennings, p. 543; approvingly, Gill, 7 Hague Y. I. L. 30 (7,988) pp. 51-2. 
'3ý With regard to the Nicaraguan contras, see ld. pp. 61-62, paras 108-9. 
233 Supra n. 232; cf. The Corfu Channel Case I. C. J. Rep. 1949, p. 18. 
234 Supra notes 168,169. Indeed, with respect to the so-called national liberation 
movements, the political case of these organisations seems to be reinforced and their broad 
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Uses of force against guerrillas on the territory of another State has 
on many occasions been considered as directed against it rather than 
against the guerrillas. It appears that the way and the circumstances of the 
uses of force by the victim State on the territory of other States involved 
excessive force and it affected the host State as such 
- 
although its precise 
complicity was not proved beyond any doubt 
- 
and in some cases it was 
solely and exclusively directed against the host State itself 
- 
e. g. the 
destruction of the Ghor Cannal ( used for irrigation purposes ) by Israeli 
commandos in Jordan on 23 June 1969235. Any operation on the territory 
of the host State that involves land forces is bound to be strikingly 
disproportionate if the number of the troops involved is considerably high 
and the operation has the character of a general "sweeping" action rather 
than the limited objective of silencing a specific source of force situated 
across the frontier which is in progress there and then. Such operations 
unavoidably interfere with the life of the citizens of the State, they inflict, 
by their nature large-scale destruction of human life and property, and it is 
very doubtful that they will be successful in completely destroying the 
guerrillas. Military operations like the joint S. Viet- Namese-U. S. 
incursion in Cambodia (1970), the S. African operations Protea (1981), 
Daisy (1981) and Askari(1983), and the Israeli operation Peace for Galilee 
(1982) were utterly unnecessary and disproportionate in view of the 
guerrilla uses of force preceding them, inflicted immeasurable damage to 
the States of Cambodia, Angola and Lebanon, and apart from causing a 
brief interruption of guerrilla activities, they failed to conclusively and 
permanently dispense with the guerrilla activities as a whole. 
Furthermore, host States of the guerrillas that have openly exposed 
political support for their cause have in some cases become themselves 
the targets of the use of force by the beleaguered State, notwithstanding the 
fact that they have not been the authors of the use of force and that the 
action has been directed against targets totally unrelated to the guerrillas. 
Such action appears to aim at intimidating or punishing the host State 
itself. The destruction of the Ghor Cannal by Israeli commandos in Jordan 
in 1969, the Beirut raid by Israeli commandos in 1968, the Portuguese 
mercenary attack against Guinea in 1971, the Rhodesian attack on the fuel 
depots in Beira in Mozambique (1979), and the S. African raid on the 
policies of the victim State that amount to violations of the right of self-determination of 
peoples under colonial or alien domination. 
235 Keesing's 1969-1970, p. 23667. 
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Angolan Oil Installations in Cabinda, 2,000 miles from the area where 
S. \V. A. I'. O. operated, are illustrations of such practice and constitute cases 
of armed reprisals that are unlawful under present international law. 
In all cases the action by the guerrillas is directed against either the 
incumbent Government (guerrilla movements aiming at overthrowing 
the Government of a State) or the territorial integrity of a State 
- 
viz. 
secessionist movements like the Eritrean E. P. L. F. 
- 
or against the 
administration of a territory by another State (self-determination 
movements). With the exception of the latter23b, in the absence of State 
connivance that generally amounts to a use of force or 
, 
in particular, to an 
armed attack, guerrilla action is a matter which would be prima facie 
considered as an internal issue of the victim State237. Moreover, and this 
includes every kind of guerrilla organisations, if the insurgency is simply 
the product of the internal administration and policies of a Government 
as well as the aspirations of the political opposition to the Government 
, 
rather than the policy of another State, then there is no violation of Art. 
2(4) of the Charter-13, s. The latter occurs only if another State provides the 
guerrillas with material assistance that has a direct bearing on the actual 
use of force by the insurgents. Still, notwithstanding such eventuality, the 
outbreak of armed insurgency has in most cases been totally bey=ond the 
activities of the assisting State. It is submitted, that it is only in the case of 
an unarmed opposition-in-exile and no hitherto use of armed force on the 
territory of the victim State, where the provision of military organisation, 
training, arm-, and logistical support for the purpose of starting guerrilla 
warfare amount-, to an armed attack by the assisting Staten 3U. 
Though assistance to armed bands, that constitute. a case of 
unlawful use of force and that may not amount to an armed attack, 
suggests that defensive force is not to be resorted to against the assisting 
State as such for it is not the actual author of the use of force, the use of 
force by the guerrillas against the victim State represents a grim reality. 
There has been a tendency., in the practice of States to consider action by 
guerrillas as deplorable in its own right24o. Victim States that have used 
force on the territory of another State have escaped condemnation by the 
Security Council on the basis of lack of parallel condemnation of the 
='h See supra Part One 
, 
Ch. 6. 
`'3' Falk, /5 Yule L. I. 1122 (1966) p. 1125. 
2218 Bowett loc. cit. in Moore op. cit. Supra n. 62, p. 39. 
'-39 Supºa 
240 Supra n. 114. 
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activities of the armed bands. The United States has on certain occasions 
prevented the adoption of draft resolutions'by casting a negative vote, 
condemning S. Africa24l or Israel242 because it considered the 
condemnation solely of the State resorting to force as "unbalanced". At the 
same time, however, forcible action taken by victim States on the territory 
of host/assisting States was either condemned or deplored. That a victim 
State of guerrilla activities is entitled to protect its territorial integrity or 
political independence against use of force by armed bands, and that such 
action is defensive in character, is not denied243. The controversy lies with 
regard to, first, the target of the defensive action, and secondly the locus of 
this action. It is submitted that as long as forcible counter-measures must 
be directed against the source of the use of force that needs to be repelled, 
they must be directed solely against the insurgents244. As for the locality of 
resort to forcible counter-measures, it is submitted that two lines of 
conduct are open to the victim State: First, to confine the use of force to its 
territory either individually or jointly with its allies, or secondly to use 
force extraterritoriality on the territory of the host/ assisting State 
individually. The latter possibility is the most controversial one. It is 
submitted that force on the territory of another State is as a rule 
inadmissible if no involvement of the latter is established, or no consent 
for such action is given. The joint S. Viet- Namese 
- 
U. S. action in 
Cambodia (1970) and the individual S. Viet- Namese action in Laos (1971) 
were met with strong protests by the Cambodian and Laotian 
Governments as constituting violations of the territorial integrity of their 
countries for no prior consent had been given for such action245. 
Extra-territorial use of force against guerrillas, that are themselves 
the authors of force and at the same time receive material assistance from 
another State, has been asserted exclusively against guerrillas that are 
based on the territory of another State, which incidentally may not be the 
one that provides the bulk of the assistance to the insurgents 
- 
viz. 
Honduras in relation to the activities of the contra movement. It is 
submitted that military action depends on the necessity to counter every 
and each one specific use of armed force by the guerrillas at a specific 
241 S. C. O. R. 36th yr. 2300th mtg. para 48 (Operation Protea ) 242 Id. 37th yr. 2377th mtg. para 27 (Operation Peace for Galilee ) 
243 Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 62, pp. 374-5; Falk, 76 Yale L. J. 1095 (19617), p. 1140; Farer, 81 
. 
4, /IL. 112 (1987), p. 113. 
244 N. D. White, ix Int. Rel. 535 (1989), p. 543. 
245 Keesing's 1969-1970, p. 24132; id. 1971-1972, p. 24622 
361 
location and specific time of occurrence246. Guerrillas constitute an 
individual source of armed force when and wherefrom they resort to 
armed force. It must be a flawed assumption to consider the mere 
existence of a guerrilla organisation as a danger to the entirety of the 
existence of the victim State as a matter of the prohibition of the threat or 
use of force, that becomes established on the basis of the insurgents being 
assisted from abroad. Even in this case Governments are extremely 
privileged in that they have unlimited access to capital arms and 
intelligence resources that enables them to acquire an a priori superior 
position over armed bands and maintain their position in the State247. 
The Ethiopian Government was faced with no less than three guerrilla 
movements 
- 
E. P. L. F. 
, 
E. R. P. D. F. 
, 
O. P. L. F. 
- 
for 30 years but this had not 
affected its international position as the Government of the State. The 
Government of Afghanistan has survived a large-scale guerrilla action. 
Sudan, Burma, Sri Lanka and Mozambique have endemic guerrilla 
movements that have not impaired their existence as sovereign States. It 
is a gross over-estimation that the existence of a guerrilla movement will 
mathematically lead to the destruction of the State as a whole. 
Furthermore, a subsequent invocation on the above grounds, of the right 
of individual self-defence against an armed attack, beyond the frontiers of 
the victim State, may trigger off claims of collective self-defence by both 
the victim and the assisting States to their allies with a danger of a major 
conflict24s. It is submitted that on the basis of overwhelming State practice 
and persistent opposition to claims of extra-territorial use of force, the use 
of force against armed bands as the only source and author of armed force 
should be confined within the territory of the victim State because it is 
there where guerrilla action occurs and it is, therefore, there that it should 
be repelled249. 
On several occasions armed bands are permanently based on the 
territory of a neighbouring State or simply withdraw therein under 
military pressure by the forces of the victim State. Still, it is where the 
actual use of guerrilla force takes place that must condition the response of 
the latter. It is submitted that on three occasions force is, by way of 
exception, to be used on the territory of another State: 
246 Falk loc. cit. supra n. 243. 
247 Farer loc. cit. supra n. 243, p. 114. 
248 Falk, 75 Yale L. J. 1122 (1966), p. 1136; Farer supra n. 247. 
249 Brownlie, 7 I. C. L. Q. 712 (1958), p. 730 and id, op. cit. supra n. 62, p. 373; Gill, 1 Hague 
Y. 1. L. 30 (1988), p. 41. 
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First, when the exercise of armed force by the armed bands occurs from the 
territory of another State. On 8 April 1969, P. L. O. fighters launched a rocket 
attack on the Israeli port of Eilat from the Jordanian town of Aqaba; the 
Israeli dir Force attacked and destroyed the rocket launchers. King 
Hussein of Jordan dissociated his Government from the attack and 
announced that the perpetrators had been arrested by the Jordanian 
police25o. 
Secondly, the case of attacks perpetrated from operational bases on the 
territory of another State. Such bases may be attacked if they constitute 
strictly military encampments used as the final launching ground for 
operations against the victim State. Again the use of force should be 
confined to the source of a specific instance of force by the guerrillas. The 
clandestine nature of the guerrilla operations may excuse the lapse of a 
certain period of time in order to spot the base and mount the operation. 
Such action should be exercised only if the territorial State is according to 
compelling evidence highly involved in the guerrilla activities by way of 
assistance that amounts to a use of force. At the same time, the aim of the 
insurgency may be also relevant. It is submitted that if the guerrilla action 
is directed towards impairing the territorial integrity of the victim State 
- 
viz. a secessionist movement 
-, 
the destruction of the security or economic 
infrastructure of the State, or the overthrow of the Government of the 
State without the guerrillas having a broad popular basis as a political 
opposition to the latter-251. On 8: March 1988 the Nicaraguan Army took 
action against contra bases on Honduran territory. Such action may have 
been justifiable due to the aim of the contras at overthrowing the 
Sandinista Government252 
, 
the existence of contra military 
encampments in Honduras and the insurgents narrow popular basis as an 
Opposition to the Nicaraguan Government253. The same action must be 
admitted in the case where the guerrilla bases are situated in an area of the 
250 Keesing's 1969-1970, p. 23327. 
251 The opposite situation, which represents the political locus staºidi of all self- 
determination movements may be of significance with regard to the attitude of third States 
towards extra-territorial uses of force by the victim State_ See, Farer, 67 Col. L. R. 266 
(1967), p. 277 and id. loc. cit. supra n. 243, p. 115; cf. Schachter, 11 Hoils. J. 1. L. 309 (1989), p. 
314. 
252 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 124, para 241. 253 However, Honduras had persistently denied the presence of contra bases on its 
territory, considered the Nicaraguan operation as a violation of its territorial integrity 
and invited U. S. military assistance. The latter dispatched 3,200 troops, and this seems to 
have prompted the Nicaraguan Government, first to call off the operation and then to deny 
that Nicaraguan troops entered Honduras. Keesing's 1988, p. 35950. 
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host State which the guerrilla organisation has under its effective control 
because of the inability of the former to exercise any Government 
authority in the area, not due to the fact that the clandestine nature of the 
guerrilla activities has superseded the measures taken or because of the 
geography of the region, but due to circumstances that have the position of 
force majeure such as a state of civil war. This is the position of the 
Palestinian guerrilla camps in Southern Lebanon; the Israeli Air Force has 
often resorted to air strikes against their bases therein. Such selective 
action against precise Palestinian bases has so far gone without any 
protest; by contrast major land operations by Israel that involved 
invasion and occupation of Lebanese territory have attracted immense 
international reaction2 4. 
'Thirdly, extra-territorial use of force against guerrilla-, forms part of the 
controversial issue of the protection of nationals abroad. In cases of 
highjacking of aircraft by armed groups and the holding of the nationals of 
a particular State as hostage in return for certain act-, or omissions on the 
part of the the State, it is the latter that it is the target of the activities of the 
armed groups through its nationals. Resort to forcible counter-measures 
can be therefore envisaged 
- 
viz. the Israeli operation at Entebe (1976)255. 
This, however, is a rather tenuous submission255a 
. 
Coiicli: iuH. 
It is submitted that the distinction between self-defence against an 
armed attack and proportionate counter-measures against a use of force 
that does not amount to an armed attack is not so much a distinction of 
kind, as it is a distinction of two different types of necessity that Nvarrant 
defensive action without jeöpardising international peace and security. 
This is implicit in the wording of Art. 51 of the Charter by virtue of which 
the exercise of the right of self-defence must cease when the Security 
Council takes measures' against the aggressor. To invoke a necessity to 
protect the State as a whole with regard to any use of force, whether by 
regular armed forces or guerrillas, as if every use of force imputable to a 
State constitutes a case of an armed attack, may lead to extensive use of 
force that could escalate in a large-scale conflict, notwithstanding the 
254 Supra n. 227. 
255 Schachter, 11 Hors. I. L. I. 309 (1989), pp. 311-312. 
255a See infra Part Three 
, 
Ch. 11, First Title. 
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laudable cause for resorting to force in defence of one's State. The great 
and most likely risk for such an escalation lies in the invocation of the 
right of collective self-defence. State practice shows that the requirement of 
proportionality, equally important as that of necessity, can be very easily 
adapted to the latter. It was the same necessity that had been invoked in 
1965 by the U. S. A. for the collective self-defence of S. Viet- Nam in its 
entirety as a political and territorial unit that led to the escalation of the 
conflict with the Cambodian operation of 1970. The consideration of the 
existence and activities of the P. L. O. and S. W. A. P. O. as a menace to their 
existence as a whole seems to have over-shadowed the specific uses of 
force by the above organisations and has led to large-scale military 
incursions by Israel and S. Africa inside the neighbouring States of 
Lebanon and Angola that resulted in great loss of life and property. It has 
even prompted long-distance operations like the 1985 Israeli air strike on 
the P. L. O. headquarters in Tunis although no guerrilla operations were 
being mounted from Tunisia. Indeed the invention of the so-called 
"accumulation of events" argument seems to imply that its adherents 
recognise that it is only the necessity to repel a specific use of force when 
and where it occurs that offers a credible justification for the use of force, 
and that its purpose is to accommodate individual and quite arbitrary 
views of certain Governments with regard to the overall security of the 
State25h. 
That even such justifications have proved ineffective in order to crush the 
activities of armed bands have prompted certain States, under the 
invocation. of the same necessity, to establish military occupations and 
thus outrightly impair the territorial integrity of other States 
- 
viz. the so- 
called "security zones" established by S. Africa in southern Angola from 
1982-1988, and by Israel in southern Lebanon from 1983-the present day. To 
present a use of force that is directed against the territory of a State and is 
inherently associated with the internal policies of the latter, as a force 
aiming at the destruction of the State as a whole, and upon this basis to 
unleash defensive force to protect the entirety of the State may in certain 
circumstances 
-. 
for example, when guerrillas receive material assistance 
from another State 
- 
acquire a large degree of plausibility. In this case it is a 
matter of evidence as to the precise level of another State's involvement 
that an extra-territorial use of force should be deemed admissible or not. 
25a Contra : Blum loc. cit. in Netanyahu op. cit. supra n. 147, p. 136; Schachter loc. cit. 
supra n. 255, p. 313. 
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The fact, however, that other States are pronounced as accomplices of the 
guerrillas on very little evidence or general assumption based on the 
physical existence of the armed bands on the territory of the alleged 
assisting State; or on its political affiliation with the cause of the guerrilla 
action, and that force is used indiscriminately against them and the 
guerrillas, without any attempt at identifying the actual source and author 
of force, has led to very dangerous situations for international peace and 
security. The frequent uses of force by Portugal against the African States 
bordering on her colonies in Africa have provoked a very interesting 
statement that summarises the whole issue. During the debate in the 
Security Council on the Portuguese shelling of two Guinean villages on 2 
December 1969, the representative of Madagascar stated: 
"... What assurances have we of peace and security so long as by their very nature 
Portugal's operations against the liberation movements go beyond the the bounds within 
which they should be confined ?... " 257 
257 S. C. O. R. 24th yr. 1523rd mtg. of 17 Dec. 1969, para 31. 
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CHAPTER 10 
THE RIGHT OF COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENCE. 
1. Definition 
. 
The term collective self-defence connotes the situation where a State 
which is not itself the victim of an armed attack resorts to force in defence 
of another State that has been the victim of an armed attack, and has 
requested the assisting State's military assistance for its defences. 
2. Collective Self-Defence and Collective Security 
. 
Collective self-defence must be distinguished from collective 
security which envisages armed action that is directed at the maintenance 
or restoration of international peace and security. In contemporary 
international law such action, that has the character of enforcement action 
on behalf of the international community, fulfils a general interest shared 
by all States and has been entrusted to the United Nations Organisation, 
and more specifically to the Security Council thereof, which has primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and 
to the General Assembly by virtue of the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution'-. 
The unilateral use of armed force in order to vindicate 
international law and maintain international peace and security is 
inadmissible in contemporary international law. On 29 October 1956 the 
Israel armed forces launched a large-scale offensive in the Sinai peninsula 
' See infra notes 35-38 
, 
Addendum to the Eighth Report on State Responsibility 
, 
by 
Special Rapporteur Ago, Doc. A/CN. 4/318/ADD. 5-7, I. L. C. Ybk. 1980, Volume 11, Part 
One, p. 13 at p. 68, para 118; Dinstein, War,, Aggression and Self-Defence, 1988, p. 232. 
Contra, Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict, 1954, p. 245: " 
... 
Thus under general 
international law, a State has no right of "self-defence" in respect of an armed attack upon 
a third State. The very notion of collective self-defence seems contradictory, except as 
resorted to by two or more victims simultaneously attacked by the same Power... " 
2 Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law, 1958, pp. 203-205,223,239-244; id. The 
Interrelation of Theories of Intervention and Self-Defence, in J. N. Moore (ed. ), Law and 
Civil War in the Modern World, 1974, p. 47; Stone op. cit. supra n. 1, p. 264; Kelsen, 
Collective Security and Collective Self-Defence under the Charter of the United Nations, 
42 A. J. I. L. 783 (1948), pp. 794-796; id. Recent Trends in the Law of the United Nations, 1951, 
p. 922. 
Cf 
. 
McDougal & Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order, 1961, p. 246; Dinstein 
op. cit. snhra n. 1, p. 234. 
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across the 1949 Egypt-Israel Armistice Line, and in the early stages of the 
campaign they advanced in the vicinity of the Suez Canal. On 30 October 
1956 the Governments of the U. K. and France communicated a joint 
ultimatum to both Israel and Egypt demanding the cessation of hostilities, 
the withdrawal of the forces of both belligerents from the area of the Suez 
Canal, and the acceptance of temporary occupation of certain key positions 
of the Canal area on Egyptian territory by U. K. and French forces; it was 
also stated in the ultimatum that "... failing an answer by 6.30 am, Cairo 
time, on 31 October 1956, the Governments of the U. K. and France would 
intervene in whatever strength they might deem necessary to secure 
compliance 
... 
"3. According to the representative of the U. K. in the Security 
Council the objectives of the Anglo-French action were purported to be 
the stopping of the fighting and the safeguarding of the free passage of 
shipping through the Suez Canal; Sir Pierson Dixon concluded that: 
"... I trust that the great majority of the members of the Council will agree that the 
action which the French Government and H. M. Government have taken is in the general 
interest and in the interest of security and peace... "4 
Opposition to such claim has been unanimous. Mr. Lodge, the 
representative of the U. S. A. 
, 
introducing a draft resolution calling for 
Israel withdrawal behind the 1949 Armistice lines stated: 
We believe that if the draft resolution is adopted and promptly carried out 
... 
the reason for the twelve-hour United Kingdom and French ultimatum as well as its basis, 
will have disappeared. In saying this d wish to make clear that we do not imply that in 
any circumstances this ultimatum would be justifiable or be found to be consistent with the 
purposes and principles of the Charter... - 5 
Moreover, the representative of Yugoslavia stated that: 
"... While the Security Council, the organ of the United Nations which bears 
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, is 
considering the action to be taken in the face of Israel aggression against Egypt, two Member 
States of the United Nations have apparently decided to embark upon what can be 
described as the unilateral application of force. They have done so clearly without any 
kind of authorisation from the United Nations 
... 
"6 
3 Letter dated 30 October 1956 from the representative of Egypt to the President of the 
Security Council, Doc. S/ 3712, S. C. O. R. 11th yr. Suppl. for Oct. 
-Dec. 1956, p. 111. t S. C. O. R. 11th yr. 749th mtg, para 11. See infra Part 3, Ch. 11, First Title. S S. C. O. R. 11th yr. 749th mtg, para 22. 
6 Ibid. para 25; see also ibid. para 118 (Peru). G. A. O. R. (ES-1), Plennary Meetings and 
Annexes, 561st plen. mtg Para 150 (U. S. A. ), 562nd plen. mtg para 31 (Colombia), 563rd plen. 
mtg para 254 (EI Salvador). 
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Collective self-defence is also not a substitute for collective security. 
It has been suggested that in the face of the paralysis of the Security 
Council due to super-power political antagonism, the only Option left to 
States in order to protect themselves was to conclude collective defence 
arrangements based on Article 51 of the Charter. The rationale behind this 
argument is that by admitting the only legitimate Situation of unilateral 
resort to force without prior authorisation by the Security Council, one 
dispenses with the danger of a State being left unprotected in the event of 
a Permanent Member blocking a decision of the Council by casting a 
negative vote' 
While this viert= may be cited to explain the political consideration. -, 
that prompted States to contemplate the creation of and participation in 
collective self-defence arrangements ( like, for instance, N. A. T. O. 
, 
the 
Warsaw Pact, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance ), the 
inference that such practice aims at establishing peripheral security 
arrangements as a matter of law divests the concept of collective self- 
defence of its true meaning which is none other than that of individual 
self-defence, namely, protective armed action in the event of a necessity 
giving rise to it and which is exercised by proportionate means8 
. 
It is submitted that the emergence of collective self-defence 
groupings reveals simply the very pragmatic realisation that an individual 
State may protect itself more effectively against an armed attack if it is 
assisted by another or more States, than if it acts on its own. 
Furthermore, where concerted enforcement action for the 
restoration of international peace and security is undertaken by a group of 
States acting under prior authorisation for such action by the United 
Nations, it does not constitute collective self-defence9 
. 
Whether military 
operation-, are pursued under an a priori agreed unified 
7 Kunz, Individual and Collective Self-Defence in Article 51 of the Charter of the United 
Nations, 41 A. I. I. L. 872 (1947), p. 874; Fenwick, The Atlantic Pact, 43 A. I. I. L. 312 (1949), p. 
315, Dinstein, National and Collective Self-Defence, in Bassiouni-Nanda (eds. ), 
A Try 1i, e on International Criminal Lam, angl. i, Crimes and Punishment, 1973, p. 284; 
Rifaat, t nter"na oaaal Aggression, pp. 192-193; Schachter, The Right of States to Use 
Armed Force, 82 Mich. L. K. 1620 (1984), p. 1639; E. Jimenez de Arechaga, International Law 
in the Past Third of a Century, 759 H. R. C. 9 (7978 1), p. 126. 
8 Bowett op. cit. supra n. 2, pp. 237-244. It must be pointed that such regional collective 
security arrangements are admissible under Chapter V111 of the U. N. Charter. 1-However, 
insofar as they purport to undertake military enforcement action within the region they 
operate, it is, unlike Art. :; 1, only after prior authorisation by the Security Council that 
they can embark upon such action. 
T. Franck & F. Patel, U. N. Police Action in Lieu of War: "The Old Order Changeth", 85 
1. j. l. L. 63 (1991) 
. 
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central command bearing the insignia of the United Nationsl0 or simply 
being allocated to one of the participating States11 
, 
it does not alter the aim 
of the military action, namely, the restoration of international peace and 
security by virtue of prior endorsement by the Security Council that has 
primary responsibility to this effect12 
. 
Such action constitutes enforcement 
action and its prior sanctioning by the Security Council appears to remove 
from it the nuance of unilateral resort to force and harmonise it with the 
competence of the United Nations as the sole author of enforcement 
measures against aggression13. The practice of the Organisation appears to 
support this contingency. Apart from the measures for the maintenance of 
international peace and security that the Security Council delegated to 
individual Members in Korea and the Gulf conflict, it authorised by virtue 
of S. C. Res. 221 (1966) of 9 April 1966 the U. K. Royal Navy to " 
... 
prevent, 
by the use of force if necessary,... " the shipment of oil to Rhodesia via the 
port of Beira on the Mozambique coast. Statements by individual 
Governments generally reveal no opposition and in some cases appear to 
be concurring. During the Security Council debate on the Suez crisis the 
representative of Peru stated that: 
" 
... 
the Council's functions with regard to peace cannot be evaded, and can be 
delegated only on its explicit instructions except in the case of self-defence... "14 
10 Viz. action in Korea by virtue of S. C. Resolutions 83 (1950) of 27 June 1950 and 84 (1950) of 
7 July 1950. 
>> Viz. action against Iraq in Kuwait by virtue of S. C. Res. 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990. 
Also see Greenwood, New World Order or Old? The Invasion of Kuwait and the Rule of 
Law, 55 Modern L. R. 153 (1992), pp. 165-171. 
12 S. C. Res. 83 (1950) of 27 June 1950 appears to have been adopted under Art. 39 of the U. N. 
Charter as the ad hoc term of reference for the measures authorised by the Council. S. C. 
Res. 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990 makes a general reference to Chapter VII of the 
Charter; it is however presumed that the same provision of Art. 39 constitutes the basis for 
the action undertaken against Iraq. See N. D. White, The Invasion of Kuwait in D. J. Harris, 
Cases and Materials on International Law, 4th ed., 1991, Appendix IV, p. 1015; N. D. White 
& H. McCoubrev, International Law and the Use of Force in the Gulf, x Int. Rel. 347 (1991), 
350,355. Cf. Greenwood,. 55 Modern L. R. 153 (1992), pp. 167-169. 11 
Contra 
, 
Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 A. J. I. L. 452 (1991), pp. 
459-460, but. cf. pp. 461-463; Rostow, Until What ? Enforcement Action or Collective Self- 
Defence, 85 A. J. I. L. 506 (1991) 
. 
The issue appears to be closely connected with the question 
of whether the Council has taken measures for the maintenance of of international peace 
and security whereupon action in self-defence should cease. See supra Chapter 9, First 
Title. 
14 S. C. O. R. 11th yr. 749th mtg pars 118. Cf 
. 
S/ PV. 2963 of 29 November 1990, statement by 
the representative of Iraq in which it was asserted that the Council could authorise 
military measures only under Articles 42 and 43 of the Charter, Lauterpacht and others 
(eds. ), The Kuwait Crisis: Basic Documents, 1991, p. 161. 
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3. The "Inherent" Right of Collective Self-Defence 
. 
Article 51 of the Charter expressly refers to collective self-defence as 
an "inherent" right. This implies that, like the individual exercise of the 
right, collective self-defence is acknowledged as part of customary 
international law. 
The Court in the Nicaragua Case held that the wording of Article 51 
"... testifies to the existence of the right of collective self-defence 'in' 
customary international law 
... 
"15 
. 
In his dissenting opinion Judge Oda is 
critical of the Court for not analysing more extensively precedent 
justifying the existence of collective self-defence in customary lawv16. 
State practice in the period prior to the adoption of the United 
Nations Charter appears to admit the right of collective self-defence in the 
context of mutual assistance and defensive alliance treaties; indeed, the 
Act of Chapultepec of 1945 that certain authorities consider as the sole 
reason for the inclusion of Art. 51 in the text of the Charter, constitutes 
part of this practice17 
. 
The practice of States in the aftermath of the 
conclusion of the Charter reveals that Article 51 has served as the basis for 
the conclusion of multilateral collective self-defence treaties18 while the 
practice of concluding bilateral defensive treaties has continued19. It is 
submitted that the above practice has further contributed to the existence 
of the right of collective self-defence in customary law20. 
At the same time conventional practice in the form of collective 
defence treaties has led to a suggestion that under such instruments 
collective defence constitutes not only a right but an obligation as well2l 
15 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, at p. 102, para 193; cf. ibid. per Judge Schwebel 
, 
p. 362, para 200. 
Contra, Stone op. cit. supra n. 1. ýh I. C. J. Rep. 1986 per Judge Oda pp. 253-258, paras 90-97; Higgins, 37 B. Y. I. L. 269 (1961), 
p 307. 
Kunz, 41 A. J. 1. L. 872 (1947), p. 874; Oppenheim, International Laug, vol. i, 8th ed. by 
Lauterpacht, 1955, p. 959 et seq. ; Wright, United States Intervention in Lebanon, 53 A. J. I. L. 
112 (1959), p. 118; cf. Dinstein op. cit. supra n. 1, pp. 235-236. 18 The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Rio de Janeiro 1947,21 U. N. T. S. 77; 
The North Atlantic Treaty, 1949,34 U. N. T. S. 243; Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation 
and Mutual Assistance (The Warsaw Pact), 1955 
, 
219 U. N. T. S. 3. 
19 Treaty of Dunk-Irk- (France-U. K), 1947,9 U. N. T. S. 187; Panama Canal Treaty (U. S. A. 
- 
Panama), 7 September 1977,16 I. L. M. 1022 (1977), Art. IV; U. S. S. R. 
- 
Socialist Republic of 
Viet- \i, W, Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, 3 November 1978,17 I. L. M. 1485 (1978), 
Art. 6; Afghanistan 
- 
U. S. S. R. Treaty of Friendship, Goodneighbourliness and Cooperation, 
5 December 1978 
, 
19 I. L. M. 1 (1980), Art. 4(1); U. S. S. R. 
- 
People's Democratic Republic of 
Yemen, Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, 25 October 1979 
, 
19 I. L. M. 644 (1980), Art. 5. 
20 Dinstein op. cit. supra n. 1, p. 235. 
21 I. C. J. Rep. 1986 per Judge Schwebet, p. 359, para 196; Kunz, 41 A. J. 1. L. 872 (1947), p. 875; 
Dinstein op. cit. supra n. 1, pp. 169,239 et seq. 
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The matter is closely connected with the question of who has the right of 
collective self-defence which is to be considered at length presently. For 
the moment it is sufficient to point that by virtue of the terms of these 
multilateral or bilateral collective defence treaties, the obligation to resort 
to force to assist the other party always presupposes that the latter has been 
the victim of an "armed attack" ( see infra ). Thus the obligation of 
assistance is conditional upon a claim of individual self-defence which, 
with regard to its merits and admissibility in law, is not regulated by the 
collective defence treaty but, rather, by customary law22. Therefore, it is 
appropriate to say that the obligation to render assistance to the victim of 
an armed attack is nothing less than " 
... 
the duty 
... 
of each party 
... 
to reach 
its decision fairly and justly in the light of the facts of the situation and of 
the obligation to give assistance 
... 
"23 
. 
In other words every party to a 
collective defence treaty has the duty to render assistance only after prior 
determination of whether the conditions for the exercise of individual 
self-defence of the victim of aggression are present. Hence, assistance may 
be withheld if the requirement of necessity of self-defence is absent, or it 
may not amount to the use of armed force 
- 
e. g. the dispatch by the U. S. A. 
of Patriot anti-missile batteries to Israel when the latter came under long- 
range missile attack by Iraq on 17 January 1991. Indeed, collective self- 
defence treaties include wording with respect to assistance rendered 
individually or collectively to the attacked State like "such action as it 
deems necessary" ( Art. 5, North Atlantic Treaty ), or "each one of the 
parties may determine the immediate measures which it may 
individually take" ( Art. 3(2), Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal 
Assistance ), or "such means as it deems necessary" ( Art. 4, Warsaw Pact ); 
such phraseology has been pointed at as evidence in that respect24. 
It is submitted that if the carrying out of an obligation incurred by 
way of a treaty to assist the victim of an armed attack allows discretion on 
the part of the obligee to determine whether certain conditions have been 
fulfilled, then there is hardly any automatic duty to act. Instead, it appears 
to be the case that the propriety of assistance is in any case to be judged to a 
considerable extent by the assisting State, and this is a contingency that 
22 Bowett, op. ©t_ supra n. 2, p. 238. 
23 Sit Eric Beckett, The North Atlantic Treaty, The Brussels Treaty and the Charter of the 
United Nations, 1950, pp. 28-29; Goodhart, The North Atlantic Treaty of 1949,79 H. R. C. 
18; (1951 11), p. 223; Fenwick, 43 A. J. I. L. 312 (1949), 314. 
24 Bowett op. cit. supra n. 2, pp. 231-232; Sir Eric Beckett op. cit. supra n. 23; according to 
the latter this discretion exists whether such clauses are included or not in a defensive 
treaty. Also see Dinstein op. cit. supra n. 1, pp. 236-238. 
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partakes in the first instance the character of a right rather than a duty. 
Still, however, discussion must go further. 'To say that assistance to an 
attacked State must be given by the automatic operation of a treaty 
obligation without any consideration of whether the facts of a specific 
situation warrant a necessity of, first, individual self-defence by the State to 
be assisted, entails the danger that armed action may be resorted to purely 
on the individual assessment on the part of either the victim or the 
assisting State. In both cases a grave breach of peace may occur on merely 
subjective consideration. 
lt is submitted that a treaty of collective self-defence introduces an 
undertaking given in advance to exercise one's own right to use force for 
the assistance of another State. The requirements for this are a matter of 
customary law which remain unaffected by the treaty. It is only after the 
said requirements are satisfied on the basis of the facts of a given situation 
that any invocation of a treat, - obligation can be made. 
This contingency creates, iss this writer's view, the need for a certain 
minimum of objective criteria in claims of resort to force in collective self- 
defence, and central to this consideration is the determination of who is 
the subject of the right of collective self-defence. 
4. The Sul et of the Right of Collecti->e Self-Defence 
The writings of eminent authorities reveal that discussion of 
collective self-defence has focused exclusively on the assisting State; 
indeed it is the legal basis for the latter's action that appears to constitute 
the centre of juridical attention and the requirements for the exercise of 
collective defence are drawn on this basis. 
Oppenheim views collective self-defence as the resort to force by a 
Member of the United Nations, 
" 
... 
not only when it is itself the object of armed attack, but also when such attack is 
directed against any other State or States whose safety and independence are deemed vital 
to the safety and independence of the State thus resisting 
... 
the aggressor. Such extension of 
the notion of self-defence is a proper expression of the ultimate identity of interest of the 
international community in the preservation of peace. It is also a practical recognition of 
the fact that 
- 
in the absence of an effective machinery of the United Nations for the 
suppression of acts of aggression 
- 
unless such right of collective self-defence is recognized 
the doer is open for peacemeal annihilation of victims of aggression by a State or States 
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intent upon the domination of the world. In that sense collective self-defence is no more 
than rationally conceived individual self-defence 
... 
"25 
The above analysis centres on two distinct considerations. First, that 
the assisting State's security is threatened by an armed attack on a third 
State, and, secondly, that the action of the assisting State reflects an interest 
that any member of the international community may have against any 
aggression. 
The first consideration has been elaborated by Bowett in the famous 
passage, 
" 
... 
State A violates the legally protected interests of States B and C. Here A is in 
breach of an established duty vis-a-vis both B and C and both may exercise their rights of 
individual self-defence 
... 
or may exercise these in concert; this is the position which is 
properly termed 'collective self-defence'. The essence of this position is that the 
participants base their action on a violation of their own legally protected rights or 
interests, and this remains true whether they are two or twenty-two in number 
... 
"26 
The author then proceeds to define the assisting State's own right 
of individual self-defence on the basis of an "interdependence of security" 
between the victim State and the assisting State which, he claims, is 
evidenced by the existence of geographical proximity, cultural or economic 
ties27 
. 
The second part of Oppenheim's thesis is advocated in Dinstein: 
... 
An armed attack is like an infectious disease in the body politic of the family 
of nations. Every State has a demonstrable self- interest in the maintenance of 
international peace, for once the disease starts to spread there is no telling if and where it 
will stop. As long as the system of collective security within the United 'Tations 
organization is ineffective, collective self-defence constitutes the sole insurance policy 
against an armed attack 
... 
"28 
Both of the above views merit certain observations. 
Dinstein's thesis that every aggression is of concern for every 
individual member of the international community to the point of 
exercising an independent right to protect its own "self" in the face of 
attack on another State comes very dose to the concept of collective 
25 Oppenheim, International Law, vol. ii, 7th ed. by Lauterpacht, 1952, pp. 155-156; 
approvingly in I. C. J. Rep. 1986 per Judge Schwebel 
, 
pp. 361-362, par 199. 
2E' Bowett op. cit. supra n. 2, p. 206; id. loc. cit. in Moore (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 2, pp. 48-49; 
approvingly in I. C. J. Rep. 1986 per Judge Jennings 
, 
p. 546. 
2 Bowett op. cit. supra n. 2, pp. 234-238. 
28 Dinstein op. cit. supra n. 1, p. 234; id. loc. cit. in Bassiouni-Nanda (eds. ) op. cit. supra n. 
7, p. 284. See also Goodrich, Hambro, Simons, Charter of the United Nations, Commentary 
and Documents, 3rd ed. 1969, pp. 348-9. 
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security. Certainly an act of aggression is of concern to the entire 
international community for it constitutes a breach of international peace. 
The suppression of the aggression, however, is by no means the 
responsibility of individual States acting unilaterally, especially under the 
justification of defending their individual "self". This is contrary to settled 
practice as it emerged during the Suez crisis of 1956 and it is submitted that 
it does not constitute part of customary law29. 
Bowett's thesis, on the other hand, is commendable by its attempt to 
restrict the exercise of collective self-defence by requiring the assisting State 
to prove that it has an individual right of self-defence. At the same time, 
however, the grounds for establishing the latter's individual self-defence, 
namely, the concept of "interdependence of security" appear so vague as to 
override the effort of minimizing the risk of armed conflict30 
. 
This 
inherent contradiction is further exacerbated by the fact that as the 
"interdependence of security" appears to be assessed exclusively by the 
assisting State itself and as long as it essentially remains not clearly 
delineated, it may, in practice, imply a very serious breach of peace on the 
basis of subjective consideration. 
The best view, in the opinion of this writer, is to be founded on the 
basis of striking a balance between the predicament facing the victim State 
and any individual claim that the assisting State may have towards 
resorting to force in assistance to the former. 
5. The Requirements of Collective Self-Defence 
. 
The essence of collective self-defence is that it constitutes armed 
action by a State, not itself the target of the aggressor, in defence of another 
State, the victim of the aggressor. What is, therefore, needed is a necessity 
of individual self-defence that arises because of an armed attack against a 
State. It is the latter, and not the former, 
which is the "self" that must be defended31 
_ 
This can be pursued by the 
victim State individually and it is this State alone which has the discretion 
of cal 
.g upon other 
States to participate in its own defence: What the 
victim State may do on its own devices, It may do in concert with other 
29 See Bowe" op. cit. supra n. 2, pp. 204-205,216-219,239-244; id. loc. cit. in Moore (ed. ) op. 
cit. supra n. 2, pp. 46-48. 
30 Brownlie, International Lau, and the Use of Force by States, 1963, p. 330. 31 Kunz, 41 A. I. I. L. 87? (1947), p. 875; Kelsen, 42 A. J. I. L. 783 (1948), p. 792. 
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States32 
. 
Thus the starting point for action in collective self-defence is a 
situation of individual self-defence that arises because of an actual armed 
attack against the State which is to be assisted. Any action to that effect 
must unavoidably have its genesis closer to the object of the collective 
action, namely, the protection of the State that has the right of individual 
self-defence33 
. 
The majority of writers and State practice appear to advocate the 
contingency that there is a right in customary law to render assistance to a 
third State that has been the object of unlawful armed force34 
. 
The above begs the question of the manner in which the rendering 
of assistance is to be activated. The Court in its judgment on the Merits of 
the Nicaragua Case dealt with the concept of collective self-defence in 
customary international law and ruled that: 
(1) The right of collective self-defence is exercised in the event of an armed 
attack35 
(2) "... it is the State which is the victim of an armed attack which must form and 
declare the view that it has been so attacked. There is no rule in customary international 
law permitting another State to exercise the right of collective self-defence on the basis of 
its own assessment of the situation. Where collective self-defence is invoked, it is to be 
expected that the State for whose benefit this right is used will have to declare itself to be 
the victim of an armed attack 
... 
"36 
(3) " 
... 
At all events, the Court finds that in customary international law, whether 
of a general kind or that particular to the Inter-American legal system, there is no rule 
permitting the exercise of collective self-defence in the absence of a request by the State 
which regards itself as the victim of an armed attack 
... 
"37 
. (4) " 
... 
the lawfulness of the use of force by a State in response to a wrongful act 
which it has not itself been the victim is not admitted when this wrongful act which it has 
32 Keesen, Recent Trends in the Law of the United Nations, 1951, p. 915. 
33 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14 at p. 120, para 232; Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by 
Individual States in International Law, 81 H. R. C. 455 (1952 11), p. 505. 
34 Adendum to the Eighth Report on State Responsibility by Special Rapporteur Ago, loc. 
cit. supra n. 1; Kunz, 41 A. J. 1. L. 872 (1947), p. 875; Kelsen, 42 A. J. I. L. 783 (1948), p. 792; id. 
, Recent Trends in the Law of the United Nations, 1951, p. 915; Waldock loc. cit. supra n. 33, 
pp. 504-505; Wright, 53 A. J. I. L. 112 (1959), p. 118; Skubiszewski, Use of Force by States, in 
M. Sorensen (ed. ), Manual of Public International Law, 1968, pp. 768-769; Brownlie op. cit. 
supra n. 30, pp. 330-331,331 n. 1, but cf. pp. 332-333; Sir Eric Beckett op. cit. supra n. 23, p. 
13; Rifaat op. cit. supra n. 7, pp. 196-197; Goodrich, Hambro, Simons, Charter of the United 
Nations. Commentary and Documerfs, 3rd ed., 1969, p. 348 n. 209; Schachter, The Right of 
States to Use Armed Force, 82 :k hch. L. R. 1620 (1984), p. 1639; id. 85 A. J. 1. L. 452 (1991), 457; 
Higgins, The Attitude of Western States Towards Legai Aspects of the Use of Force, in 
Cassese (ed. ) The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force, 1986, p. 441; Akehurst, A 
Modern Introduction to International Law, 6th ed., 1986, pp. 265-266; id. 
, 
Nicaragua v. 
United States of America, 21 1. J. I. L. 357 (1987), pp. 375-376; Falk, The Cambodian 
Operation and International Law, in Falk (ed. ), The Viet-Nanu War and International 
Late, vol. iii, 1971, p. 46. 
35 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, at p. 103, para 195. 
36 Ibid. p. 104, para 195. 37 Ibid. p. 105, para 199. 
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not itself been the victim is not an armed attack. In the view of the Court under 
international law in force today 
... 
States do not have a right of "collective" armed 
response to acts which do not constitute an "armed attack" 
... 
"38 
Whether assistance is pledged by virtue of a treaty, or in case of the 
absence of a treaty, it is believed by some authority that it should be 
forthcoming only at the request of the Government of the victim State39 
Article 3(2) of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance 
provides that: 
... 
On the request of the State or States directly attacked and until the decision of 
the Organ of Consultation of the Inter-American system, each one of the Contracting Parties 
may determine the immediate measures which it may individually take in fulfilment of 
the obligation contained in the preceding paragraph and in accordance with the principle 
of continental solidarity.... 
Furthermore, the absence of a request for assistance or the lack of 
genuine requeSt40 has been treated as a contingency that undermines 
claims of collective self-defence. This is supported by the practice of States. 
The Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956 was justified by the 
Soviet Government as action in collective self-defence by virtue of a prior 
request by the Hungarian Government in accordance with the Warsaw 
Pact47 
. 
The representative of France in the Security Council pointed that 
the Soviet action " 
... 
was spontaneous and 
... 
it occurred before any appeal 
was made by the Hungarian Government 
... 
"42 
. 
The dispatch of U. S. and U. K. troops to Lebanon and Jordan 
respectively in 1958 was justified as action in collective self-defence 
pursuant to the request of the Lebanese and Jordanian Governments 42bi5 
38 Ibid. p. 110, para 211. 
39 Wright, 53 A. I. I. L. 112 (1959), p. 118; Cot & Pellet, La Chaite des Nations Unigis, 1985, 
pp. 784-785; Adendum to the Eighth Report on State Responsibility by Special Rapporteur 
Ago, loc. cit. sripra n. 1; Rowles, "Secret Wars", Self-Defence and the Charter -A Reply to 
Professor Moore, 80 I. L. A. J. 568 (7986), p. 572 n. 18. Contra 
, 
I. C. J. Rep. 1986 per Judge 
Schinebel 
, 
p. 362, para 199; ibid. per Judge Jennings, p. 545; Moore, The Nicaragua Case and 
the Deterioration of World Order, 81 A. J. I. L. 751 (7987), p. 155; Dinstein op. cit. supra n. 1, 
250. Cf. 
, 
Schachter, 85 A. J. I. L. 452 (1991), 457. 
40 This implies that the authority that launches the request does not constitute the 
Government of the State as a matter of international law, either because the body which 
purports to be the Government of the State has been installed as a result of the use of force 
by the State-recipient of the request, or it does not constitute an organ of the State that 
would, in the usual conduct of international relations, be held to represent the State on the 
international plane. See infra Part Three, Ch. 12. 
41 S. C. O. R. 11th yr. 746th mtg 
, 
pars 156. 
42 Ibid. para 90. 
42bis S. C. O. R. 13th yr. 827th mtg, paras 34-35,43 (U. S. A. ), 84 (Lebanon), 87 (U. K. ); 831st 
mtg, paras 24-25 (Jordan), 29 (U. K. ). Statement by the U. K. Prime Minister, H. McMillan in 
the House of Commons on 17 July 1958, Keesing's 1957-1958, p. 16308. 
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The U. S. military action against North Viet- Nam in February 1965 
was justified in a Memorandum from the Law Office of the Legal Adviser 
of the State Department in the following terms: " 
... 
in response to requests 
from the Government of South Viet- Nam, the United States has been 
assisting that country in defending itself against armed attack from the 
Communist North 
... 
"43 
. 
Moreover, in a letter dated 7 February 1965 from 
the representative of the U. S. A. to the President of the Security Council, 
the U. S. Government stated that " 
... 
[T]he Republic of Viet- Nam, and at 
its request, the Government of the United States and other Governments, 
are resisting this systematic and continuing aggression 
... 
" by North Viet- 
Nam44. 
On 1 May 1970 the armed forces of South Viet- Nam and the L. S. A. 
launched a large-scale offensive against Vietkong positions on the 
territory of Cambodia; the action was justified as collective self-defence 
and reference was made to the letters by the L. S. A. to the Security Council 
of 7 and 27 February 196545. 
The military intervention by the U. S. S. R. and other socialist 
countries in Czechoslovakia in August 1968 was again justified as action 
in collective self-defence under the Warsaw Pact after prior request of the 
Czechoslovak Government46 
. 
The representative of Czechoslovakia in 
the Security Council repudiated the Soviet claim of prior request by his 
Government by stating that " 
... 
IT]he Soviet armed forces were not invited 
into Czechoslovakia by anybody 
- 
not by anybody in position to speak for 
the Czech nation or the Czech people. They are uninvited guests 
... 
"4% 
. 
The Ethiopian Government requested and received military 
assistance from Cuba, South Yemen and the U. S. S. R. in the fighting 
against the W. S. L. F. and the Somali regular armed forces in Ogaden in 
1978; President Senghor of Senegal stated on 7 April 1978 that he 
supported the Cuban-Soviet assistance to Ethiopia as it aimed at the 
defence of the latter's frontiers48. 
43 5 i. E. M. 565 (1966), pp. 565,579. 44 Doc S/6174/ Corr. 1, S. C. O. R. 20th yr., Suppl. for January-March 1965, p. 43 at p. 44; also 
see Letter dated 27 February 1965 from the representative of the U. S. A. to the President of 
the Security Council, Doc. S/6206, in Ibid. pp. 78-79. 
4' Letter dated 5 May 1970 from the representative of the U. S. A. to the President of the 
Security Council, Doc. S/9781, S. C. O. R. 25th yr. Suppl. for April-June 1970, pp. 176-177. 4' S. C. O. R. 23rd 
yr. 
1441st mtg, paras 3,90,92 (U. S. S. R. ). 
4' Ibid. para 162; see also ibid. paras 70 (Denmark), 40 (U. S. A. ); 1442nd mtg, para 7 
(Ethiopia). 
48 Keesing's 1978, pp. 28760,28989-28991. 
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The U. S. S. R. justified the dispatch of large numbers of troops to 
Afghanistan in December 1979 as compatible with the right of collective 
self-defence in pursuance to a request by the Afghan Government which 
was made by virtue of the 1978 Treaty of Friendship, Goodneighbourliness 
and Cooperation between the two States49 " The request by the Afghan 
Government was disputed on the basis of its genuineness; it was alleged 
that the Soviet forces had overthrown the legitimate Government of 
Afghanistan and installed the one that made the request of assistance50. 
In the period 1981-1989 the U. S. A. provided material assistance to 
the contra insurgency in Nicaragua. The latter instituted proceedings 
against the U. S. before the International Court of Justice. According to the 
evidence available to the Court the United States justified its action as 
collective self-defence in support, on the one hand, of El Salvador, the 
Government of which was faced with armed insurgency that was assisted 
by the Government of Nicaragua, and on the other hand, of Honduras and 
Costa Rica, in the face of certain trans-border incursions by the armed 
forces of Nicaragua in the territory of these Statessl 
. 
With regard to the 
facts before it, the Court concluded that although El Salvador had indeed 
declared itself the victim of an armed attack and requested the assistance of 
the U. S. A. in 1984, this took place at a time much later than the activities 
Nicaragua had been accused of, namely, the provision of weapons to the 
Salvadorean guerrillas that enabled them to launch a large-scale offensive 
in 1981 52. As for Honduras and Costa Rica the Court found that there 
was very little information about the circumstances of occurrence of the 
trans-border incursions that would lead to their characterisation as an 
"armed attack"; in any case, these States did not behave as if they had been 
victims of armed attack at the time of the border incidents and at no time 
had they requested assistance from the U. S. A. 53. 
Lastly, in the aftermath of the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by 
Iraq in August 1990, the Government of Saudi Arabia requested and 
received on the territory of the Saudi Kingdom U. S. and other States' army 
49 34 Ybk of the U. N.. 1980, p. 299. 
50 See statements by the representatives of Singapore, Kuwait, Japan, Pakistan, the U. K. 
, 
and Italy during the Sixth Special Emergency Session of the G. A., in Ibid. pp. 300-301. 
51 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, at p. 119, para 229. 
52 Ibid. pp. 119-122, paras 229,230,233,236. In any case, the Court held that the provision 
of weapons did not constitute a case of armed attack; ibid. p. 104, para 195. 53 In fact, Honduras alleged that it had been the victim of "aggression" at a later stage. 
See ibid. paras 231,234,236. 
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contingents whose role would be the defence of the Kingdom in the event 
of imminent Iraqi invasion 54. 
The requirement of the request of assistance by the State victim of 
the use of force and the exclusion of resort to force on the individual 
assessment of the assisting State, renders the latter's position of secondan- 
importance as a matter of law. It opens, however, the dangerous possibility 
that concerted military action involving the armed forces of two or more 
States (an eventuality that implies a grave breach of peace), may 
commence solely on the individual assessment of the situation on the 
part of the victim State. This is of extremely practical significance in cases 
of regional disputes between weak States (as opposed to Great Powers ) 
with powerful allies, which may rely on the occurrence of any use of force 
against them and request assistance. The balance in this case is struck by 
virtue of the requirement of armed attack for the exercise of collective self- 
defence. 
It is submitted that only a use of force of the scale and effects so as to 
amount to a threat to the victim State as a whole, namely, as a political, 
territorial or economic entity, would justify unilateral resort to force by 
another or other States acting in concert against the aggression. Any 
collective reaction against acts of force short of an armed attack, while it 
might appear plausible in principle, could entail a breach of international 
peace of considerable magnitude, it could invite rapid escalation of the 
conflict by involving the allies of either side, and would contribute to the 
collapse of the entire organisational structure of international order55 
. 
Moreover, the existence or not of an armed attack is a contingency which 
is objectively verifiable and this constitutes a factor that would help 
determine the attitude of third States whose assistance is requested or 
established in advance in treaty provisions 56 
. 
State practice supports the 
54 S/P. V. 2934,9 August 1990, statement by Mr. Pickering (U. S. A. ), in Lauterpacht and 
others (eds. ) op. cit. supra n. 14, p. 155; Keesing's 1990, p. 37638. However, there was little 
evidence that an attack by Iraq against Saudi Arabia was imminent There was no 
indication that Iraq was massing troops on the Iraq-Saudi border; Iraq was only 
consolidating its armed forces on the Kuwait-Saudi border, following the occupation of the 
Emirate. See N. D. White & H_ McCoubrey, x Int. Rel. 347 (1991), p. 351. Cf. Greenwood, 
New World Order or Old? The Invasion of Kuwait and the Rule of Law, 55 Modern L. R. 153 (1992), pp. 163-4. 
Farer, Drawing the Right Line, 81 A. I. I. L. 112 (1987); contra, Hargrove, 81 A. I. I. L. 135 (1987), p. 141. 
5o See Bowett op. cit. supra n. 2, p. 237 but cf. pp. 231-237; Dinstein op. cit. supra n. 1, pp. 
238,242 but cf. pp. 247-248; McDougal & Feliciano op. cit. slirn-a n. 2, pp. 248,251; 
Schachter, 82 Mich. L. R. 1620 (1984), 1639; Falk loc. cit. in Falk (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 34, pp. 
44-46. Cf. Goodhart, 79 H. R. C. 187 (1951 11), p. 222. Conitra. Hargrove loc. cit supra n. 55. 
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above argument. All collective self-defence treaties consider as the event 
which renders operative the obligation to assist the victim of the use of 
force ( casus foederis ) the occurrence of an "armed attack"57 
. 
Statements by individual Governments with reference to claims of 
exercise of collective self-defence by other States, or decline to resort to 
force in collective self-defence, point at the existence or not of an armed 
attack. 
During the debates in the Security Council and the General 
Assembly on the Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956, a number of 
delegates pointed at the absence of an attack on Hungary 58. 
The dispatch of U. S. troops to Lebanon in 1958 was disputed by the 
representative of Sweden in the Security Council on the basis of the fact 
that his Government did not consider the internal disturbances in the 
country as constituting an armed attack in the sense of Article 51 59. 
The military action against N. Viet- Nam in 1965 was justified by 
the U. S. A. on the basis of the existence of armed attack against S. Viet- 
Nam that was perpetrated by way of infiltration of elements of the N. Viet- 
_NTamese armed forces fighting alongside the Vietkong guerrillas in S. 
Viet- Nam 6o 
. 
By contrast, the joint S. Viet- Namese-U. S. operation in 
Cambodia in 1970 has been criticised for the lack of evidence with regard to 
the existence of an armed attack against S. Viet- Nam and the Cambodian 
Government's complicity therein 61 
. 
During the debate in the Security Council on the military 
intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the representative of Senegal 
condemned it on the basis that Czechoslovakia " 
... 
was not threatened by 
any aggression from outside 
... 
"62. 
The Government of the Soviet Union refrained from resorting to 
force in collective self-defence to assist Viet- Nam against China in 1979 by 
57 Art. II, Treaty of Dunkirk (France-U. K. ); Art. 3(1), Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal 
Assistance, Rio de Janeiro 1947 ; contrast this provision with Art. 6 of the Treaty; Art. 5, 
North Atlantic Treaty, 1949 ; Art. 4, Warsaw Pact, 1955 ; Art. 6, U. S. 
- 
Viet- Nain, 
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, 1978 
. 58 S. C. O. R. 11th yr. 746th mtg, paras 116,119 (Peru), 108 (Cuba), 90-91 (France), 79 (U. K. ). 
G. A. O. R. 11th session, Plennar)- Meetings, vol. III (1957), 670th plen. mtg, paras 65,70-72 (Philippines). 
59 S. C. O. R. 13th yr. 830th mtg 
, 
para 48. It is worth mentioning that the United Nations 
Observers Group in Lebanon (U. N. O. G. I. L. ) reported to the Securih- Council that the 
allegation by the Lebanese Government of U. A. R. sponsored infiltration of armed bands in 
the Lebanon had not been established; see Keesing's 1957-1958, pp. 16295,16440-16441. 60 5 I. L. M. 565 (7966), p. 566; also see supra n. 44. 
61 See supra Ch. 9, Second Title. 
62 S. C. O. R. 23rd yr. 1443rd mtg, para 19. 
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arguing that the scale of hostilities between the two countries remained 
limited 
- 
an assertion indicative of the fact that in the opinion of the 
U. S. S. R. there was no armed attack against Viet- Nam 6, 
. 
The invocation of the right of collective self-defence by the Afghan 
and Soviet Governments in justification of the latter's dispatch of troops 
in Afghanistan in 1979 was challenged by pointing to the fact that Afghan- 
Soviet allegations of armed attack and external aggression against 
Afghanistan were suspicious by not being substantiated by factual evidence 
64. The U. S. military operation in Panama on 20 December 1989 was 
justified as action in pelf-defence in accordance with the Panama Canal 
Treaty of 1977 concluded between Panama and the U. S. A. 6.5. Article 
IV(1,2) of the Treaty provides that: 
.. .The United States of America and Panama commit themselves to protect and 
defend the Panama Canal. Each Party shall act, in accordance with its constitutional 
processes, to meet the danger resulting from an armed attack or other actions which 
threaten the security of the Panama Canal or of ships transiting it 
... 
... 
the United States of America shall have primary responsibility to protect and 
defend the Canal 
... 
66 
The facts prior to the U. S. operation reveal that there had not been 
any attack on the Panama Canal66h; 
. 
Moreover, the "primary 
responsibility" of the United States with regard to the defence of the Canal 
bring-, the Treaty as to its nature closer to the concept of "treaties of 
guarantee" that envisage action which is "unidirectional" in that it is 
undertaken by one of the parties only, as opposed to the reciprocal 
character of collective defence treaties h- 
. 
The Court's ruling in the Nicaragua Case that the State victim of an 
armed attack must declare itself as such and the implication that such 
declaration must be official and public appears at first glance to be 
redundant as too formalistic. Indeed, because of the contemporary 
"' Keesing's 1979, p. 29872. 
64 34 Ybk. of the U. N. 1980, p. 300 (statements by the representatives of Pakistan and the 
U. K. ); also see Cot-Pellet op. cit. supra n. 39, p. 785. 
65 U. N. Chronfcle vol. xxvii No 1 March 1990, p. 67; cf. Keesing's 1989, p. 37112. 
66 Text in 1( 11-41.7022 (711', ). 
6&bis Herzkin, The Invasion of Panama Under International Law: A Gross Violation, 29 Col. 
I. Trans. L. 293 (1991), pp. 302-3,305-6. Cf. A. D. Sofaer, The Legality of the United States 
Action in Panama, 29? Col. 1. Tran.. L. 281 (1991), pp. 287-8. 
h' Oppenheim, International Law, vol. i, 8th ed. by Laiuterpacht, 1955, p. 964 et seq.; 
Dinstein op. cit. supra n. 1, pp. 243-246. Treaties of guarantee raise the general issue of 
consent of a State to the military action by the guarantor State; see infra Part Three, Ch. 
12. 
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sophisticated methods of gathering and disseminating of information, it 
can be expected that a use of force of the magnitude of an armed attack is to 
be easily ascertained by the rest of the international community. 
It is submitted, however, that this represents a rather sceptical 
consideration of the Court's view 6s unless it is placed within the general 
context of the right of self-defence. A State that declares itself to be the 
victim of an armed attack unavoidably holds itself to be entitled to exercise 
the right of individual self-defence by 
. 
Indeed, Article 51 of the Charter 
seems to imply this by requiring the report of measures of self-defence to 
the Security Council 70 The reporting requirement of action in self- 
defence may be held to constitute a means of declaration by a State to be 
the object of an armed attack. Moreover, the Court's ruling that no such 
requirement exists in customary international law could arguably be 
treated as warranting the desirability of such declaration in the official 
statements of a Government in order to counter-balance the lack of an 
explicit treaty procedure ( like the one provided for in Article 51 of the 
Charter ) in customary international law 71 
It is submitted that seen in this light a declaration that a State is the 
victim of armed attack places its concomitant claim of self-defence under 
the scrutiny of its allies and the international community and, in 
conjunction with a request of assistance, gives them the opportunity to 
decide whether they will exercise their right to resort to force in defence of 
the attacked State 72 
. 
In practice this constitutes a very serious decision. It 
means that troops and resources will be committed to an armed conflict in 
which the assisting State is not ab initio implicated. Whether it will 
respond positively to the victim State's request is dependent on the 
concept of "interdependence of security" suggested by Bowett. It is 
submitted that this constitutes merely a political consideration that may 
lead a third State to rely on the requirements of collective self-defence 
stipulated in customary international law and resort to force in assistance 
of the victim of the armed attack. In other words, it may explain why a 
State may be forthcoming in joining the defensive action of the attacked 
State against the aggressor but it is not accepted in the practice of States as 
constituting the grounds prescribed by law for the exercise of collective 
,8 See, for instance, Moore, 81 A. J. 1. L. 151 (1987), p. 155. 69 Cf. I. C. J. Rep. 1986 per Judge Jennings 
, 
pp. 544-54,. ( ' Cf. Ibid. per Judge Schinebel 
, 
p. 356, para 191. 71 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, at pp. 95-96, para 178. 
-' Ibid. p. 120, para 232. 
383 
self-defence. Matters appear to be somewhat complicated in the case of two 
States that are parties to the same collective self-defence treaty but that are 
not in friendly bilateral relations ( viz. Greece and Turkey in \. A. T. O. ) 73. 
The question that arises is whether either of them may invoke the lack of 
"interdependence of security" in order to avoid assisting the other under 
the terms of the treaty. It is submitted that the answer in this question 
must be given as a matter of law in the negative. If the essence of a 
collective defence treaty is to pledge in advance the exercise of one's own 
right to assist another State if the latter is the victim of an armed attack, it 
does not and cannot supersede the basis for the exercise of collective self- 
defence, namely the existence of an armed attack against the victim State 
and request on the part of the latter for assistance. Any, avoidance of 
honouring one's contractual obligation, should there be a treaty involved, 
must be based on legal rather than on political consideration. 
'3 Dinstein op. Cit. supra n. 1, p. 241. 
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PART THREE 
CONTROVERSIAL EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE OF THE PROHIBITION 
OF THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES. 
INTRODUCTION. 
The grounds for resort to armed force that are dealt with infra are 
often treated in international law literature as instances of intervention 
. 
For this, reason, the present writer thinks that a brief discussion of the 
concept is pertinent, before the particular content of the purported 
exceptions is, considered. 
Intervention means the interference of a State in the internal or 
external affairs of another State in a manner impairing its territorial 
integrity or its political independence-i The interference must be 
"dictatorial"2 and coercion constitutes its essence3 
. 
In its Judgment on the Merit-, in the Nicaragua Case 
, 
the International 
Court of justice outlined the characteristics of unlawful intervention in 
customary international law: 
" 
... 
A prohibited intervention 
... 
must he one bearing on matters in which each State 
is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely. One of these is the 
choice of a political, economic, social and cultural system and the formulation of foreign 
policy. Intervention is wrongful when it uses methods of coercion in regard to such choices, 
which must remain free ones. The element of coercion, which defines, and indeed forms the 
very essence of, prohibited intervention, is particularly obvious in the case of intervention 
which uses force 
... 
"`t 
Intervention was, considered to be prima facie contrary to 
international law in that it constituted a violation of a duty of Non- 
Interventivn5 
. 
It has been stated that the duty of non-intervention was a 
1 Walte, 1-ß. e Reg Wation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, 
81 H. R. L. 455 0952 Hi, p. 461; Brownfie, Interrtatronal Lino and the Use of Force by States, 
7903, p. 44; Potter, L' Intervention en Droit International Moderne, 32 N. R. C. 617 (793(1 11), 
614; Brierly, Tile Law of Nations, 6111 ed. by Waldock, 1963, p. 402. 
Oppenheim, International Law, vol. ii, 7th ed. by Lauterpacht, 1952, p. 150. 3 Potter loc. cit. supra n. 1, p. 61 
. t I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14 
, 
at p. 108, para 205. 
5 Sec also G. A. Res. 2131 (XX) of 1965, Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in 
the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, 
G. A. O. R. 20th session, Suppl. No 14, p. 11. G. A. Res. 2625 (XXV) of 1970, Declaration of 
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restatement of the right of independence from the opposite side6 
. 
Nevertheless, by the 19th century the rule of non-intervention had 
been subject to various exceptions whereby intervention was justifiable in 
terms of self-preservation or self-defence, the protection of the life and 
property of nationals abroad, reprisal, constraint towards obedience to 
international law? 
. 
Intervention was considered admissible when it was undertaken by 
virtue of a treaty provision to which at least the intervening State was a 
party 
, 
or when the consent of the intervened State was ad hoc given with 
regard to a specific case 
. 
Such conduct may be said not to constitute, in 
principle, unlawful intervention, but this is not conclusive of the ultimate 
characterisation of the action as lawful8. Potter argued that what really 
mattered was not the existence or absence of consent, but that " 
... 
1' 
element essentiel et characteristique de 1' intervention est 1' action 
coercitive de 1' Etat qui agit et non la resistance de celui qui subi 1' action 
... 
"y 
. 
Consent as such seems to acquire importance so far as the lawfulness 
of intervention is concerned and it is not a conditio sine qua non for the 
characterisation of an act as intervention or otherwise. For if intervention 
is an unlawful act because it inheres coercion, it may occur despite the 
existence of consent. 
It is submitted that an action that is carried out by way of armed 
force is by its nature an instance of unlawful intervention 
. 
In the case, 
however, of State conduct that falls short of armed force or, that involves 
armed force and is undertaken with the consent of the intervened State, 
the element of coercion may not be discernible ab initio 
. 
It, therefore, 
remains to be seen ex nunc 
, 
as the intervening State's conduct progresses, 
whether it does in fact constitute intervention or not 
. 
G. A. O. R,. I 'Ah session, Suppl. No 14, p. 11. G. A. Res. 2625 (XXV) of 1970, Declaration of 
Principles Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations, G. A. O. R. 25th session, Suppl. No 28, p. 121. It was held 
in the Nicaragua Case (lcrits), that these resolutions constituted evidence of customary 
law on the rule of non-intervention. See I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, at pp. 106-107, paras 202-203. 6 See Bowett, Self-Defend, in International Lau', 1958, p. 44. 7 See Stowell, Intervention in International Lazy', 1921 
8 See infra Ch. 12. 
9 Potter loc. cit. supra n. 1, p. 655. 
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CHAPTER 11 
THE USE OF FORCE FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE LIVES AND 
PROPERTY OF INDIVIDUALS. 
Introduction 
The situations envisaged under the above rubric concern the use of 
armed force by a State in the territory of another State for the protection or 
rescue of individuals, whose lives are in mortal danger, and/or their 
property, which has arisen either due to the policies of the territorial State 
or due to the breakdown of law and order therein. 
Such use of armed force is purported to constitute an exception to 
the general rule of non-use of force which is enshrined in Article 2(4) of 
the United Nations Charter and constitutes part of customary 
international law. 
The alleged exception is generally permeated by considerations of 
humanity. State practice and theory, however, have introduced a 
distinction by reference to the status of individuals to be protected in 
relation to the State that uses force to protect them, as well as the State that 
is the target of the use of force. Thus, the general exception of the 
protection of individuals' lives and property is considered to comprise, in 
reality, of two distinct instances of allegedly lawful use of force: First, the 
application of armed force by a State for the protection of the lives and 
property of its nationals in another State. It may be the case that nationals 
of other States (other than the target State of the intervention) are rescued 
alongside the national of the intervening State. This does not deprive the 
action of the character of protection of nationals abroad and, certainly, does 
not imply at all legitimacy of the doctrine of humanitarian interventions 
Secondly, the use of armed force for the protection of the nationals of the 
target State in case of widespread violations of their human rights by the 
territorial sovereign. The latter situation is described by the term 
"humanitarian intervention". 
1 See Bowett, The Use of Force for the Protection of Nationals Abroad, in Cassese (ed. ), The 
Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force, 1986, pp. 43-44. 
X87 
Although certain jurists, mainly from the U. S. A. 
, 
do not draw such 
distinction' 
, 
the latter appears to be firmly established in the works of 
eminent authority2 
. 
State practice seems to be concurrent with regard to the distinction 
between protection of nationals and humanitarian intervention. An 
illustration of this is to be found in the justification offerred by the United 
States Government for the military action in Grenada on 25 October 1983. 
The U. S. action was justified on three grounds: (1) Invitation by the 
Legitimate Government of Grenada. (2) The protection of the lives of U. S. 
citizens. (3) Invitation extended by the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean 
States (O. E. C. S. )3 
. 
With regard to the plea of protection of nationals it was 
expressly stated by the Department of State that the U. S. A. deliberately did 
not rely on a "... broad doctrine of 'humanitarian intervention'... " in 
lbiN See Farer, The Regulation of Foreign Intervention in Civil Armed Conflict, 142 H. R. C. 
29; (1973 11), pp. 387,392; Gordon, Bilder, Rovine, Wallace Jr. 
, 
International Law and the 
United States Action in Grenada: A Report, 18 Intern. Laun, /er 331 (1984), p. 378; J. N. Moore, 
Grenada and the International Double Standard, 78 A. J. LL. 145 (1984), p. 156; Nanda, The 
United States Armed Intervention in Grenada 
- 
Impact on World Order, 14 Cal. W. I. L. J. 395 
(1984), p. 423; id. 
, 
The Validity of the United States Intervention in Panama under 
International Law, AGORA: U. S. FORCES IN PANAMA: DEFENDERS, AGGRESSORS 
OR HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS, 84 A. J. I. L. 494 (1990), p. 496; Henkin, General Course on 
Public International Law, 216 H. R. C. 19 (1989 IV), p. 153; id. The Invasion of Panama 
Under International Law: A Gross Violation, 29 Col. J. Trans. L. 293 (1991), pp. 296-7; Tesön, 
Humanitarian 1111erventiou: An Inquiry into Law and Alorality, 1988, p. 114. 
2 See Oppenheim, International Laze, vol. i, 8th edition by Lauterpacht, 1955, pp. 309,312- 
313,686-691; Higgins, Intervention and International Law, in Bull (ed. ), Intervention in 
"'orld Politic, 1984, p. 29 at p. 38; Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by 
States, 1963, pp. 292 et seq. and 338 et seq. ; id. 
, 
The Principle of Non-Use of Force in 
Contemporary International Law, in Butler (ed. ), The Non-Use of Force in International 
Lain, 1989, p. 17 at p. 25; Akehurst, The Use of Force for the Protection of Nationals Abroad, 
5 International Relations 3 (1977), at p. 15; Bowett, The Use of Force for the Protection of 
Nationals Abroad, in Cassese (ed. ), The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force, 1986, 
p. 49; id. 
, 
The Interrelation of the Theories of Intervention and Self- Defence, in Moore 
(ed. ), Law and Civil star in the Modern World, 1974, p. 44; L. Doswald-Beck, The Legality 
of the United States Intervention in Grenada, 31 N. I. L. R. 355 (1984), p. 363; N. Ronzitti, 
Rescuing Nationals Abroad Through Military Coercion and Intervention on Grounds of 
Hunuanitit, 1985, p. 108; Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, 1988, p. 215; 
Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 Mich. L. R. 1620 (1984), p. 1629; F. 
Jhabvala, Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention and International Law, 21 I. J. I. L. 208 
(1981), p. 209; D'Angelo, Resort to Force by States to Protect Nationals: The United States 
Mission to Iran and its Legality under International Law, 21 485 (1981), p. 518; Th. 
E. Behuniak, The Law of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention by Armed Force: A Legal 
Survey, 79 Military L. R. 151 (1978), 158-159; J. Donelly, Human Rights, Humanitarian 
Intervention and American Foreign Policy, 37 Journal of Intern. Affairs 311 (1984), p. 312. 3 Letter dated 25 October 1983 from the representative of the U. S. A. to the President of the 
Security Council, Doc. S/ 1607, S. C. O. R. 38th yr. Suppl. for Oct. 
- 
Dec. 1983, pp. 37-38; N1. 
Nash-Leigh, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 78 
A. J. I. L. 200 (1984), p. 205. 
388 
favour of the "... narrower, well-established ground of protection of U. S. 
nationals 
... 
"4 
Moreover, while States have on several occasions preferred to 
justify military action on the territory of another State as protection of 
nationals, they have, generally, not relied on the doctrine of 
humanitarian interventions 
. 
Indeed, as will be seen infra 
, 
the latter does 
not constitute part of the corpus of contemporary customary international 
law. 
The use of force under either of the above justifications is very 
similar as a matter of function, if considerations of humanity are 
considered the least common denominator of both justifications6 
However, the distinction between protection of nationals and 
humanitarian intervention really lies with the relationship between the 
individuals to be rescued and the State that takes military action. 
The concept of nationality in conjunction with the long-standing 
rule of customary international law that every State has the duty 
... 
to 
grant to aliens at least equality before the law with its citizens, as far as the 
safety of person and property is concerned 
... 
"7 
, 
has offered the basis for the 
argument that the link between a State and an individual through the 
bond of nationality provides the legal standing for the former to 
undertake protective action with regard to the latter8 
. 
Certainly, this is 
recognised in relation to international law of State Responsibility by virtue 
of the concept of "diplomatic protection"9 
. 
However, it is submitted, that 
it is very doubtful that an analogy can be drawn from the principle of 
diplomatic protection in order to establish the admissibility of the forcible 
protection of nationals abroad1° 
. 
The former is pertinent to the duty of 
peaceful settlement of disputes which corresponds to the prevention of 
the settlement of disputes through armed violence by virtue of the rule of 
the prohibition of the use of armed force by States. The incompatibility of 
military action to rescue nationals abroad with the principle of peaceful 
settlement of disputes can be illustrated by the abortive U. S. military 
operation in Iran on 24 April 1980. The aim of the action was to liberate 
4 Letter from Mr. D. R. Robinson to Professor Gordon, 18 Intern. Lawyer 381 (1984), p. 386. 5 Akehurst, loc. cit. in Bull (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 2, p. 99. 6 Brownlie, loc. cit. in Butler (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 2. 7 Oppenheim, op. cit. supra n. 2, p. 688. 8 See, Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law, 1958, pp. 94-96; Jhabvala, 21 I. I. I. L. 208 (1981), pp. 210-211. 
9 See Panevezys-Saldutiskis Case 
, 
P. C. I. J. Series A/B No 76. 
10 Contra Jhabvala, loc. cit. supra n. 8. 
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the American hostages held at the U. S. Embassy in Tehran since its 
occupation by a group of Iranian demonstrators on 4 November 1979. The 
operation was launched at the same time when the International Court of 
Justice was adjudicating on the proceedings instituted by the U. S. A. against 
Iran with regard to the seizure of the Embassy in Tehran. In its judgment 
on the Merits of the Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and 
Consular Staff in Tehran ( U. S. A. v. Iran ) 11 the Court while declining to 
pronounce on the legality of rescue operations12 
, 
stated in an obiter 
dictum that: 
... 
The Court 
... 
feels bound to observe that an operation undertaken in those 
circumstances, from whatever motive, is of a kind calculated to undermine respect for the 
judicial process in international relations; and to recall that in paragraph 47,1 B, of its 
Order of 15 December 1979 the Court had indicated that no action was to be taken by either 
party which might aggravate the tension between the two countries 
... 
13 
Moreover, the Charter of the United Nations that stipulates the 
prohibition of unilateral resort to force does not expressly provide for 
unilateral armed action for the protection of nationals abroad as an 
exception to Article 2(4 ). The question that arises is whether the position 
is identical under customary international law. The Court decided in the 
Nicaragua Case that: 
... 
As regards the suggestion that the areas covered by the two sources of law are 
identical, the Court observes that the United Nations Charter, the convention to which 
most of the United States argument is directed, by no means covers the whole area of the 
regulation of the use of force in international relations 
... 
14 
In spite of the fact that the Court went on to explain the above 
passage by offering as an illustration the content of an already existing 
exception to the rule of Art. 2(4) in the text of the Charter, ( namely, the 
right of individual and collective self-defence )15 
, 
the tenor of generality 
in the language of the ruling does not appear to establish conclusively that 
the Court intended the dictum to refer to exceptions expressly provided 
for in the text of the Charter. This has led at least one commentator to 
conclude that the Court's Judgment allows for the existence of a right to 
11 Hereinafter refferred to as the Hostages Case ; I. C. J. Rep. 1980, p. 3. 12 Ibid. p. 43, para 94. 
13 Ibid. para 93; Also see, Ronzitti op. cit. supra n. 2, pp. 71-72; Rubin, The Hostages 
Incident: The United States and Iran, 36 Ybk. World Affairs 213 (1982), pp. 227-228; cf. 
Schachter, 82 A1ich. L. R. 1620 (1984), p. 1631. 
14 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, at p. 94, para 176. 
15 Ibid. 
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protect nationals in customary law in the aftermath of the Charter16 
Whether this is true or not is a matter of examining the practice of States 
in the post-1945 period17. 
Lastly, it must be born in mind that the notion of nationality is 
surrounded with doctrinal uncertainty in international law as to a 
generally accepted definition18. 
The doctrine of humanitarian intervention, on the other hand, 
does not rely on any direct link between the intervening State and the 
individuals to be protected. On the contrary it asserts a right of protection 
of the citizens of a State against their own Government, a contingency 
which has been untenable under traditional customary law. It is only after 
the interest taken by international law in the protection of human rights 
of individuals on the part of their State that a legal standing for 
intervention has been sought to be formulated by the adherents of this 
doctrine. 
Both grounds for military action have been sought to be justified as 
exceptions to the general prohibition of the use of force by States. The first 
observation, therefore, is that prohibition of armed force constitutes the 
rule. Furthermore, there are certain legal grounds that have been 
articulated for their admissibility in law and which are of common 
application to both protection of nationals and humanitarian 
intervention. At the same time each of them is purported to be supported 
as to its legality by additional individual bases which are commensurate to 
the particularities of each one of them with regard to the status of the 
individuals rescued. 
The present writer proposes to discuss the arguments common to 
both concepts first, and the particular ones under separate headings for 
each concept. 
16 J Raby, The Right of Intervention for the Protection of Nationals: Reassessing the 
Doctrinal Debate, 30 C. de D. 441 (1989), p. 467. 
17 See infra First Title 
18 See Brownlie, op. cit. supra n. 2, p. 300; id. Principles of Public International Law, 4th 
ed. 
, 
1990, pp. 381-420. 
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Common Arguments with regard to the Lawfulness of both Protection of 
National,; Abroad and Humanitarian InterG'ention 
The grounds of legality common to both protection of nationals and 
humanitarian intervention are drawn on the one hand from the text of 
Article 2(4) of the Charter, and on the other from what is perceived to be 
the ineffectiveness of the collective security system and a reassessment of 
the rule of the prohibition of the use of force in the context of this 
situation. 
One argument that has been propounded in favour of a right to 
protect individuals, is that the use of force for the protection of nationals 
and humanitarian intervention is not directed "against the territorial 
integrity and political independence" of the target Stately. 
With regard to this contention it has been argued supra 19bis that 
the phrase in Art. 2(4 ) that concerns the "territorial integrity and political 
independence" of any State had been inserted in the Charter at the request 
of weak States in order to reinforce the tenor of the prohibition, rather 
than to restrict its scope; moreover, State practice reveals that the said 
19 Bow-. 
-ett, loc. cit. in Cassese (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 2, p. 40; Thomas and Thomas, The 
Dominican Republic Crisis 1965, The Ntlith Hamuzarskjbld Forum 1967, p. 15; D'Angelo, 21 
Va J. 1.1.. 4,85 (1981), pp, 491-498,510-512; Jeffery, The American Hostages in Tehran: The 
I. C. J. and the Legality of Rescue Missions, 30 I. C. L. Q. 717 (1981), pp. 725-728; Teson op. cit. 
supra n. 1, pp. 130-134; Raby, 30 C. de D. 441 (1989), 454-462; Reisman, Humanitarian 
Intervention to Protect the Ibos, in Lillich (ed. ), Humanitarian Intervention and the United 
Nations, 1973, pp. 177-178; Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brown-lie 
and Plea for Constitutive Alternatives, in Moore (ed. ), Liu, and Civil War in the Modern 
World, 1974, pp. 236-237; Chilstrom, Humanitarian Intervention under Contemporary 
International Law, 1 Yale Studies in World Public Order 93 (1974), pp. 97-98. Cf. Nanda, 14 
Cal. tV. 1. L. 1.395 (1984), pp. 316-317; Moore, The Control of Foreign Intervention in Internal 
Conflict, 9 Va. J. LL. 209 (1969), pp. 262,264. 
The clause from the text of Article 2(4) "... or in any other manner inconsistent with 
the purposes of the United Nations... " is invoked mainly with regard to the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention, under the special rubric of which it is being dealt infra 
. 
Some 
authorities, however, have relied on the said phrase from Art. 2(4) in support of the right 
of protection of nationals. The purpose of this invocation appears to be based on the 
humanitarian nature of protecting one's nationals. Given, however, the fact that protection 
of nationals is preferably justified as a form of exercise of the right of self-defence, such 
assertion of consistency with the purposes of the U. N. seems to be ancillary with regard to 
the concept of protection of nationals. See Bowett, ref. in this note; Schweisfurth, 
Operations to Rescue Nationals in Third States Involving the Use of Armed Force in 
Relation to the Protection of Human Rights, 23 G. Y. I. L. 159 (1980) ; Wengler, L' Interdiction 
de Recourir ä la Force. Problemes et Tendances, 7 Rev. Belege D. I. 401 (1971), p. 417; Moore, 9 
Va. 1. J. L, 209 (1969), 264. 
19bi', See 
. 
upra Part One 
, 
Ch. 7. 
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clause of Art. 2(4 ) far from being understood as territorial severance is 
held to connote territorial inviolability20 
. 
The argument that military force for the protection of nationals and 
humanitarian intervention should be pursued unilaterally by States due 
to the ineffectiveness of the United Nations partakes the character of an 
application of the clausula rebus sic standibus : Namely, that the 
prohibition of the use of force in Art. 2(4) envisaged the effective work of 
the collective security system of the Charter of the United Nations21 
The period of the so-called "Cold War" with the super-power 
antagonism has admittedly prevented the United Nations Organisation 
from functioning properly with regard to the maintenance of 
international peace and security. However, it did not constitute an 
"unforeseen" circumstance warranting the abrogation of Art. 2(4 ). First, 
the preparatory work of the Charter indicates that a rift between the 
Permanent Members of the Security Council had indeed been foreseen22, 
and, secondly, it is very doubtful that the remedy of such eventuality 
would warrant a return to unilateral forcible action as a viable alternative. 
As early as 1949 the International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel 
Case has dismissed any attempt of legitimising forcible unilateralism on 
the basis of the ineffectiveness of the United Nations system: 
... 
The Court can only regard the alleged right of intervention as a manifestation of 
a policy of force, such as has, in the past, given rise to most serious abuses and such as 
cannot, whatever the present defects in international organisation, find a place in 
international law... 23 
What the above passage reveals is a demonstration of scepticism of 
unilateral resort to force being a pertinent alternative to the 
"ineffectiveness" of the United Nations. This is perfectly understandable 
in view of the fact that the use of armed force is likely to result in far 
greater harm than the breach it purports to meet24 
. 
Moreover, the rule 
20 See Art. I of the United Nations Definition of Aggression appended to G. A. Res. 3314 
(XXIX) of 1974. Cf 
. 
Statement of the French delegate in the Security Council during the 
debate on the Entebbe incident, S. CO. R. 31st yr. 1943rd mtg. para 45. 21 Lillich, loc. cit_ in Moore (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 19, p. 238; Bazyler, Reexamining the 
Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light of Atrocities in Kampuchea and Ethiopia, 
23 Stanford 1.11.547 (1987), p. 578; Sornarajah, Internal Colonialism and Humanitarian 
Intervention, 11 Ga. J. I. Comp. L. 45 (1981), 59-60; Chilstrom, I Yale Studies in World Public 
Order 93 (1974), p. 127 et seq. 
22 See Ronzitti op. cit. supra n. 2, p. 9. 
23 I. C. J. Rep. 1949, p. 4, at p. 35. See also I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, at p. 107, para 202. 24 Akehurst, 5 Int. Rel. 3 (1977), p. 18; Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention, in Moore (ed. ) 
op. cit. supra n. 19, p. 224. 
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enshrined in Art. 2(4 ) of the Charter constitutes a rule of customary 
international law to which the clausula rebus sic stantibus is not 
applicable25 
. 
Finally, the practice of States is unsupportive of the 
contention that an "unforeseen" fundamental change of circumstances 
has occurred. On the contrary, as the Court has ruled in the Nicaragua 
Case 
, 
States appear to maintain the place of Art. 2(4) as a general 
prohibition by always seeking to justify their resort to force on the basis of 
an exception to Art. 2(4 ) of the Charter26. 
A final point to be made at this stage is that the situations to be dealt 
with in this Chapter concern resort to force by States without the consent 
of the territorial sovereign. Such consent deprives such use of force of any 
trait of "dictatorial interference" in the affairs of the target State27 and 
shifts the question from the issue of a priori lawfulness of the use of force 
for the protection of individuals to the genuineness of the consent 
extended to the intervening State. 
First Title:: THE USE OF FORCE FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE LIVES 
AND PROPERTY OF NATIONALS ABROAD. 
In the period prior to the Covenant of the League of Nations and 
the Pact of Paris States have asserted an autonomous right of using force 
for the protection of the lives and property of their citizens on the territory 
of another Stater 
. 
In this period the right of forcible protection of 
nationals was justified as either self-preservation 
, 
or self-defence3 
, 
or 
reprisal4 
, 
or a measure of "international police" due to the non-existent 
25 Nicaragua Case ( Merits ), I. C. ). Rep. 1986,. p. 14, at p. 95 para 178. Also see Ronzitti 
supra n. 22. 
26 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, at p. 98 pars 186. 27 Schweisfurth, 23 G. Y. 1. L. 159 (1981», p. 159; Milenkovic, Hijacking and National 
Sovereignty 
- 
With Reference to the Lamaca Airport Incident, 29 Review of International 
Affairs ( Belgrade ) 33 (1978), p. 35. Cf. Bowett, loc. cit. in Cassese (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 2, 
pp. 46-47. 
See Vattel, Le Droit des Gens, Book II, Cll. vi, 71; Anglo-Spanish Arbitrations, Beni- 
Madati, Rzitli Claim (1925), (Spanish Moroccan Claims Case), U. N. R. I. A. A. 
, 
vol. II, p. 616. 
2 Hall, international Lau?, 8th ed. 
, 
1924, p. 322. 
3 Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, 
81 H. R. C. 455 (1952 11), p. 467. Cf. Brierly, 58 H. R. C. 5 (1936 IV), p. 128. 4 Hindmarsh, Force in Peace, 1933, p. 57. 
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organisation of the international community5 
. 
These rather multifarious 
legal grounds for the admissibility of protection nationals appear to 
deprive the concept of consistency of opinio juris in the practice of States. 
In any case, enquiry into the lawfulness or not of such use of force is 
somewhat futile due to the lack of any rule of international law on the 
prohibition of the use of force in the period under discussion6 
. 
The introduction of the League of Nations and the conclusion of 
the Pact of Paris constituted the first attempts at regulating the resort to 
armed force by States? 
. 
During the period 1920-1945 the right of protection 
of nationals abroad was asserted on several occasions by the U. S. A. 
, 
Britain and Japan 
. 
The most important invocation of the right was made by Japan 
during the Manchurian crisis of September 19318 
. 
It was not until 
February 1933 when the Assembly of the League of Nations condemned 
the Japanese action in Manchuria but by that time it had become clear that 
there was no factual basis to intervene for the protection of nationals. It is, 
however, important that the attitude of the League Council when the 
dispute was first referred to it 
, 
was far from unequivocal. In its Resolution 
of 30 September 1931 the League Council took note of the Japanese 
representative's statement that the withdrawal of the Japanese troops from 
Manchuria would be in proportion with the safety of the life and property 
of the Japanese nationals9 
. 
Moreover in the debate on the Shanghai 
incident of 1932 at the Council of the League, the Japanese representative 
after denying that the Japanese action constituted an infringement of the 
territorial integrity of China claimed that the Council had recognised the 
right of the Japanese troops to remain in Manchuria to protect nationals 
and that it was the same case in Shanghail° 
. 
The British representative in 
the League Council took the view that the Council had recognised that 
the obligation of Japan to withdraw from Manchuria was dependent on 
the safety of the Japanese nationals and it was this interpretation that gave 
support to the view that the Resolution of 30 September 1931 tacitly 
recognised the right to protect nationals11 
. 
5 Giraud, La Theorie de la Legitime Defense, 49 N. R. C. 691 (1934 110, pp. 737-738. 6 Bowett, The Use of Force for the Protection of Nationals Abroad, in Cassese (ed. ), The 
Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force, 1986, p. 39. 
7 See supra Part One, Ch. I. 8 L. N. O. J. 1931, p. 2267. 9 Ibid. pp. 2307-8. 
10 L. N 
. 
O. J. 1932, pp. 344-345. 
11 Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, 1963, p. 296. 
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Still, protection of nationals appears to have been invoked in State 
practice as an autonomous basis for the use of force against another State 
and no attempts seem to have been made by Governments to 
accommodate protection of nationals with the Pact of Paris as part of the 
exception of self-defence12. 
Finally, a definite conclusion as to the existence of a right of 
protection of nationals in the period of the League of Nations is not free 
from doubt at least with regard to the United States that became party to 
the Additional Protocol relative to Non-Intervention which was 
concluded in Buenos Aires in 1936, without any reservation with regard to 
such a right13 
. 
The introduction of the United Nations Charter signaled the rule of 
the absolute prohibition of the use of armed force stipulated in Article 2 (4 
) of the Charter. The question of whether the right to protect nationals has 
survived or not the introduction of the Charter is a question which in the 
opinion of this writer must be dealt with on the basis of subsequent State 
practice 
. 
Authority have largely treated the question as being one of prima 
facie violation of the rule of non-use of force the wrongfulness of which 
is precluded by virtue of one of the following contentions: 
(1) That the use of force to protect nationals abroad is based on the 
concept of necessity. 
(2) That the use of force to protect nationals abroad is an exercise of 
the right of self-defence. 
(3) That there is an autonomous right to use force for the protection 
of nationals abroad. 
(4) That protection of nationals abroad is a form of protection of 
human rights. 
The present author proposes to discuss the above arguments in the 
light of the State practice in the post- 1945 period. 
(1) That the use of force for the protection of nationals is based on the 
concept of necessity 
. 
12 The Japanese justification for resort to force in Manchuria in September 1931 was 
twofold: (1) self-defence, (2) protection of nationals, L. N. O. J. 1931, p. 2267. 13 Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 11, p. 294. 
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Fitzmaurice has taken the view that the use of force for the 
protection of nationals abroad is justified on the ground of necessity 
because "... certain kinds of grave physical injury are irremediable... "14 
. 
Bowett argues that necessity is the legal basis justifying military 
action for the protection of nationals only if the threat to their lives 
emanates from mobs, hijackers, mutinous troops and so on which act 
without the complicity of the Government of the target Stately 
. 
State practice contains only one instance of invocation of necessity 
as justification. On 10 July 1960 Belgium introduced troops in the Congo 
- 
mainly in the southern province of Katanga and the capital of the country 
Leopoldville 
- 
without the consent of the Congolese Government shortly 
after the country had become independent. The Belgian Government 
justified the military action as aiming at rescuing Belgian and other 
European nationals whose lives were in mortal danger due to the riots 
and acts of violence that resulted from the mutiny of the Congolese Force 
Publique 
. 
The Prime Minister of Belgium, Mr. Eyskens, claimed before the 
House of Senate of the Belgian Parliament on 13 July 1960 that Belgian 
troops were introduced in the Congo: 
"... parce que le gouvernement s' est trouve place devant un cas de force nurjeure. Le 
gouvernement beige, comme le gouvernement de tout pays qui se respecte, a pour devoir d' 
observer une regle de morale internationale et une regle du droit des gens, qui impose a un 
pays de proteger la vie de ses ressortisans. Le gouvernement beige est intervenu uniquement 
dans le but d' eviter des effusions de sang, d' apporter une protection, combien necessaire, 
afro de preserver des vies humaines 
... 
"16 
The invocation of a state of necessity in the context of protection of 
nationals is problematic in that it extends the application of this kind of 
action beyond threats to the lives of nationals that are perpetrated by the 
Government of the target State and thus dispenses with the requirement 
of responsibility or complicity of the latter17. Moreover, it is very doubtful 
that in contemporary customary international law a state of necessity 
could justify the use of armed force in view of the fact that the 
14 Fitzmaurice, The General Principles of International Law, 92 H. R. C. 5 (1957 11), p. 173. 
See also Wengler, 7 Ren. Beige D. I. 401 (1971), p. 417; Raby, 30 C. de D. 441 (1989), p. 486. 15 Bowett loc. cit. in Cassese (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 6, p. 43. Bowett is one of the leading 
proponents of the admissibility of protection of nationals as an exercise of the right of self- 
defence. Cf. id. Self-Defence in International Law, 1958, pp. 90-91. 16 Quoted in Ronzitti, Rescuing Nationals Abroad Through Military Coercion and 
lilterneuutionn on Grounds of Hunmanihy, 1985, p. 30. Also see, Statement by Mr. Eyskens before 
the Chamber of Representatives, 11 July 1960, Keesing's 1959-1960,17641; statements before 
the S. C. 
, 
S. C. O. R. 15th yr. 873rd mtg. paras 181-184 ( Belgium ), 121 ( Italy ). 
17 Ronzitti op. cit. supra n. 16, p. 13. 
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determining factor for the resort to violence does not depend on an 
external objectively ascertained event but rather on the subjective 
consideration of the intervening State with regard to what it, and it alone, 
conceives to be a threat to its securityl s. 
In its Commentary on the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, the 
International Law Commission concluded that "... the practice of States is 
inconclusive with regard to whether a state of necessity constitutes an 
exception to Article 2(4) of the Charter 
... 
"'19. 
It is, therefore submitted, that State practice is inconclusive and 
does not support the contention of protection of nationals being justified 
on the basis of a state of necessity. 
(2) That the use of force for the protection of nationals is an exercise of 
the right of self-defence 
This is by far the most compelling contention for the admissibility 
of the right to protect the lives of nationals and it is supported by eminent 
authority. 
Waldock has expressed the view that resort to force for the 
protection of nationals is an exercise of the right of self-defence on the 
basis of the Caroline formula in these terms: 
"... There must be: 
(1) An imminent threat of injury to nationals. 
(2) A failure or inability on the part of the territorial sovereign to protect them. 
(3) Measures of protection strictly confined to the object of protecting them against 
injury 
... 
"20 
18 Commentary by the I. L. C. on the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Doc. A/ 35/ 10, 
I. L. C. Ybk. 1980, Volume It, Part Two, p. 34, para 22- 
19 Ibid. p. 45, para 26. 20 Waldock, 81 H. R. C. 455 (1952 11), p. 467. See also Bowett op. cit. supra n. 15, pp. 87-105; 
id. loc. cit. in Cassese (ed. ) op. cit. srepra n. 6, pp. 40,43; id. The Interrelation of Theories of 
Intervention anno' Self--Defense; ku Moore (ed. ) Irrtal and Civil War in the Modern World, 
1974, p. 44; Mc-Nair, Tice La Tv of Treaties, 1961, pp. 209-210; Speech by Lord McNair in the 
House of Lords on 12 September 1956, Hansard Parliamentary Debates, H. L., 5th series, vol. 
199 
, 
cols. 659-660; Gilmore, The Grenada Intervention, 1984, p. 58; Moore, 78 A. J. I. L. 145 
(1984), p. 156; Doswald-Beck, 31 N. I. L. R. 355 (1984), p. 361; Nanda, 14 Cal. W. I. L. J. 395 
(1984), 407,409-410; Thomas & Thomas, The Dominican Republic Crisis 1965, The Ninth 
Hammarskjöld Foruin, 1967, pp. 13-16; Fenwick, The Dominican Republic: Intervention or 
Collective Self-Defense, 60 A. J. I. L. 64 (1966), p. 64; Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self- 
Defence, 1988, pp. 212-215; Schachter, 82 Mich. L. R. 1620 (1984), 1632; Jeffery, The 
American Hostages in Tehran: The I. C. J. and the Legality of Rescue Missions, 30 I. C. L. Q. 
717 (1981), pp. 724-728. 
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The above view is largely based on the Vattelian argument that the 
nationals of a State constitute an extension of the State itself; therefore, an 
attack on the nationals constitutes an attack on the State, because the 
element of a "community" (in the sense of the population of the State) is 
essential for the existence of the State27 
. 
The argument that protection of nationals is a form of exercise of 
the right of self-defence might be considered commendable in that it 
aspires to accommodating the use of force towards this end with the rule 
of non-use of force, the supremacy of which is implicitly recognised22. 
The overwhelming practice of States that have resorted to armed 
force under the plea of protection of nationals abroad seems to characterise 
such action as an exercise of the right of self-defence. 
In a statement to the House of Commons on 31 October 1956 the 
Foreign Secretary of the U. K. 
, 
Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, after strongly denying 
that the U. K. action in Suez constituted a violation of the Charter of the 
United Nations, stated that: 
" 
... 
the effect of the Charter is that force may lawfully be used or threatened on 
the express authority of the United Nations or in self-defence. And self-defence 
undoubtedly includes a situation where the lives of the State's nationals abroad are in 
imminent danger 
... 
"23 
In a speech to the House of Lords on 1 November 1956 the Lord 
Chancellor expressed the same view on the basis of the formula 
articulated by Waldock and said that the doctrine of the protection 
nationals " 
... 
was established in the case of the Caroline 
... 
"24 
. 
It is 
noteworthy that the plea of protection of nationals was argued by the U. K. 
very briefly during the debate at the Security Council25, and was 
completely abandoned before the General Assembly of the United Nations 
in favour of the argument that action had been taken in order to separate 
the belligerent parties ( Egypt and Israel) and to restore international 
navigation through the Suez Canal. It may be argued that this line of 
action was followed because it could not be argued plausibly that there was 
21 See Bowen op. cit. sure-a r. 15, pp. 91-92, but cf. p. 93; id. loc. cit. in Cassese (ed. ) op. cit. 
si+p'a n. 6, pp. 40-41; Doswald-Beck loc. cit. supra n. 20; Thomas & Thomas loc. cit. supra n. 
20, p. 14. Cf. Jeffery, loc. cit supra n. 20, p. 724. 
22 Schachter loc. cit. supra n. 20. 23 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, H. C., 5th series, vol. 558, col. 1565. Mr. Selwyn Lloyd 
went on to reproduce z'erbatim Waldock's requirements for the exercise of protection of 
nationals; ibid. col. 1566. 24 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, H. L., 5th series, vol. 199, cols. 1348-1350,1355. 25 S. C. O. R. 11th yr. 749th mtg. paras 2-11. 
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any evidence of threat to the lives of British nationals in Egypt26 
. 
Indeed, 
it seems ironic that the real threat to the lives of British and other 
European nationals occurred when the joint Anglo-French military 
operation was launched at the Suez Canal area27. 
On 14 May 1975 the U. S. armed forces launched an operation in 
Cambodia that achieved the release of the freighter S. S. Mayaguez and her 
crew that had been arrested by the Cambodian authorities in the Gulf of 
Siam on 12 May 197528 
. 
According to the Cambodian authorities the 
Mayaguez was involved in an espionage operation inside the territorial 
sea of Cambodia and the crew was taken ashore for interrogation29. 
In a letter dated 14 May 1975 from the representative of the U. S. A. to the 
President of the Security Council it was stated that: 
" 
... 
the United States Government has taken certain appropriate measures under 
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations the purpose of which is to achieve the 
release of the vessel and its crew 
... 
"30 
It must be noted that the U. S. Government provided no evidence of a 
threat to the lives of the crew of the Mayaguez 
, 
while it was the U. S. 
military action that seems to have endangered the lives of the U. S. citizens 
in Cambodian custody31 
. 
On 27 June 1976 a scheduled Air France flight from Tel Aviv to 
Paris was hijacked by an armed group which were believed to be members 
of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (P. F. L. P. )32 
. 
After 
refuelling at Benghazi airport in Libya, the Air France flight was 
commandeered to Entebbe Airport in Uganda where the hijackers were 
joined by six more men33. President Amin of Uganda visited Entebbe 
airport stating his conviction that the passengers were innocent but 
emphasising that the cause of the Palestinians was a just one and hoping 
for the early release of the hostages provided the hijackers' demands were 
met by Israel34. These demands were the release of 53 Palestinians 
26 Bowett op. cit. supra n. 15, p. 104. 
27 R. Fullick & G. Powell, Suez: The Double War, 1979, pp. 114-115,151-152. 
28 Keesing's 1975, p. 272239- 
29 Ibid. 
30 Doc. SJ 11689, S. C. O. R. 30th yr. Suppl. for April-June 1975, pp. 24-25. 31 Several members of the crew were injured during the operation; Keesing's 1975, p. 27239. 
Also see Paust, The Seizure and Recovery of the Mayaguez, 85 Yale L. J. 774 (1976), pp. 800- 
802. 
32 Keesing's 1976, p. 27888. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
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imprisoned in Israel, West Germany, Switzerland and Kenya by 1 July 1976 
failing which the hostages would suffer strict and severe punishment35 
After a second visit to the airport by President Amin, the hijackers 
released 47 of the hostages ( women, children, old men) but subsequently 
went on to separate the remaining hostages into Israelis and non-Israelis; 
the latter were released on 1 July 197636. As for the remaining Israeli 
hostages, the hijackers threatened to execute them if their demands were 
not met by 4 July 197637. On the night of 3-4 July 1976 Israel conimandos 
landed at Entebbe airport and released the hostages; the operation resulted 
in the death of three hostages, seven hijackers, twenty Ugandan soldiers 
and one Israeli commando, as well as considerable material damage at the 
airport38. During the debate on the Entebbe incident at the Security 
Council, Mr. Herzog, the Israel representative, justified the operation as an 
exercise of the right of self-defence applied in accordance to the Caroline 
formula and supported his argument by detailed reference to previous 
State practice and juridical authority39 
. 
The representative of the United 
States expressed his Government's support to Israel and stated that: 
there is a well established right to use limited force for the protection of one's 
own nationals from imminent threat of injury or death where the State in whose territory 
they are located is either unwilling or unable to protect them. The right, flowing from the 
the right of self-defence, is limited to such use of force as it is necessary and appropriate to 
protect threatened nationals from injury 
... 
"40 
An Islamic Republic was proclaimed in Iran on 11 February 1979 
subsequent to the overthrow of the Shah; on 22 October ] 979 the Shah 
arrived in N. York for medical treatment and his admission in the U. S. A. 
provoked strong protests from the Iranian Government on 26,30,31 
October and 1 November 197941 
. 
On 4 November 1979 the U. S. Embassy in 
Tehran was occupied by a group of Iranian demonstrators that held the 
diplomatic and consular staff therein as hostage the release of which was 
made conditional on the extradition of the Shah from the U. S. A. to Iran42 
. 
The Iranian Government did not appear to have incited the occupation 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. p. 27889. 
3' Ibid. 
36 Ibid. pp. 27889-27890. 39 S. C. O. R. 31st yr. 1939th mtg. paras 101,106-121. 
40 Ibid. 1941st mtg. pars 77. 
41 Keesing's 1980, pp. 30141,30149-30150. 
4 
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of the U. S. Embassy43 but it was later established that it had subsequently 
endorsed the demonstrators' action44 
. 
The U. S. Government demanded 
the unconditional release of the hostages45 and took a series of economic 
and diplomatic counter-measures against Iran46 
. 
At the same time the 
U. S. instituted proceedings against Iran before the I. C. J. 47 and brought the 
hostages question to the attention of the Security Council48 
. 
On 24 April 
1980 a U. S. commando force mounted an operation inside Iran for the 
release of the Embassy hostages; the rescue mission was, however, 
abandoned in its early stages due to the failure of three of the eight 
helicopters involved48 
. 
In a letter dated 25 April 1980 from the 
representative of the U. S. A. to the President of the Security Council it was 
stated that the mission in Iran, 
" 
... 
was carried out by the United States in exercise of of its inherent right of self- 
defence, with the aim of extricating American nationals who have been and remain the 
victims of the Iranian armed attack on our embassy 
... 
"49 
Lastly, the United States Government invoked the right to protect 
U. S. nationals as an exercise of the right of self-defence in justification of 
the military operation in Panama on 20 December 198950 
. 
It is submitted that the characterisation of military action for the 
protection of nationals as an exercise of the right of self-defence on the 
basis of the argument that an attack on the nationals of a State is an attack 
on the State itself, is ill-founded and question-begging. 
43 Ibid. Also see Hostages Case 
, 
I. C. J. Rep. 1980, p. 3, at pp. 29-30, paras 58-60; cf 
. 
para 
61. 
`a`} Keesing's 1980, p. 30205; I. C. J. Rep. 1980, p. 3, at pp. 33-35, paras 69-74. 
45 Keesing's 1980, p. 30150 
46 Ibid. pp. 30206,30529. Also see M. Nash, Contemporary Practice of the U. S. Relating to 
International Law, 74 A. I. I. L. 657 (1980), pp. 657,663-665,658-660,668-673. 
These measures included the halting of shipment of $300,000,000 worth of military spare 
parts; the expulsion of Iranian students from the U. S. A.; a ban of oil imports from Iran; the 
break-off of diplomatic relations; the freezing of assets of the Iranian Government in the 
U. S.; the prohibition of all exports to [ran except for food an medicine; the invalidation of 
all entry visas to the U. S. 47 Text of the application in 74 A. I. I. L. 258 (1980). 
48 The Security Council adopted S. C. Res. 457 (1979) of 4 Dec. 1979 and S. C. Res. 461 (1979) 
of 31 Dec. 1979, respectively calling for the release of the hostages and deploring their 
continuing detention. On 13 January 1980 a U. S. draft Resolution authorising economic 
sanctions against Iran under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter failed to be adopted due to 
the negative vote of the U. S. S. R. See S. C. O. R. 35th yr. 2191st mtg. paras 44-56,149,164- 
168; text of draft resolution 
, 
Doc. S/ 13735, S. C. O. R. 35th yr. Suppl. for Jan. 
-March 1980, pp. 
10-11. 
48bis Keesing's 1980, p. 30531. 
49 Doc. S/ 13908, S. C. O. R. 35th yr. Suppl. for April-June 1980, pp. 28-29. 50 Keesing's 1989, p. 37112. 
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The right of self-defence is exercised according to Article 51 of the 
Charter and customary international law only if there is an "armed attack" 
against a State51 
.A use of armed force in violation of Article 2(4 ) and of 
the rule of non-use of force does not automatically constitute an armed 
attack. That use of force is an armed attack which is of such "scale and 
effects" that it is prejudicial to the international standing of a State as a 
sovereign, political, territorial and economic entity. To say that a forcible 
act against the nationals of a State constitutes an "armed attack" would 
imply that force is used against the totality or overwhelming majority of 
the population of the State52 
. 
Furthermore, the argument that an attack 
on the citizens of a State is an attack against the latter appears to award to 
the nationals of a State a standing that individuals are not thought to 
possess in international law53. This is so because an armed attack is an 
event which State practice and the United Nations Charter (by virtue of 
Articles 2(4) and 51 considered in conjunction) view as an act committed 
by a State and directed against another State. To use the same term to 
connote a situation where the lives of a State's nationals are threatened by 
another State and immediately assert an ipso facto attack against the State 
of nationality is a process which requires further explanation which, 
unfortunately, is not forthcoming in most works of authority. Thus, 
Fawcett is right in claiming that: 
" 
... 
To regard the mistreatment of nationals or the infringement of property rights 
as an "armed attack" within the scope of Article 51 would be to empty that expression of 
all its real meaning and is plainly inadmissible 
... 
"54 
Moreover, the identification of the nationals with their State begs 
the question of whether a certain numerical minimum of nationals must 
exist as requirement for the use of military force for their protection. In the 
cases of the Mayaguez 
, 
Entebbe and the U. S. mission in Iran there were 
less than one hundred individuals to be rescued. By contrast, in the cases 
of the Congo, the Dominican Republic and Panama the persons to be 
protected were several thousand. Schweisfurth has rightly pointed that in 
51 Nicaragua Case ( Meats ), I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, at p. 103, para 195. 
52 Fier, 142 H. R. C. 297 (1374 If), pp. 392-393; Higgins, 
, 
37 B. Y. I. L. 269 (1961), p. 316; 
Jefferv, 30 I. C. L. Q. 717 (1981), p. 724; Ronzitti op. cit. supra n. 16, p. 11 but cf. p. 12; Raby, 
30 C. de D. 441 (1989), p. 477; Schweisfurth, 23 G. Y. I. L. 159 (1980), pp. 163-164; Quigley, 
The Legality of the United States Invasion of Panama, 15 Yale J. I. L. 276 (1990), pp. 292-4; 
I. C. J. Rep. 1980 ( per Judge A'torozov ), pp. 56-57, para 8; ibid. ( per Judge Tarazi ), pp. 64-65; 
the Entebbe incident, S. C. O. R. 31st yr. 1942nd mtg paras 39 (Romania), 146 (India). 
53 Akehurst, 5 Int. Rel. 3 (1977), p-17- 
54 Fawcett, 103 H. R. C. 347 (1961 11), p. 404. 
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the absence of any such established criterion it is the decision-maker that 
not only decides to use force for the protection of nationals, but rather " 
... 
decides in advance whether this right does exist at all 
... 
"55 
. 
Bowett has 
argued that the point where a threat to the nationals implies a threat to 
the State is not to be judged by "counting heads"; instead he proposes, first, 
" 
... 
the principle of relativity of rights which demands a weighing of one 
State's right to territorial integrity against other States' right of protection 
[of their nationals] 
... 
" and, secondly, the principle of proportionality56 
. 
It is submitted that the above view reinforces the question-begging 
nature of the argument used as a basis for considering protection of 
nationals as exercise of self-defence. To argue on the ground of the 
principle of proportionality indicates that the necessity of self-defence, a 
contingency that has to be separately and conclusively established, already 
exists, without any prior explanation. The assertion 
, 
then, of a "a right of 
protection" places the argument for the establishment of a necessity of self- 
defence with regard to threats to nationals on the very concept that needs 
to be proven. Moreover, it also misplaces the point at issue, which is not a 
right of forcible protection, but rather the a priori obligation to refrain 
from the use of armed force except for the existence of a necessity of self- 
defences' 
The formula propounded by Waldock has been expressly adhered to 
by the U. K. Government during the Suez crisis58 and the Israel 
Government during the Security Council debate on the Entebbe incident59 
. 
This view is open to the criticism expressed by the present author supra 
when dealing with the concept of individual self-defence against an armed 
attack; namely, that it is pointless to try to establish the content of 
contemporary customary law on self-defence by invoking a precedent that 
took place at a time when force was not prohibited in international 
relations and regarding it as the conclusive statement of the law by 
ignoring the State practice from the middle of the 19th century until 
194560. 
The practice of States with regard to the protection of nationals as an 
exercise of the right of self-defence and, especially, the Entebbe incident 
55 Schweisfurth, 23 G. Y. I. L. 159 (1980), p. 164. 
56 Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law, 1958, pp. 93-94; id. loc. cit. in Cassese (ed. ) 
o cit. supra n. 6, p. 43. 
5ý Schweisfurth, 23 G. Y. I. L. 159 (1980), p. 169. 
58 Supra n. 24. 
59 S. C. O. R. 31st yr, 1939th mtg pars 115. 
'0 See supra Part Two 
, 
Ch. 9, First Title. 
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and the U. S. mission to Iran, come very close in supporting a theory, albeit 
very tenuously, of admissibility of defensive action on the part of a State 
that is consummated in the rescue of its nationals that are in mortal 
danger"bls 
. 
It is submitted de lege ferenda that the basis of lawfulness of such 
military action is not self-defence against an armed attack but rather the 
concept of proportionate counter-measures "analogous to self-defence"61, 
against a use of force short of an armed attack. The main issue at this point 
is whether the imminent danger to the lives of a State's nationals 
constitutes a use of force against that State in the sense of Article 2(4 ) of 
the Charter. It is submitted that if the nationals of a State are seized by 
another State or by groups of individuals with the complicity or material 
support of another State and a threat is put on their lives by which the 
State of nationality is blackmailed to committing an act or omission, then 
the force threatened or used against its nationals is in reality force directed 
against the State62 
. 
For if a State is blackmailed by way of coercion against 
the lives of its nationals to act in a way that compromises or deprives it of 
the freedom of sovereignty to do or not to do something, then it is a 
coercion directed against the State. What brings this activity within the 
ambit of Article 2(4 ) of the Charter is, first, that this coercion is perpetrated 
directly or indirectly by another State, and, secondly, the fact that that 
armed violence is used against individuals that are linked with bond of 
nationality to another State in order to achieve certain ends on the part of 
the latter by paralysing its sovereign discretion to act or not in relation to a 
certain contingency. 
This is illustrated by both the Entebbe incident and the U. S. action 
in Iran. In both cases Israeli and U. S. nationals had been seized hostage 
and certain demands had been made to both Israel and the U. S. A. failing 
the satisfaction of which the hostages would perish63. In both cases the 
State where the hostages were held «gas implicated by supporting the 
hostage takers. In the case of the Iran this has been held by the Court in the 
Hostages Case to be established. There has been no such positive 
affirmation in the case of the Entebbe incident. The great length of the 
6Ohic See infra section on the Evaluation of State practice, p. 416 et seq. ('1 Si+pºa 
, 
Part Two, Ch. 9, Second Title. See also supra n. 60bis. 
h2 Schachter, 53 Univ. Chic. L. R. 713 (1986), p. 139 n. 107; Dinstein op. cit. supra n. 20, p. 
214. 
63 This is definitely the case with regard to the Israeli hostages at Entebbe. It is not 
certain whether the U. S. hostages in Tehran faced an imminent threat to their lives. See 
Schachter, 82' Mirk. L. R. 1620 (1984), p. 1632. 
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Israeli argument about the complicity of the Ugandan Government64 and 
the persistent denial by the latter of the Israel allegation65, are of 
considerable significance. During the debate at the Security Council on the 
Entebbe incident the representative of the U. S. A. made the following 
statement with regard to the position of Israel: 
" 
... 
That Israel might have secured the release of its nationals by complying with 
the terrorists' demands does not alter these conclusions 
... 
No State is required to yield 
control over persons in lawful custody in its territory under criminal charges 
... 
"66 
What appears to make this contingency plausible is the fact that 
Governments are always sensitive with regard to the well-being of their 
citizens, notably when the latter have a "genuine link" with the State 
whose nationality they beach' 
. 
It is the view of this author that a case of 
defensive action by way of counter-measures weakens considerably in 
situations of nationals of a State that effectivelyT reside and have their 
livelihood in another State. This could be arguably be the case about 
Europeans that remained in former colonies after their independence 
- 
e. g. 
the Congo. Admittedly the concept of nationality has not been 
conclusively defined in international law68 ; however, what matters is not 
that a State is to be given a general right to use force because the lives of its 
nationals are in mortal danger, but, rather, a situation where a State itself 
is the victim of coercion in defiance of its sovereignty. The danger to the 
lives of the State's nationals appears to constitute the means rather than 
the sole and final object of coercion. It is thus appropriate in the opinion of 
this writer to establish a "genuine link" between individuals and the 
intervening State in every specific instance that use of force has been 
resorted to in such circumstances. Such link, however, is to be a link of 
nationality and not a link on religious or ethnic grounds between the 
intervening State and the individuals in mortal danger69 
b4 S. C. O. R. 31st yr. 1939th mtg. paras 92-97; 1942nd mtg. paras 80-91. 
65 Ibid. 1939th mtg. paras 34-35. 
"r" Ibid_ para 60; also see 1943rd mtg. para 44 (France). 
67 Nollebolun Case, I. C. J. Rep. 1955, p. 4, at pp. 31-33. 
68 See Brownlie, lntri-nationa! Law and the Use of Force by States, 7963, p. 300. 
69 Cf. The assertion in statements of the Israeli Government of a general right to resort to 
force for the protection of Jews generally, as opposed to Jews of Israeli nationality. See 
statement by Mr. Herzog before the S. C. during the debate on the Entebbe incident, S. C. O. R. 
31st yr. 1939th mtg. paras 81-83,112; statement by Mr. Netanyahu during the S. C. debate on 
the Israel air strike on the P. L. O. Headquarters in Tunis (1985), U. N. Chronicle, vol. XII, 
nos 10/ 11, Nov. / Dec. 1985, p. 4. 
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(3) That there is an autonomous right to use force for the protection of 
nationals 
. 
It has been suggested both in the practice of States and the works of 
certain jurists that the use of force for the protection of nationals abroad is 
admissible under the United Nations Charter and customary international 
law as an autonomous right70 
. 
The Government of the U. S. A. justified its military action in 
Grenada on this basis. According to the U. S. Department of State, " 
... [P]rotection of nationals is a well-established, narrowly drawn ground for 
the use of force which has not been considered to conflict with the United 
Nations Charter 
... 
"; moreover, it has been expressly stated that in the case 
of Grenada the U. S. A. avoided relying on the right of self-defence under 
Article 51 " 
... 
for the same reasons as in the Cuban missile crisis 
... 
"71 
. 
Akehurst72 has suggested on the basis of the Entebbe incident that a 
narrow exception to Article 2(4) of the Charter may be envisaged in the 
case of nationals of the intervening State being led involutarily to the 
territory of another State. 
The present author considers the above views unsatisfactory for the 
following reasons. First, simply to say that protection of nationals is 
admissible under the Charter simply begs the very question whether this 
is so. The text of the Charter contains no such stipulation and it is indeed % 
interesting to know on the basis of which exception to Art. 2(4) the alleged 
right is established. Secondly, the view expressed by Akehurst initially 
appears commendable in that it aspires to restricting resort to force for the 
protection of nationals only to cases of abduction of the citizens of a State 
by another State or individuals having the support of another State. 
However, it is not explained on the basis of an existing exception to the 
rule of non-use of force. Akehurst considers cases where "... a State (or 
individuals for whose acts the State is responsible) brings the nationals of 
another State on to its territory and in violation of international law 
... 
"73 
In this case he contends that the State of nationality may use force to 
rescue its citizens and that the State where they are held " 
... 
cannot invoke 
70 Akehurst, 5 Int. Rel. 3 (1977), pp. 21-22; Henkin, 216 H. R. C. 19 (1989 1V), p. 153; cf 
. Raby, 30 C. de D. 441 (1989), pp. 476,477 et seq. 
71 Letter from Mr. D. R. Robinson to Prof. Gordon, 18 hit. Lawyer 381 (1984), p. 385. 
72 Loc. cit. supra n. 70; also see Henkin loc. cit. supra n. 70. 
73 Akehurst loc. cit. supra n. 70, p. 21. 
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its territorial sovereignty 
... 
when the presence of nationals in its territory 
was the result of its own violation of the territorial sovereignty of the 
State from which the individuals were abducted 
... 
"74 
. 
As it stands, the 
above suggestion would only apply to cases of abduction of a State's 
nationals from within the latter's territory 
-a contingency unsupported by 
State practice75. In fact, the Israeli nationals that were rescued at Entebbe 
had not been abducted in Israel but in Greece. In addition, Akehurst's view 
in effect enlarges the scope of exceptions to Article 2(4 ) by suggesting 
military action to rescue captured nationals as an autonomous ground for 
unilateral resort to force76 
. 
Finally, an examination of State practice points to the opposite 
conclusion with regard to the existence of an autonomous right of 
protection of nationals under the United Nations Charter. With the 
exception of the U. S. action in Grenada, all other instances of use of armed 
force for the protection of nationals abroad were justified either on the 
basis of the right of self-defence77 or a state of necessity78 or the consent of 
the target State79 
. 
(4) That protection of nationals is a form of protection of human rights 
. 
Schweisfurths° has articulated a theory according to which there is 
a conflict of obligations for a State when its nationals are in mortal danger, 
namely, the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force and the 
obligation to protect the human rights of its citizens81 
. 
He then argues 
that the power to protect human rights of individuals depends on the 
nationality of the latter, and that the advancement of the law with regard 
to such protection has strengthened the bond established by nationality 
between a State and its citizens to the point that the former may lawfully 
74 Ibid. 
75 See Ronzitti op. cit. supra n. 16, p. 14. 
7o See SchweisIurtl6,23 G. Y. t. L. 159 (1980), p. 165. 
77 See Suez (1956), The A9uyaguez (1975), Entebbe (1976), U. S. action in Iran (1980), 
Panama (1989). 
78 See the Belgian action in the Congo (1960) 79 See Lebanon (1958), Stanleyville (1964), The Dominican Republic (1965), Mogadishu 
(1977), Kolwezi, Zaire (1978), Grenada (1983), Malta (1985), Somalia (1988,1991), Liberia 
(1990), Kinshasha, Zaire (1991). 
8() Schweisfurth, Operations to Rescue Nationals in Third States Involving the Use of 
Force in Relation to the Protection of Human Rights, 23 G. Y. I. L. 159 (1980). 
81 Ibid. pp. 169,170-173. 
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protect the human rights of the latter extraterritorially, even by the use of 
force82 
. 
Schweisfurth contends that only the intransigence of a State in 
not respecting the human rights of the citizens of another State would 
legitimise the latter in undertaking a rescue operation by military means. 
Moreover, he argues that on balance the obligation to respect human 
rights should prevail over the obligation not to use force for in the case of 
a rescue operation the latter obligation is only temporarily breached83. 
The present author feels bound to disagree with the above view. 
First, "a balance of values" is not supported in the practice of States. No 
State that has resorted to force to protect its nationals, has ever justified its 
action on the basis of a superior obligation to support the human rights of 
its citizens84 
. 
Indeed, this view appears to overlook the character of the 
prohibition of the use of force as a rule of jus cogens 84bis 
. 
Secondly, 
Schweisfurth's theory extends the scope of what has traditionally been the 
object of protection, namely, the lives of nationals against mortal danger. 
Finally, there is no basis in contemporary international law for the 
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the use of force for the protection 
of the human rights of the citizen's of a State. The obligation of a State to 
protect human rights appears to extend only within its own jurisdiction 
and not beyond. To say that the opposite is admissible would gravely 
endanger international peace and security85. 
The Question of Protection of Property of Nationals 
. 
Authority has generally treated the issue either with extreme 
scepticism86 or with outright rejection87 
. 
Bowett, an eminent supporter of 
the lawfulness of the use of force for the protection of the lives of 
nationals, approaches the matter cautiously by remarking at the outset that 
82 Ibid. pp. 174-179. By Human Rights Schweisfurth means "fundamental human rights" 
which he designates by sefererece to the non-derogable rights under the U. N. Covenant on 
Cavil and Political Rights. See /rtiere. 4 of the Covenant. 
83 Ebid. p. 178. 84 Cf. statement by the Italian representative during the S. C. debate on the Belgian action 
in the Congo, S. C. O. R. 15th yr. 873rd mtg. paras 120-121. 84bis See I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, pp. 100-101, para 190. 85 Contra 
, 
Schweisfurth loc. cit. supra n. 80, p. 176. 8f' Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 68, p. 300; Farer, Humanitarian Intervention. The View From 
Charlottesville, in Lillich (ed. ) Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations, 1973, 
p 155. $ý Akehurst, 5 Int. Rel. 3 (1977), p. 19; Paust, 85 Yale L. J. 774 (1976), p. 800. 
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" 
... 
one hesitates to place the same value on property as one does on 
human life 
... 
"88 
. 
He, nevertheless, feels inclined to admit the exercise of 
forcible action towards this end in case of threat to property the destruction 
of which cannot be met with compensation or restitutio 
, 
or property 
relevant to the security of the State, such as military hardware89. 
There is paucity in State practice with regard to the issue. States that 
have resorted to force for the protection of nationals have consistently 
given primacy to the protection of their lives and either have not 
expressed any claim of a right to protect their property or made collateral 
reference to it. 
On 2 August 1946, during riots that had broken out in Abadan, seat 
of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. in southern Iran, the U. K. Government 
dispatched troops from India " 
... 
in order that they may be at hand for the 
protection, should circumstances demand it, of Indian and British lives, 
and in order to safeguard Indian and British interests in South Persia 
... 
"90 
In the aftermath of the nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. 
in 1951, the U. K. Government again contemplated military action for the 
protection of British lives in Iran91 
. 
It is significant that Foreign Secretary 
H. Morrison, when asked in the House of Commons whether the 
undertaking to protect British nationals also applied to the British 
installations and property, he treated the protection of property as "a 
different matter"92. 
Exactly the opposite view was taken in the speeches made by 
Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd and the Lord Chancellor to the House of 
Commons and the House of Lords respectively during the Suez crisis. 
The Foreign Secretary stated on 31 October 1956 that: 
" 
... 
It has certainly been argued that there is a great distinction between the 
prevention of the loss of human lives and the protection of property. Yet if the interests 
concerned are sufficiently vital and if the damage which threatens them is sufficiently 
great, then, I believe that action to protect our interests is also justified 
... 
"93 
The Lord Chancellor took the view that: 
88 Bowett loc. cit. in Cassese (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 6, p. 48; id. op. cit. supra n. 15, p. 100. 89 Id. loc. cit. in Cassese (ed. ) op. cit. pp. 48-49; op. cit. p. 103. 
90 Keesing's 1946-1948, p. 8084. 
91 Keesing's 1950-1952, pp. 11575,11602. 
92 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, H. C. 
, 
5th series, vol. 489, col. 1189. 93 Ibid. vol. 558, col. 1566. 
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" 
... 
if really valuable and internationally important foreign property is in danger 
of irreparable injury, through the breakdown of order, entry by a foreign State for the sole 
purpose of securing the safety of that property is excusable 
... 
"94 
In the case of the rescue of the Mayaguez and her crew there was no 
reference to the importance of the vessel to the U. S. Government. 
In June 1990 the U. S. A. dispatched six warships with a contingent of 
2,000 Marines off the coast of Liberia, which had been in a state of civil war 
since December 1989 and where the rule of the Government of President 
Doe had totally collapsed95 
. 
The U. S. Government contemplated the 
landing of troops for the protection of U. S. nationals in the capital 
Monrovia as well as the protection of sophisticated information gathering 
and submarine detection detection installations therein; while U. S. 
nationals were airlifted in mid-June 1990 from Monrovia, no action 
appears to have been taken with regard to the installations96. 
It is submitted that the practice of States does not support the 
existence of any right to protect the property of nationals abroad. The U. K. 
practice is somewhat inconsistent in that while no reference was made to 
the forcible protection of the assets of Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. in 1951, a 
totally different position was adopted with regard to the Suez Canal in 
1956. Furthermore, what makes the latter claim even more doubtful in 
law is that it appears to be based on a general right of self-preservation for 
the protection of the "vital interests" of the State. Finally, in so far as 
Public Contract Debts are concerned the use of force for their collection is 
expressly prohibited by virtue of the Hague Convention I, 1907 97. 
Evaluation of State Practice 
. 
It is rather controversial to establish with finality whether resort to 
force for the protection of nationals constitutes part of contemporary 
international law. Eminent authority is either opposite or very sceptical 
about the lawfulness of such use of force9s 
. 
Moreover, State practice does 
94 Ibid. H. L., vol. 199, cos. 1349. 95 Keesing's 1990, p. 37601. 96 Ibid. 
97 U. K. Treaty Series 1909-1911, vol. 2, no 7,1179. 
98 See Wehberg, L' Interdiction du Recours ä la Force. Le Principe et les Problemes qui se 
posent, 78 H. R. C. 7 (1951 1), p. 71; Fawcett, 103 H. R. C. 347 (1961 11), pp. 404-405; Higgins, 
37 B. Y. I. L. 269 (1961), pp. 316-317; id. Intervention and International Law, in Bull (ed. ) 
Intervention in World Politics, 1984, p. 38; Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 68, pp. 298-301; id. The 
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not appear to be conclusive, because every instance of the use of force 
under the justification of the protection of nationals has not been left 
unopposed. 
The dispatch of U. K. forces to Basra on 2 August 1946 in 
contemplation of intervention in Abadan in Southern Iran, encountered 
the protest of the Iranian Government. It was stated on 5 August 1946 by 
Prince Firouz, the Minister of Labour and Propaganda, that there had not 
been the "slightest legal justification" for the sending of British troops, 
that this act constituted breach of Iran's sovereignty and that it was 
contrary to the United Nations Charter". 
A similar protest was levelled by the Iranian Government towards 
the dispatch of British forces in the area in 1951, in the aftermath of the 
nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Mr. Kazemi, the Iranian 
Foreign Minister, stated that the U. K. action aimed at intimidating Persia 
and demanded that the Government of Iraq, where the U. K. forces were 
stationed, take "all appropriate steps" to rectify the situation100 
. 
The Belgian action in the Congo on 10 July 1960 raised considerable 
opposition by both the Government of the Congo, that requested United 
Nations military assistance to meet the Belgian intervention101 and by 
third States. During the debate at the Security Council the representative 
of Tunisia expressly stated that the acts of violence against Belgian and 
other European nationals in the Congo appeared to have been sparked off 
by the very Belgian military intervention that was supposed to offer 
protection against such acts102 
. 
Moreover, the representatives of Poland 
and the U. S. S. R. took the view that the Belgian use of force constituted 
"aggression" 103 
. 
The above contention seems to have been established on 
the basis of the allegation that the real aim of the Belgian Government 
was the support of the secession of Katanga, the south-eastern province of 
the Congo. The secession took place subsequently to the Belgian 
Principle of Non-Use of Force in Contemporary International Law, in Butler (ed. ) The Non- 
Use of Force in International Lau,, 1989, pp. 23-24; Akehurst, 5 Int. Rel. 3 (1977), p. 16 et seq. 
; Farer, 142 H. R. C. 297 (1974 11), pp. 392-393, but cf. id. Panama: Beyond the Charter 
Paradigm, 84 A. I. I. L. 503 (1950), p. 505; Quigley, The United States Invasion of Grenada: 
Stranger than Fiction, 18 Miami U. Inter-Ain. L. R. 271 (1986-87), p. 303; D' Angelo, 21 Va. 
J. I. L. 485 (1981), 519; Ronzitti op. cit. supra n. 16, p. 64; Milenhovic, 29 Review of 
International Affairs (Belgrade) 33 (1978), p. 35. 
99 Keesing's 1946-1948, p. 8084. 
100 Keesing's 1950-1952, p. 11603. 
101 Keesing's 1959-1960,17642. 
102 S. C. O. R. 15th yr. 873rd mtg. paras 81-86. 
103 Ibid. paras 103 (U. S. S. R. ), 156,158 (Poland). 
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intervention that mainly occurred in that province, and where vast 
quantities of mineral wealth existed that were exploited by Belgian 
nationals during the years of colonial administration. Indeed, the attitude 
of the Belgian Government towards the Katangese secession appeared to 
be very equivocal. Prime Minister Eyskens stated with regard to the 
secessionist authorities in Katanga that he preferred the presence of such a 
Government " 
... 
which seems to be taking decisions in certain fields, has a 
Parliamentary majority, and is trying to re-establish order 
... 
"104 
. 
Furthermore, during the debate at the Security Council, the Belgian 
representative suggested that the military intervention by his country's 
forces was carried out with the consent of " 
... 
the head of the provisional 
Government of Katanga 
... 
"105. Finally, the Belgian Government rendered 
technical and economic assistance to the secessionist movement in 
Katanga106. 
The U. S. action in the Dominican Republic on 28 April 1965 was 
justified as having been undertaken at the request of the local authorities 
and for the protection of the lives of U. S. and other nationals107 
. 
Two 
facts, however, are significant. First, that the U. S. A. immediately sought 
endorsement of her action by the O. A. S. and, secondly, that it was stated by 
the U. S. Government both within and without the United Nations that 
the operation aimed at "preventing another communist State" in the 
Western hernispherel08 
. 
The speed with which the U. S. Government had 
recourse to the O. A. S. and sought to transform an act of unilateral use of 
force to an act of collective regional security, has been interpreted as 
suggesting that the U. S. Government did not consider the justification 
offered as tenable on the basis of the facts109 
. 
The Cuban representative in 
the Security Council treated the U. S. justification of protection of nationals 
as merely a "pretext" and concluded that: 
104 Keesing's 1959-1960, p. 17639. 
105 S. C. O. R. 15th yr. 873rd mtg. paras 186 et seq. 
106 Keesing's 1959-1960, pp. J7645-17646. 
107 See Letter dated 29 April 1%5 from the representative of the U. S. A. to the President of 
the Security Council, Doc. S/6310, S. C. O. R_ 20th yr. Suppl. for April-June 1965, pp. 55-56; 
statement before the S. C. for the U. S. A. by Mr. A. Stevenson, S. C. O. R. 20th yr. 1196th mtg. 
para 67. 
108 See Television broadcast of 2 May 1965 by U. S. President L. Johnson, Keesing's 1965- 
1966, pp. 20813-20814; S. C. O. R. 20th yr. 11%th mtg paras 64-66,82,92-93; id. 1202nd mtg 
para 19 (China). 
109 Brownlie, Thoughts of Kind-Hearted Gunmen, in Lillich (ed. ) Humanitarian 
Intervention and the United Nations, 1973, p. 139. 
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" 
... 
if a powerful country can land troops on the territory of a small country in 
which some of its citizens happen to live or to own property, no weak country anywhere 
will be able to enjoy sovereignty or independence 
... 
"110 
Moreover, the representative of Jordan stated: 
" 
... 
What happened was a swift armed intervention by the U. S. in response to a 
report or an appraisal of the situation from the United States authorities in Santo 
Domingo. The question that one is bound to ask in such a case is whether any Government 
under similar circumstances in any other country could feel free to take similar action. That 
course, if condoned, will undermine the basic principles of the sovereignty of States and 
international order 
... 
"111 
An interesting statement was made by the representative of France; 
he said that: 
" 
... 
We fully understand that with the onset of a situation of civil war and the 
violent clashes taking place, the Government of the United States should have been 
concerned for the safety of its nationals and should have wished to see to their evacuation. 
However, as in many similar cases in the past, such operations should be limited in 
their objective 
, 
in their duration and in the scope of the measures applied. Should this not 
be the case we would have to recognise that, owing to the dispatch and landing of a 
considerable number of United States troops, we are faced with a genuine armed 
intervention the necessity of which is not apparent 
... 
" 
112 
The U. S. military operation for the rescue of the S. S. Mayaguez and 
her crew was met with protests from the Cambodian and Algerian 
Governments that considered the U. S. action as an act of "aggression", 
while the Chinese Government protested by claiming that the Mayaguez 
was seized in Cambodia's territorial sea and that the U. S. had committed 
an "act of piracy" 113 
The Israeli operation at Entebbe in 1976 was condemned by Uganda 
as "aggression" and "invasion"114. Other States pointed at what they 
considered as the unlawfulness of the Israeli action but refrained from 
110 S. C. O. R. 20th yr. 1196th mtg para 126. 
111 Ibid. 1200th mtg para 8. 112 Ibid. 1198th mtg paras 111-112. 
113 Ronzitti op. cit. supra n. 16, p. 36. 
114 See Letter dated 5 July 1976 from the representative of Uganda to the President of the 
Security Council, annexing a message dated 4 July 1976 from the President of the Republic of 
Uganda to the Prime Minister of Mauritius, Current Chairman of the O. A. U., to the 
President of the Security Council, and to the Secretary General, Doc. S/ 12124, S. C. O. R. 31st 
yr. Suppl. for July-Sept. 1976, p. 3. Statement by the Foreign Minister of Uganda to the S. C. 
, 
S. C. O. R. 31st yr. 1939th mtg para 37. Several representatives of third States took the 
same view. See statements, 1939th mtg paras 47 (Mauritania), 148-160 (Kenya), 168-170 
(Qatar), 209-222 (Cameroon), 224 (China), 232-250 (Libya); 1940th mtg paras 28 (Guinea), 
84 (Guyana); 1941st mtg paras 9 (Benin), 30 (Somalia), 65 (Yugoslavia), 127,134 (Pakistan), 
160,162 (U. S. S. R. ). 
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condemning the operation] 15 
. 
The representative of Guyana considered 
the Israeli operation as "gun-boat diplomacy" which would make small 
and weak States " 
... 
hostage to the dictates of naked power 
... 
" 116. The 
representative of Tanzania characterised the Israeli action unlawful on 
these grounds: 
" 
... 
Israel has no case in international law as it exists now. Whatever might have 
been the law in the past, and whatever writers and jurists of the past have seen as law 
with regard to the right of a State to protect its nationals abroad, such is no longer the case 
now. The advent of the law of the Charter did away with all the traditional methods for 
a State to obtain satisfaction on a unilateral basis by employing measures short of war 
which were being resorted to in the past 
.............. 
................... 
The Israeli military action at Entebbe cannot be taken lightly. It is a 
dangerous precedent which if allowed to go uncontested, would usher in a new era in 
international relations, an era of lawlessness 
... 
"117 
Finally, the representative of Panama, after stating that the Israeli 
action could not be in self-defence because Israel had not been the victim 
of an armed attack by Uganda' 18, said that: 
" 
... 
Some delegations have invoked as justification for Israel's action the right of 
that State to protect its nationals who had been kidnapped on foreign territory. We must 
point out, however, that the international Court of Justice in the Hague, though admitting 
that it is an elementary principle of international law that a State has the authority to 
protect its nationals who have been harmed by acts contrary to international law 
committed by another State, at the same time limits that right to the exercise of 
diplomatic or international judicial action and, in any case, to the means of the peaceful 
settlement of disputes laid down in Article 33 of the Charter. 
The military action taken by Israel is not, therefore, characteristic of the right of a 
State to protect its nationals, as this right is envisaged in the Charter among the peaceful 
means for the settlement of disputes, but rather becomes an act of armed intervention such as 
those frequently resorted to by powerful countries against weaker countries 
... 
"119 
The U. S. abortive operation in Iran in 1980 was condemned by the 
U. S. S. R. and the Arab countries except Egypt as "aggression" 120. The 
Iranian Government denounced the action as tantamount to an act of 
war121. 
The military in intervention in. Grenada in October 1983 was 
condemned by the majority of States at the Security Council as unlawful 
115 S. C. O. R. tSth yr. 1944th mtg pacas 122-123 (Sweden); 1942nd mtg paras 57-58 (Japan). 
116 Ibid. 1940th mtg Para 85. 
117 Ibid. 1941st mtg paras 104,109. See also paras 105-107. 
118 Ibid. 1942nd mtg para 27. 119 Ibid. paras 30-31; also see Letter dated 9 July 1976 from the representative of Mexico to 
the President of the Security Council, Doc. S/ 12135, S. C. O. R. 31st yr. Suppl. for July-Sept. 
1976, p. 14. 
120 Keesing's 1980, p. 30534; cf. Ronzitti op. cit. supra n. 16, p. 46. 
121 Keesing's 1980, p. 30533. 
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intervention in the internal affairs of another State. With regard to the 
U. S. plea of protection of nationals, the Nicaraguan representative 
considered it as a relic of the 19th century power politics122. The 
representatives of Colombia and Mexico treated the U. S. action as a threat 
to international peace and security123 
, 
while the Chinese representative 
said that the U. S. operation under whatever pretext was "absolutely 
inadmissible" 124 
. 
By far the most important statement, however, came 
from the representative of France, a country that has been in principle in 
support of military action for the protection of nationals, that indicates a 
certain scepticism as to the admissibility of unilateral resort to force in 
cases other than under a request by the Government of a country or by way 
of authorisation by the Security Council125 
. 
The representative of The 
Netherlands took the view that the U. S. operation was incompatible with 
the principles of the United Nations Charter126 
. 
Finally, the 
representative of the U. S. S. R. condemned the U. S. action by drawing a 
parallel with the operation in the Dominican Republic] 27 
. 
Furthermore, the U. S. military intervention in Panama in 1989 was 
also met with considerable international condemnation128. 
State practice, notably, the attitude of the target State and third States 
towards the use of force for the protection of nationals, and authority, 
reveal that the opposition to the principle is established on two 
considerations: First, the likelihood of abuse and secondly the dangerous 
situation that such military action might create for international peace and 
security. 
The likelihood of abuse as an argument is based on two grounds. 
First, that protection of nationals constitutes a use of force which is the 
privilege of powerful Western States, and, secondly, that it has been used 
as a pretext for the advancement of those States' political and economic 
interests129. The argument with regard to abuse finds support in the 
122 U. N. Chronide Vol. XX, No 11, Dec. 1983, p. 16. Also see statements by the 
representatiwes of Grenada, p. 17 and Cuba, pp. 17-18. 
123 Ibid. pp. 19,20. 
124 Ibid. p. 21. 125 Ibid. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid. p. 22. 
128 Keesing's 1989, p. 37112. 129 See Wehberg loc. cit. supra n. 98; Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 68, p. 300; Higgins, 37 
B. Y. I. L. 269 (1961), p. 317; Akehurst, 5 Int. Rel. 3 (1977), p. 6; Gilmore, The Grenada 
Intervention, 1984, pp. 60-64; Farer, loc. cit. in Lillich (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 86, pp. 155-156; 
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famous dictum of the International Court in the Corfu Channel Case in 
relation to the lawfulness of intervention as "manifestation of force"130. 
The contention that only a specific group of States has resorted to armed 
force for the protection of nationals is largely true but not absolute. 
Whereas the majority of these States have been militarily or politically 
powerful it is not the case of a monopoly of the Western States any more. 
Some States that were traditionally considered as the target of such 
intervention have invoked the right themselves. Egypt has used force for 
the protection of nationals on two occasions, in Cyprus (1978)131 and 
Malta (1985)132, while it expressly supported the U. S. action in Iran133. 
The ECOMOG, the peace-keeping force consisting of contingents of 
Nigeria, Ghana, The Gambia, Guinea and Sierra Leone, that was 
dispatched by the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) to Liberia on 25 August 1990, evacuated 7,000 citizens of 
Nigeria, Ghana and Guinea that had been attacked by one of the warring 
factions in the Liberian civil wart 34 
. 
It is submitted that it is not the kind of States that undertake action 
for the protection of nationals but rather the aim of the action that 
matters, considered on the basis of the facts of the case135 
. 
If the military 
action is launched due to the mere presence of the intervening State's 
nationals in the target State rather than because of an existing imminent 
danger against their lives, then a case of abuse can be said to exist. The U. S. 
action in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Panama, the Gulf of Siam 
The Mayaguez ) and the U. K. action in Suez constitute illustrations. In 
these cases there was no threat to the lives of nationals and it appears that 
the action taken was inspired by considerations of geopolitical interest. In 
id. 84 A. J. I. L. 503 (1990), pp. 504,506 et seq. ; Fawcett, 103 H. R. C. 347 (1961 11), pp. 404-405; 
Gordon et al. 
, 
International Law and the United States Action in Grenada. A Report, 18 Int. 
Lawyer 331 (1984), p. 379; Joyner, Reflections on the Lawfulness of an Invasion, 78 A. I. I. L. 
131 (1984), pp. 134-135; Vagts, International Law under Time Pressure: Grading The 
Grenada Take-Home Examination, 78 A. J. I. L. 169 (1984), pp. 169-170; Nanda, 14 Cal. W. 
I. L. I. 395 (1984), p. 423; id. 84 A. I. I. L. 494 (1990), pp. 496-497; Quigley, 18 U. Miami Inter- 
Am. L. R. (1986-87), pp. 275-305; Paust, 85 Yale L. J. 774 (1976), pp. 800-802; Ronzitti op. cit. 
supra n. 16, p. 64; Schachter, 82 Mich. L. R. 1620 (1984), pp. 1630-1631 but cf. at p. 1632; 
Milenhovic, 29 Review of intern ational Affairs (Belgrade) 33 (1978), p. 35. Cf. Bowett op. 
cit. supra n. 15, pp. 104-105. 
130 I. C. J. Rep. 1949, p. 4, at p. 35. 
131 Keesing's 1978, p. 29305. 
132 Keesing's 1986, p. 34326. 
133 Keesing's 1980, p. 30534. 
134 Keesing's 1990, p. 37644. 
135 See Higgins loc. cit. in Bull (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 98, p. 38; cf 
. 
Ronzitti op. cit. supra n. 
16, p. 64. 
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fact the danger to the lives of nationals was either totally absent 
- 
viz. 
Suez, Grenada136 
, 
Panamal36bis 
- 
or was created by the policies of the 
intervening State towards the target State 
- 
viz. Panama137 
- 
or by the very 
action aiming at their protection 
- 
viz. Suez138, The Mayaguez 139, 
Grenada140 
, 
Panama. 
The suggestion of likelihood of abuse, however, is somewhat 
problematic for it presupposes the existence of a right to protect nationals. 
The argument of abuse of a right does not imply the a priori absence of 
the right in law. It is submitted that in so far as an autonomous right of 
protection of nationals is asserted or one based on the concept of necessity, 
the impact of Article 2(4 ) of the Charter on the practice of States militates 
against such an assertion. Therefore, considerations of abuse could only be 
raised de lege ferenda 
. 
This writer has submitted supra that the operation at Entebbe and 
the U. S. abortive action in Iran141 could be relied on in support of the 
view that protection of nationals may constitute a case of exercise of 
proportionate counter-measures against a use of force short of an armed 
attack. The abuse in this case would consist of the fact that resort to 
military force is had in order to promote geopolitical interests of the 
intervening State by way of armed force. In other words, what might be 
sought is an effective regression of the law to the 19th century doctrines of 
self-preservation and self-help. The above view, however, is extremely 
tenuous due to opposition by third States. 
Moreover, although the Israeli action at Entebbe appears to fulfil the 
requirement of proportionality, this is regrettably not the case in a large 
number of cases of resort to force for the protection of nationals. The 
Belgian intervention in the Congo, the U. S. operations in the Dominican 
Republic, Grenada, Panama, and the Anglo-French action in Suez 
involved the use of overwhelming force and occupation of the territory of 
136 Gilmore op. cit. supra n. 129, p. 61. 
136bis See Henkin, 29 Col. J. Trans. L. 293 (1991), p. 296. 
137 Farer, 84 A. J. I. L. 503 (1990), p. 506. 
138 Supra n. 27. 
139 Paust, 85 Yale L. J. 774 (1976), pp. 801-802. 
140 Doswald-Beck, 31 N. I. L. R. 355 (1984), p. 362; Quigley, 18 U. Miami I,: ter-Ani. L. R. 271 
(1986-87), pp. 297-300. 
141 The latter with the reservation of the Court's obiter dictum in the Hostages Case 
. 
See 
supra pp. 419-421. 
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the target State142 
.A further 
objection to resort to force for the protection of nationals as counter- 
measure in the sense of the Nicaragua Case is the possibility of 
widespread casualties among the individuals to be rescued143. It may be 
argued that the casualties caused by the Israeli operation at Entebbe were 
reasonable, and that casualties are an integral part of any defensive 
operation. The experience of the Egyptian rescue operation at Malta airport 
in 1985, as a result of which 60 of the 92 passengers of the Egypt 'Air 
airliner to be rescued were killed144 does not dispense with the above 
objection. Indeed, if such casualties are to be incurred, and they are very 
likely to, if the armed or security forces of the target State mount 
considerable resistance against the rescuers, then the pertinence of such 
operations may extremely doubtful145. 
Apart from the casualties among the nationals to be rescued by 
military intervention, the population of the target State may be severely 
affected. In the case of the U. S. action in Panama, the United Nations 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights noted in its draft 
report of 6 December 1991, that large numbers of Panamanian citizens 
were affected by the U. S. operation, mainly by being made homeless due to 
the U. S. bombing of Panama Cityl45*. 
By far more dangerous is the possibility of a serious breach of peace 
and the outbreak of serious armed conflict between the intervening and 
the target States145hic 
. 
The incident at Larnaca airport is a pertinent illustration. On 18 
February 1978 two gunmen seized a number of Egyptian nationals hostage 
and held them at Larnaca airport146 
. 
On 19 October 1978 a force of Egyptian 
commandos landed at Larnaca and attempted to rescue the hostages. As a 
result of the Egyptian operation heavy fighting broke out between the 
commandos and the Cypriot national guards with considerable casualties 
142 See Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 68, p. 300; Nanda, 14 Cal. W. I. L. J. 494 (1990), p. 497; 
Heukin, The Invasion of Panama Under International Law: A Gross Violation, 29 Col. J. 
Trans. L. 293 (1991), p. 306. 
143 See Brownlie loc. cit. in Butler (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 98, pp. 23-24. 144 Keesing's 1986, p. 34326. 145 See Brownlie supra n. 142; Akehurst, 5 Jut. Rel. 3 (1977), p. 18; Paust, 85 Yale L. J. 774 (1976), pp. 801-802; Milenhovic supra n. 129. 
145* See Doc E/ C. 12/1991 /CRP. 1 /Add. 3,6 December 1991, p. 12, paras 42,43. The 
Committee emphasised the contradiction between the report of the Panamanian 
Government referring to 3,000 persons affected by the bombing and " 
... 
all other sources 
.. 
which placed the figure between 12,500 and 20,000 persons 
... 
" 
145bis See Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 68, p. 300. 
146 Keesing's 1978, p. 29305. 
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and resulting in the break-off of diplomatic relations between Cyprus and 
Egypt. It appears, however, 
that in the case of successful and proportionate rescue operations the 
intervening State is unlikely to be condemned as the aggressor at the 
United Nations 
- 
viz. the Israeli operation at Entebbe147. 
There seems to be consensus only on one aspect of the use of force 
for the protection of nationals, namely, that it is admissible by the consent 
of the Government of the State on the territory of which the operation 
takes place148 
. 
State practice appears to support the above contingency. 
With the exceptions of the rescue of the Mayaguez 
, 
the Iran 
operation and Panama, the practice of the United States has been to launch 
operations for the protection of U. S. nationals on the basis of the consent 
of the territorial sovereign 
- 
viz. the dispatch of U. S. troops to Lebanon 
(1958), the Dominican Republic (1965), the Congo (Stanleyville, 1964) and 
Grenada (1983). 
The U. S. Secretary of State, Mr. J. Foster-Dulles stated on 20 May 
1958 with regard to the civil unrest in Lebanon that: 
"... Now what we would do if American life and property was endangered would 
depend, of course, in the first instance upon what we were requested to do by the Government 
of Lebanon. We do not introduce American forces into foreign countries except on the 
invitation of the lawful Government of the State concerned 
... 
', 
149 
The undertaking of action without the consent of the Government 
of the States concerned in the three instances referred to above seems to 
have occurred because of the manifest hostility of the Governments of 
Cambodia, Iran and Panama towards the U. S. A. and does not appear to 
constitute a change of policy. 
It is significant that the Belgian Government attempted to justify 
the introduction of troops in the Congo in 1960 on the basis of the consent 
of both the regional government in Katanga and the central Government 
of the State150. Subsequent practice of Belgium shows a consistent 
preference for receiving prior consent of the territorial sovereign for 
action aiming at the protection of Belgian nationals 
- 
viz. dispatch of 
Belgian troops to Congo/Zaire in 1964 (Stanleyville), 1978 (Kolwezi) and 
1991 (Kinshasha). 
147 Supra n. 115. 
148 See Brownlie supra n. 142; see supra Introduction n. 27. 
149 38 Dept. of State Bulletin, No 989, p. 947. 
150 S. C. O. R. 15th yr. 873rd mtg paras 186-190. 
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The practice of France (Kolwezi, 1978 and Kinshasha, 1991), West 
Germany (Mogadishu 1977)151 
, 
Egypt (Malta 1985)152 and Italy (Somalia 
1991)153 of sending troops for the protection of nationals is also based on 
the consent of the territorial sovereign. 
It can be argued in conclusion that the existence of a right to resort 
to force unilaterally for the protection of nationals is subject to 
considerable doubt. With the possible exception of rescue operations at the 
request of the territorial sovereign, operation under the justification of 
such a right have been met with persistent opposition on the part of a 
large part of the international community. It is submitted, albeit de lege 
ferenda 
, 
that the Israeli operation at Entebbe and the U. S. rescue mission 
in Iran may serve as the basis for the admissibility of such a right as an 
exercise of proportionate counter-measures in the sense of the Nicaragua 
Case 
. 
This justification offers, in the opinion of this writer, the best basis 
for the undertaking of operations for the protection of nationals abroad 
because it keeps unilateral forcible action within the framework of 
admissible exceptions to the rule of non-use of force in customary law. 
Second Title : THE DOCTRINE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
. 
The use of military force under the justification of humanitarian 
intervention aims at the protection of nationals, not of the intervening 
State, but of the target State, that suffer human rights deprivations at the 
hands of their Government. 
The concept is largely the offspring of jurists' minds rather than the 
practice of States. It appears to have been articulated towards the end of the 
19th century on the basis of instances of intervention by European Powers 
in the Ottoman Empire during periods when atrocities were perpetrated 
against the Christian populations of the Empires 
. 
Support for the doctrine of humanitarian intervention is found in 
the writings of publicists of the period after the introduction of the United 
151 Keesing's 1978, pp. 28918-9. 
152 Keesing's 1986, p. 34326. 
153 Keesing's 1991, p. 37947. 
1 See Rougier, Theorie de I' Intervention d' humanite, 17 R. G. D. I. P. 472 (1910) ; Stowell, 
Intervention in International Law, 1921, pp. 51 et seq. 
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Nations Charter and this is mainly based on the considerable advances of 
contemporary international law in the field of human rights2 
. 
It is submitted that the exercise of humanitarian intervention by 
way of unilateral resort to force does not constitute part of contemporary 
international law3 for the following reasons. 
2 See Oppenheim, International Law, vol. i, Sth ed. by Lauterpacht, 1955, pp. 312 et seq. ; 
Lauterpacht, An International Bill of the Rights of Man, 1945, p. 120; Tesön, Humanitarian 
Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality, 1988 ; id. Le Peuple, C' Est Moi! The World 
Court and Human Rights, 81 A. J. I. L. 173 (1987) ; Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention to 
Protect the Ibos, in Lillich (ed. ) Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations, 1973, 
pp. 167-195; Lillich, Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights, 53 Iowa L. R. 
325 (1967) ; id. Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a Plea for 
Constructive Alternatives, in Moore (ed. ) Law and Civil War in the Modern World, 1974, p. 
229; Moore, The Control of External Intervention in Internal Conflict, 9 Va J. I. L. 209 (1969) ; 
id. Grenada and the International Double Standard, 78 A. J. I. L. 145 (1984), p. 156; D' 
Amato, Nicaragua and International Law : The "Academic" and the "Real" 
, 
79 A. J. I. L. 657 
(1985), pp. 660-1; id. The Invasion of Panama was a Lawful Response to Tyranny, 84 A. J. I. L. 
516 (1990) ; Sornarajah, Internal Colonialism and Humanitarian Intervention, 11 Ga. J. Int. 
and Coinp. L. 45 (1981) ; Chilstrom, Humanitarian Intervention under Contemporary 
International Law, I Yale Studies in World Public Order 93 (1974) ; Chaterjee, Some Legal 
Problems of Support Role in International Law: Tanzania and Uganda, 30 I. C. L. Q. 755 
(1981) ; Fonteyne, The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian 
Intervention: Its current Validity under the United Nations Charter, 4 Cal. W. I. L. J. 203 
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(1) The prohibition of the unilateral resort to force by virtue of 
Article 2(4) of the Charter precludes resort to force on the grounds of 
humanity. 
(2) The practice of States does not support the existence of a doctrine 
of humanitarian intervention. 
(3) Even as a concept de lege ftrenda military intervention on the 
grounds of humanity would be undesirable. 
(1) The Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention is Inadmissible 
under Article 2(4 ) of the Charter 
The text of the Charter contains no express exception justifying 
resort to force on grounds of humanity. Action in self-defence under 
Article 51 of the Charter cannot be invoked to justify humanitarian 
intervention for there is no necessity of self-defence on the part of the 
intervening State. The plausible argument for the admissibility of 
protection of nationals as exercise of the right of self-defence is impossible 
to be argued for the protection of the nationals of another State4 
. 
Indeed, 
in the present state of the international community that is largely 
composed of sovereign States, the general area of the law on the use of 
force is applicable exclusively between States. Hence, the right of self- 
defence is recognised as admissible for the protection of the entirety of a 
territorial, political populated community 
- 
the States. 
By contrast, the assertion of a right to forcibly protect the citizens of 
another State against their Government, is based on the concept of 
protection of human rights that is pertinent to individuals and appears to 
be irreconcilable with the State-based nature of the law on the use of force, ' 
The claimant of a right of use of force for the protection of human 
rights of the citizens of another State has the difficult task of surmounting 
the provision of Article 2(4) of the Charter. Two arguments have been 
A. J. I. L. 275 (1973) ; Ronzitti, Rescuing Nationals Abroad Through Military Coercion and 
Intervention on Grounds of Humanity, 1985, pp. 108-109; Dinstein, War, Aggression and 
Self Defence, 1988, pp. 88-89; Donelly, 37 J. Int. Affairs 311 (1984); Schachter, 82 Mich. L. R. 
1620 (1984), p. 1629. Also see supra Chapter 2. 
4 See Akehurst, loc. cit. supra n. 3, p. 15; Bowett, loc. cit. in Moore (ed. ) op. cit. supra note 3, 
44; 
Kahn, From Nuremberg to the Hague: The United States Position in Nicaragua v. United 
States and the Development of International Law, 12 Yale J. I. L. 1 (1987), p. 47. 6 Ibid. p. 48. 
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formulated and tend to be invoked in concert. First, that humanitarian 
intervention is not force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of the target State. Secondly, it is claimed that humanitarian 
intervention is a use of force that is consistent with the purposes of the 
United Nations, and more specifically the undertaking to respect human 
rights as a means of international cooperation and peaceful relations 
between States? 
. 
The present writer has dealt with the first argument supra This 
. 
It is 
important, however, to remark that the the three instances of State 
practice that are referred to as illustrations of humanitarian intervention 
in the post-Charter era point to the opposite conclusion. 
Thus, the Indian intervention in East Pakistan/ Bangladesh (1971), 
the Viet- Namese intervention in Cambodia (1978) and the Tanzanian 
intervention in Uganda (1978-1979), resulted, all three of them, in the 
territorial inviolability of Pakistan, Cambodia and Uganda. In the case of 
Pakistan, the Indian action resulted in the secession of the Eastern 
province, namely, in the permanent territorial impairment of the country. 
In the cases of Cambodia and Uganda it resulted in the violent overthrow 
of the Governments of these countries. It is indeed interesting to know 
what constitutes force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of a State if the above instances do not. 
The second argument of consistency with the purposes of the 
United Nations is open to serious objection. 
Does it imply that every purpose of the United Nations stated in 
Article I of the Charter can be pursued by unilateral resort to force? This 
involves questions of hierarchy of the purposes of the United Nations8 or 
of equality of their standing. Whatever be the answer to the issue, it is 
immaterial. It is submitted that no purpose of the United Nations can be 
realised by resort to unilateral force9 
. 
An illustration of the above 
submission is the universal condemnation of the joint Anglo-French 
action in Suez that purported to restore international peace and security 
in the area by unilateral means. 
7 See Articles 1(3), 55,56 of the U. N. Charter. 
7b" See supra p. 407, n. 19 bis. 
8 See Tes6n op. cit. supra n. 2, pp. 132-134. 
' Akehurst, 5 bit. Rel. 3 (1977), p. 16; Farer, 142 H. R. C. 297 (1974 11), p. 388. 
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This is probably the reason why certain jurists have taken the view 
of the supremacy of human rights over State sovereignty, in international 
law10 
. 
The view that human rights constitute the ultima ratio of 
contemporary international law has nuances of natural law and the 
Grotian tradition, in' that it regards the concept of the State as merely an 
artificial unit composed of individuals11 
. 
This conception of the 
international community is reflected in the argument put forward by 
Teson that the use of force in self-defence is in reality the use of force in 
defence of human rights12 
-a position which is totally untenable in view 
of the present composition of the international community, which 
mainly consists, regrettably or not, of sovereign States. 
What is frequently disregarded is that the desirable advance of 
international law in the field of human rights 
, 
as well as the 
implementation of the protection of the latter, is the object of treaty 
obligations that have been voluntarily incurred by sovereign States 
towards other States. In other words, the duty under international law of a 
State to safeguard, respect, and protect the human rights of its citizens 
within its territory, is a duty owed to the other States Parties to the treaty. 
Insofar as respect for certain basic human rights is an obligation under 
customary law, according to the Judgment of the Court in the Barcelona 
Traction Case this duty is owed to the entire international community 
with regard to certain human rights13 
. 
A breach of this obligation would entitle the States to which the 
obligation is owed to take measures to meet the breach in accordance with 
international law in force, which prohibits in explicit terms the unilateral 
resort to force. It is submitted that an a priori admissibility of 
humanitarian intervvenlion is nothing more than an attempt to 
implement an obligation under treaty or customary international law by 
means constituting a violation of the duty of peaceful settlement of 
disputes. Furthermore, it is a fact of international relations that many 
10 See D' Amato loc. citi supra n. 2; Chilstrom loc. cit. supra n. 2, p. 99; Bazyler, 23 
Stanford J. I. L. 547 (1987), pp. 570-571. Tes6n goes further and in effect advocates the total 
abolition of State sovereignty in international law; op. cit. supra n. 2, Part 1, and Part II p. 
146 et seq. ; cf. D' Amato, 84 A. J. I. L. 516 (1990), p. 516 n. 2. 
11 For an analysis and critique of this view see Kahn loc. cit. supra n. 5, p. 48 et seq. 12 Op. cit. supra n. 2, pp. 113-4. 
13 I. C. J. Rep. 1970, paras 33-34. 
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States are reluctant to undertake obligations under human rights treaties14 
, 
and in many cases it is themselves that are the perpetrators of violations 
of human rights. How is it then plausible to argue that States which tend 
not to become internationally bound to respect human rights within their 
territories, would be given the right to defend other peoples' rights in 
another State? ] s 
Far from being a destruction of State sovereignty the duty to respect 
human rights is a self-imposed limitation on that sovereignty; it is " 
... 
a 
qualitative step forward in the content of international law not a 
qualitative step in the structure of international law 
... 
"16 
It is not surprising, therefore, that certain proponents of 
humanitarian intervention, whose views fall short of advocating the 
demise of State sovereignty, have resorted to the arbitrary and highly 
subjective assertion that certain regimes are by definition violators of 
human rights and hence constitute a threat to the "world order"17 
. 
These 
regimes are never Western-style democracies, and the argument appears 
to have been aimed at either socialist States, in their entirety, or 
conservative authoritarian Governments, very selectively. It is the latter 
case where the argument in support of humanitarian intervention, based 
on the very sensitive concern about the protection of human rights and 
their supremacy in contemporary international law, encounters some 
very embarrassing realities of international relations. 
As the Court in the Nicaragua Case understood, the Government 
of the U. S. A. has sought to justify its assistance to the contra opposition 
on claims of violations of human rights by the Sandinista Government of 
Nicaraguas s. It is ironic that assistance was rendered to a guerrilla 
movement which as a political organisation had very little to do, if 
anything at all, with respect of human rights19 
. 
14 lt took the U. S. A. forty years to ratify, the Genocide Convention of 1948. Furthermore, 
the U. S. A. has yet to ratify the U. N. Covenants on Civil, Political, and Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights. 
15 Brownlie, loc. cit. in LAbeh (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 3, p. 141. 
1b Arangio-Ruiz, 157 I-1. R. C. 70; 09771V), pp. 289-294. 
17 See Moore, The Secret War in Central America and the Future of World Order, 80 
A. J. I. L. 43 (1986), pp. 45-46,117-125; D' Amato loc. citi supra n. 2; see criticism of this view 
in Kahn loc. cit. supra n. 5, p. 52 et seq. 
18 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, at p. 134, para 267. Cf 
. 
Kahn loc. cit. supra n. 5, pp. 46-48. 
19 See Farer, Drawing the Right Line, 81 A. I. I. L. 112 (1987), p. 116. Even proponents of 
humanitarian intervention have expressed doubt with regard to the likelihood that the 
contras would respect human rights. See D' Amato, 79 A. I. I. L. 657 (1985), p. 661; Teson op. 
cit. supra n. 2, p. 240 et seq. 
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The effrontery to everything that the human rights law stands for 
that has been presented by South Africa, has been met with sanctions very 
reluctantly on the part of the very States that consider themselves the 
bearers of the torch of human dignity. 
The large-scale killings of communist supporters in Indonesia in 
196520, and the systematic killing of an estimated 100,000 members of the 
Hutu tribe by the ruling minority of the Tutsi tribe in Burundi in 197221 
, 
were met with financial assistance in the case of the former, and outright 
support of the latter by the O. A. U. 22. 
General Noriega, the ruler of Panama, who was deposed as a result 
of the U. S. operation of 20 December 1989, had only recently fell foul of the 
U. S. Government the patronage of which he had enjoyed for considerable 
time. 
Finally, the systematic violations of human rights in Iraq were 
ignored by Western States prior to the invasion of Kuwait. In the 
aftermath of the use of chemical weapons against Kurdish civilians in 
northern Iraq in March 1988, the Government of the U. K. extended new 
trade credits to Iraq, while the Government of the U. S. declined to co- 
sponsor a resolution of the U. N. Commission oh Human Rights 
condemning Iraq23. It was not until the aggression against Kuwait that 
Western Governments started to castigate the tyrannical nature of the 
Iraqi Government. 
The above instances in the practice of States reveal what Farer has 
candidly stated with regard to the Hutu killings in Burundi: 
"... When the community of nations is unwilling to intervene to end selective 
genocide in a country as vulnerable as Burundi, it is sending us a message. And that message I/,, 
- 
is that in order to find human rights in the hierarchy of elite values we must keep our eyes 
on the ground 
... 
"24 
(2) State Practice does not Support the Existence of the Doctrine 
of Humanitarian Intervention 
. 
20 Keesing's 1965-1966, pp. 21039,21222. It is believed that around 150,000-300,000 people 
were killed. 
21 Keesing's 1971-1972, pp. 25323-4; Keesing's 1973, pp. 26059-26060. 22 Farer, 142 H. R. C. 297 (1974 11), pp. 398-402; Brownlie loc. cit. in Lillich (ed. ) op. cit. 
supra n. 3, p. 147. 
23 See J. Gittings (ed. ), Beyond The Gulf War. The Middle East and the New World Order, 
1991, Introduction, p. 8. 
24 Farer, 142 H. R. C. 297 (1974 11), p. 402; also see, Jhabvala, 21 I. I. I. L. 208 (1981), p. 219 et 
seq. ; Doswald-Beck, 31 N. I. L. R. 355 (1984), p. 365. 
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The doctrine of humanitarian intervention that was formulated by 
jurists on the basis of State practice in the 19th century seems to have been 
based on a wide variety of factual bases and it, therefore, appears to lack 
definitional precision within accurately delineated limits25 
. 
Thus, Stowell cites no less than seven grounds for resort to 
humanitarian intervention: (1) Persecution, (2) oppression, (3) 
suppression of the slave trade, (4) uncivilised warfare, (5) injustice, (6) 
humanitarian asylum, and (7) foreign commerce26 
. 
In any case the state of 
the law prior to the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Pact of 
Paris that did not contain a general prohibition of resort to force, renders 
discussion as to the existence of an exception of humanitarian 
intervention somewhat immaterial. 
During the period 1920-1945 there has been a remarkable paucity of 
practice with only one instance of humanitarian intervention in the 
Proclamation of a Protectorate over Bohemia and Moravia made by Nazi 
Germany on 15 March 1939. In it, A. Hitler, the German Chancellor, 
referred to "assaults on the life and liberty of minorities, and the purpose 
of disarming Czech troops and terrorist bands threatening the lives of 
minorities" 27 
. 
Practice in the aftermath of the introduction of the Charter of the 
United Nations is also very limited 28 
. 
Moreover, what appears to be important with regard to this practice is that 
in the three cases of the Indian action in East Pakistan, the Viet- Namese 
action in Cambodia and the Tanzanian action in Uganda, which have the 
external marks of humanitarian intervention, there is total lack of opinio 
juris in respect of a customary law right of humanitarian intervention. 
Instead, in all three cases the right-Of self-defence was invoked. 
The military intervention by India in East Pakistan (present 
Bangladesh) in December 1971 took place in the course of a secessionist 
revolt that was being brutally suppressed by the Pakistani armed forces. 
During the debate at the Security Council the Indian Government 
made a brief reference to considerations of humanity as basis of her action 
25 See Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 3, p. 338; id. loc. cit. in Lillich (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 3, p. 
139-140. Cf. Verwey, 32 N. I. L. R. 357 (1985), p. 367 et seq. 
26 Stowell op. cit. supra n. 1, pp. 51-257. 
27 Quoted in Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 3, p. 340 n. 9. 
28 See references supra n. 3. 
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in East Pakistan. Mr. Sen, the representative of India in the Council, stated 
that: 
" 
... 
We are glad that we have on this particular occasion absolutely nothing but 
the purest of motives and the purest of intentions: to rescue the people of East Bengal from 
what they are suffering 
... 
"29 
However, this justification was far from being the central Indian 
argument for action in East Pakistan, which recurred repeatedly during the 
debate, that: 
ºf 
ý`1 c4 d'l 
" 
... 
Provocation and aggression of various kinds by Pakistan from 25 March onwards ýP L is a reality. As a result, retaliation had followed in exercise of the right of self-defence, Uý i 
and we have warned that we shall exercise this right without hesitation 
... 
"30 
Representatives of third States made no reference to the Indian 
argument of using force in order to rescue the Benghali population; on the 
contrary the majority of the Members of the Council urged India to cease 
hostilities and withdraw from East Pakistan31 
. 
The Viet- Namese action in Cambodia on 25 December 1978 had as a 
result the overthrow of the Khmer Rouge Government that had 
perpetrated horrific atrocities against the Cambodian population from 
1975-1978, and its replacement by a new Government composed of 
Members of a "Cambodian National United Front" that appears to have 
been formed under the patronage of the Viet- Namese Government31 
. 
At the same time relations between Cambodia and Viet- Nam had 
been severely strained because of repeated border incidents perpetuated by 
the Cambodian armed forces since 197532. 
During the debate at the Security Council the Viet- Namese 
representative stated the following: 
29 S. C. O. R. 26th yr. 1606th mtg. para 185; also see 1608th mtg. pars 262; cf. 1606th mtg. 
ara 267 (U. S. S. R. ). 
0 Ibid. 1608th mtg_ Para 272. The provocations referred to were according to the Indian 
Government the bombing of Indian airfields, troop positions and border towns by the 
Pakistan armed forces. See ibid. 1606th mtg. paras 154,163,175. 31 See Ibid. 1606th mtg. paras 193-194 (U. S. A. )[The U. S. representative treated the Indian 
action as armed intervention contrary to the U. N. Charterj, 237 (China)[ The Chinese 
representative stated that "... the Government of India using the question of East Pakistan 
as a pretext, has committed an act of aggression against Pakistan 
... 
"], 201-213 (Italy), 215- 
219 (Somalia), 220-227 (France), 228-234 (Japan), 279-292 (Belgium), 293-299 (Burundi), 311- 
321 (Argentina), 325-330 (U. K. ); 1608th mtg. paras 225-226 (Saudi Arabia). 
31 Keesing's 1979, p. 29613 et seq. 
32 Keesing's 1978, pp. 29269-29272; id. supra n. 31. 
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" 
... 
In order to draw a clear picture of the problem of Kampuchea, it is appropriate 
to make a clear distinction between two wars: one, the border war 
... 
against Viet- Nam, 
which the Viet- Namese people have been forced to deal with; the other, the 
revolutionary war of the Kampuchean people against the dictatorial rule of the Pol Pot 
- 
leng Sary clique 
...... 
..... 
Like any other country in a similar situation, Viet- Nam is determined to 
exercise its right of legitimate defence recognizes by the Charter of the United Nations and 
by International law in order to defend its independence, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity 
... 
"33 
After distinguishing the action of his country from that of the 
Cambodian people the representative of Viet- Nam referred to the reasons 
that prompted the alleged uprising one of which was that " 
... 
the regime 
was abhored and detested by the entire people of Kampuchea 
... 
"34 
. 
It is significant that, with the exception of the U. S. S. R. and 
Czechoslovakia, the other Members of the Council considered the Viet- 
Namese action as unlawful intervention and some representatives 
expressly argued against the use of force for the protection of human 
rights. 
Mir. Algard, the representative of Norway, stated that: 
" 
... 
The Norwegian Government and public opinion in Norway have expressed 
strong objections to the serious violations of human rights committed by the Pol Pot 
Government. However, the domestic policies of that Government cannot 
- 
we repeat cannot 
- justify the actions of Viet- Nam over the last days and weeks. The Norwegian Government 
firmly rejects the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political 
independence of any State and wishes to emphasize the obligation of Member States under 
the Charter to resolve disputes by peaceful means 
... 
"35 
Mr. Leprette of France argued that: 
" 
... 
The notion that because a regime is detestable foreign intervention is justified 
and forcible overthrow is legitimate is extremely dangerous. That could ultimately 
jeopardize the very maintenance of international law and order and make the continued 
existence of various regimes dependent on the judgment of their neighbours 
... 
"3' 
Furthermore, the representative of Singapore stated that: 
" 
... 
No other country has a right to topple the Government of Democratic 
Kampuchea, however, badly that Government may have treated its people. To hold to the 
contrary pri ple is to concede the right of a foreign Government to intervene and 
overthrow the Government of another country 
... 
"37 
33 S. C. O. R. 34th yr. 2108th mtg. paras 115,126. 34 Ibid. para 136; also see paras 148-155 (U. S. S. R. ). 
35 S. C. O. R. 34th yr. 2109th mtg. para 18 
36 Ibid. para 36. 37 Id. 2110th mtg. para 49; also see paras 27,29 (Portugal), 58 (N. Zealand). 
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Finally, the representative of the U. K. took the view that: 
" 
... 
Whatever is said about human rights in Kampuchea, it cannot excuse Viet- 
Nam, whose human rights record is deplorable, for violating the territorial integrity of 
Democratic Kampuchea, an Independent State Member of the United Nations 
... 
"38 
The use of armed force by Tanzania against Uganda in 1978-1979 has 
similarities with the Viet- Namese action in Cambodia. The two countries 
had a territorial dispute over the Kagera salient39 
. 
On 31 October 1978 the 
Ugandan Army invaded and occupied the salient and on 1 November 
President Amin proclaimed its annexation to Uganda40 
. 
On 15 November 
1978 the Tanzanian Army entered the Kagera salient, expelled the 
Ugandan occupation forces and subsequently invaded the territory of 
Uganda41 
. 
The Tanzanian troops were joined by a force of dissident exiles 
already operating inside Uganda against the Government of President 
Amin and on 11 April 1979 captured the capital Kampala and overthrew 
the Ugandan Government42. On 23 February 1979 President Nyerere of 
Tanzania stated that " 
... 
It is not my responsibility to overthrow Amin. 
That is the responsibility of the Ugandans. It was my task to chase him 
from Tanzanian soil. I have done so 
... 
"43 
The action by Tanzania was met with virtually no opposition at all, 
presumably because of the general international antipathy towards the 
tyrannical regime of President Amin. However, on 17 July 1979 during the 
16th annual summit of the O. A. U. in the Liberian capital Monrovia, 
President Nemery of Sudan, the current Chairman of the O. A. U. 
, 
criticised Tanzania for interfering in the internal affairs of Uganda in 
violation of O. A. U. principles44 
. 
Moreover, President Obasanjo of Nigeria 
stated on 19 July 1979 that the Tanzanian action constituted a dangerous 
precedent for Africa and argued that a distinction should be drawn 
between the overthrow of a tyrant from within the country and an attack 
from outside45 
. 
The statement by President Nyerere of 23 February 1979 clearly 
indicates an argument similar to that raised by the Viet- Namese 
38 Ibid. para 65; also see paras 72-74,76,79 (U. S. A. ). 
39 See Brownlie, African Boundaries, 1979, pp. 1014-1015. 
40 Keesing's 1979, p. 29669. 
41 Id. p. 29670. 
42 Id. pp. 29671-2. 
43 Id. p. 29671. 
44 Id. pp. 29840-1. 
45 Id. p. 29841. 
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Government at the Security Council; namely, that there had been "two 
wars" in Uganda: one was in self-defence on the part of Tanzania and the 
other was an internal revolt by the Ugandan people against the 
Government of President Amin. 
Finally, the U. S. Government claimed that it deliberately refrained 
from invoking " 
... 
a broad doctrine of humanitarian intervention 
... 
" in 
justification of its action in Grenada46 
. 
The doctrine of humanitarian intervention is also repudiated by the 
jurisprudence of the International Court. In so far as the doctrine connotes 
a species similar to an actio popularis in international law, whereby every 
State has a legal standing against another State with regard to the latter's 
practice in the field of human rights, the judgment of the Court in the 
South-West Africa Cases (Second Phase) militates against any such 
general rule47 
. 
Moreover, the protection of human rights by way of unilateral 
resort to force has been dealt with by the Court in the Nicaragua Case in 
relation to the U. S. argument that the policies of the Sandinista 
Government in Nicaragua amounted to violating human rights therein. 
The Court ruled that, " 
... 
where human rights are protected by 
international conventions, that protection takes the form of such 
arrangements for monitoring respect for human rights as one provided 
for in the conventions themselves 
... 
"4s 
. 
The Court then went on to find 
that Nicaragua had indeed made political pledges to the O. A. S. concerning 
respect for human rights and by ratifying the Inter-American Convention 
on Human Rights; therefore, the Court concluded, that by submitting 
herself to the procedures of those mechanisms for respect for human 
rights, the O. A. S. was in a position to assess the Nicaraguan policies on 
human rights49. 
The Court, then, ruled: 
... 
In any event, while the United States might form its own appraisal of the 
situation as to respect for human rights in Nicaragua, the use of force could not be the 
appropriate method to monitor or ensure such respect. With regard to the steps actually 
4' Letter from Mr. Robinson to Prof. Gordon, 18 Int. Lawyer 381 (1984), p. 386. 47 I. C. J. Rep. 1966, p. 6. The Court dismissed the case brought before it by Ethiopia and 
Liberia against South Africa (with regard to the violations by the latter of its obligations 
under the League of Nations Mandate over S. W. Africa] on the grounds that neither of the 
plaintiffs had a legal interest with regard to the claim. See Brownlie, loc. cit. in Lillich 
(ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 3, p. 147. 
48 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, at p. 134, para 267. 
49 Ibid. 
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taken, the protection of human rights, a strictly humanitarian objective, cannot be 
compatible with the mining of ports, the destruction of oil installations, or again, with the 
training, arming and equipping of the contras 
. 
The Court concludes that the argument 
derived from the preservation of human rights in Nicaragua cannot afford a legal 
justification for the conduct of the United States, and cannot in any way be reconciled with 
the legal strategy of the respondent State, which is based on the right of collective self- 
defence 
... 
50 
The Judgment of the Court indicates that while respect and 
protection of human rights under a treaty or not constitute an obligation 
the breach of which cannot be pursued with impunity51 the meeting of the 
violation is to be effected either by making use of the monitoring 
procedure provided for by the treaty, or, in the absence of a treaty, by 
means that do not involve the use of force52 
. 
It is submitted that such 
means would include unilateral or collective economic or diplomatic 
measures against the recalcitrant State, but never the use of armed force. 
(3) The Undesirability of Humanitarian Intervention De Lege Ferenda 
. 
The reference in the Judgment of the Court in the Nicaragua Case 
to the incompatibility of the United States conduct in Nicaragua with any 
notion of humanitarianism, points at the great likelihood of abuse of the 
doctrine should it be admissible in international law53 
. 
The risk of abuse 
appears to stem from the generality and vagueness of definitions of 
humanitarian intervention. 
Lauterpacht defines humanitarian intervention as the resort to 
forcible self-help " 
... 
in cases where a State maltreats its subjects in a 
manner which shocks the conscience of mankind 
... 
"54 
. 
Tesön55 has suggested that humanitarian intervention constitutes 
the " 
... 
proportionate transboundary help, including forcible help, 
provided by a Government to individuals in another State who are being 
denied basic human rights and who themselves would be rationally 
willing to revolt against their oppressive Government 
... 
" 
50 Ibid. pp. 134-135, para 268. Also see Kahn loc. cit. supra n. 5, pp. 46-48. 
51 Ibid. p. 134, para 267. 
52 Cf. Tesön op. cit. supra n. 2, pp. 203-4,240-1. 
53 See supra references in n. 3. 
54 Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights, 1950, p. 32; Oppenheim op. cit. 
supra n. 2, p. 312. 55 Op. cit. supra n. 2, p. 5. 
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Other jurists refer to "inhumane treatment"56 
, 
"protection of 
minorities"57 
, 
"protection of human rights" with emphasis on the right 
to life58 
," 
compliance with a minimum international standard of human 
rights"59 
," 
functional enforcement of international human rights in 
certain extreme situations"60 
, 
as bases for the exercise of humanitarian 
intervention. The lack of precision with regard to situations for this kind 
of intervention is extremely likely to lead to an easy fabrication of 
humanitarian grounds on the basis of which armed force could be resorted 
to61 
. 
Moreover, the problem of abuse is exacerbated by the wide spectrum 
of human rights the protection of which is not universally agreed 
- 
viz. 
the distrust of "free market" polities to the protection of social, economic 
and cultural rights and the corresponding opposition of socialist States to 
the protection of civil and political rights. The admissibility of 
humanitarian intervention may lead to a host of interventions according 
to every State's political orientation. 
Finally, geopolitical and economic interests of States have played a 
major role in resorting to force in humanitarian intervention. This is 
illustrated by the fact that the series of interventions by European States in 
the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century were inextricably linked with the 
special status of certain ethnic minorities [that had been conceded by the 
Ottoman Government in peace treaties and by way of capitulations 
agreements] which served the economic interests of the European 
powers62 
. 
But the "self-interest" factor is more blatantly manifested by the 
cases where humanitarian intervention was not resorted to63 
. 
Proponents of humanitarian intervention have proposed de lege 
ferenda a series of guide-lines that aspire to formulating a framework of 
lawful humanitarian intervention. Lillich has suggested the following 
criteria for forcible unilateral humanitarian intervention: 
(1) Immediacy of violation of human rights. 
(2) Extent of violation of human rights. 
(3) Invitation to use forcible self-help by the de jure Government of a State. 
(4) Degree of coercive measures employed. 
56 Bazyler, 73 Stanford I. I. L. 547 (1987), p. 548. 
57 Sornarajah, 11 Ga. J. Int. & Comp. L. 45 (1981). 
58 Moore, 9 Va I. I. L. 209 (1969), p. 264. 
59 Chilstrom, 1 Yale Studies in World Public Order 93 (1974), p. 95 60 Fonteyne, 4 Cal. W. 1. L. J. 203 (1974), p. 258. 
61 See Remarks by Henkin supra n. 3. 
62 See Pogany loc. cit. supra n. 3. 
63 See Farer, 142 H. R. C. 297 (1974 11), pp. 400-2. 
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(5) Relative disinterestedness of the intervening State. 64 
The objection to the above formula is that it is simply unworkable 
in practice. 
Criterion (3) begs the question in cases of different States recognising 
different Governments in the target State65 
. 
Moreover, even if problems 
of recognition do not arise it is ludicrous to believe that the very 
Government that violates the human rights of its citizens would invite an 
armed intervention against it. 
Criterion (4 ) points at the principle of proportionality which is 
totally unworkable. While proportionality in the case of protection of 
nationals could be plausibly argued in the sense of evacuating the 
endangered nationals out of the territorial State, it is impossible to 
"transport" the entire population of the State in cases of gross violations of 
human rights66 
. 
The only tangible solution towards eliminating human 
rights abuse would be the elimination of the source of the violation, 
namely, the Government of the target State, by overthrowing it or by 
separating the territory where the oppressed individuals live from the 
rest of the State67 
. 
Furthermore, protection of the human rights of the 
victims of an oppressive Government may require a complete change of 
the administrative and political structure of of the target State and this 
may involve a long-term military presence of the intervening State 
- 
viz. 
the military occupation of Germany after the end of the Second World 
War. The possibility of armed resistance by the recalcitrant Government 
and its allies68 may escalate into a disastrous armed conflict and may lead 
to much greater loss of life than the one aspired to be protected69 
. 
Finally, criterion (5) is contradicted by historical fact. Far from being 
altruistic, States that have resorted to what appears to be humanitarian 
intervention have manifested a large degree of expediency and self- 
interest70 
The protection of human rights holds a prominent position in 
inter ational law. It is submitted that this can be effected by strengthening 
64 Lillich loc. citi supra n. 2; Tesön op. cit. supra n. 2, pp. 111-123; Reisman loc. cit. supra n. 
2; Verwey loc. cit. supra n. 2. 
65 Cf. Thomas & Thomas loc. cit. supra n. 3, p. 22. 
66 Farer, loc. cit. in Lillich (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 3, p. 153. 67 See Brownlie loc. cit. in Lillich (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 3, p. 146; Jhabvala loc. cit. supra n. 
3, p. 217. 
68 The Ugandan Government was assisted by Libyan troops against the Tanzanian Army. 69 Brownlie, loc. cit. in Moore (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 3, p. 224. 
70 See Brownlie, supra n. 69, pp. 224-5; Franck & Roddley, 67 A. J. LL. 275 (1973), pp. 302-4. 
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the machinery of protection provided for in human rights treaties, by 
resorting to the United Nations collective security procedures or by 
unilateral counter-measures short of the use of armed force. 
The unilateral resort to force as an alternative is destructive of 
international peace and security, inheres the danger of great loss of life and 
links the protection of human rights, as State practice reveals, to very 
suspect motives of individual States. 
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CHAPTER 12 
THE USE OF ARMED FORCE ON THE BASIS OF STATE CONSENT 
Introduction 
In this section the present author will deal with the event of use of 
armed force by a State on the territory of another State by virtue of the 
latter's consents 
. 
The practice of States acknowledges two situations where such use 
of force may take place: 
(1) The dispatch of military forces on the territory of a State at the 
invitation of the legitimate Government of that State in order to assist it 
to suppress internal armed opposition against its authority. 
(2) The introduction of troops in the territory of a State under the 
provision of a treaty whereby the intervening State is given by the 
territorial sovereign of a State a general right to resort to force on its 
territory. 
The sending of armed forces into the territory of another State on 
the basis of its consent has been treated as an act that is prima facie 
compatible with the rules of non-intervention and non-use of force. Thus, 
it is considered on the basis of the principle volenti non fit injuria that 
the consent of the territorial sovereign deprives the dispatch of foreign 
troops of the character of "dictatorial interference" that signifies 
technically an unlawful intervention2 
1 It is generally accepted that the armed forces of a State may enter and be stationed on the 
territorv of another State on the basis of its consent 
- 
viz. the various U. S. military bases in 
other countries. indeed, Article 3 (e) of the 1974 Definition of Aggression appears to 
recognise this contingency in a negative fashion 
. 
See G. A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), G. A. O. R. 29th 
session, Suppl. No 31, p. 142. 
See supra Part Two, Ch. 9, First Title ; G. A. Res. 36/103 of 9 December 1981; Doswald 
- 
Beck, The Legal Validity of Military Intervention by Invitation of the Government, 56 
B. Y. 1. L. 189 0985), p. 189. 
2 See APPenheim International Law, vol. i, 8th ed. by Lauteipacht 7955, p. 305; Garner 
, Questions of International Law in the Spanish Civil War, 31 A. J. I. L. 66 (1937), p. 68; 
Fitzmaurice, The General Principles of International Law, 92 H. R. C. 5 (1957 11), pp. 177-8; 
E. Lauterpacht, The Contemporary Practice of the United Kingdom in the Field of 
International Law; Intervention by Invitation, 7 I. C. L. Q. 102 (1958), p. 103; Fawcett, 
Intervention in International Law, 103 H. R. C. 347 (1961 11), pp. 366-7; Comment by 
O'Connell, Le Principe de non-intervention dans les guerres civiles (Huitieme Commission), 
5; 
-4wi. I. D. J. 119 (19-5), p. 139; R. Ago (Special Rapporteur), Eighth Report on State 
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Moreover, this Chapter shall focus on issues arising out of the 
actual dispatch of military forces on to the territory of another State, as 
opposed to "assistance" in general to the Government of that State. This 
latter contingency covers a broad spectrum of aid rendered to the 
Government of a State by third States which includes, apart from the 
actual sending of troops, the supply of economic aid, military equipment, 
logistical support, intelligence information, training for the armed forces 
and administration of the State. There is no doubt that this type of 
assistance constitutes a very common phenomenon of international 
relations. In relation to the specific context of civil strife within the 
recipient State, authority appears to be generally in agreement with regard 
to the lawfulness of such assistance to the Government of the State3 
. 
First Title. THE USE OF ARMED FORCE AT THE INVITATION OF THE 
LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE. 
The situations contemplated under the above rubric concern the 
request by the Government of a State for military assistance on the part of 
third States in order to help it put down an uprising against its authority. 
The setting for this kind of action is a situation of civil strife within the 
territory of the requesting State. 
The practice of States in the period prior to the League of Nations 
supports the admissibility of such action4 
. 
In 1826 British troops were sent 
to Portugal at the request of the Portuguese Government to assist in 
preventing a successful rebellion by Don Miguel and in 1849 Russian 
troops assisted the suppression. of a rebellion in Hungary at the request of 
Responsibility, Doc. A/CN. 4/318 and Add. 1-4, I. L. C. Ybk. 1979, Vol. II, Part One, pp. 30- 
31,32, paras 56-57,60; Report of the I. L. C. 
, 
Doc. A/ 34/ 10, I. L. C. Ybk. 1979, Vol. II, Part 
Two, pp. 110-112, paras 5,10-11; Brownlie, The United Nations Charter and the Use of 
Force, 1945-1985, in Cassese (ed. ), The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force, 1986, p. 
491 at p. 501; Joyner, 78 A. J. I. L. 131 (1984), p. 138; Letter from Mr. Robinson to Prof. Gordon, 
18 Int. Launder 381 (1984), p. 382; Quigley, 18 Miami Inter-Amer. L. R. 271 (1986), p. 345; 
Ronzitti, Rescuing Nationals Abroad Through Military Coercion and Intervention on 
Grounds of Humanity, 1985, p. 77. 
3 Farer, intervention in Civil Wars: A Modest Proposal, 67 Col. L. R. 266 (1967), pp. 274-6; 
Moore, Legal Standards for Intervention in Internal Conflicts, 13 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 191 
(1983), p. 196; Doswald-Beck, 56 B. Y. I. L. 189 (1985), p. 244; Akehurst, A Modern 
Introduction to International Law, 6th ed. 1987, pp. 287-8; D. L. Khairallah, Insurrection 
under International Law, 1973, pp. 269-270. Cf 
. 
Bowett, The Interrelation of Theories of 
Intervention and Self-Defence, in Moore (ed. ), Law and Civil War in the Modern World, 
1974, p. 38 at pp. 42-3. See infra n. 64. 
4 See Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, 1963, p. 321. 
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the Austrian Government 
. 
Moreover, the Treaty of the Holy Alliance 
contemplated intervention as a means of preserving the monarchic status 
quo in Europe and, indeed, this was materialized in the suppression of a 
rebellion in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies in the 1820s. 
Writings of Publicists 
. 
Works of authority reveal three theories pertinent to the issue. 
(1) That foreign military assistance is admissible on the side of the 
Government but not on the side of the rebels. 
(2) That foreign military assistance is inadmissible on either side in the 
civil strife. 
(3) That foreign military assistance is admissible on both sides. 
(1) Military aid to the Government but not to the rebels 
. 
What is perceived to be the position under classical international 
law is stated in Garners : 
" 
... 
There is no rule of international law which forbids the government of one State 
from rendering assistance to the established government of another State with a view of 
enabling it to suppress an insurrection against its authority. Whether it shall render such 
aid is entirely a matter of policy or expediency and raises no question of right or duty under 
international law. If assistance is rendered to the legitimate government it is not a case of 
unlawful intervention as is the giving of assistance to rebels who are arrayed against its 
authority 
... 
"6 
The practice of States appears to support the above view. The 
operation which was undertaken in Stanleyville, the Congo, by Belgian 
and U. S. forces in November 1964 was aimed according to both 
intervening States at rescuing Belgian, American and other European 
nationals whose lives were in mortal danger. The operation was launched 
under the consent of the central Congolese Government which was faced 
at that time with a large-scale insurgency against its authority. In fact the 
5 Garner, 31 A. J. 1. L. 66 (1937), p. 68. 
h Also see, "'hiiteman 
, 
Digest of International Law, vol. 12, p. 235; Fawcett, loc. cit. supra 
n. 2; Farer, Drawing the Right Line, 81 A. J.. 1. L. 112 0987), p. 114 but cf. id. 67 Col. L. R. 266 
(1967'), p. 271 et seq. ; Joyner, loc. cit sußro n. 2; 5b Ann. 1. D. l. 119 (1975), p. 139 (O'Connell); 
Castren, Civi1 War, 1966, pp. 20-21 but cf 
. 
id. in 56 Ann. I. D. I. 119 (1975), pp. 134-135; 
Quigley, loc. cit. supra n. 2, p. 345; Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, 1988, p. 10; 
Schwarzenberger, International Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, vol. 
ii, 1968, p. 675; Fitzmaurice, loc. cit. supra n. 2, p. 178; Brownlie, loc. cit. in Cassese (ed. ) op. 
cit. supra in. 2 and cf. id. op. cit. supra in. 4, pp. 326-7; Ronzitti op. cit. supra n. 2; Ago (Special Rapporteur) loc. cit. supra n. 2, pp. 30-32,34-35, paras 56-57,59-60,66,68; Report 
of the I. L. C. loc. cit. supra n. 2. 
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European and American nationals' lives were threatened by rebel forces 
whose headquarters were in Stanleyville. The joint U. S. 
-Belgian action 
was censured as unlawful intervention by a number of delegations at the 
Security Council. In reply to the charge of illegality the Belgian 
representative stated: 
" 
... 
There is no interference in the domestic affairs of a country when the lawful 
Government of that country is given the assistance for which it asks. 
There is interference in the domestic affairs of a country when support is given to 
rebellion or revolution against the lawful Government 
... 
"7 
In a letter from Mr. Robinson of the U. S. State Dept. to Prof. 
Gordon, the U. S. action in Grenada in 1983 which was justified partly on 
the basis of request of the lawful Government of Grenada, it was stated 
that: 
" 
... 
The request of lawful authority is a well established basis for providing 
military assistance whether the requesting State is seeking assistance in the exercise of its 
inherent right of self-defence recognized in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, or for 
other lawful purposes, such maintenance of internal order 
... 
"8 
Finally, the Court ruled in the Nicaragua Case that: 
" 
... 
Having concluded that the activities of the United States in relation to the 
activities of the contras in Nicaragua constitute prima facie acts of intervention, the Court 
must next consider whether they may nevertheless be justified on some legal ground. As the 
Court has stated, the principle of non-intervention derives from customary law. It would 
certainly loose its effectiveness as a principle of law if intervention were to be justified by a 
mere request for assistance made by an opposition group in another State 
- 
supposing such a 
request to have actually been made by an opposition to the regime in Nicaragua in this 
instance. Indeed, it is difficult to see what would remain of the principle of non- 
intervention in international law if intervention, which is already allowable at the 
request of the government of a State, were also to be allowed at the request of the 
opposition. This would permit any State to intervene at any moment in the internal affairs 
of another State, whether at the request of the government or at the request of the 
opposition. Such a situation does not in the Court's view correspond to the present state of 
international law 
... 
"9 
(2) Inadmissibility of Military Assistance to either side. 
The second theory advocates complete abstention from assisting 
either side in a civil zwar and is supported by eminent authority. In Hall 
the following passage occurs: 
7 S. C. O. R. 19th yr. 1173rd mtg. para 73; also see 1176th mtg. para 13 (Nigeria). 
8 18 hit. Lawyer 381 (1984), p. 382; M. Nash Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United 
States Relating to International Law, 78 A. J. 1. L. 200 (1984), p. 203. 9 I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14 at p. 126, para 246. See also id. p. 109, para 209; S. C. Res. 387 (1976) 
of 31 March 1976,4th preambular paragraph; Akehurst, Nicaragua v. United States of 
America, 27 I. I. I. L. 357 (1987), p. 374. Cf. 57 B. Y. I. L. 614 (1986), p. 616. 
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" 
... 
Supposing [the intervention] 
... 
to be directed against the rebels, the fact that it 
has been necessary to call in foreign help is enough to show that the issue of the conflict 
would without it be uncertain, and consequently that there is doubt as to which side would 
ultimately establish itself as the legal representative of the State. If, again, intervention 
is based upon an opinion as to the merits of the question at issue, the intervening State takes 
upon itself to pass judgment in a matter which, having nothing to do with the relations of 
States, must be regarded as being for legal purposes, beyond the range of its vision... " 10 
This view appears to be supported by the text of G. A. Res. 2131 (XX) 
of 1965 and G. A. Res. 2625 (XXV) of 1970, both of which stipulate that: 
" 
... 
no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, 
terrorist armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another 
State, or interfere in civil strife in another State 
... 
"11 
Furthermore, the practice of States contains instances of either 
opposition to military action by a State at the request of the beleaguered 
Government, or of abstention from rendering assistance to a beleaguered 
Government. 
Thus, during the debate at the Security Council on the situation in 
Hungary (1956) the majority of representatives of the Members of the 
Council treated the Soviet action as unlawful intervention in the internal 
affairs of Hungary that resulted in the violation of the right of self- 
determination of the Hungarian people12 
. 
10 Hall, A Treatise on International Laut, 8th ed. by P. Higgins, 1924, p. 347. Also see, 
Lawrence, Principles of Internatioºul Law, 7th ed. 1930,131-2; Stowell, Intervention in 
International Law, 1921, pp. 329-345; Hyde, International Law, vol. i, 2nd ed. 1945,253; 
Bowett loc. cit. in Moore (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 3, p. 41 et seq. ; Higgins, Internal War and 
International Law, in Black & Falk (eds. ) The Future of the International Legal Order, vol. 
3,1971, Ch. 3, pp. 97,103; Q. Wright, United States Intervention in the Lebanon, 53 A. J. I. L. 
112 (1959), pp. 120-3; Vagts, 78 A. J. 1. L. 169 (1984), p. 171; Friedman, Intervention and the 
Developing Countries, 10 Va J. I. L. 205 (1970), pp. 210-3; Moore, The Control of Foreign 
Intervention in Internal Conflict, 9 Va J. I. L. 209 (1969), p. 272 et seq. ; id. 13 Ga J. Intl & 
Comp. L. 191 (1983), p. 196; Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 Mich. 
L. R. 1620 (1984), p. 1642; 56 Ann. I. D. I. 119 (1975), comments at pp. 148-151 (Zourek), 136-7 
(Chaumont), 138 (Munch), 143-5 (Skubiszewski) but cf. pp. 134-5 (Castren), 142-3 
(Rousseau); Perkins, The Right of Counter-Intervention, 17 Ga J. Int'l. & Coinp. L. 171 (1987), 
p. 184 et seq. ; Sohn, Gradations of Intervention in Internal Conflict, 13 Ga 1. Int'l. & Comp. 
L. 225 (1983), pp. 225-7; Doswald-Beck, 56 B. Y. I. L. 189 (1985), pp. 242-3; Akehurst, op. cit. 
supra n. 3, p. 285; Mullerson, Intervention by Invitation, in Damrosch & Scheffer (eds. ), 
Law and Force in the New Internatiatwl Order, 1991,131-133. Cf. Jessup, A Modern Law of 
Nations, 1947, pp. 184-7. 
11 However, it is uncertain whether this passage implies any inadmissibility of military 
assistance to the Government of the beleaguered State; the preparatory works of these 
resolutions are inconclusive to this respect. See Doswald-Beck, 56 B. Y. I. L. 189 (1985), pp. 
208-9. 
12 See S. C. O. R. 11th yr. 746th mtg. paras 58 (U. S. A. ), 77 (U. K. ), 89 (France), 113 (Peru), 
179,182-3 (Belgium); 752nd mtg. paras 50 (U. S. A. ), 76 (U. K. ), 122 (France). Similar 
opposition towards the Soviet action has been voiced during the works of the Second 
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Moreover, the French Government declined to respond to the 
request of the Government of Chad for military assistance to help suppress 
an insurgency against it in December 1990. As a result of the insurgency 
the Government of President Habre was overthrown] 3. 
(3) Admissibility of Military Assistance to both sides. 
The third theory acquires its importance because it opens the 
possibility of providing military assistance to the rebels. 
Classical international law admitted such contingency provided 
that the armed opposition against the incumbent Government was 
awarded recognition of belligerency14 
. 
The rebels were thought to be 
entitled to belligerent status if the civil strife fulfilled four conditions: 
(1) Existence of civil war and general hostilities. 
(2) Occupation and a measure of orderly administration of a substantial 
part of national territory by the insurgents. 
(3) Observance of the rules of warfare on the part of the insurgent forces 
acting under a responsible authority. 
(4) A practical necessity for third States to define their attitude. '5 
Falk has used this traditional approach towards the insurgents as a 
starting point to formulate a theory of participation in civil conflicts, in 
the political and strategic context of the so-called "Cold War" and the 
process of decolonisation in Africa and Asia16. 
The ideological nature of and the strategic considerations in the 
relations between the two superpowers set the pattern of treating every 
civil strife within a State as a potential political and strategic expansion of 
"one side", namely, the U. S. A. or the U. S. S. R. 
, 
to the detriment of the 
other, in the politics of the "Cold War" 17 
. 
The political polarisation of international relations during this 
period has been considered to preclude the applications of the traditional 
requirements of recognition of belligerency. These were premised upon 
factual characteristics of the intensity of the civil strife, whereas the period 
Special Emergency Session of the G. A.; see U. N. Review, Dec. 1956, vol. 3, No 6, p. 61 
(Australia), p. 63 (Peru). 
13 Keesing's 1990, p. 37907. 
14 See Schwarzenberger op. cit. supra n. 6, p. 675. 15 See Oppenheim, International Lau,, vol. ii, 7th ed. by Lauteipacht 1952, pp. 249-251. 
1t R. Falk, Janus Tormented: The International Law of Internal War, in J. Rosenau (ed. ), 
International Aspects of Civil Strife, 1964, p. 185; Cf 
. 
J. L. Hargrove, Intervention by 
Invitation and the Politics of the New World Order, in Damrosch & Scheffer (eds. ) op. cit. 
supra n. 10, p. 121 et seq. 
17 Ibid. pp. 188-190; also see Farer, 67 Col. L. R. 266 (1967), pp. 267-271. 
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of the "Cold War" was characterised by the pursuit of ideological, political 
and strategic objectives as well as the desire of both superpowers to avoid a 
major nuclear conflict18 
. 
It was concern about the likelihood of such 
devastating outbreak of force that seems to have elevated internal conflicts 
from the insulation of domestic jurisdiction and transformed them into 
the battleground of superpower antagonism19. 
Hence, Falk has suggested that, in principle, competence to decide 
intervention to assist either faction in a civil strife should be delegated to 
the United Nations or a regional organisation, while in case of inability of 
the latter to act ( this was a certainty in relation to the U. N. during the 
"Cold War" years ), then unilateral "neutralizing participation" on either 
side would be admissible20 
In so far as this thesis allows for the possibility of furnishing 
military assistance to the insurgents, the views expressed by socialist and 
developing countries in favour of assistance to national liberation 
movements in their struggle against colonial powers constitute an 
illustration. The present writer has dealt with the issue Supra and takes, 
the view that due to persistent objection by a number of States, the absence 
of direct military support, and denials of general material support to 
national liberation movements by States advocating its admissibility, has 
prevented this view from becoming part of customary lawv21 
. 
(4) Some Comment, 
. 
All three theories have their merits and disadvantages, each in its 
proper confines. 
The first theory ( that allows for military action at the request of the 
Government) reflects the existing structure of the international 
community which is largely composed of independent sovereign States 
that are represented as far as other States are concerned, by their 
established Governments" 
Moreover, what seems to be meant by the terms "established" or 
"legitimate" Government, is neither a Government that has assumed 
18 Falk, loc. cit. supra n. 16, pp. 206-9; 
19 Ibid. pp. 185-7. 
20 Ibid. p. 209; cf. Higgins loc. cit. supra n. 10, pp. 118-9. 
21 Cf 
. 
Brownlie, loc. cit. in Cassese (ed. ) op. cit. supra n. 2; Khairallah op. cit. supra n. 3, 
p. 262. Contra 
. 
Farer, The Regulation of Foreign Intervention in Civil Armed Conflict, 142 
H. R. C. 297 (1974 11), pp. 370-1. See supra Part One 
, 
Ch. 6. 
22 B. Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, 
1953, pp. 183-5. 
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power by constitutional means according to the domestic law of the State23 
nor an entity that is merely recognised as being such24 ( viz. the 
recognition of the nationalist insurgents as the legitimate Government of 
Spain by Germany and Italy during the Spanish civil war ), or even a 
regime that has the approval of the population of the State. 
The "established" Government of a State is rather the regime that 
has control of the country without the assistance of another State and 
commands the obedience of the population of the State25 
. 
The position of 
such a regime as the Government of the State is, furthermore, reinforced 
by the maintenance of diplomatic relations with other States and its 
representation of the State at the U. N. and regional organisations. 
During the debate at the Security Council on the joint U. S. 
-Belgian 
operation at Stanleyville in 1964, a considerable number of delegates 
disputed the authority of the Congolese Government ( headed by Mr. 
Tshombe, the leader of the Katangese secession ), that granted its consent 
for the military action, as the "legitimate" Government of the Congo26 
. 
The representative of Brazil took a different view and stated that: 
" 
... 
The operation liberating these hostages held by the rebels at Stanleyville was 
requested by the constitutional Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the 
only legal Government of that country, recognised by the United Nations as such, and the 
request was made in the use of its sovereign rights 
... 
.... 
the majority of the African countries which have been taking part in the work of 
the Council recognise the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and 
maintain normal diplomatic relations with that Government. 
Consequently, from the formal juridical point of view, the life-saving operation 
was completely legitimate, solicited as it was by the Congolese Government itself, in the 
use of its powers 
... 
"27 
The second theory of complete impartiality has been established on 
a presumption against the authority of the Government to represent the 
State, in cases of loss of de facto control of the territory of the country to 
the rebels. Wright has claimed that " 
... 
a government even if generally 
recognized, cannot speak for the state if it is not in firm possession of the 
state's territory. In international law the de facto situation is presumed to 
23 
lContia 
. 
Dinstefn, op. cit. supra n. 2. 
24 Bowett, loc. cit. supra n. 3, p. 42- 
25 See The Tinoco Case 
,1R. I. A. A. 369; D. J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 4th ed. 1991, pp. 142-8; Doswald-Beck, 56 B. Y. I. L. 189 (1985), pp. 192-5. 26 See S. C. O. R. 19th yr. 1183rd mtg. paras 12,14,17-18 (Algeria); 1178th mtg. para 18 (Tanzania). 
27 Id. 1177th mtg. paras 88-89; also see 1173rd mtg. paras 74-74 (Belgium); 1174th mtg. 
paras 99-100 (U. S. A. ); 1176th mtg. (Nigeria); 1183rd mtg. (Bolivia). 
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overrule the de jure situation 
... 
"28 
. 
However, such claim is not 
supported by State practice. In fact, a Government that has been in control 
of the territory of the State continues to be regarded as the established 
Government even if it subsequently has lost such control29 
. 
The 
Governments of Chad, Afghanistan (before 1979 ), Ethiopia, Angola and 
Lebanon did not cease to be considered as the "established" Governments 
of these countries during the long civil conflicts therein despite the fact 
that large parts of the territories of these States had passed under the de 
facto control of the rebels. 
The attraction of the impartiality theory seems to lie, instead, in the 
argument that active military assistance to the Government may 
constitute use of force against the political independence of the State 
because it may result in the violation of the right of self-determination of 
the people of the State30 
. 
Self-determination in this case is perceived as 
the "... right of a people to choose its own economic, social and political 
system 
... 
"31 
. 
Moreover, what this means is not that the Government of 
the State should be democratically elected, but, rather, that it should not be 
imposed by outside intervention32 
. 
However, the impartiality theory is subject to two qualifications. 
First, there must be no external assistance to the insurgents33 and, 
secondly, that assistance to the incumbent Government must cease only 
in cases where the outcome of the civil war is "uncertain"34 in the sense 
that there is a situation of widespread hostilities, as opposed to small-scale 
riots and disturbances, and the Government forces seem to be losing 
28 Q. Wright, 57 A. I. I. L. 112 (1959), p. 120. Wright admits one exception to his thesis, 
namely, that the de jure situation persists when the de facto government is installed as a 
result of external aggression. 
29 Doswald-Beck, 56 B. Y. I. L. 189 (1985), pp. 197-9. 30 See Hall op. cit. supra n. 10; Bonweit loc. cit supra n. 3, p. 42; Higgins loc. cit. supra n. 
10, p. 97; Moore, 9 Va I. I. L. 209 (1969), pp. 272-3; id. 13 Ga ). Intl & Comp. L. 191 (1983), p. 
196; Schachter, 82 Mich. L_R. 1620 (1984), p. 1641 et seq. ; 56 Ann. I. D. I. 119 (1975), 
Comments cited supra n. 10, Perkins loc. cit. supra n. 10, p. 184 et seq. ; Doswald-Beck loc. 
cit. supra 11.29, p. 244; EareT, 142 H. R. C. 297 (1974 II), p. 365; Akehurst op. cit. supra n. 3, p. 
185. Cf. Brownie Ioc. cit. supra it 2. 31 See Doswald-Beck loc. cit. supra n. 29, pp. 200-3. 32 Ibid. pp. 203-8. 33 E. Lauterpacht, 7 I. C. L. Q. 102 (1958), p. 106; Brownhe op. cit. supra n. 4, p. 327; id loc. 
cit. supra n. 2; Higgins loc. cit. supra n. 10, p. 94; Farer, 81 A. J. 1. L. 112 (1987), p. 114 but cf 
. id. 142 H. R. C. 297 (1974 11), pp. 365,370-1; Moore, loci citi supra n. 30; Article 2(3) of the 
resolution of the Institute of International Law, 56 Ann. I. D. I. 119 (1975), p. 133 and 
Comments by Chaumont and Skubiszewski cited supra n. 10; Perkins loc. cit. supra n. 10, p. 
192, but cf. pp. 194-5; Doswald-Beck loc. cit. supra n. 29, p. 213 et seq. ; Akehurst op. cit. 
supra n. 3, p. 288. 
34 Hall op. cit. supra n. 10; Q. Wright loc. cit. supra n. 10, p. 122. 
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ground to the rebels. It is this latter qualification that creates a lot of 
controversy as to the precise moment when a civil strife acquires the 
intensity that signals the advent of the purported obligation to desist from 
assisting the incumbent Government. 
The "uncertainty" of the outcome of the conflict advocated by Hall 
and Wright, simply begs the question. 
E. Lauterpacht has suggested the application by analogy of the 
criteria of recognition of belligerency, without, however, prior formal 
recognition of belligerent status to the insurgents35 
. 
Moore36 has articulated a set of criteria according to which 
assistance to the incumbent Government should stop if (i) the internal 
strife is aimed at the overthrow of the incumbent Government; (ii) the 
established Government " 
... 
is obliged to make continuing use of most of 
its regular armed forces against the insurgents, or a substantial segment of 
its regular military forces have ceased to accept orders 
... 
"; (iii) the 
insurgents have prevented the established Government from exercising 
its authority over a significant part of the population and (iv) a 
considerably high proportion of the population support and assist the 
insurgents. 
The draft resolution of the Institute of International Law 
approaches the issue negatively by defining what does not constitute a 
civil war. Article 1(2)(a-b) of the resolution provides that: 
.... 
2. Ne sont pas des guerres civiles au sens de la presente resolution: 
(a) les troubles localisees ou les erneutes; 
(b) ]es conflits armes entre les entites politiques qui sont separees par une ligne 
internationale de demarcation ou qui, pendant une duree prolongee, ont existee en fait 
comme des Etats, ni les conflits entre une teile entite et un Etat 
.......... 
37 
Fitzmaurice38 considers the threshold of cessation of assistance to 
the incumbents to be established when such assistance has the character of 
"rescue" of a "seriously endangered government" or when the incumbent 
Government is "'unrepresentative of the people". 
Moreover, all of the above views lead to the conclusion that 
assistance to the established Government is not prohibited at all times and 
some authority suggest that aid to the incumbents short of the dispatch of 
military forces to join in the fighting against the rebels is permissible, even 
35 Id. 7 I. C. L. Q. 102 (1958), pp. 104-5. 36 Id. 9 Va I. I. L. 209 (1969), pp. 275-6. 
37 56 Ann. I. D. I. 119 (1975), p. 132. 
38 Id. 92 H. R. C. 5 (1957 11), pp. 178-9. 
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during civil strife of the highest intensity39 
. 
Furthermore, the fact that the 
impartiality theory does not admit any assistance to the rebels appears to 
suggest that this theory operates in effect in favour of the incumbent 
Government40 
. 
Finally, claims for application of the requirements of recognition of 
belligerency are not supported by the practice of States. Recognition of 
belligerent status of insurgents has not occurred since the American Civil 
War, and in any case the criteria of belligerency could be unlikely to be met 
in contemporary internal conflicts41 
. 
The merit of the third theory is that it has placed issues of 
participation in internal conflict in the politico-strategic context of the 
"Cold War" that prevailed in international relations from the end of the 
Second World War until very recently. Its great disadvantage, however, 
lies in the fact that it totally ignores the rules of international law 
pertinent to the use of force by States in relation to material assistance to 
insurgents. 
The use of the derelict doctrine of recognition of belligerency as a 
starting point is, in the opinion of this writer, manifestly incompatible 
with Article 2(4) of the Charter and the principles of non-intervention and 
non-use of force. The practice of States in the post-1945 period suggests that 
any attempt at recognition of belligerency of insurgents ( that equates the 
insurgent community with a State for the purposes of armed conflict ) is to 
be treated as direct violation of the sovereignty of the beleaguered State. 
An illustration of this is the attitude of the overwhelming majority of the 
international community towards secessionist movements in other States, 
and, notably, the cases of the Biafran and Katangese secessions42. 
Of the three theories formulated by publicists, the first two appear to 
lay considerable emphasis on the position of the Government as the agent 
of the State, while the third aspires to subjecting the entirety of State 
representation to political, strategic and ideological concerns which are 
being dictated by antagonistic realities of international relations, such as 
the "Cold War". Emphasis on the status of the Government unavoidably 
links the whole issue of military action at the request of the Government 
39 See Moore, 13 Ga I. Intl & Comp. L. 191 (1983), p. 196; Doswald-Beck loc. cit. supra n. 29, 
pp. 221-2,244; Farer, 67 Col. L. R. 266 (1967), pp. 274-6; Akehurst op. cit. supra n. 3; Falk 
(ed. ), The International Law of Civil War, 1971, Introduction, pp. 22-3. 
40 See Farer, 67 Col. L. R. 266 (1967) ; id. 81 A. J. I. L. 112 (1987). 
41 See Bowett loc. cit. supra n. 3, p. 41 n. 9; Farer, 142 H. R. C. 297 (1974 11), p. 356; Doswald- 
Beck loc. cit. supra n. 29, p. 197 et seq. 
42 See Doswald-Beck loc. cit. supra n. 29, p. 197. 
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with the highly subjective and politicised concept of recognition43 
. 
Viewed from this angle the issue tends to become an intellectual exercise 
that avoids addressing the core of the problem of use of force at the request 
of the Government, namely, whether such use of force contravenes the 
existing rules of international law on unilateral resort to force by States. 
Doswald-Beck is right in principle to place the question of 
legitimacy of such use of force within the rule of non-intervention, rather 
than the concepts of recognition and self-determination44 
. 
But the 
existence or not of intervention appears to be precisely what is sought to be 
proven. It does not explain the reasons or circumstances of whether or 
when such use of armed force partakes the character of unlawful 
intervention and a violation of the rule of non-use of force. Is such action 
to be regarded unlawful intervention from the very first moment foreign 
troops are introduced in the beleaguered State's territory? It is submitted 
that this issue is best dealt with by considering instances of State practice. 
Consideration of Instances of State Practice 
. 
The practice of States reveals that first, the incumbent Government 
enjoys a far more privileged status than the rebels in the international 
community, and, secondly, any material assistance to the rebels constitutes 
a violation of the rules of non-use of force and non-intervention. It is also 
revealed that a request by the Government of a State for military assistance 
on the part of other States is expressed in order to suppress (1) an 
insurgency that is assisted from abroad by another State or States; or, (2) an 
insurgency that is of limited proportion in the sense that it is extremely 
localised or has the character of a military coup d' etat and (3) an 
insurgency that constitutes a large-scale popular uprising that involves the 
support of the majority of the population of the State or aims at the 
secession of part of the territory of the requesting State. 
The instances of State practice where request of the incumbent 
Government has been invoked in order to justify the dispatch of troops to 
another State are numerous. The present author proposes to review some 
of them. 
43 Moore, 9 Va I. I. L. 209 (1969), p. 278; Bowett loc. cit. supra n. 3, p. 42; Falk (ed. ) op. cit. 
supra n. 40, pp. 7,13-14; Farer, 142 H. R. C. 297 (1974 11), pp. 358-360. 
44 Id. loc. cit. supra n. 29, p. 207 et seq. 
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Hungary 1956; Czechoslovakia 1968; Af; hani.. tan 1979. The 
introduction of Soviet armed forces to these countries was justified as 
undertaken upon the request of their respective Governments. In all three 
case-, it was alleged that Soviet military assistance had been sought in 
order to counter external intervention and subversion in the affairs of 
these States3 
Lebanon 1958; Jordan 1958. The dispatch of U. S. troops to Lebanon 
and U. K. forces to Jordan was justified as made at the request of the 
Government-, of these States on the basis of allegations of subversion by 
the U. A. R. 46 
. 
Yemen 1962. The sending of U. A. R. troops to Yemen in 1962 was 
justified as undertaken at the request of the republican Government of the 
country in order to counter the royalist insurgents that were assisted by 
Saudi Arabia and Jordan4 
. 
The I)o, ninican Republic 1965 
. 
The U. S. action was justified as 
resorted to at the request of the local authorities in order to rescue U. S. 
nationals. During the debate at the Security Council the U. S. 
representative claimed the existence of Cuban subversion in the civil strife 
in the capital Santo Doming048 
. 
Con; o 1967. On 5 July 1967 a mercenary commando force landed at 
Kisangani (formerly Stanleyville), occupied the airport and attacked 
positions of the Congolese Army49 
. 
The Government of President 
Mobutu alleged that the mercenaries had been recruited with the support 
of Belgium, Portugal and Spain50. At the request of the Congolese 
Government Ethiopia dispatched units of its air force to the Congo to 
assist the Government repel the mercenaries51 
The Biafra secession 
. 
During the Biafra uprising in Nigeria, the 
French Government expressed po itical support for the secession, but it 
strongly denied that it provided the insurgents with arms51., 
. 
Moreover, 
on 22 and 24 Maj, T969 a squadron of Swedish-made aircraft under the 
command of aS edi-, h national launched a series of air raids on Federal 
45 See statements by the Soviet Government with regard to Hungary, S. C. O. R. 11th yr. 
746th mtg. paras 14-15,754th mtg. Para 45-51; with regard to Czechoslovakia, S. C. O. R. 
23rd yr. 1441st mtg. para 3; with regard to Afghanistan, 34 Ybk. of the U. N. 1980, p. 299. 
46 See supra Part Two, Ch. 9, Second Title, notes 96-102. 
4, Keesing's 1963-1964, pp. 19297-19300. 
48 S. C. O. R. 20th yr. 1196th mtg. paras 64-67,82,92. 
49 Keesing's 1967-1968, p. 22188. 
50 Id. p. 22189. 
51 Ibid. 
51a Keesing's 1969-1970, pp. 23161,23154-5. 
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airfields; the Swedish Government was swift in dissociating itself from the 
participation of any Swedish nationals in the fighting on the side of the 
insurgents against the Nigerian Federal Governmentslb 
. 
Zaire 1977. On 8 March 1977 a band of 2,000 former Katangese rebels 
crossed the border into Zaire from Angola. The Government of President 
Mobutu accused Angola, Cuba and the U. S. S. R. of involvement in the 
activities of the irregulars and upon its request Morocco dispatched 1,500. 
troops that assisted the Zairean Army to repel the invaders52. 
Civil War in Angola 
. 
During the long civil war in Angola (1976- 
1989) Cuban troops actively assisted the Angolan Government in the 
fighting against the rebel movement UNTTA that had been assisted by 
South Africa. In May 1977 the President of Cuba, F. Castro, stated that " 
... [W]e shall remain in Angola as long as necessary, with the agreement of 
the sovereign Government 
... , 
to contribute to its defence and to the 
consolidation of its independence against all threats of aggression from 
wherever they may come 
... 
"53. Moreover, the Agreement of 22 December 
1988 between the Republics of Cuba and Angola in relation to the 
withdrawal of the Cuban military contingent from the latter, provided 
that " 
... 
[T]he conditions have been created which permit the 
commencement of the return to its homeland of the Cuban military 
contingent now present in Angolan territory which has successfully 
fulfilled its international mission 
... 
"53bis 
Ethiopia 
. 
Cuban troops assisted the Ethiopian Government, upon 
its request, against the Somali irregulars that had been sent by the Somali 
Government in Ogaden in 197854, but did not take part in the fighting 
against the Ethiopian opposition during the long civil war in that country. 
The Cuban Government had regarded the civil conflict between the 
Ethiopian Government and the Eritrean secessionist movement (E. P. L. F. ) 
as an internal matter55 
. 
By contrast Soviet naval units assisted the 
Ethiopian Government in the bombardment of E. P. L. F. positions around 
the port of Masawa in December 197756. 
51b ]bid. p. 23648. 52 Keesing's 1977, p. 28397. 
53 Id. p. 28489. 
53bis The latter referred to the military assistance to the Government of Angola in the 
fighting against U. N. I. T. A. in collective self-defence. See 28 I. L. M. 959 (1989). 5 Keesing's 1978, p. 28760. 
55 Keesing's 1989, p. 37063. 
56 Keesing's 1978, p. 28994. 
Grenada 1983 
. 
In October 1983 the U. S. and Member States of the 
O. E. C. S. launched a military operation in Grenada that was justified as 
aiming at the protection of U. S. nationals and being undertaken at the 
request of the Governor-General of Grenada. 
Civil War in Mozambique 
. 
In 1987 army contingents from 
Zimbabwe and Tanzania assisted the Mozambique Government at its 
request in the fighting against the rebel movement RE. NA. MO. that was 
supplied with material assistance by S. Africa57. 
Chad. Chad is a State where outbreaks of insurgency have been 
frequent since the middle of the 1960s. On three occasions, in 1968,1983 
and 1986, French troops assisted Government forces in the fighting against 
the rebels which were supported by Libyan troops58 
. 
It appears that Libyan 
involvement on the side of the rebels played a great part in responding to 
the request of military assistance by the Chadian Government. By contrast, 
the French Government declined to assist the Government of President 
Habre in 1990 to crush a rebellion against its authority that appeared to 
have been mounted without any foreign assistance59 
. 
However, the U. S. 
Government alleged that the rebels had received Libyan financial support 
and on 3 December 1990 it refused to recognize the new rebel Government 
that had, meanwhile, overthrown President Habr660. 
Civil War in Sri Lanka 
. 
By virtue of clause 2.16 (c) of the 
Agreement concluded between the Governments of India and Sri Lanka 
on 29 July 1987, Indian troops that had been sent to Sri Lanka as 
peacekeeping forces in the civil war between the Government and the 
Tamil secessionist movement, took part in the fighting against the rebels 
at the request of the Government of Sri Lankahl 
. 
It must be noted that 
there was no evidence that the Tamil insurgents received any assistance 
from another State. 
The Phillipines 
. 
In December 1989 a military coup took place at the 
Phillipines capital Manilla that aimed at the overthrow of the 
Government of President C. Acquino. Upon the request of the 
Government units of the U. S. air force assisted loyal troops to the 
Government to crush the coup62 
_ 
57 Keesing's 1988, p. 35685. 58 See supra n. 46, notes 124-126. 
59 Keesing's 1990, p. 37907. 
6'O Ibid. 
61 Supra n. 46, notes 128-130. 
62 Keesing's 1989, p. 37120. 
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Rwanda 1990 
. 
In October 1990 the Government of Rwanda 
requested and received Zairean troops that assisted the Government 
forces in fighting a dissident force that invaded the country from Uganda63 
. 
It must be noted that the dispatch of Zairean forces was effected in 
execution of a mutual defence agreement between the two States and that, 
on the other hand, there was no evidence that the irregular force received 
any assistance from another country. 
State practice appears to be consistent in that requests for military 
assistance in order to suppress internal strife are positively responded to by 
third States where the insurgents are assisted by another State or where 
the insurgency creates imminent danger to the intervening State's 
nationals. In this case military action has been justified by reference to the 
right of self-defence or, in the opinion of this writer, proportionate 
counter 
-measures that are admissible exceptions to the rule of non-use of 
force. The same may be held with regard to insurgencies that have the 
character of localised disturbances or a military coup against the authority 
of the Government. 
By contrast, in situations where the insurgents do not appear to 
receive any assistance by another State, or if they do, but it falls short of 
being high-level support, (in the sense of provision of arms, training, 
logistical support or direct participation on the side of the rebels), State 
practice shows a tendency of declining to provide active military support 
to the incumbent Government. The positions taken by the Cuban 
Government in the civil war in Ethiopia and by the French Government 
in Chad in 1990 are illustrative. In these cases there was some evidence 
that the E. P. L. F. and the Chadian rebels received financial support by third 
States. At the same time, however, State practice is not conclusive that 
abstention from providing direct military support to the incumbent 
Government constitutes the rule 
- 
e. g. the Zairean military assistance 
rendered to the Government of Rwanda. 
In cases of secessionist movements or large-scale popular uprisings 
State practice is unequivocally in favour of the incumbent Government in 
terms of providing it with economic assistance and military materiel 
- 
e. g. 
the large-scale military and economic aid to the Salvadorean Government 
63 Supra n. 46, p. notes 131-133. 
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by the U. S. A. At the same time assistance to the insurgents is totally 
denied 
- 
e. g. the Biafra secession64. 
Direct military assistance to the incumbent Government, however, 
is not frequently resorted to in these cases but it is not to be ruled out as 
the Indian military assistance to the Sri Lanka Government illustrates. 
There is, in any case, some evidence to suggest that in cases of wide-spread 
popular insurgencies active military assistance to the beleaguered 
Government by third States may be regarded as an intervention in the 
internal affairs of the requesting State or as use of force against its political 
independence65. Doswald-Beck has argued that "... [A] technical plea of 
invitation is not considered to be the crucial point but rather whether 
there has in fact been an interference in the affairs of another State and 
with its people's total independence 
... 
"66 
. 
State practice reveals, in the opinion of this writer, that there is a 
very strong presumption in favour of the incumbent Government. 
Moreover, it becomes clear that the rendering of active military assistance 
upon request is in principle not to be discarded as impermissible ab initio. 
The fact that a request for direct military involvement is not heeded, does 
not imply conclusively that third States are under any a priori duty of 
abstention because otherwise the political independence of the requesting 
State will be violated. Such abstention, when it is manifested, rather 
appears to be on considerations of policy and not of respect for a 
prohibitive rule to introduce troops in a State upon the request of the 
Government67. 
It may be argued that the invocation of the grounds of self-defence 
and of protection of nationals to justify the dispatch of troops to the 
territory of a State in civil strife, reveals an opinio juris that advocates the 
inadmissibility of military intervention by invitation in order to put down 
an insurgency. 
Indeed, in the majority of instances of State practice the request for 
military assistance is based on considerations of self-defence and 
protection of nationals. This preference may be explained, first, as 
corresponding to the facts of the situation; namely, that the insurgents are 
assisted by another State or that the lives of the nationals of the 
intervening State are, in fact, in mortal danger. Secondly, the pleas of self- 
64 Supra notes 51a & 51b. 
65 See Doswald-Beck loc. cit. supra n. 29, pp. 222-238. ('f' Ibid. p. 239. This view comes very close to the absolute impartiality theory. 
67 See Garner, 31 A. I. I. L. 66 (1937), p. 68; E. Lauterpacht, 7 I. C. L. Q. 102 (1958), p. 105. 
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defence and protection of nationals may constitute evidence of a tendency 
in the practice of States to rely on grounds 'that preclude a violation of the 
rule of non-use of force ab initio 
. 
This is especially evident with regard to 
self-defence which constitutes the only universally admitted exception to 
the above rule. Such claims appear to preclude claims of illegality from the 
very first moment of introduction of foreign troops in the territory of 
another State. 
In a situation of civil strife (other than a national liberation struggle 
of colonial peoples), the use of force by the incumbent Government 
against the insurgents constitutes force in the domestic sphere of the State 
and as such it is not a violation of Article 2(4) and customary law. If this 
force is compatible with the rule of non-use of force ab initio 
, 
it is 
submitted that there is no reason why it should be inadmissible (ah initio 
) if it is exercised in concert with another State at the express request of the 
beleaguered Government. 
This submission is illustrated by the Judgment of the Court in the 
Nicaragua Case in respect of proportionate counter-rneasures against 
indirect use of force that does not amount to an armed attack67 
. 
The 
Court held that such action may be pursued by the beleaguered State 
indlv ididally onlyb7b 
. 
It is clear from the Judgment that the individual 
character of proportionate counter-measures is pertinent with regard to 
force used against the State that assists the insurgency; that is action on the 
international plane- It can also be inferred from the judgment that forcible 
measures against the guerrillas within the territory of the beleaguered 
State may be undertaken collectivelyh7c 
The point to be made is this: Protective action by way of counter- 
measures against an insurgency that is assisted from abroad is action on 
the basis of an exception to the rule of non-use of force. However, in this 
case the defence of the beleaguered State is consummated by the crushing 
of the insurgency- If military contingents of another State are sent to the 
beleaguered State at its request to fight against the guerrillas only, then the 
individual character of counter-measures is not violated because the 
concerted action c : curs within the territory of the beleaguered State and 
against an entity ` vhich i' not protected by the rule of non-use of force. 
67a See supra Part Two, Ch. 9, Second Title. 
f'Th See I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, pp. 110,127, paras 210,211,249. 
6ýlc ld. p. 126, para 246. 
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A breach of this rule could only occur as between the beleaguered 
State and the State that dispatched troops to assist it against the insurgents. 
This is not the case because foreign troops are introduced by virtue of the 
beleaguered State's consent and are not directed against it but against its 
internal enemies. If this line of action is admitted with regard to 
insurgency assisted from abroad, it is, however, executed within the 
domestic confines of the requesting State and it aims at the crushing of the 
insurgency, then this writer does not see why it could not be the same, as a 
matter of law, with regard to an insurgency unsupported by another State. 
It is submitted that, violation of the political independence of the 
requesting State (and, hence, a violation of the rule of non-use of force) 
may be the case, and, indeed, it has been the case, not because of an existing 
requirement of the law to abstain from rendering military assistance to the 
incumbent Government, but, rather, because the request of assistance, 
when expressed, is not genuine in its merits67d 
. 
Moreover, even if there is 
genuine request, the action of the assisting State may result, and it may 
result only ex nunc, in the imposition by the assisting State of a 
settlement of the internal strife according to its own political interests. 
This is illustrated by the attempt of the Belgian Government to 
justify the action of Belgian troops in the Congo in 1960 as undertaken at 
the request of the central Congolese Government as well as at the request 
of the regional authorities of Katanga68 
. 
The representative of Tunisia did not dispute the admissibility of the 
alleged consent by the central Congolese Government ( he did so with 
regard to the Katangese authorities ), but he 
, 
nevertheless, added that such 
request could not " 
... 
be used as an argument to justify generalised 
intervention which is aimed 
- 
and this is the most serious consideration 
- 
not at rendering the general assistance requested by that independent and 
sovereign State but at replacing its sovereign independent authority 
... 
by 
another authority exercising the essential attributes of sovereignty 
... 
"69 
. 
It 
is submitted that in such circumstances the use of force by the assisting 
State degenerates into force against the territorial integrity and political 
independence of the requesting State. 
67d Fawcett, 103 H. R. C. 347 (1961 11), p. 366; Hargrove loc. cit. supra n. 16, pp. 116-119 but 
cf 
. 
p. 121 et seq. 
68 S. C. O. R. 15th yr. 873rd mtg. paras 186-190. 
69 Ibid. para 209. The statement appears to imply that the Belgian action aimed at 
assisting the Katangese secession. Also see, statement by S. Schwebel, I. L. C. Ybk. 1979, Vol. 
1, Summary Records of the Meetings of the 31st session, 1538th mtg. p. 46, paras 12-14. 
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There is evidence in State practice that opposition to third States' 
military action which is purportedly undertaken at the request of the 
incumbent Government is considered a violation of Article 2(4) of the 
Charter and of the rule of non-use of force not because of a general rule of 
impartiality but, rather, because it is the request for assistance itself that, if 
relied upon, renders the subsequent military action unlawful. Thus, the 
dispatch of military forces by a State on the territory of another State on 
the basis of the latter's request constitutes an instance of unlawful use of 
force in the following cases. 
(1) That the request is not given freely and that it is the result of 
prior threat or use of force70. 
The Judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 
found that the consent of the Czech Government to the proclamation by 
Nazi Germany of the protectorate over Bohemia and Moravia in March 
1939 was given under the threat of use of armed force71 
. 
The dispatch of Soviet troops to Hungary on 4 November 1956 was 
justified on the basis of the request of the Hungarian Government. The 
Soviet claim was disputed on the basis of the facts. In the autumn 1956 
large popular demonstrations occurred in Hungary and on 23-24 October 
1956 fighting broke out. On 24 October 1956 Mr. Nagy became the Prime 
Minister of Hungary and it was announced that the Government had 
requested the assistance of the U. S. S. R. to restore order ( the appeal seems 
to have been made by Mr. Gero, the First Secretary of the Hungarian 
Workers' Party). On 1 November 1956 the Hungarian Government 
demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Hungary, 
repudiated the Warsaw Pact and proclaimed the country's neutrality72. 
Instead of withdrawing the Soviet forces in Hungary were reinforced and 
on 4 November 1956 they overthrew the Government of Mr. Nagy; the 
request for the intervention was apparently made by Mr. Kadar, who 
succeeded Mr. Gero as First Secretary of the Hungarian Workers' Party. 
The majority of the Members of the Security Council treated the Soviet 
70 See I. L. C. Ybk. 1979, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 112, paras 12-13; Ronzitti op. cit. supra n. 2, p. 
84 et seq. 
71 The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Proceedings of the International Military 
Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany, part 22, H. M. S. O. 1950, p. 429. 
72 See Cablegram dated 1 November 1956 from the President of the Council of Ministers to 
the Secretary General. Doc. A/ 3251, G. A. (ES-II), Annexes, a. i. 5, p. 10; also see statement 
by the Hungarian representative in the S. C. 
, 
S. C. O. R. 11th yr. 753rd mtg. para 61. 
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action as a violation of the sovereignty and political independence of 
Hungary, and of the right of self-determination of the Hungarian people. 
This view addresses the result of the Soviet action in Hungary, but does 
not explain why this result had occurred. Only the representative of 
France attempted to link the unlawfulness of the Soviet intervention with 
the purported request of the Hungarian Government. He stated that: 
" 
... 
We were told five days ago that the Hungarian Government had asked for this 
intervention. We already had misgivings on that point. Mr Gero may in fact have asked for 
the assistance of foreign troops in order to maintain himself in power, but the intervention 
took place after Mr. Gero had fallen from power and Mr. Nagy had succeeded him. The 
Nagy Government was thus from the outset subjected to foreign intervention which had been 
provoked by its predecessor 
.... 
... 
In any case even we had any doubts a few days ago 
... 
we have none today. The 
Hungarian Government, through the President of the Council of Ministers, has officially 
requested the withdrawal of Soviet troops 
.... 
... 
Foreign intervention is taking place in Hungary. This intervention is being 
carried out against the wishes of the Hungarian people and the Hungarian Government. 
All this has been made clear in Mr Nagy's communication to the United Nations 
... 
"73 
Moreover, during the debate at the Second Special Emergency 
Session of the General Assembly, the U. S. described the Kadar 
Government as a "small group of Soviet straw men" and then stated that 
" 
... 
we have seen no passage of government authority from one 
Hungarian government to another, only the creation of a puppet clique 
and the overthrow of a liberal socialist government responsive to popular 
will in its desire to see these troops go 
... 
"74 
. 
A similar situation occurred in Afghanistan in December 1979. The 
request for military assistance came from the Government of B. Karmal 
that took power after the violent overthrow of the Government of 
President H. Amin which occurred with the assistance of Soviet armed 
forces. During the debate at the Security Council the representative of 
Singapore stated that: 
" 
... 
The Soviet Union has argued that its troops are in Afghanistan at the 
invitation of the Afghan Government 
... 
.... 
Unless we assume that the late President Amin had suicidal tendencies, it is 
reasonable to infer that he would not have invited Soviet troops to enter Afghanistan in 
order to depose and kill him. 
After the coup against President Amin, the Soviet Union brought an Afghan, 
Babrak Karmal, from exile in Eastern Europe and made him the new President of 
Afghanistan. The important fact is that at the time of the Soviet intervention, Babrak 
73 S. C. O. R. 11th yr. 752nd mtg. para 117; 753rd mtg. para 76; see also para 48 (Belgium). 74 U. N. Review, Dec. 1956, vol. 3, No 6, p. 62. 
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Karmal was not part of the Government of Afghanistan and therefore had no authority to 
request the intervention of Soviet troops 
... 
"7' 
A more recent illustration of a request made by a Government that 
has assumed power as a result of the use of force by the purportedly 
invited State is the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on 2 August 1990. The Iraqi 
invasion was justified as being undertaken at the request of "... the Free 
Provisional Government of Kuwait 
... 
to assist it to establish security and 
order so that the Kuwaitis would not have to suffer. My Government has 
decided to provide such assistance, solely on that basis 
... 
"76 
Mr. Pickering, the representative of the U. S. A., treated the Iraqi 
justification in the following terms: 
" 
... 
while the Iraqi invasion was carefully planned and professionally executed, 
the Iraqis at one salient point made a serious mistake. Instead of staging their coup d' etat 
and installing this so-called Free Provisional Government before the invasion, they got it 
the wrong way around: they invaded Kuwait and then staged the coup d' etat in a blatant 
and deceitful effort to justify their action 
... 
"77 
(2) That the request for assistance is not really established but is only 
presumed 
. 
78 
This contingency involves questions of the existence of any request 
at all. 
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg found in 
relation to the incorporation of Austria in the Third Reich on 12 March 
1938, that the purported request of the Austrian Government for the 
Anschluss was in fact never made; instead the statement of consent had 
been prepared and delivered to the Austrian authorities by the German 
Government 
, 
and not the other way around79 
. 
75 S. C. O. R. 35th yr. 2187th mtg. paras 42-43. The representative of Singapore concluded 
that the Soviet action was a violation of the rules of non-intervention and non-use of force 
by reference to G. A. Res. 2625 (XXV) of 1970, para 44. Also see ibid. paras 87 (Malaysia), 94 
(Costa Rica). 
76 Statement by Mr. Kadrat, the Iraqi representative in the Security Council, S. C. O. R. 
45th yr. S/PV. 2932nd mtg. 
, 
reproduced in Lauterpacht & others (eds. ), The Kuwait Crisis 
- 
Basic Documents, 1997, p. 100; also see Press Release by the Press Office of the Republic of 
Iraq, London, 12 Sept. 1990, in ibid. p. 74. 
77 S/ PV, 2932nd mtg. in ibid. p. 100; also see statement by the representative of the U. K. 
, ibid. p. 101. 
78 See loc. cit. supra n. 70, pp. 112-3, para 14. 
79 Supra n. 71, p. 426. 
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A similar situation of total absence of consent is illustrated by the 
presence of the South African Army in southern Angola in 1975, prior to 
the declaration of independence from Portugal. The S. African 
Government claimed that troops had been introduced at the request of 
Portugal, that had been the administering power of the colony8o. The 
Portuguese Government denied that it had ever expressed any such 
requestsl 
. 
Total lack of consent is also illustrated by the Soviet actions in 
Hungary (1956) 
, 
Czechoslovakia (1968) 82 
, 
and by the invasion of Kuwait 
by Iraq (1990). 
(3) That the request has emanated from a body that is not the 
Government of the State 
. 
83 
A request for military assistance is vitiated if it is expressed by: 
(i) The political opposition to the Government or the authorities of a 
secessionist movement. 
(ii) Either of the opposing factions in a civil conflict 
, 
that have never been 
the Government of the State. 
(iii) A body that purports to be the Government of the State and has not 
yet established control over the greatest part of the territory of the State, 
and, conversely, a body that used to be the Government of the State but 
has lost control not only of the territory of the State but of the 
administrative executive machinery of government as well. 
(iv) A body or an individual that does not have the constitutional capacity 
in domestic law to make such request. 
State practice contains illustrations for all these instances. 
(i) Direct military assistance to the armed opposition of the 
Government of a State is generally thought to constitute a use of force that 
amounts to an "armed attack" against the State84 The fact that a response 
for military assistance to the opposition is inadmissible is illustrated by the 
Viet- Namese invasion of Cambodia in 1978 and the Tanzanian action in 
Uganda in 1978-79 that both resulted in the overthrow of the established 
8th S. C_O. R 31st yr. 1904th mtg. para 100. 
81 ibid. 1905th mtg. paras 87-88. 
82 See statement by the Czech representative in the S. C., S. C. O. R. 23rd yr. 1441st mtg. 
Para 162. 
83 Loc. cit. supra n. 70, p. 113, para 15- 
84 See supra Part Two , Ch. 9, First Title. 
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Governments of the intervened States and their replacement by 
opposition dissidents. Both the Viet- Namese and the Tanzanian 
Governments, however, expressly dissociated their actions from the 
armed insurgencies against the established Governments of Cambodia and 
Uganda. 
The inadmissibility of military action at the request of a secessionist 
movement is illustrated by the Belgian military operation in the Congo in 
July 1960. The action took place at the same time with the secession of the 
south-eastern province of Katanga 
. 
During the debate at the Security 
Council the Belgian representative claimed that the action in the Congo 
had been launched with the consent of the Katangese authorities85 
. 
To 
this the representative of Tunisia contended that: 
" 
... 
I should like 
... 
to question the legitimacy of the intervention of Belgian troops. 
In our opinion this intervention cannot be justified by a request for foreign intervention 
... 
made by a regional authority 
... 
"86 
(ii) In cases of civil strife that erupts after the overthrow of the 
established Government of a State and involves factions neither of which 
has ever been the Government of the State, military action at the request 
either of them has been characterised as unlawful. 
This is illustrated by the U. S. action in the Dominican Republic in 
1965. On 25 April 1965 the three-man junta that had governed the country 
since the overthrow of President Bosch, was itself overthrown by 
supporters of the former President 87. The supporters of President Bosch 
had the support of the Army, but not of the Air Force and the Navy 8s. 
On 26 April 1965 heavy fighting broke out between the two factions in and 
around the capital Santo Domingo and by 28 April all organised 
government authority ceased to exist 89. On the same day U. S. forces 
landed in the Dominican Republic. The operation was justified as having 
been launched at the request of the "local authorities"9o 
. 
It was, however, 
doubtful that such a request was ever made, and even if it had been made, 
neither of the factions was treated as the Government of the country by 
either the ß_. ß. S. or the United Nations 91 
. 
85 S. C. O. R. 15th yr. 873rd mtg. para 186. 
8, Ibid. para 209. 
87 Keesing's 1965-1966, p. 20813. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
90 S. C. O. R. 20th yr. 1196th mtg. para 67. 
91 Doswald-Beck, lo. cit. siIpra n. 29, pp. 200,228-230. 
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(iii) The third situation refers to conditions of heavy civil strife 
between the established Government and the opposition, at the early 
stages of a struggle for the position of Government within the State. 
The rule is that in these cases there is strong presumption in favour 
of the incumbent Government whose overthrow is being attempted. 
Therefore, the dispatch of troops to assist the rebels is treated with hostility 
and amounts to the position discussed under (i). 
There are certain cases, however, where the rebellion is launched by 
a part of the executive branch of the State, such as the armed forces, and 
rapid seizure of the machinery of government and the greatest part of the 
territory of the State is effected by the insurgents. It is submitted that until 
the former established Government is totally divested of all governmental 
functions and until the insurgents succeed it in these functions, direct 
military assistance to either side is of very doubtful validity. This is so in 
cases where the rebels take control of the capital, the main urban centres 
and the security apparatus of the State, and notably, where the former 
Government has been expelled from the territory of the State. 
This, however, cannot be ascertained at the very early stages of the 
civil strife. It is in this context where the practice of recognition acquires an 
element of abuse that may lead to different States recognising either the 
incumbents or the rebels as the Government of the State and furnish both 
of them with active military support with the danger of escalating the civil 
conflict into a major inter-State armed conflict. 
An illustration of this submission is the situation in the Yemen in 
1962 92 
. 
On 27 September 1962 the Royal Government of Imam 
Mohammed was overthrown in a military coup and Yemen became a 
Republic. The Imam escaped to Saudi Arabia where he set up a 
government-in-exile that was recognised as the legitimate Government of 
Yemen by Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Meanwhile, soon after the military 
coup a large U. A. R. expeditionary force was dispatched to Yemen in order 
to assist the republican Government that had been recognised by the 
U. A. R. as the legitimate Government of Yemen in the fighting against the 
Imam's supporters. 
For the next eight years great tension existed in the relations 
between the U. A. R. and Saudi Arabia and clashes between the armed 
forces of both States in Yemen threatened the outbreak of a major armed 
conflict. 
92 See Keesing's 1%3-1964, p. 19298. 
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A similar situation has arisen in the process of decolonisation. This 
is the case where the colonial power has relinquished the administration 
of the territory and has withdrawn, and fighting breaks out among two or 
more factions that aim at becoming the Government of the new State. 
Again, at the early stages of the conflict military assistance to any faction 
appears to be inadmissible until the point has been reached where on e of 
them professes the military capacity to establish control on the largest part 
of the territory of the State. 
This is illustrated by the situation in Angola following the 
withdrawal of the Portuguese colonial administration in 1975. 
Government power was contested by three rival liberation movements : 
the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (M. P. L. A. ), the 
National Front for the Liberation of Angola (F. N. L. A. ) and the National 
Union for Total Independence of Angola (U. N. I. T. A. ). Fighting broke out 
between the M. P. L. A. on the one hand and the F. N. L. A. and U. N. I. T. A. on 
the other in late April 1975 93 
. 
It was only after considerable military 
successes that the M. P. L. A. was recognised as the legitimate Government 
of Angola in February 1976 94. 
There is evidence that during the inconclusive period of internal 
strife ( April 1975-February 1976 ), the M. P. L. A. was assisted by a contingent 
of 3,000 Cuban troops. In March 1976 the M. P. L. A. Government of Angola 
defended before the Security Council the military assistance rendered by 
Cuba as the sovereign prerogative of Angola to request and receive foreign 
military assistance in the fighting against the 
opposition 95. However, the participation of Cuban troops on the side of 
the M. P. L. A. prior to its recognition in February 1976 created a 
presumption of unlawful intervention that persisted throughout the long 
civil war in Angola. On 31 August 1981 the U. S. A. prevented the adoption 
by the Security Council of a draft resolution condemning South Africa for 
a large-scale military incursion in Angola (codenamed Operation Protea ). 
The negative vote of the U. S. was justified on the basis of the assertion 
that the Cuban military presence in Angola was also responsible for the 
escalation of violence in southern Africa 96 
. 
93 King's 1975, p. 27497. 
94 Keesing's 1976, p. 27661. 
95 S. C. O. R. 31st yr. 1900th mtg. para 19; also see para 76 (Tanzania); S. C. Res. 387 (1976) of 
31 March 1976,4th preambular paragraph. 
96 S. C. O. R. 36th yr. 2300th mtg. para 48. There is, however, authority to suggest that once 
the M. P. L. A. was recognised as the legitimate Government of Angola, the presence of the 
Cuban troops therein would be legitimised only ex nunc and not for the period prior to 
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(iv) Uncertainty about the genuineness of the request by the 
Government of the State for foreign military assistance may arise due to 
the constitutional competence (according to domestic law) of the organ 
making the request, to express the will of the State in the international 
community. 
The issue has arisen in connection with the U. S. 
- 
O. E. C. S. 
operation in Grenada in 1983. The request for military assistance was 
claimed to have been made by Sir Paul Scoon, the Governor-General of 
Grenada. According to the representative of Barbados in the Security 
Council the Governor-General of Grenada was the sole legitimate 
authority on the island after the overthrow and execution of Prime 
Minister Bishop 97. 
The U. S. action was censured by the majority of the delegations at 
the Security Council as unlawful intervention and violation of the 
sovereignty of Grenada, but no views were expressed about the 
competence of the Governor-General to request military assistance. 
Subsequent literature on the events in Grenada cast doubt on the 
Governor-General's constitutional capacity to make such a request 98. The 
I. L. C. has treated the matter constitutional competence somewhat 
equivocally. It took the view that the issue is to be settled on the basis of 
"the rules of international law relating to the expression of the will of the 
State, not to mention the constitutional rules to which, in certain cases, 
international law may refer"99 
. 
In the case of Grenada the question is not so much whether the 
Governor-General could be constitutionally empowered to make a request 
for military assistance but whether he was competent to do so under the 
circumstances prevailing in Grenada in October 1983. It must be 
remembered that at that time there was a Government in Grenada, the 
one formed by the opponents of the deposed Prime Minister Bishop, that 
February 1976; see loc. cit. supra n. 70, p. 113, para 16; Quigley, 18 Univ. Miami inter-Amer. 
L. R. 271 (1986), p. 346. 
97 U. N. Chronicle, vol. xx, No 11, Dec. 1983, p. 19; Keesing's 1984, pp. 32614-5; Letter from 
Mr. Robinson to Prof. Gordon, 18 fett. Laaw wr, 382 (1984), p. 382; Moore, Grenada and the 
International Double Standard, 78 A. I. I. L. 145 (1984), pp. 148,156,159-161. 98 See Gordon & others, International Law and the United States Action in Grenada: A 
Report, 18 ]nt. Launfer 331 (1984), p. 345-351; Joyner, 78 A. I. I. L. 131 (1984), pp. 138-9; Vagts, 
78 A. J. I. L. 169 (1984), 170-1; Nanda, 14 Cal. W. I. L. I. 395 (1984), 412-4; cf. Quigley loc. cit. 
stipra n. 96, pp. 329-330. 99 Loc. cit. sigl-nra n. 70, p. 113, para 15. 
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had effective control of the country loo 
. 
It is also true that according to the 
Constitution of Grenada the Governor-General had largely ceremonial 
powers and that the State was represented by the Prime Minister and his 
Government ioi 
. 
Since there was a Government in office in October 1983, 
it seems that competence to request military assistance lay with that 
Government. 
Be that as it may, the fact is that in times of constitutional crisis a lot 
of uncertainty is created with regard to the genuineness of the plea for 
military assistance and it is to be expected that third States may not treat 
such request favourably 102. 
(4) That the request is given after the dispatch of military forces by 
the assisting State 
. 
An ex post facto request for assistance is inadmissible. This was the 
case in relation to the U. S. 
-O. E. C. S. action in Grenada in 1983 103. This is 
so because the dispatch of troops to the territory of a State without its prior 
consent constitutes a violation of the rule of non-use of force 104. 
A point, however, must be made clear. The dispatch of troops to the 
territory of a State may be contemplated and planned in advance. This is 
usually the case with regard to situations of protection of nationals abroad. 
It is submitted that if a decision to to intervene is taken but is not carried 
out prior to the request of the Government of the State, there is no 
violation of the rule of non-use of force los 
. 
Concluding Remarks 
. 
The state of the law with regard to the use of military force at the 
request of the Government of a State may be described as being the 
following. 
(1) Contemporary international law favours the incumbent 
Government of the State and not the insurgents. Thus, the incumbent 
100 Quigley loc. cit. supra n. 96, pp. 347-350; Gilmore, The Grenada Intervention, 1984, p. 
73; Davidson, Grenada, 1987, pp. 91-101; cf. Nanda loc. cit. supra n. 98, pp. 413-4. 
101 See supra n. 98. 102 See Brownhe ioc. cit. supra n. 2, pp. 501-2. 
103 See statement by the representative of Trinidad-Tobago at the S. C., U. N. Chronicle, 
vol. xx, No 11, Dec. 1983, p. 20; Keesing's 1984, p. 32616; Quigley loc. cit. supra n. 96, pp. 337- 
347. 
104 Loc. cit. supra n. 70, pp. 110-112, paras 5,10-11. Cf 
. 
supra n. 96. 
105 Quigley loc. cit. supra n. 96; for an opposite view see S. C. O. R. 19th yr. 1172nd mtg. para 
22 (Algeria). 
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Government may lawfully receive assistance short of actual dispatch of 
armed forces from other States whereas the rebels may not. 
(2) In case the rebels are provided with material assistance or with 
direct military assistance by another State then the beleaguered 
Government may lawfully be assisted by another State at its request. This 
assistance is rendered under the justification of self-defence or 
proportionate counter-measures. 
(3) In the case where the insurgency is not assisted by another State 
but is largely localised or of low intensity, then it is generally accepted that 
a State may assist by direct military force the beleaguered Government 
upon its requests O5bis 
. 
Controversy arises in the case of large-scale insurgencies that 
command popular support. It has been argued that the principles of non- 
intervention and self-determination lün of the people of the intervened 
State would render military assistance to the beleaguered Government 
inadmissible 107 
. 
It is submitted that although military action by States upon the 
request of the Government of another State has in a large number of cases 
constituted a breach of the duty of non-intervention and a violation of 
the principle of self-determination, this, was due to the manner that such 
militariv action was undertaken, rather than due to a violation of an 
existing rule of impartiality in cases of civil strife. 
While it is accepted in the practice of States that the request of 
military action by the Government of a State renders the use of force by 
another State lawful in principle, illegality is brought about by either the 
invalidity of this request or 
, 
even if the request is genuine, by the 
subsequent conduct of the assisting State. Both the U. S. A. and the U. S. S. R. 
made no secret of their geopolitical interests in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, 
Afghanistan, the Dominican Republic, and Grenada. Even if request of the 
Governments of these States had been valid, the result might have been 
the violation of their political independence. However, this cannot be 
ascertained ab inifi: n but only by examining the attitude of the assisting 
State in the period after the initial introduction of troops. 
See Statement by the U. K. representative (Mr. Sinclair) in the 1967 Special 
Committee on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations etc. U. N. Doc. 
A/A. C. 125/ S. R. 57, p. 5., 1967 B. P. I. L. 36. 
This is not the same as self-determination of colonial peoples. See supra Part One, Ch. 
6. 
ýýý' Doswald 
- 
Beck loc. cit. supra n. 29, p. 213 et seq. 
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Second Title : THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE UNDER THE PROVISION 
OF A TREATY 
. 
There have been cases of treaties that were concluded prior to the 
introduction of the United Nations Charter which conferred to a State or a 
group of States a general right of military intervention in another States 
. 
In this type of treaty belong the so-called treaties of guarantee which 
establish the "unidirectional" duty of one or more signatories "to do what 
is in its [or their] power to secure a certain object to the other party" 2. 
The objects of a treaty of guarantee vary and may include, the 
preservation of State's territory against external aggression, the 
preservation of a certain form of government within a State, the 
protection of international waterways; the assistance to a Government to 
crush internal rebellion 3. 
The unidirectional character of such treaties distinguishes them 
from collective self-defence agreements that are reciprocal in nature. 
Moreover, this type of treaty must be distinguished from treaties 
establishing regional security arrangements and from Chapter VII of the 
U. N. Charter. The difference between treaties of guarantee and the above 
instruments lies in the fact that the object of the former is exclusively 
consummated within the territorial confines of another State and not in 
relation to the entire planet or a designated geographical region. 
The post-1945 practice contains very few instances of conclusion of 
treaties giving a general right of military intervention 
. 
When Cyprus became independent in 1960 a Treaty of Guarantee 
was concluded between Cyprus, on the one hand, and Greece, Turkey and 
the United Kingdom, on the other. By virtue of Article I of the Treaty 
Cyprus undertook the obligation to ensure respect of its constitution, the 
provisions of which were the subject of the London 
- 
Zurich Accords of 
1959 (concluded among Greece, Turkey and the U. K. ) 4. Article II of the 
Treaty stipulated that Greece, Turkey and the U. K. would guarantee the 
independence, territorial integrity, the security and the fundamental 
1 See Oppenheim, International law, vol. i, 8th ed. by Lauterpacht 1955, p. 309; Brownlie, 
International Law and the Use of Force by States, 1963, pp. 318-320. 
2 Oppenheim op. cit. supra n. 1, p. 964; Diastein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, 1988, p. 
244. 
3 See generally, Oppenheim op. cit. supra n. 1, p. 965; Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 1. 4 See Ehrlich, Cyprus 1958-1967, Oxford 1974, p. 37. 
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provisions of the constitution of the new State. Finally, Article IV of the 
Treaty provided that: 
In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and 
the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or 
measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions. 
In so far as common or concerted action may not be possible, each of the three 
guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing 
the state of affairs created by the present Treaty. 5 
It is more likely that the right to resort to armed force under the 
provision of a treaty is stipulated on the basis of one of the exceptions of 
the rule of non-use of force. 
The Panama Canal Treaty of 1977 between the U. S. A. and Panama 
provides in Article IV(2) that: 
the United States of America shall have primary responsibility to protect and 
defend the Canal 
... 
6 
Finally, on 29 July 1987 the governments of India and Sri Lanka 
concluded an Agreement by virtue of which India pledged to ensure that 
its territory would not be used "... for activities prejudicial to the unity, 
integrity and security of Sri Lanka 
... 
"; according to clause 2.16(c) of the 
Agreement: 
... 
In the event that the Government of Sri Lanka requests the Government of India 
to afford military assistance to implement these proposals the Government of India will 
cooperate by giving the Government of Sri Lanka such military assistance as and when 
requested 
... 
7 
In so far as such treaties give a right of unilateral resort to force on 
the territory of the guarantied State, the question arises whether they are 
compatible with Article 2(4) of the Charter and the customary law rule of 
non-use of force s. Moreover, the character of of the latter as a peremptory 
5 382 L1. N. T. S. No 5475. 
6 16 1. L. M. 1022 (1977). 
7 27 I. I. I. L. 274-8 (1987). 
8 See generally, Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 1, pp. 320-321; Ronzitti, Rescuing Nationals 
Abroad Through Military Coercion and Intervention on Grounds of Humanity, 1985, p. 115 n. 
1. 
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norm of international law (jus cogens ) creates a very strong presumption 
against treaties of guarantee 9, 
If a provision of a treaty of guarantee is interpreted as giving the 
right to the guarantor power to resort to force unilaterally upon its own 
assessment of the situation, this inheres the implication that an act 
contrary to Art. 2(4) of the Charter is permissible by virtue of a treaty. 
As such a treaty of guarantee encounters two legal obstacles. 
First, Article 103 of the Charter provides that: 
In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United 
Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international 
agreement, their obligations under the Charter shall prevail. 
This means that such a provision in a treaty of guarantee must be 
untenable because of the obligation under Art. 2(4) of the Charter and that 
it can be fulfilled only if its application does not involve the use of armed 
force lo 
. 
The second obstacle is the character of the the prohibition of the use 
of force as a rule of jus cogens that renders such a treaty null and void 
because it purports to contract out of the customary rule of non-use of 
force 11 
. 
It is submitted that a treaty of guarantee may be valid in respect of 
international jus cogens and compatible with Article 103 of the Charter if 
the relevant provision that authorises resort to force is premised upon an 
exception to the general rule of non-use of force 12 
. 
Thus, Article IV(2) of the Panama Canal Treaty is premised on the 
right of self-defence and its concomitant requirements of necessity and 
proportionality. The Agreement between India and Sri Lanka is to be 
activated at the request of the Sri Lankan Government without India 
having the right to furnish military assistance on its own initiative. 
9 See Art. 53, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969; Nicaragua Case (Merits), 
I. C. J. Rep. 1986, p. 14, pp. 100-1, para 190; Beownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 
4th ed. 1.991, pp. 513-4; Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Lau? of Treaties, 2nd ed. 
1984, pp. 203-226- 
10 See Schwelb, Some Aspects of International Jus Cogens as Formulated by the 
International Law Commission, 61 A. j_f. L. 946 (1967), pp. 958-9. Incompatibility with Art. 
103 of the Charter does not imply the invalidity of the treaty. See Waldock, Second Report 
on the Law of Treaties, I. L. C. Ybk. 1%3, Vol. 11, pp. 55-6; Fitzmaurice, Third Report on the 
Law of Treaties, I. L. C. Ybk. 1958, Vol. II, p. 43. Contra 
. 
McNair, The Lain of Treaties, 1961, 
ff217-8. 
Brownlie op. cit. supra n. 9, p. 514. 
12 See statement by Sir Francis Vallat, I. L. C. Ybk. 1979, Vol. 1,1538th mtg. p. 38, para 38. 
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Indeed, even if a treaty of guarantee purports general licence of 
unilateral military intervention to the guarantor party, this can logically 
become operative only if the situation giving rise to the fulfilment of the 
duty of guarantee occurs in relation to the guarantied party which is the 
only party competent to invoke the relevant provision of the treaty and 
request the guarantor's assistance 13. 
It is not possible to argue that consent, once given, constitutes a 
compromise in perpetuity of the consenting State's sovereignty, when it 
subjects the consenting State to conduct which is contrary to the 
prohibition of the use of force and which becomes operative solely at the 
discretion of and determination of the guarantor power 13a. 
It is for these reasons that Article IV(2) of the 1960 Treaty of 
Guarantee of the Republic of Cyprus is very problematic. The above 
provision was invoked by Turkey in justification of its military action in 
Cyprus on 20 July 1974. It appears that the situation that provoked the 
Turkish intervention was the military coup of 15 July 1974 which was 
incited by the military Government of Greece and led to the overthrow of 
the Government of Archbishop Makarios 14 
. 
The Turkish plea of Article 
IV(2) of the Treaty of Guarantee was expressly disputed by the 
Government of Cyprus. Mr. Rossides, the representative of Cyprus in the 
Security Council, stated that: 
" 
... 
We are told that the justification is the so-called Treaty of Guarantee. Turkey 
says "I am using my right to intervene under the Treaty of Guarantee". Hence, the meaning 
of the Treaty of Guarantee must be made clear 
... 
... 
What does the relevant Article of the Treaty of Guarantee say about 
intervention? It says that in the event of a breach of the provisions of the Treaty the three 
guarantors undertake to consult together. And with respect to what? With respect of 
invading or attacking or using napalm bombs on Cyprus? No, with respect to representations 
or measures necessary to ensure observance... For to attack and to bomb is contrary to the 
Charter. The provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee do not provide for such attacks.... "15 
13 Oppenheim op. cit si&p a n. 1, p. 366. 13a See Doswald-Beck, 56 B. Y. I. L. 189 (1985), p. 246; contra 
. 
Necatigil, The Cyprus 
Question and the Turkish Position in International Law, 1989, p. 110. 
14 See statements by the representative of Turkey in the S. C. S. C. O. R. 29th yr. 1780th mtg. 
F aras 55,57-58; 
5 S. C. O. R. 29th yr. 1782nd mtg. paras 41-42. 
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Several other delegates disapproved of the Turkish action 16, albeit 
without expressing themselves on Art. IV(2) of the Treaty of Guarantee 17. 
The question of whether this provision entitles the three Guarantor 
Powers to resort to force in fulfilment of the guarantee has been a matter 
of controversy. Cyprus has consistently argued against the admissibility of 
the use of force under the Treaty. Greece has expressly denied that it had a 
right to resort to force under Article IV(2) 18 
. 
The U. K. appears to have 
taken the opposite view 19 
, 
while Turkey, as the events of July "1974 have 
shown, has considered that it has a right of military intervention. 
This author believes that Article IV(2) of the Treaty, as it is phrased, 
is incompatible with Art. 103 of the Charter and contrary to international 
jus cogens by virtue of Articles 64 and 71(2) of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention 20 
.A possible admissibility of use of force under Article IV(2) 
would have been conceivable if Cyprus had requested for military 
assistance on the part of Turkey. 
Furthermore, the Turkish action in 1974 begs some very interesting 
questions. Even if it is arguendo assumed that military intervention was 
indeed permissible under the Treaty of Guarantee, then Turkey has never 
explained satisfactorily why, instead of withdrawing after the restoration 
of the constitutional order on the island 21 
, 
which its action purported to 
achieve, it occupied one third of Cyprus; claimed that the 1960 
constitutional arrangements were inoperative; and allowed the Turkish- 
Cypriot community in the occupied territory to secede in 1983, thus 
impairing the territorial integrity of Cyprus which it has undertaken to 
guarantee. 
Indeed, this practice reveals a manifest contradiction, and hence 
inconsistency, with regard to a right to use force under a general guarantee 
provision which when resorted to destroys the very object it purports to 
guarantee 22 
. 
It, moreover, reveals the danger of abuse a treaty of guarantee may 
be subject to by a guarantor power, to the detriment of the guarantied 
16 See ibid. 1786th mtg. paras 50,55 (India); U. N. Monthly Chronicle vol. xi, No 8, Aug. 
- 
Sept. 1974, pp. "16 (U. S. A. ), 18 (Costa Rica, Austria), 19 (Australia). 
17 Only the representative of France stated that the Turkish action was in violation of the 
Treaty of Guarantee, see U. N. Monthly Chronicle loc. cit. supra n. 16, p. 16. 
18 S. C. O. R. 19th yr. 1097th mtg. para 169. 
19 Ibid. 1098th mtg. paras 66-68. 
20 Sinclair op. cit. supra n. 9, p. 225; contra 
. 
Ronzitti op. cit. supra n. 8, p. 133; Necatigil op. 
cit. supra n. 13a, p. 110. 
21 Cf 
. 
Polyviou, Cyprus, the Tragedy and the Challenge, 1975, pp. 69-70. 22 Ibid. pp. 72-3. 
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State, if licence is given for military intervention in relation to a wide 
spectrum of objectives, and this is left to the absolute discretion of the 
former 23 
. 
23 See Henkin, Comment in Ehrlich op. cit. supra n. 4, pp. 129-130; Dinstein op. cit. supra n. 
2, pp. 245-6. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this section is to present this writer's submissions on the 
current state of customary international law of the use of force by States, 
and attempt an evaluation of the influence of this law on the conduct of 
individual States in their international relations. 
The international law on the use of armed force is pertinent to 
States in their international relations. This is as true at present as it was in 
1945, when the United Nations was established, and prior to that date. 
Statehood is the main component of the international community and 
permeates contemporary international law. Furthermore, the concept of 
State sovereignty, the juridical manifestation of Statehood, continues to 
play a major role in international relations. State sovereignty, however, 
has come a long way to become subject to the rule of law that was 
generated through its exercise in the practice of States. The phenomenon 
of the use of armed force has been one of the most important areas of 
international relations where State sovereignty has been voluntarily 
subjected to the rule of law. 
Resort to armed force has constituted throughout human history an 
ugly and deplorable condition. It entails a manifestation of social 
individualism which is established on the premise that the promotion of 
the interests of a Member of the international community is effected by 
violent means through the destruction of part or the entirety of another 
Member of this community. 
The history of mankind is full of instances of resort to violence. It 
was, however, the immense destruction that came as a result of the two 
World conflicts of 1914-18 and 1939-45 that became the catalyst for the 
initiation of the current rule of the prohibition of the use of force by States. 
The two World Wars during this century and the mobilisation of 
scientific technology and industrial production as part of the conduct of 
armed conflict have expanded the ambit of "targets" of military action. 
These came to include, apart from the military capability of an opponent, 
its entire economic infra-structure as well. This contingency brought 
armed conflict to bear on the belligerent States as a whole, rather that 
solely on the contending armies on the battlefield. 
The repercussions of war on the totality of the State gave rise to the 
need of introducing some kind of restrictions upon the unlimited right of 
States to to resort to force in classical international law. 
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The establishment of the League of Nations in the aftermath of the 
First World War aspired to regulating "resort to war". In this sense resort 
to force remained legitimate but only as part of a procedure of which it 
constituted only the final stage. Peaceful settlement of disputes by way of 
arbitration, adjudication or use of the Council of the League, should 
always precede resort to violence. During this period, however, State 
practice evolved beyond mere regulation of resort to force to the total 
prohibition of armed force. The turning point was the conclusion of the 
General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National 
Policy, 1928, (The Kellogg-Briand Pact or the Pact of Paris). The Pact of Paris 
prohibited all resort to war except in self-defence. 
The reference to "war" in the text of the Covenant of the League 
and the Pact of Paris has been problematic. "War" as a term of art connoted 
a formal state of affairs, rather than strictly acts of armed force, and its 
existence was dependent upon the will of the disputing States. The practice 
of States, however, especially subsequent to the Pact of Paris, evinces a 
total prohibition of the use of armed force which culminated in the 
adoption of the Charter of the United Nations, and Article 2(4) thereof. 
This has set the pattern of contemporary customary international 
law which is submitted to be the following: 
1. Resort to armed force or the threat thereof is totally and 
unequivocally prohibited. This implies the following: 
1.1 The prohibition extends to threats of force. A threat of force 
exists if there is an explicit or implicit indication of the intention to use 
force by one State against another that is not factually premised on an 
exception to the rule of non-use of force. A threat of force must be treated 
as a violation of the prohibition of force by being viewed against the 
background of a specific dispute between two States and all relevant 
circumstances. 
1.2 The prohibition of resort to armed force is phrased in broad 
terms. As such it covers the use of force irrespective of a "state of war", 
and more specifically it entails the inadmissibility of armed reprisals and 
instances of resort to force by proxy of armed individuals that do not 
belong to the armed or security forces of a State. With the exception of 
political support and humanitarian assistance to armed bands any other 
material support is a violation of the rule of non-use of force if it is such as 
to amount to a direct link between the provision of materiel and the 
ability of the guerrillas to use force against another State. 
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1.3 The prohibition of the use of force applies to action by a State to 
deprive a colonial people of their right of self-determination. This is 
pertinent to two situations: 
1.3 (i). The administering Power which is debarred from adopting 
forcible measures, individually or in concert with another State, against 
the population of the territory that reveal a systematically organised 
attempt at destroying the colonial people's right to self-determination. 
1.3 (ii). Neighbouring States that assert a claim on the colonial 
territory irrespective of the wishes of the population thereof. 
By contrast there is no prohibition in international law that forbids 
a colonial people to rise in revolt against the colonial Power. At the same 
time this revolt is totally outside the sphere of international law and 
entitles the armed forces of the administering Power to defend themselves 
against specific instances of attack. What it does not entitle the colonial 
Power to do is to embark upon a policy of suppression that deprives the 
people of the the colony of self-determination. Other States may support 
the struggle of self-determination but short of direct military intervention 
on behalf of the insurgents or by providing them with material or 
financial assistance. 
The use of force on the part of a colonial Power with respect to self- 
determination is a use of force in "international relations" only as far as 
the conduct of the colonial Power or neighbouring States is concerned 
towards the people of the territory. The reverse is not the case. A revolt by 
the latter does not constitute force "in international relations". Finally, 
minority groups that do not qualify for the status of colonial peoples may 
become the target of State use of force provided that the territory where 
they reside is not under military occupation or in dispute between 
successor ethnic groups after the withdrawal of an administering Power. 
1.4 The prohibition of force refers to the territorial integrity and 
political independence of another State. This implies that: 
1.4 (i). The acquisition of territory or the creation of a State by way of the 
use of force by another State is unlawful. The practice of non-recognition 
since the 1930s constitutes evidence in customary law of this contingency. 
1.4 (ii). The phrase "territorial integrity and political independence" 
does not purport to restrict the rule of non-use of force. On the contrary, it 
must be read as referring to the territorial sovereignty of the State: 
Namely, the physical element of land, maritime, and air space, and the 
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political competence of the State therein. Thus, force is prohibited in the 
sense of mere violation of the boundaries of a State. 
1.4 (iii). The non-violabilty of frontiers extends to the inviolability 
of demarcation lines in territory disputed by two States. This development 
incurs the advantage of not subjugating the rule of non-use of force to the 
merits of a territorial dispute with respect to opposing claims of territorial 
sovereignty. 
1.5 The rule of the prohibition of force refers to armed force. Thus, 
political and economic coercion is in principle compatible with the rule of 
non-use of force. They can be harmful for the State they are directed 
against but this is not always discernible ab initio 
. 
It remains to be assessed 
in the course of such conduct. It is, therefore, more appropriate to view 
such policies according to the manner they progress, and it is better to 
consider them as instances of intervention rather than violations of the 
rule of the prohibition of the use of force. 
1.6 The prohibition of force extends to the promotion of the 
purposes of the United Nations (as they are stated in Article 1 of the U. N. 
Charter) by way of unilateral violence. Thus, claims of resort to force for 
the promotion of international peace or protection of the human rights of 
the population of a State, are unlawful in contemporary customary 
international law. 
1.7 The practice of States since the 1930s has upheld the prohibition 
of the use of force as a rule of customary law. This is manifested by the 
tendency, even by States intent upon violating the law, to justify resort to 
force by reference to exceptions of the rule of non-use of force. There is no 
instance in State practice that the rule of the prohibition of armed force 
has been abandoned in favour of the 19th century unlimited right of resort 
to force. Claims by a minority of jurists that the United Nations 
Organisation has been proven ineffective and that, hence, the prohibition 
of the use of force has in effect been repudiated are not shared by 
Governments. The International Court of justice in its Judgment in the 
Nicaragua Case pointed at this contingency and held that the rule of non- 
use of force was not only part of customary law, but also, a peremptory 
norm of international law (jus cogens ) 
The unilateral resort to force by States is not totally restricted. The 
law allows for exceptions to the rule of non-use of force. 
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1. Defensive Action constitutes the only universally undisputed 
occasion of unilateral resort to force. "Self-defence" has been presented, in 
the overwhelming majority of literature, as a general concept that entitles 
States to resort to force in protective action (should the necessity arise) 
which must be proportionate to the threat to be repelled. Little attention 
has been given to the precise factual situations that give rise to such 
action. 
Self-defence is admissible in cases of extreme urgency in which the 
violation of the law can be best countered by unilateral rather than 
community action. It is not a case of an a priori conceptual admissibility of 
unilateral forcible action irrespective of the degree of urgency and 
intensity of the situation that gives rise to it. Otherwise, there is the danger 
that States are recognised considerable freedom to rely on a theoretical 
formula which may be easily adapted to the facts of a situation instead of 
the other way around: Namely, that it is the factual situation on the 
ground that warrants or does not warrant a forcible response, its kind, its 
intensity, its being undertaken in concert with another State. The 
Judgment of the Court in the Nicaragua Case has dealt with the problem 
from precisely this angle. 
What is perceived as "self-defence" is an activity between two States 
that arises with regard to an actual use of force. Thus, the concepts of 
anticipatory self-defence and pre-emptive strike are inadmissible in 
contemporary international law. 
The fact that gives rise to protective action is the occurrence of a use 
of armed force. It is the latter that constitutes the centre around which the 
right of self-defence revolves. 
1.1 If the unlawful use of force against a State is of such magnitude, 
in terms of intensity and/or territorial scope, as to be prejudicial to the 
international standing of the State as a territorial political and economic 
entity, there exists a case of armed attach. Self-defence may be resorted to 
both individually and collectively according to customary law and the 
U. N. Charter (viz. Article 51)_ The extremity of the danger against the 
victim State is such as to excuse a breach of international peace of 
considerable intensity. 
1.2 By contrast, if the use of force against the victim State is not such 
as to pose a danger to its existence as a whole, then defensive action is 
lawfully undertaken against the precise source of the use of force. If the 
latter is situated on the territory of another State, then defensive action 
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must be carried out individually only. While the necessity of protection is 
acknowledged it is not such that must extend to the point of creating a 
serious breach of peace. This kind of action was labelled by the Court in the 
Nicaragua Case as action in proportionate counter-measures. 
1.3 With regard to collective self-defence, apart from the existence of 
an armed attack against the victim State, there must exist a statement that 
the latter is the victim of an armed attack and an express request for 
assistance. 
1.4 Defensive action is exceptional only and it must cease if the 
necessity that gave rise to it disappears or if the Security Council of the 
United Nations has adopted effective collective measures for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. 
2. State practice provides evidence of certain other grounds which 
are purported to allow for lawful unilateral resort to force. 
2.1 Protection of Nationals 
. 
It is doubtful that there is a general 
right allowing for the protection of a State's nationals abroad. This 
justification has been met with persistent objection whenever it was 
undertaken without the consent of the State where the rescue operation 
takes place. Unilateral forcible action for the protection of nationals has 
often been presented as self-defence. It is not an exercise of the right of self- 
defence due to the lack of the requirement of armed attack. It could be, 
however, as a de lege ferenda proposition, an exercise of proportionate 
counter-measures. This contingency should arise only in cases where 
violence is threatened against individuals that are associated with a State 
through a genuine link of nationality in order to coerce the State into an 
act or omission which is within its sovereign discretion to commit. 
2.2 Humanitarian Intervention 
. 
The resort to force on the territory 
of a State in order to protect its citizenry from gross abuses of human 
rights by their Government is unlawful by virtue of total lack of opinio 
juris in the practice of States. 
2.3 The Use of Military Force on the Basis of the Consent of the 
Government of a State in situation of Civil Strife 
. 
In such cases international law favours the incumbent Government but 
not the rebels. The latter are not entitled to any form of material assistance 
to pursue their armed struggle. 
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The provision of assistance by a State to the Government of another 
State in the form of economic aid and material supplies is generally 
considered to be lawful. 
Some controversy arises with regard to the dispatch of troops to the 
territory of another State at the invitation of the Government in order to 
assist it to suppress internal rebellion. Such action is generally considered 
lawful if the insurgents are assisted by another State. 
In the case where the rebels do not receive outside material support two 
situations must be distinguished: 
2.3 (i). If the insurgency is highly localised or of low intensity it is 
considered lawful to assist the incumbent Government to suppress the 
uprising. 
2.3 (ii). If the insurgency is wide-spread and commands popular 
support, then it is being argued by considerable authoritative opinion that 
active military assistance to the incumbent Government is unlawful as 
violating the principles of self-determination and non-intervention. 
This writer has suggested a different approach. The introduction of 
troops at the invitation of the incumbent Government is in principle 
lawful. This is so because the consent of the territorial sovereign deprives 
the introduction of troops to be violative of the territory of the requesting 
State. As such it does not breach the rule of non-use of force that refers 
only to external force in relation to the requesting State. The violation of 
the rule of non-use of force exists, rather, because of a defect of the request, 
or, even if this not the case, because of the subsequent conduct of the 
assisting State. The latter would consist of imposing a solution to the 
internal conflict against the wishes of the incumbent Government and 
beyond the terms of the invitation. 
2.4 Military Intervention under the Provision of a Treaty 
. 
So long 
as the licence to intervene which is embodied in the text of the treaty is 
premised on one of the exceptions to the rule of non-use of force there is 
no violation of the law. However, if the right to intervene is conferred in 
general terms and the putative intervenor is given a general mandate to 
judge the circumstances in which military action is to be undertaken, then 
there is violation of the law. Such contingency would amount to the 
effective abolition of the constraint imposed by the rule of non-use of force 
and a derogation from a rule of Jus cogens that would render embodying 
this right null and void. 
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International relations from 1945-1992 have witnessed frequent 
resorts to force and a tendency on the part of some States to pursue forcible 
action that appeared to disregard the constraints of the law. 
The main factors that caused resort to force during this period could 
be said to be: (1) The polarisation of international relations during the 
"Cold War" period (e. g. the U. S. and Soviet interventions in other 
countries). (2) The stubborn disinclination to accept change and relinquish 
colonial or mandatory administration of territories in Africa (e. g. the 
conduct of Portugal and South Africa). (3) The greed for political and 
territorial expansion (e. g. the actions of India in Goa, Indonesia in East 
Timor, Morocco in Western Sahara, Argentina in the Falkland Islands, 
Iraq against Iran, Iraq against Kuwait). (4) The promotion of economic 
interests (e. g. the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq). (5) The refusal to admit the 
creation of a new State in a specific region (e. g. the attitude of the Arab 
States towards the State of Israel). (6) The option of the new State to 
impose its existence and extract admission in the region on its own terms 
(e. g. the attitude of Israel towards the Arab States after 1967). 
The significant factor of the above situation is that use was made of 
concepts that are in principle exceptions to the rule of non-use of force. 
The practice of the States that have resorted to armed force constituted an 
attempt either at expanding the scope of the exceptions to the rule of non- 
use of force or simply using these exceptions as caveat to conceal policies 
of aggression. 
While the option for the exceptions rather than the repudiation of 
the rule of the prohibition of the use of force is implicit of the primacy of 
the rule, the abuse or broad interpretation of concepts such as self-defence, 
protection of nationals and State consent, may have the effect of eroding 
the rule of non-use of force. This is not the case for two reasons: 
First, the persistent objection on the part of the majority of the 
international community towards such claims has prevented them from 
becoming rules of customary law. 
Secondly, the States that themselves have resorted to force made 
opposite claims in upholding the law and the restrictive application of its 
exceptions when their politically rival States resorted to force. Now, this 
manifests a fundamental inconsistency of practice that prevents such 
claims from being consolidated as a rule of customary law. 
Moreover, the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua Case 
treated the phenomenon of the use of force in the context of the legal 
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claims of its authors (as opposed to claims of policy and "national 
security") and interpreted the exception of self-defence very restrictively. 
The combined effect of the overwhelming majority of State practice and 
the statement of the law in the Nicaragua Case is that the prohibition of 
the use of force is firmly established, unilateral resort to force is an 
exceptional circumstance and it should not be allowed to be destructive of 
general international peace. 
In 1945 the victorious Allies against the Axis established the United 
Nations Organisation in order to divest individual States of the 
instrument of armed violence and to constitute the use of armed force a 
means of community reaction against aggression. The advent of the so- 
called "Cold War" rendered the latter very important action of the 
Organisation unworkable in practice. At the same time the Kuwait crisis of 
1990-1991 manifested the power of the collective security machinery of the 
United Nations and may lead to optimistic forecasts of the future of the 
international community. The present author does not deem appropriate 
to speculate in that direction. 
What must be pointed out is this: Irrespective of the workability or 
effectiveness of the United Nations, the underlying factors of unilateral 
resort to force are and shall always be present. Unilateral forcible action 
when military, political, economic potency exists is a temptation that, 
sadly, has penetrated and often moulded the decision-making of many a 
Government. It is for this reason that a restrictive theory on the 
exceptional circumstances of unilateral resort to force becomes 
indispensable. For if force is to be used only in cases of the utmost 
emergency, then international peace and security will be served. The 
Unite Nations is an important means in that process but it is not an end in 
itself. In the latter case every failure, whether big or small, will be 
interpreted as impotence of the enforceability of the law at large. As such it 
may be used to persuade Governments of States to espouse the sinister 
option of unilateral resort to force in order to safeguard their interests at 
the expense of other Members of the international community. 
History reveals that such conduct is detrimental to its perpetrator 
politically and sometimes materially, whether it be a great or a weak 
Power: The experience inflicted upon Nazi Germany, pre-1945 Japan and, 
forty-five years later, on Iraq, illustrates this point. The political damage 
done to the U. S. A. and the Soviet Union because of their interventions 
has been considerable. Portugal and South Africa have been the political 
480 
pariahs of the international community for a long time. Israel has not 
found peace and security throughout its forty-four years of existence 
despite several attempts at securing its acceptance in the region by way of 
unilateral resort to force. 
It is also detrimental to the international community as a whole. 
An armed conflict between two States can degenerate quickly into a 
conflict involving a great number of States. Inter-State commerce, the 
environment, the human rights of individuals are often victim of 
initiation of violence. Armed force as an instrument of national policy is 
the vehicle of inflicting upon another State or States one's own perception 
of how things ought to be. It is the hope of this writer that the experience 
of the past forty-five years and especially of the Kuwait crisis shall 
function as an impediment on intentions of pursuing one's own interests 
by way of the use of force. 
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